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1ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the sedentarization of bedouin nomads in Saudi
Arabia: partly in general, but mostly focussing on a particular region
(Sajir) which was studied in the field.
Our approach emphasizes that such bedouin communities were never
self-contained, but rather an integral part of their regional and
(latterly) national setting.	 Their integration has been crucially
affected by broader processes: early political changes, development of
the oil-based national economy, and recent rural policies (not all
targeted specifically at bedouin). Moreover, we show how the bedouins
themselves, far from being passively shaped by these pressures, have
actively taken advantage of their opportunities and thus internalized
these broader developments.
Particular attention is paid to the settled agricultural alternative,
with its associated land reforms and development programmes. 	 More
broadly, the heritage and shifting meanings of "bedouinism" are
scrutinized in this context of rapid change.
To these ends, the early chapters aim to: 1) Develop theoretical
framework on nomads and sedentarization from the relevant literature
(mostly authropological); 2) Review and evaluate previous studies of
the sedentarization of Saudi nomads in particular; and 3) Give a
comprehensive overview of the Saudi agricultural sector as a whole,
thereby assessing its land reforms and development programmes.
The latter four chapters report observations gathered from fieldwork in
Sajir. These examine this comunity's sedentarization patterns, their
11
present mix of agricultural and pastoral activities, and some of the
specific socio-economic factors operative in the region.
The main conclusions of the thesis emphasize:
1) The strength of bedouin integration (politically, socially, and
economically) into the national context;
2) The unbalanced and differentiated nature and consequences for
the bedouin of national land and agricultural policies;
3) The definitive impact of recent transformations of the rural
econony on traditional bedouin occupations and livelihood; and
4) The continuing active (if changing) role of a specifically
bedouin identity and ideology within the comunity.
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Glossary
Aamarah: Literally the upper part of the human torso (chest
and neck), a sub-tribe or a maximal lineage in the
Arab tribal organisation.
Al-badawah:	 Pastoral Nomadism, the economic activity of the
bedouin nomad.
Al-Bait:
Al-Satin:
Al-dalal:
Baal:
Dirah:
Fakhath:
An individual household, or family.
Literally abdomen, a clan or major lineage of the
tribal organisation.
Literally auctioneer, the traditional marketing
agent for a variety of goods.
Dry peasant farming in Najd.
A traditional tribal territory
Literally thigh, a minor lineage of the Arab tribal
organi sati on.
Falah:	 Farmer, connoting peasant agriculture.
Al-hadharah:	 Sedentarism, civilisation or sedentary production
(adjective Hadhar).
Hadith:
Hadj:
Hamulah:
Hema:
Hijrah:
I g gt:
Ikhwan:
Imam:
I qta:
Jihad:
Prophet Mohaniied's sayings (Peace be upon him).
The pilgrimage to Meccah.
A group of related kin, sometimes represented by the
term minimal lineage.
Protected tribal grazing territories.
Bedouin settlement (plural Hujar)
A traditional snack, made with thickened milk and
served with tea.
Moslem brothers, the bedouins who espoused the
Wahabi ideology, settled in agricultural
comuriities, and fought for the cause (1912-1930).
The leader of the Moslem community, or the leader of
the prayers in the Mosque.
Land grant and donation.
Literally holy war, the struggle waged by those who
espoused the Wahabi reTigious movement and fought
for its spread.
xviii
Khalifa:
Mawat:
Mujahidin:
Mulk:
Mushaa:
Muzaraa:
Qabilah:
Al-rashash:
Shariah:
Sunna:
Ui ama:
Wanit:
Waqf:
Commonly called Caliph in English. The leader of
the Moslem community after the death of the Prophet.
(Plural Khulafa).
Literally dead land.	 Uncultivated and unutilised
land.
Holy warciors.	 The people who engage in Jihad or
holy wars.
Privately owned land.
Unutilised and unowned land, open for utilization.
Farmer, connoting modern agriculture.
The mother tribe, or the macro level of the Arab
tribal organisation.
Literally sprinkler, the local name for a central
pivot irrigation system.
The Islamic Law.
The deeds and actions of the prophet.
The religious leaders and scholars.
Small pick-up truck.
Religious endowments.
1.
Introduction (1)
1. Themes In the Study of the Saudi Nomad
The Arab bedouin, and the nomads of the Peninsula have been an object
of fascination and study for travellers, historians and anthropologists
since early times. The extremely inhospitable nature of the deserts in
the interiors of the Peninsula; the perceived symbiosis between the
nomads, their environment and their animals; as well as the images of
autonomy and freedom that this life is supposed to bring to these
tribally organized people, all have contributed to this fascination and
to the reproduction of perceptions and images that continue to affect
the study of nomadism until present times.
The Saudi beclouin and nomadic sector have also been an object of
attention in contemporary times because of four factors:
A	 The Saudi pastoral sector constituted one of the largest
nomadic conuiiunities of the contemporary world, and it was
often perceived as constituting a relatively permanent
feature of the region, until very recent times. The Saudi
nomadic bedouins, therefore, represent in the minds of many
writers the closest approximation of the Arab tribally
organised nomadic people.
B	 The Saudi bedouins have had a very significant and formative
role in the creation of the Saudi central state. This role
has been vital to the spread of Al-Saud's authority and
control over the areas outside the central region of Najd.
2Despite the fact that this role has been mostly confined to
military conquests and had only lasted from 1912 to 1930
(when the Ikhwan bedouin army was defeated and dispersed), it
remains symbolic of a fascinating period in the short history
of Saudi Arabia, in which the basic fundamentals of the
modern state were constructed and formulated. Such
fundamentals include the ideological basis of the state (the
Wahabi Unitarian movement), and the relationship of the
modern state to the traditional elements of the society it
had unified in the early decades of the twentieth century.
C The Saudi bedouin sector, furthermore, has a significance
that is derived from the fact that there is an observable
relationship between the state's ideals, ethos and practices
and those originating in the traditional tribal structures of
the Peninsula.	 The Saudi bedouin sector, moreover,
represents to many observers the closest link to these
ideals, ethos and practices. Some of these tribal
manifestations, moreover, remain operative in the Saudi
modern society, even at present.
D	 The sedentarization process of the Saudi nomad, especially in
the early period, represents a unique case of nomad
settlement in contemporary times. That period, which
resulted in the creation of the Ikhwan army, saw an
overwhelming push for settlement on the part of the bedouins
unequalled before or since in Saudi history. Settlement in
this early period was due to a policy of ideological
intervention, based on converting the bedouins to the Islamic
principles of the Wahabi revivalist movement and persuading
3them to settle in agricultural comunities. The success of
this policy is seen as representing the single most important
factor facilitating the state's triumph over the traditional
political divisions and strifes in the Peninsula. Even after
the dissolution of the Ikhwan bedouin force, and the official
proclamation of Saudi Kingdom (1932), the incorporation of
the bedouin (at least politically) remained an important
element on the national agenda for stability and integration.
This was manifested in a persistant, but mostly low profile,
policy for encouraging the bedouins to settle in agricultural
comunities. Two of the best known governmental schemes to
settle the nomads are the Wadi Sirhan (in the 1950s), and the
Haradh (in the 1960s) agricultural projects. The two
schemes, however, were largely unsuccessful in achieving
their goals.
The above four areas of significance surrounding the Saudi nomadic and
bedouin sector have been largely the areas of interest and focus that
writers have accorded to the nomadic and bedouin sector of Saudi
Arabia. So the bedouins have been studied as cases of pastoral nomadic
groups by anthropologists; as part of a political process in the
creation of a national state and identity by historians and political
scientists; and as a vital ingredient in the development process of the
country by various other social scientists.
One of the most important features of the study of the Saudi bedouins
has been to sometimes perceive them as a separate sector, with next to
no ties to the city or the sedentaries. This image is unwarranted by
both general anthropological accounts of nomadic people as well as in
the factual consideration of the region's historical and current social
formation. It is also misleading in the analysis of the political and
social development occuring in the Kingdom, as well as to the
understanding of the relationships forged between the leaderships of
the traditional elements, i.e. religious and tribal (nomadic and
sedentary), and the emerging state. These relationships have been most
influential in the development of the nation as a who)e, as we)) as
within the rural sector. The tendency to see the bedouins as a
separate and uniform sector that stands distinct from sedentary farmers
and urbanites politically, economically and socially is an unfair and
sometimes misleading assumption that bears little relationship to the
developments affecting the bedouins in the urban and rural settings.
Another feature of the analysis of the Saudi bedouin, which is an
extension of the previous one, has been to concentrate primarily on the
sector as an object and a target for deliberate policies, that have
special goals. This analytical viewpoint is justified in so far as
long episodes of Saudi history have indeed seen the nomadic sector as a
prime target for political and social change (i.e. the Ikhwan
settlement scheme as a military force for political expansion, and
modern agricultural schemes for the economic incorporation of the
nomads). These policies, furthermore, have had profound effects on the
development of the nomadic sector in so far as agricultural production
and settlement were encouraged among the bedouins, and pastoral
production discouraged and underdeveloped.
Nonetheless, the time has come for the study of the Saudi bedouin to
5take a different form. One that springs from a precise knowledge of
the sector's place in the historical formation of the Peninsula, its
role in the formation of the contemporary state, the political and
economic landmarks in the national developments affecting it, and most
importantly how these developments have affected the internal
composition of the sector, not only in terms of direct policies
affecting the nomads only, but also in terms of national policies for
rural development formulated at different stages in Saudi history and
implemented in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, we need to look at
the nomadic sector as an integral part of the national setting, and
more particularly of the rural and agricultural sectors.
In adopting this approach to the study of Saudi bedouin we hope to
avoid the simple generalisations of cause and effect, the temptation to
view the nomadic sector as a uniform economic and social entity that is
totally distinct from that of the sedentary agriculturalists and
urbanists, and the consequent oversimplifications of the transformation
process affecting the bedouin population and productive forces.
2. Focus and Alms
This thesis focuses on the studied bedouin comunity and the
sedentarization process as an integral part of the regional setting,
and the rural sector and its development. Three factors underlie the
justification for this focus.
6A-
A significant portion of the anthropological accounts of nomadism and
nomadic populations advocate an approach to the study of the nomads
from within their status in, and relationships to, the outside world.
In other words, the socio-political developments in a nomadic society
are very largely determined by its relationships to the national
(regional) political	 and economic setting, and the individual
particularities of the latter. In adopting this approach. this study
distances itself from the alternative perception that the integration
and the development of nomadic societies in a wider context is mostly a
function of their internal political, economic and social
peculiarities. This latter approach, which emphasises the difference
between the nomad and the sedentary, is wholly unjustified for
contemporary nomadic societies, and more particularly for the Saudi
nomadic sector.
B-
While there is a need to study the specific processes of
sedentarization and change affecting the Saudi nomadic sector, as a
result of particular policies adopted in the past regarding their
soclo-economic organisation (either through a national settlement
scheme or local agricultural projects), a more significant area for
study presents itself in the present decade. One that is a natural
progression of the previously studied facets of social change affecting
the bedouins - namely the nature of the bedouins' involvement in
agricultural production, and how settlement and alternative economic
opportunities and activities have affected their traditional pastoral
production.
The study of the agricultural sector, moreover, can promote a fuller
7and clearer understanding of the sedentarization policies on the one
hand, and the modes of bedouin integration on the other. Significant
additional aspects of the process of change experienced by the bedouin
comunities become crystalised with this focus. These include the
following:
1 The Land Reforms and Policies: These reforms have been one of the
first aspects of the economic policies affecting the nation at large
and the nomadic sector in particular. The reforms began with the 1925
law abolishing the tribal dirahs (collectively owned tribal land), and
culminated in the 1968 Public Land Distribution Ordinance. The land
reforms and distribution policies are vital to the understanding of the
sedentarization process, as well as to the eventual developments in the
agricultural sector in the 1970s and the 1980s. Moreover, they played
a major part in the reconstruction of the rural social structure, not
only in terms of land ownership and agricultural production, but also
by creating regional differentiation within the sector and encouraging
investment from outside it.
Another, equally important, aspect of the land distribution policies
has been in land donations and grants outside the confines of the
bureaucratic procedures of the 1968 ordinance. Such land donations
have been practised since the early stages of Saudi history; and are
through direct royal land grants to particular tribal groups or
individuals. Land distributions of this kind originate from the
traditional and Islamic rights of the ruler or Irnam, and are usually
politically motivated.
8Both of the two types of land distribution practices - originating from
bureaucratic official procedures and traditional land grants - are
highly significant to bedouin comunities. In the first case because
it allows the bedouins to acquire private land, when they have lost
their collective traditional rights to their dirah, and in the second
case because a significant number of important tribal groups have been
fortunate to receive royal land grants through Iqta (traditional land
donation) to their areas of settlement, or to unutilized land.
The existence of these two processes of land distribution within the
rural sector has had wide ranging consequences for the present patterns
of land ownership, because they have differing rationality,
differential land distribution practices (in terms of size) and
differing potential for agricultural productivity. This is more
particularly clear among the bedouins, because in most cases the
comunity is new to landownership and to agricultural production.
2 The Policies for Agricultural Development: The end of the 1960s
marked the culmination of the land reform in its established
bureaucratic form (the Public Land Distribution Ordinance of 1968).
The next decade marked the start of a developmental programe for the
agricultural sector. This process started with the first subsidization
programme for agricultural machinery in 1973. Subsidisation continued
vigorously to the end of the decade, and included many of the necessary
aspects of modern farming like machinery, poultry and dairy equipment,
fertilizers, tree planting, and water systems. The high point of the
subsidisation programmes has been in the wheat output price support of
1979, which guaranteed the wheat producers a price of more than five
times that paid for imported wheat. 	 This high level of wheat
subsidisation continued well into the early years of the 1980s (in 1984
9the price support was reduced); and it was extremely significant to the
developments affecting agricultural investment and production.
The agricultural development programe of the 1970s has been motivated
by a need to bring the hitherto isolated and traditional sector into
more modern patterns of production, and towards better productivity.
Furthermore, it was designed to stimulate growth and halt the
increasingly diminishing role of agriculture in the national economy.
Some of the other aims of the agricultural developmental plan were to
stimulate the investment of the private sector turban and rurafl into
agricultural production, to raise the standard of living among the
rural population, and to diversify the economy away from its oil
revenue base.
The combination of land policies with the agricultural ones have been
vital to the sedentarization process in the 1970s and the 1980s, in
terms of i) encouraging settlement, ii) encouraging agricultural
investment and iii) defining what constitutes sedentary agricultural
production. It has also been generally instrumental in constructing
the national patterns of landownershfp, types of agricu?urar
investment, and patterns of production.
It seems, therefore, imperative that we gain a good understanding of
the	 agricultural	 sector	 in	 all	 its	 dimensions	 (physical
characteristics, resources, productivity and population), as well as of
the relevant policies affecting it before we venture to study
settlement among bedouin communities.
C-
Another justification for focusing on the sedentarization process as an
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integral part of the regional setting and of rural development arises
from the suitability of this focus for a thorough empirical approach,
and the necessity of the latter approach to the study of Saudi society
and population at the present stage of the country's development.
Most of the previous theoretically based studies of the Saudi nomad
have seen the dynamic for the process of change and sedentarization as
arising from outside the sector, and more particularly in the political
changes occuring in the kingdom; i.e. the centralization of power, the
changes affecting the ideological basis of political integration, and
the effects of specific policies on the social organisation of the
bedouin.
This particular approach is relevant and justified in so far as it is a
first step in understanding nomadic social change. It can, however,
lead to narrow and often unsubstantiated views. To demonstrate this
point further we might take the issues concerning sedentarization and
'detribalisation' as a case In point.	 Some writers perceive guided
nomad sedentarization as a policy of detribalisation (A. Asad,
Al-Fiar), others see the early hijar scheme and the defeat of the
Ikhwan as a landmark and an impetus for a detribalisation process
(A.Said). In both of these views, it is assumed that a) tribalism is
confined to the nomadic bedouin sector, b) tribalism of any shape
cannot exist under strong central government, and c) the Saudi state
has not maintained any aspect of the tribal structure, but sought to
eradicate it completely.
The above three assumptions are at best unsubstantiated in the Saudi
case. In fact other writers take somewhat of an opposing view, even at
the political level. For example Niblock sees the Saudi political
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system as operating through an alliance between the 'modern 1 forces and
the 'traditional' ones, with both seeking common goals.	 The way in
which the traditional forces maintained their effectiveness within the
modern society was through obtaining political and subsequently
economic strength throughout the process of development. 	 Niblock,
furthemore, specified the religious leadership and the tribal
leadership as two of the partners in this alliance.
Another approach, not very different from Niblock's is presented by M.
Abir. He sees the Saudi regime as an oligarchy, whose cornerstone is
the principle of consultation and concensus. 	 The senior partner of
this tripod political structure is the Royal family, while the leading
religious leaders on the one hand, and the tribal sheiks and the
members of the regional leadership on the other, constitute the second
and third legs of the political system. Abir, however, states that the
influence of the two last groups (i.e. religious leaders and tribal and
regional leaders) has declined significantly since the modernisation of
the kingdom has gained momentum, especially within the governmental
organisation and the economic structure.
To take the above three views in perspective, we could say that even
when certain assumptions are formulated on the strength of obvious
political developments, they are by no means absolute, nor unqualified
truths. Hence, even if we accept that the traditional elements of the
society (political and economic) are being eroded by new forms of
political and productive organisation, 	 we cannot assume that the
traditional social groupings have had no benefit from, role in, or
influence over the new directions and developments that the society has
undertaken.
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A similar form of confusion has been between analyses that deal with
sectors of the economy and those concerned with social groupings. So
when the pastoral sector is perceived as being eroded by particular
policies, more profitable sectors of the econonly, or by a gradual
process of sedentarisation among the bedouin; then it is assumed that
the Saudi bedouins are homogeneously marginalised and impoverished
social groupings.	 Yet this cannot be totally true if some of the
tribal groups and their traditional leaders have had a degree of
involvement in the new political structures.
To return to the sedentarization and detribalisation issues, we must
therefore distinguish between the centrally institutionalised tribalism
that allows the tribal leadership (sedentary and nomadic) political and
economic significance in order to neutralise its effectiveness, and the
tribalism which offered the individual full membership in a dynamic and
effective political, economic and social structure. "Detribalisation",
by the same token, must not be taken as given because of certain
political or economic developments (i.e. centralisation of political
power, decline of pastoralism or a sedentarization process).
Theoretical	 generalisatlons	 and	 conclusions,	 furthermore,	 are
meaningless unless they can be observed in actual and living
situations, and are perceived to have particular results and effects.
This type of empirical testing and analysis is unfortunately embryonic
in the material about the Saudi society and population. 	 Empirical
analysis, furthermore, brings out the various complexities of a case,
and points out any other operative factors in a particular situation.
This is badly needed in the study of the Saudi nomad (as well as in
other areas) and the sedentarization process, because we need to
discover the bedoulns' true status within the modern Saudi society.
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In so doing we may demonstrate some of the accepted hypotheses about
the Saudi nomads; but we may also dispell some of the myths regarding
their distinctive status, and observe their modes of integration within
the national economy in all possible dimensions.
This thesis, therefore, aims at first hand study of the modes of
integration of the studied bedouin community in the rural setting.
This will be through direct observations, as well as by a number of
interviews with sedentarized bedouins who are farming at present.
Moreover, our approach not only emphasises the relationship between
this process of integration and the national soclo-economic
developments, but also stresses how these developments have been
operative within, and utilized by, the studied bedouin community. This
may have occurred within a pastoral, semi-pastoral or settled context.
This in effect means that this study initially follows in the footsteps
of previous studies of the Saudi nomads, which sought to explain
bedouin social change in terms of political processes and planned
economic transformation (emphasising the sedentary agricultural
alternative).	 The present study, however, goes on to explore the
following:
A) It endeavours to link two dynamic processes. One is
operative outside the sector, and is influenced by factors
which may or may not be designed specifically for the
bedouins. These factors include the early political changes,
the gradual development of the national economy, and the more
recent rural transformations. The second dynamic is
operative among the bedouin sector and it springs from two
sources: i) their particular position within the context of
the	 previous	 dynamic,	 both	 politically	 (established
relationship to the centre), economically (in terms of
resources like land, water and pastoral resources), and
socially (in terms of length of settlement and degree of
integration); and ii) their own particular response to the
operative factors and available alternatives.
B) It evaluates	 and assesses the	 settled	 agricultural
alternative, i.e. the agricultural development programme with
its associated policies and incentives. This is done both in
general terms and within the studied community.
C) It develops a theme through which the bedouin heritage in all
its dimensions (termed bedouinism in this study) is evaluated
and assessed, both in the present 'modern' political and
economic context, and in terms of Influences on the
sedentarisation and integration of the studied bedouin
comunity.
3 Structure and Areas of Inquiry
This thesis could be seen as divided into two parts. The first four
chapters are introductory in the sense that they set the scene for the
last four, which are mostly analysis of the data gathered during the
field work period.
Chapter One is a review of the literature relating to the study of
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nomads and the sedentarization process. 	 In this chapter a basic
theoretical framework is formulated for perceiving nomadic populations.
One of the main concerns of this literature review is to construct a
theoretical	 stance which	 dispenses with the often	 utilised
conceptualisation of the nomads as a distinctive social formation, by
virtue of their economic capital, mobility and social formation. These
particular characteristics, moreover, are sometimes perceived as being
directly opposite to sedentary agricultural production.
This chapter will show how misleading the above conceptualisations are
to a proper understanding of the nomadic phenomenon. It will go on,
furthermore, to look at the sedentarization process in the light of a
theoretical stance that views any nomadic productive system and the
development process it undergoes, as largely a function of the
specificity of the national setting in which it exists (not unlike
sedentary productive systems), and not only its own particular nature.
As such, the sedentarizing nomads are not moving from an original
social formation to a more developed one; nor are they undergoing,
theoretically speaking, a radical social change. The focus in this
chapter, therefore, is on analysing the nomadic sector as part of their
regional national surrounding, and not as a distinctive feature in it.
Chapter Two re-examines the literature regarding the sedentarisation of
the nomads in Saudi Arabia. 	 It also begins to develop a theme which
distinguishes theoretically between the nomad and the bedouin, and also
between tribalism and bedouinism. In the first case nomad refers to
the economic pursuit of nomadic pastoralism; while bedouin refers to
(an Arab) pastoral heritage, be it presently practised or recently
abandoned. Tribalism in the second case cannot be confined to the
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bedouin sector in the Saudi context, even when it has been closely
associated with pastoral nomadism and bedouinism. In developing this
theme the chapter is asking what seem to be some very important
questions:
1. Can we call the early sedentarization programes and policies
a detribaljsation of the Saudi nomadic population?
2. Has the Saudi government pursued a consistent policy of
dispensing with the important characteristics operative in
the traditional society, which include tribalism in its
multi-dimensional facets (i.e. political leadership, economic
integration and social identification)?
3. If indeed there is a detribalisation process operative in the
Saudi context, where is the impetus for this process? Is it
a result of political processes or economic ones, or perhaps
a combination of the two?
Naturally, this theme of inquiry can not be dealt with and concluded in
the space allocated for this chapter alone. It Is a theme that also
runs in other areas of concern of this study, especially in some of the
latter empirically based chapters. This is because it is the view of
this study that we can only find out clear answers regarding these
issues by direct observation in specific cases, and not merely by
general theoretical observations.
Another important aspect of this chapter is a re-examination of the
already set view of the stages of sedentarization among the Saudi
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bedouin sector. The effort will be toward creating a place within this
process for the most recent developments in the rural sector (1970s and
1980s); and their great effect (still largely unstudied) on the
sedentarization process in terms of encouraging it and defining the
quality of change encountered by the sedentarized bedouins.
Chapter Three is a methodological chapter which endeavours to introduce
the area of study as well as describe the methods employed in the
gathering of the data. A section of the chapter will describe the
difficulties encountered by the researcher (as a native woman) in the
course of field work.
Chapter Four is necessarily a large one because it looks at the Saudi
agricultural sector from different aspects. It is divided into three
sections. The first looks at the basic general characteristics of the
sector including its physical resources, and its place within the
national econonb' (in terms of population, productivity and previous
development efforts). The second section looks in detail at the all
important land reforms and distribution policies. 	 It examines the
various legacies of the land utilization traditions, which existed in
the country and how these have been reflected (or utilized) in the
construction of the policies introduced by the modern national
government (both early on and at present).
Section three of chapter four deals with the programe for the
development of the agricultural sector. It concentrates mainly on the
wheat subsidisation part of the prograniiie, because it is extremely
relevant nationally, as well as in the area studied for this thesis.
The section ends with an examination of the Saudi agricultural
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development programme within the context of some of the literature on
rural development. It endeavours to put the Saudi case of land reforms
and agricultural programme in sharp focus in relation to general
conceptual thinking, as well as to internal political and economic
motivational factors.	 In concluding the chapter the general
implication for the Saudi bedouin in entering the agricultural sector
is partially explored, though total understanding can only be achieved
in specific cases by direct observations.
Chapter Five begins the second stage of the study, which also analyses
the empirical data gathered in the course of field work. The first
part of the chapter focuses on developing a viable definition of the
variable sedentarizatlon, in order to have a clear conceptual view of
what the sedentarizationprocess entails. It will also go on to detail
three periods of nomad settlement in Saudi Arabia, which are a
reflection of the previously studied history of nomad sedentarization
(chapter 2), and the agricultural sector (chapter 4). After this Is
done, the data of the interviews connected to the history of settlement
of the interviewed bedouins will be examined in detail with reference
to the already set settlement periods. This is to test if there are
indeed differences between the factors operative in each period. Other
variables like experience of pastoralism, non-rural work experience,
incentives for settlement and previous experience of cultivation will
also be examined thoroughly in the light of the previously outlined
settlement periods.	 This again is to discover if there are any
differences between settlers in the different periods.
Chapter Six looks in detail at the agricultural operation in the
studied region, as well as among the interviewed bedouins. Land
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distribution practices, agricultural production, machinery, labour,
output and other non-agricultural resources will form elements of the
analysis.	 The chapter will endeavour to highlight the particular
situation of the bedouin interviewed as sedentarised pastoralists (who
are in some cases comparatively new to cultivation); but it will also
insist that their situation must not be thought of as being radically
different or isolated from that of the sedentary farmers.	 This is
because the patterns of production are, for the most part, based on new
technologically more advanced cultivation methods, which are also new
to the region and the sedentary farmers. These patterns of production,
moreover, are a result of the new rural economic development, the
incentives offered and the alternatives available.	 By carefully
outlining the new agricultural productive system the chapter will be
indicating the quality of change encountered by the sedentary bedouins.
Chapter Seven focuses on animal wealth among the interviewed bedouins.
The importance of this chapter is due to two factors:
1.	 The sedentarization process and the social change associated
with it, in the case of the Saudi nomadic sector, emphasise
the decline of the primary economic dependence on animal
stock. As such a high degree of sedentarism in a particular
coninunity is associated with a significant decline of its
livestock breeding activities. The chapter not only examines
this aspect of the household economy among the interviewed
bedouins, it also looks at the changes apparent in the
present practices of livestock breeding (i.e. care and
grazing methods), due to the process of social change
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associated with the new patterns of production.
	 It also
endeavours to link animal wealth to cultivation and
agricultural production among those interviewed. By doing
so, the chapter asks whether or not we are justified in
associating livestock breeding with bedouinism only.
2. It continues to explore the themes begun in chapter two. In
this chapter bedouinism as an economic activity (pastoralism
or the reliance on livestock breeding) is explored among the
bedouins interviewed. This is to examine the place that the
traditional economic legacy occupies in the present-day
comunity.	 It will also highlight the effect of the
non-pastoral productive activities and non-traditional
developments on the internal changes in the studied
conununity, particularly on the previously all important
livestock resources.
Chapter Eight looks at selected features of the socio-economic system
in the studied case. It will be basically concerned with continuing
and elaborating the study of bedoulnisni as a concept and a practice,
both in general and particularly among the individuals interviewed.
Furthermore, the chapter will try to examine the effect of the said
legacy on the perceptions, self identification and attitudes of the
interviewed individuals, and their comitment to the farming
livelihood. The accent of the chapter therefore is on the bedouin as a
farmer. Four areas of inquiries will be looked at:
1.	 The means through which the images of the nomads and bedouins
become possible in the literature and in the Saudi popular
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culture, and how these images are reflected in the study of
the sedentarization process, especially when it is a planned
agricultural settlement.
2. The way in which the bedouin legacy is reflected in the
perceptions and attitudes of the interviewed bedouin farmers
towards their agricultural activities.
3. Women's position in the studied bedouin society, and how this
relates to both the traditional legacy and the new social and
economic formations (nationally and locally).
4. A comparative study of how twenty-three sedentary farmers
responded to the same section of the questionnaire (relating
to perceptions of and attitudes towards farming issues).
The amalgamation of the analysis of the four areas of inquiry will
hopefully allow us to pass judgement on how far the pastoral bedouin
ideology and way of life (i.e. bedouinism in its nomadic form) could be
related to the actual current practices of the bedouin farmers. It
will also help us to determine whether or not these traditional aspects
are visible in the interviewed bedouins' own perceptions, attitudes and
comitment to the farming operation.
4 A Postscript
Not unlike most research endeavours, this study was conceived quite
differently from the final form it has gradually assumed. This is due
to a combination of factors, the most important of which is briefly
described in chapter three dealing with this study's region and
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methods. The difficulties and obstacles encountered during the
fieldwork would not be ordinarily faced by a male researcher dealing
with the same topic. This has resulted in a focus and concentration
that may seem not so comprehensively all-encompassing as would be
customarily required from regional analysis.
In particular, we are well aware of the lack of material directly
connected to the process of decision making within the regional
political and economic organisations (e.g. the Amir's office and the
regional offices of the agricultural extension services).
	
The
rationality for the decisions made in these offices is important
because they determine the resource distribution patterns, and the
accessibility of the important agricultural loans, services and
incentives to the bedouin farmers.
Saudi women (like women in many other places), however, have never been
privy to the corridors of authority; in this case not even to the
simple goings-on of the government offices and organisations. Hence,
we can not expect the female researcher to perform a near
impossibility, nor to cross the line between the private and public
sphere without difficulties and obstacles. These socially prescribed
limitations are undoubtedly reflected in the focus of this study.
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Chapter One
Nomadisin and the Sedentarization Process
21i.
Introduction
The phenomenon of nomadism has been an intellectual preoccupation for
scholars, historians and travellers since early times. 	 Such
fascination with the nomadic way of life seems to have originated from
what appears to be its striking opposition to the sedentary one.
Nonetheless, the long history of the study of nomadism seems to have
produced relatively little precise knowledge of what nomads are about.
Instead, ambiguous attitudes and stereotypical views have been produced
time after time , and from one generation to another. At first, nomads
were primarily associated with military prowess, disasters and
savagery. In modern times, when these images no longer apply to the
nomadic way of life, it is either idealized for its freedom and
independence, or thought of as anachronistic and an embarrassment to
progressive nation-states.
Since the 1950s, nomadic studies have gained new momentum not only
theoretically, but also through vigorous new empirical research. This
is why it is possible at present to differentiate between myth and
reality, even though myths and the older ideas about nomads seem to
still exercise some influence over some writers and anthropologists.
This chapter does not propose to deal with all relevant issues about
nomadism and
	 the sedentarization of nomads.	 Its main aim is to
construct a working framework, through which nomadism and nomads could
be conceptualfsed and perceived. Once this theoretical framework is
achieved, the sedentarization process comes into sharper focus. Not
only do we understand why settlement is undertaken, but we also
understand the quality of change that sedentarization could bring.
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In the first and main section of this chapter, this necessary basic
theoretical frame work is tackled. It will start by outlining some of
the basic theoretical arguments that have been used to depict nomadisrn
and the nomadic way of life as being not only distinct, but also
opposite to a sedentary way of life.	 These arguments relate
specifically to nomads' mobility and the nature of their capital and
political organisation. Once these viewpoints have been outlined, the
rest of the section will attempt to show how misleading these
conceptualisations are to a proper understanding of the nomadic
phenomenom. This will be done by looking at the contribution of some
other anthropologists, particularly those dealing with the nomads of
the Middle East. Along the way and particularly at the end of this
section, an alternative theoretical stance	 will be outlined, which
will hopefully be a better tool to understanding what nomadism entails
and what sedentarization means.
The second section will	 deal	 with the various models of
sedentarization, that have been utilised by different anthropological
writers. It will also outline some of the major ways that nomads are
integrated into sedentary societies in the Middle East. At the end of
this section, the major areas of concern in relation to the
sedentarization process will be pointed out.
This chapter is selective in so far as it concentrates on specific
issues, and the relevant material about the type of nomadism in a
certain area (the Middle East). The justification for each focussing
will, hopefully, become clear in the course of the argument in the
chapter.
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SECTION I PASTORAL NOMADISM
1.	 A Definition
Pastoral nomadisrn , in its pure form, has been described as resting
upon the exploitation of the primary producer (the herb layer) through
the intermediary of gregarious migratory herbivorous flocks of herds
under the management of a human group.	 This ecological feature
alone, however, does not define the system of pastoral nornadisrn. 	 Two
other features are important for a full definition. 	 These are the
following:
1. Production is organised within an autonomous domestic
unit, based mainly on a family nucleus. 2 Production
within the group requires a certain equilibrium between
the domestic group and the herd (3), and mostly
internally based labour resources.
2. Nomadic pastoralism is also organised within a comunity
structure, through which the domestic units of the
comunity enjoy access to grazing lands, wells and other
natural resources, which are collectively developed and
administered. (4) Land right is, therefore, a result
of the collective community, rather than a consequence
of production (as in village communities). (5) This
type of ownership and the economic unit's right to it
allows for the practice of this fluid ecosystem, as well
as the implementation of the herdsman's own strategies
f or the best exploitation of the environment.
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Economically, therefore, the nomadic cormiunity may take the form of a
territorial community, a defensive bond, ties of co-operation or
exchange of animals. 6	These ties may be governed by a strict
political organisation (like the segmentary lineage system), or have an
essential characteristics of variability (like in age-set and most
cattle breeding societies). The basic nature of the nomadic societies
(as a productive entity) has been described by Claude Lefebure as
being:
"in their particular combination of a domestic with a
comunity	 pattern	 of	 production,	 the	 whole	 being
characterised by the autonomy of the domestic units on the
one hand and on the other, the de facto character of the
actual comunity organisation. This trait goes hand in hand
with the pre-eminent function of the comunity's own ideology
in the production process." (7)
The comprehensive definition above represents, like most definitions,
an ideal type, as well as an individual point of view. 	 It will be
used, however, as	 a starting point for this section. 	 Other
definitions and points of view will be presented at the end of the
section.
2)	 The Political Organisation of the Nomads
Pastoral nomadic societies are often represented as being egalitarian,
independent and economically homogeneous. (8)	 The frequency of the
segmentary lineage system among nomadic groups tended to re-affirm the
conviction that such societies favour the preservation of political
This is because classical anthropology has characterised
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the segmentary lineage system as being the political feature of
stateless societies (10), as well as having " no sharp divisions of rank
status or wealth."(].l)
A)	 The Tribal System
The tribal system (organisational structure of the segementary lineage
societies) is based on the patrilineal descent of the groups.
Evans-Pritchard in his description of the political organisation of the
Senusi of Cyrenaica in 1949 described the tribe as follows:
"A tribe is conceived of as a huge family descended from a
comon ancestor, from whom the tribe generally takes its
name.	 Hence its segments can be figured as a series of
political sections or as genealogical branches of a clan."
(12)
Evans-Pritchard also described the segmentations and divisions of the
tribe as being generally in two or three primary divisions
(sub-tribes). These primary divisions split into secondary divisions,
and yet again into smaller units. Each of the smaller divisions are
exact replicas of the larger ones, with each having a comon ancestor
(who descends from the original one), and exclusive rights to its
lands.	 More importantly, Evans-Pritchard describes the segementary
structures as being a system of balanced opposition between tribes and
tribal sections from the largest to the smallest levels of divisions;
with each of the segments having its own tribal head. 	 Political
leadership, therefore, is limited to situations in which a tribe or
segment of it acts corporately. (13)
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The implication of such representation is that the subsections of the
tribal groupings stand as autonomous at one level (by being opposed to
each other), but are united at the higher level of social organisation
(through common descent). The relevance of such representation of the
tribal structure to the above characterisation of pastoral nomadic
societies is too obvious to be elaborated. This has resulted in the
particular identification of the segmentary lineage system with nomadic
society (14)
Evans-Pritchard has been unequivocal in his assessment of the lack of
dominant segments in the tribal society. Consider the following:
"There is no association, class or segment which has a
dominant place in the political structure through the comand
of greater organized force than is at the disposal of any of
its cougeners." (15)
"The tribal system, typical of segmentary structures
everywhere is a system of balanced opposition between tribes
and tribal sections from the largest to the smallest
divisions, and there cannot be any single authority in a
tribe." (16)
B)	 rne Theoretical Debates
Evans-Pritchard's analysis of the social organisation of the segmentary
lineage system has not only been influential in anthropological
tradition, which agree with his theoretical stance, but also became the
starting point for divergent theoretical and analytical developments.
Some of the theoretical debates surrounding the segmentary lineage
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systems are the following:
Firstly: The extent to which the segmentary lineage is an ideal model
and the extent to which it is a reality. 	 The debate runs along a
continuum between two extremes: Those who accept the model as a
reasonable approach to the representation of tribal society (mostly
nomadic) and those who do not. (17),
1. Ernest Geliner, for instance, has described the model in
detail, using the mobile pastoralists of the high Atlas. (18)
2. Others urged the further modification of the model by
including other important elements, like territorial tribal
groups, 
(19), 
and alliances between different units other
than the descent groups (20),
3. Some define it as an ideological model that tribal groups use
to depict themselves, but claim that it is in fact incapable
of explaining the actual behaviour of the group. This group
includes those who argue that the tribal segments, in
reality, are neither balanced nor equal economically and
politically. On the one hand, the productive units have
differential access to the resources, which leads to
differential economic status and to political
differentiation. (21) On the other hand, some argue that
genealogy and descent are in themselves factors for creating
dominant groups within the system (22), Khazanov explained
this process in 1984:
"The reciprocal position and interrelations between the
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segments of one level are not identical, not only from
the point of view of corresponding numbers, size and
strength, but also of political weight. 	 Whilst the
majority of segments of one level are thought to be
more or less equal, one of them, from the point of view
of descent, notoriety and, most importantly, political
position stands higher than the rest, is 'more equal
than others'." (23)
In other words, this is how section chiefs are chosen from
chiefly lineages, and how tribal leadership is provided by
the chiefly lineages.
4.	 Others within this debate argue for the total abandonment of
the segmentary lineage schema. Emanual Marx, for example,
thought that the essence of the tribe needs to be
reconsidered.	 In his opinion, tribes are not primary
political units, but economic subsistence units with a
complex range of institutionalised relationships (territorial
and defensive).	 He also called for the total
abandonment of the segmentary model, if anthropologists wish
to fully comprehend tribal societies
Secondli: another group of anthropologists (mainly French and Marxist)
have more or less accepted the model as it stands, and have come to
regard tribal societies as a specific social formation (mode of
production).	 They, therefore, set out to prove that inequality and
contradictions do exist in such societies.	 In one such analysis of
segmentary nomads, the equality existing between the purely pastoralist
units of production is thought to be genuine, but it only concerns the
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heads of the households and not individuals as a whole. As such, women
and young men may be equal to each other, but they remain dependent
upon the head of the family (for young men this is of course
temporary).	 So "equality applies to heads of the family in their
capacity as representatives of autonomous domestic units.'1
The autonomy and equality of the units, however, does not rule out the
unequal accumulation of livestock capital. 	 Under certain conditions,
the social and natural factors that define production could lead to
economic, and political differentiation.	 For example, the family's
labour supply depends on its ability to produce offspring. Furthermore,
the individual's talent (especially that of the head of the household)
as strategist and manager determine the tribal unit's status in
relation to others.
These factors tend to generate unequal pastoral results, with some
productive units accumilating more animal wealth than others.
	 Large
owners of livestock (with increased status) can therefore weave around
themselves a complex set of economic and social relations, which prove
to be for their great advantage	 Social and economic status, for
instance, could lead to better labour resources (through additional
labour), and better access to resources. This process allows the
successful pastoral units to survive natural disaster, like drought and
epidemics (thought to be a major element of equalization in nomadic
societies), as well as gain political prominence. This ultimately
prepares the ground for the creation of groups specialising in
religious or political functions, especially when the process has
greatly affected the whole group. (29)
The above gradual transformation process is depicted (under certain
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conditions) for productive units existing in non-stratified conditions.
The transformation for tribal units within stratisfied societies is
more rapid and effective. When the same mechanism for creating
differentiation exists, it allows the prominent groups to appropriate
fixed resources for themselves (by claiming common grazing grounds, or
switching to settled farming). The impoverished groups, on the other
hand, also switch to other income generating activities, often working
for the newly rich stock breeders or farmers (30)•
The question arising from the above description is: how does the tribal
productive system maintain itself as a distinctive system with a
structural autonomy, as well as an egalitarian ideology, when the
system seems to encourage the unequal accumulation of capital? The
answer given by Lefbure is that the process only occurs in periods of
rising labour productivity, and only at the level of accumulation
within the domestic family. This means that the contradiction within
the society is mainly between the domestic framework of production and
the community conditions of reproduction. 	 In such situations, the
divisions within the society could lead to the splitting off of certain
groups who become specialised in pastoral activities, and who
ultimately accede to autonomy (30)• Lefbure also stresses that the
same mechanism that allows the creation of the rank of noble man or
wealthy herdsman can act to undermine the basis of their prestige.
Their position will oblige them to spend more, redistributing portions
of their capital on displays of wealth (in rituals and sacrifices) or
to tide their community over in periods of scarcity (31)•
The above analysis of what might be termed a nomadic mode of production
within the context of the segmentary lineage system is clearly open to
major criticisms. These will be tackled at a later point of the
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section, when the nature of the pastoral nomadic systems is examined.
C	 An Overview
In the above brief discussion of the segmentary lineage system, some
major difficulties are apparent in the anthropological debate on this
system, which leaves the non specialist thoroughly confused.
1. There does not seem to be any agreement on the theoretical
status of the tribe (the major unit in segmentary lineage
societies). Some see it as a political organisation which
defines the nature of the society (as stateless), and which
is reflected in the reality of the group. Such analysis
include those who accept the classical model or a revised
version of it, or approach it from a marxist perspective.
Another approach sees the model as an ideological system of
social representation, which does not define the real
economic capacity or the political organisation within
tribal societies. Yet another approach exists, which
advocates an identification of the tribe as an economic unit,
characterised by subsistence, which may exist within weak or
strong institutional interrelations (32)•
2. Another difficulty lies in the overlapping of segmentary
lineage societies with pastoral nomadic ones. There is
nothing in the classical depiction of segementary societies
which identifies their productive system (sedentary versus
pastoralist). Also nomadic societies may operate within a
segementary lineage system, as well as within other systems
(like age set societies and modern ones). Apparently the
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confusion stems from the focussing on the
	 alleged
egalitarianism and autonomy within both systems, as well as
the frequency of finding both combined in the same society.
This is not a helpful approach to the understanding of either
system.
3.	 On the empirical level, anthropologists have found many
societies in which genealogy and segmentation exist. They do
not agree however on a uniformity of structure, nor on a
characterisation of the structure (33), Anthropologists for
example distinguish between stratified 	 and non-stratified
segementary systems:	 the former being a result of the
relationship between the tribal society and the outside
world.	 On the other hand, some anthropologists have
concluded that among the various types of tribal societies
they studied the only common feature they found was that the
segmentary principle was operative and that territorial
groups were based on descent
The above seems to indicate that we cannot rely on the segmentary
lineage model exclusively to explain tribal societies and nomadic ones.
It may be applicable in certain cases and under certain conditions, but
any analysis should be guided by the specific reality of the studied
cases, taking into consideration all of the above qualifications. Only
then can we begin to approach a proper understanding of the specific
case.
3	 Nomads and Sedentaries: Two Opposites?
Nomadic people since ancient times have been burdened with ambiguous
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images.	 These may describe their lifestyle variously as free,
independent, full of strife and hardship, or savage - to mention only a
few.	 The nomads themselves have come under the same scrutiny of
stereotypical characterisations. 	 Their images range from the fierce
raiding warrior, to the noble egalitarian, who has no interest in fixed
property or wealth.
These images (which are mostly propagated by sedentaries) could be the
result of misunderstood realities, or arise from the essential polarity
between the sedentary and nomadic productive regimes. Nomadic studies
have come to inform us of the significant differences between nomads
and sedentary societies. Two of the major ones are the following:
A)	 Mobility Within the Productive System
The social significance of nomadic mobility is that it give the
opportunity for continued choice and change in residential association,
a characteristic inherently denied to settled people. (35) This basic
feature of nomadic groups, within their particular ecological system,
has given rise to differentiations of particular kinds between
sedentary productive systems and nomadic ones. Spooner pointed out the
basis for such differentiation as being that "the fluidity of nomadic
society renders it ideal subject matter for the study of politics which
is otherwise tied in some way to fixed economic interests"36.
The particular combination of autonomous stock rearing with residential
mobility has long been established as being opposite to sedentary
production and settled population 	 This emphasis, we are told by
Neville Dyson-Hudson, has arisen from geographical descriptive
accounts, as well as from anthropological studies of culture areas and
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cultural types, (38) which resulted in the construction of ideal type,
and generalised models.
Such studies, moreover, have resulted in a general conceptionalization
of nomads as economically independent, 	 politically free,	 and
essentially hostile towards the unfree life of sedentary communities.
The nomadic lifestyle, moreover, is thought of as ungovernable, and
uniquely suited for the military conquest of settled coninunities as
well as escape from the reach of centralised powers 39)• Some of the
contemporary anthropologists, however, who frequently observe nomadic
societies in subordinate military positions to the present government
systems, tend rather to regard the nomads' social structures as
predominantly tied to the ecological zone they inhabit; thus linking
movement patterns with terrain, climate and animal species (40), rather
than policies.
Nonetheless, other areas of the systematic study of pastoral nomadism
have continued to emphasise spatial mobility as a mechanism of
political adjustment, rather than a factor resulting from ecological
adaptation. (41)	 There is, of course,	 a general agreement that
mobility is frequently advantageous from an ecological point of view
(42)	
The emphasis here is on the structural significance of mobility,
both within the social system as well as in relation to outside
systems.	 Philip Burnham has argued that a society's reliance on
spatial mobility should be considered to be of the same structural
order and status as a society's use of lineage models to order
political relations (43)• He goes on to say:
"Once established as a principle of political organisation,
fluidity of local grouping proves to be a remarkably
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resistant feature of any society. 	 In particular, spatial
mobility greatly inhibits the development of political
centralization and although perhaps to a lesser extent, class
stratification." (44)
This feature has been described by Burnham as the source of the
structural conservatism, which is frequently seen in the transformation
of nomadic pastoral societies to centralised forms of social systems.
(45) Furthermore, he locates the structural forces responsible for such
transformation (i.e. to sedentary centralised conditions) in factors
external to the nomadic systems, and in the institutionalised
relationships between the nomads and the sedentary populations.
Others have stressed the particular combination of an autoninous animal
herding productive unit and the residential mobility of the nomads, as
creating the cultural specifity of nomadic groups. Spooner suggested
that nomadism should be treated as a "trait of cultural ecology",
characterised by a "lack of interest in fixed property and fixed
resources". 
(46) 
For Spooner, therefore, the nomads' dependence on an
unimproved natural environment "generates a characteristic nomadic
ideology in all nomadic societies." (47) ThIs he sees as creating the
cultural polarization between peasant economics and nomadic ones. (48)
B)	 Animals as Capital
Livestock as capital within the ecological system of pastoral nomadism
has figured highly in a number of anthropological accounts depicting
nomadic societies.	 For example, William Goldschmidt has emphasised
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the relationship between animal herding and the development of certain
attitudinal and personality traits. 	 49) Thus, the vulnerability of
animals to theft leads to the development of a defensive society (hence
the military posture of nomads). Likewise, the need to move the herds
from one place to another at will develops in the nomad a lack of
inclination toward routinised work (like agriculture). Or again, their
need to slaughter their animals (and establish dominance over them) is
also said to develop certain attitudinal attributes in the pastoralists
(lack of empathy). (50)
The above are only minor themes of thinking about nomads and their
animals, which are not widely current among anthropologists. A much
more relevant approach to the ownership of livestock and the dependence
on undeveloped resources, is that they develop the need for the group
to disperse at certain times and aggregate at others: in the first
instance looking for pasture, and in the second avoiding the dry season
and establishing the community.	 This is how autononjy and organised
cooporation become institutionalised in nomadic society - the latter
being essentially in relation to territoriality.
So while some anthropologists had emphasised the movement of nomads as
the most important feature in their society (see above), others have
stressed that the ownership of animals is what makes nomadic societies
not only mobile, but different from agricultural ones. Frederick Barth
developed such a theme most clearly in 1973 t51)•	 He was, however,
trying to locate the difference between two types of activities (rather
than two groups of people) within one locality:
"The pastoral regime of production has essential properties
which contrast with the other productive regimes of the
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region, and which in various modulations determine the form
and relations of nomads, dependent on this regime for their
maintenance, to the other population sectors of the
region. ,(52)
Barth characterises the pastoral capital as a determining element in
the management options. Two notable features are a) that saving and
investment are necessary under all circumstance, because herds are
insecure, perishable and must be replaced; and b) such investment is
possible without benefit of any economic institutions, because one of
the main products of the herd is lambs (calves etc). (53)
On the other hand, in an agricultural economy land is imperishable and
cannot be consumed or increased without the benefit of elaborate
economic institutions. The difference between the two types of
capitals is, therefore, that the nomadic ones has a great potential for
rapid growth (or decline), regardless of what the public institutions
and facilities may be. This is because part of the herd's product is
actually "capital gain", which only an active management decision to
slaughter will remove from reinvestment. The agricultural sector has no
such ready way for growth unless specific public institutions are
available.
In a region like the Middle East, where pastoral and agricultural
societies exist side by side, the development potential for each
productive system is vastly different:
"It should follow from the preceding argument that groups of
such (pastoral) households will always have the potentiality
of economic take-off: in prosperous times their enterprise
will expand, their capital increase, their economy will grow.
Compare this to the classical peasant situation as described
from many parts of the world. 	 Households are tied to an
agricultural regime with blockage against reinvestment and
growth, with a fraction of the product constantly tapped off
by a tax or rent system."54
Barth uses the above argument to promote the view that under certain
conditions, the pastoral sector of a regional economy will have the
advantage over the agricultural one and dominate it. (55)	 These
conditions are a) when the regional economy does not have market
facilities for converting capital, and b) when each sector of the
economy is mobilised by a distinct ethnic group. He illustrates this
theme by pointing out the dominance of the pastoral groups within the
past kingdoms of East Africa.
This is, of course, only one pattern of the relationship between
agriculture and pastoralism. Another pattern is when the population of
a region is characterised by households with mixed economies. In this
case Barth continues to argue for the buoyancy of the pastoral sector
of each household, as rendering them more prosperous than pure
agriculturalists' households even when they occupy less favourable
regions. (56) On the other hand, the agricultural sector is capable of
unprecedented	 growth	 under	 circumstances	 favouring	 technical
developments (e.g. in irrigation), and smooth administrative and
institutional functioning. 	 These periods of growth are quite
breathtaking when compared to similar events in the nomadic sector.57
Frederick Barth, in the above account, has not been concerned with the
internal mechanisms of social production within the pastoral household,
nor with the ecological conditions governing pastoral life which are
said to be favourable to equalitarianism and homogeneity. As was seen
earlier (see definitions), some anthropologists believe that there is
an equilibrium between labour and production in pastoral units. This
element, when considered together with the strong linkages between the
nomad, his herd and his environment, could be used to paint a
thoroughly contrasting picture (especially when the environment is arid
or semi arid).
Gudrun Dahi, for example, related pastoral equality and homogeneity to
ecological constraints. (58)	 Two elements are important in Dahl's
opinion for promoting equality: a) the limits to the possible
accumulation of wealth, and b) obstacles to the transferal of undivided
wealth. Both these two elements could be related to the pastoralist's
dependence on household labour in animal herding.
"One major goal in the pastoral strategy is to achieve a
balance between the size of the household and the herd. But
from the point of view of insurance against risks, a large
family with a large herd is certainly to be preferred to a
small family with a small herd; thus one strives towards a
balanced growth of both."59
A rich herdsman, therefore, is always seeking to increase his labour
supply (by taking on more wives, or incorporating poor sons-in-law).
Large herds, moreover, are geographically dispersed to minimize the
risks of total loss through disease or droughts (usually to the care of
part of the family), or redistributed to different households through
the practice of bridewealth (6O)	 These mechanism maintain homogeneity
and equality.
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I-low can we relate this picture of balanced growth and a checked
accumulation of wealth, with the previous one of buoyancy? Admittedly,
Barth was talking in terms of differences between two types of
activities, and in historical terms (in part of the analysis). Still,
the mostly biological picture he draws could benefit from considering
more of the relations of production in each productive system (even at
this level of analysis).
At this point we might also remember Lefëbure's analysis, in which he
tried to relate nomadic surplus production at the household level to
the maintenance of the community's conditions of reproduction. In his
scenario, surplus accumulation Is possible within the productive unit
in periods of rising labour productivity ( good natural conditions and
good family productivity). The animal wealth accumulated, however, is
either dissipated through increased spending and displays of rank and
wealth, or transferred into fixed property (agricultural land mainly).
The Impoverished households similarly drop out of pastoral nomadic
production through settlement. 	 When accumulation affects the whole
group, it could result In either a gradual transferal to cultivation
(and the intensification of unequal relations), or the overgrazing of
pastures which In turn reduces the numbers of animals. In either case,
the end result is a splitting off of the nomadic group that does not
conform to the dominant tendencies and ideology of the nomadic pastoral
structure.
In all of the three analyses discussed above, pastoral nomadic
production and society are presumed to be distinct from agricultural
production and society, both theoretically and in actuality. 	 The
various arguments, therefore, either try to locate this difference, or
account for some similarities at different levels (inequality of wealth
and power). There are of course striking differences between the two
productive systems, but are we justified in polarizing the two and
magnifying the differences? This point will be discussed in the coming
section.
4)	 The Nature of Nomadic Pastoralism
A)	 The Contemporary Nomads
While trying to formulate a typology of pastoral nomadism, Khazanov in
1984 wrote the following:
"Pastoral nomadism proper which is in its most pure
manifestation is characterised by absence of agriculture,
even in supplementary capacity. Despite some still existing
opinions to the contrary, pure nomads are only recorded in
certain regions of pastoral nomadism (North Eurasia, High
Inner Asia, the Eurasian Steppes, Arabia, the Sahara), but
even in these regions pastoral nomadism co-exist as a rule
with other forms of pastoralism. Semi-nomadic pastoralism is
much more widespread throughout the world."62
Even the most avid believers in the distinctive nature of pastoral
nomadism, do not deny that there are undeniable connections between
comtemporary nomads and agricultural production. W. Goldschmidt in his
typology of nomads stated the following:
"There are four basic variables that make for considerable
internal diversity in what we consider pastoralism. The
J.5
first of these is the nature of the relationship of the
society to agricultural production.
	
No pastoral nomadic
society is entirely free of involvement either directly or
indirectly with agricultural products.'63
He went on to classify the relationship of nomadic society to
agricultural in three types:64
A - Tribes that are 	 independent	 of agriculture as
comunities, but who have a symbiotic relationship to
farming comunities (like the Masai and the Berber
tribes).
B - Those who are an element in a plural society in which
they are an integrated independent ethnic unit:
sometimes subordinate to farmers (like in South West
Asia) and sometimes superordinate to farmers (e.g.
Tuareg, Tutsi).
C - Those who engage in secondary farming activities.
Goldschmidt, however, continued to draw a classification of pastoral
nornadism, which hardly takes into account the relationships between
nomads and other productive systems, (65) and only highlights the
ecological and cultural elements of nomadis (discussed i chapter
eight).
Talal Asad has also stated that all known nomadic societies cannot be
thought of as aboriginal or isolated. Anthropologists, therefore, must
make a theoretical distinction in their analysis:
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"Surely a basic theoretical distinction must be made between
aboriginal social groupings which are assumed to be isolated
and historically determinant populations who interact
systematically.	 The societies that anthropologists have
studied are all of the latter kind."66
Neville Dyson-Hudson made a similar argument, when he was lamenting the
state of nomadic studies in 1972. He first distinguished between two
styles of thought in anthropolgy. One constructs opposite ideal types,
drawing distinctions between 'nomads and peasants', 'tribal and
civilised', and the 'desert and the sown'. The second style of thought
is 'behavioural and realist', which arises from the need to handle
direct data.	 In the latter style, the specifity of the case is
always emphasised and the variablities of the factors brought out. (67)
he went on to say that it is unprofitable to mix the analytical frame
work of one type of thought, with the data of the other.
"More than anything, it is the essentialist cast of so much
thought about nomads (including , as I shall suggst later,
the concept of 'nomadism' itself) which is responsible for
the otherwise paradoxically slow development of studies in
nomadic behaviour..... We settle too readily for categories
which do not so much explain as explain away the realities of
nomadic behaviour. ,,(68)
Dyson-Hudson's call, however, is for a thoroughly empircal approach,
and the separation of the concept of "nomadism" into its two
components: as movement, and resource extraction. Yet even when this
approach had been followed, it led in some cases to the polarisation of
the nomads and the peasants - as was advocated by the definition of
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nomadism as 'cultural ecology'':69) , with a lack of interest in fixed
resources as we shall see later.
B)	 Theoretical Considerations
Due to the general realisation and acceptance of the fact that there is
no social form common to all pastoral nomadic societies (70), some of
the newer nomad ethnographers have given a dominant role to the
variance of ecological condition as explanatory factors in the
variation in nomadic social forms (:71)•	 This tendency among some
anthropologists had been criticised as being 'ecological reductionism'
or an exaggerated preoccupation with the material aspects of
production. (72)	 In defending the ecology prespective, Dahi argued
that any anthropologist wishing to use the "ecology" as an explanatory
variable in the context of pastoral systems must take it very seriously
and qualify it with precise data. Dahi 's justifications for using this
perspective are: a) ecology is the first step toward a comprehensive
analysis at the level of the economic base, and b) ecology seems to be
more a determining factor with pastoral nomadism generally, and
especially for some pastoral groups (in East Africa). (73) Dahi then
went on to analyze the Boran case in terms of ecological factors
encouraging equality (see previous section).
So it seems that the ecological approach itself which was born out of
necessity to modify the 'culture' and 'ideal type' style of analysis,
leads in some instances to further identification of pastoral nomadism
as a distinct type of production. This tendency was discussed by Talal
Asad:
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"An overdue concern with rehearsing the biological and
environment constraints of animal husbandry not only fails to
tell us anything about such crucial differences and
similarities [between peasants and farmers], it also gives
the misleading impression that technique in the narrow sense
is an independent variable, always determining and never
determined by social relations in the development of social
formations."74
William Irons raised similar questions when talking about political
stratification among the nomads.	 He began by noting that nomads
frequently share important social and cultural features with sedentary
groups in their own region, which they do not share with pastoral
nomads of other regions. 75	He went on to state:
"Given the fact that pastoral nomads exhibit such variety in
ecology,	 economy,
	
social	 organisation,	 and political
organisation, one might raise the question of whether or not
It is worth while at all to generalize about pastoral nomadic
societies. ,.(76)
His answer to this question was that we can only hope to generalize
about issues that are closely connected with a pastoral economy or a
nomadic residence pattern (discussed below). Nonetheless, he himself
put forward the hypothesis that political influence from sedentary
state-organised societies, if strong enough, can overcome the effects
of these specific characteristics of the pastoral societies.
Khazanov, on the other hand, believes that we cannot hope to understand
nomadic societies without taking into account their relationship with
the outside world; this is both as an historical phenomenom as well as
in specific modern cases ':77)•	 This point of view contains all the
necessary elements to negate the theoretical specifity of pastoral
nomadism, as well as the exaggerated polarization of nomadic and
sedentary societies in terms of specific attributes (autonomy and
equality).	 Khazanov spells it out very clearly:
"Despite the opinion of certain scholars...., nomadism should
not be regarded as a autarkic economic system, even less
should it be regarded as a distinct, closed socio-political
system corresponding to a specific stage (or stages) of
evolution, a system with its own internal laws of social
functioning and development. ,(78)
Khazanov goes on to reject the ecological and the french marxist
approaches to the identification and analysis of nomadic pastoralism.
His reason is that:
" In my view this is because extensive pastoralism, which
forms the economic basis of nomadism, is not a mode of
production, but only a distinct form of economic activity.
Nor is nomadism itself an autonomous system in any one of its
basic parameters. In this respect pastoral nomadism stands
in one typological line alongside agriculture, hunting and
fishing. ,,(79)
To adopt such a view is to be released from the curious negation of, or
perhaps the lack of emphasis on, elements associated with any analysis
of a productive system in a regional situation; i.e. the balance of
power between groups, the ownership of important resources
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(agricultural or pastoral), the role of any existing centralised
governments, and the relationships between differing groups. All of
these elements have been overpowered by emphasising the distinctiveness
of the nomadic socio-economic formation (as an original productive
system, sometimes termed primitive nomadism), and/or the political,
cultural or ecological specifity of the nomads. This has been so, even
when nomads have been studied within the context of the contemporary
world, including centralised societies, and a mixed rural economy with
agricultural and pastoral groups.
The above is not to negate the significance of the attributes of
pastoral nomadism (i.e. animal husbandry and movement). It is rather
to place them at the proper level of analysis, i.e. being
characteristics of an economic activity (or adaptation), rather than of
a political system, or of a specific culture. The justification for
adopting such a view for this study comes from a) the persuasive
theoretical arguments put forward by some anthropologists (particularly
Asad	 and	 Khazonov),	 and	 b)	 the	 valuable contributions of
anthropologists studying Middle Eastern nomadic groups (Swidler, Barth,
Nelson, Cole). The latter's studies have established that nomadism and
agriculture intermingle far more closely in the Middle East than in
other region of the world where pastoralism exist.
	 In fact
pastoralists and agriculturalists share market and economic facilities,
and are related to each other by economic, cultural and political ties.
(80)	 (The nomadism of this region will be discussed in the coming
section.)
To return to the theoretical consideration of nomadism: Asad emphasised
that the most important point about nomadic groups is not that they
move from one place to another in the course of caring for their
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animals, but that their political and economic organisation may be
based primarily on production for subsistence (81), Asad also draws a
comparison with modern ranchers who combine mobility with animal
husbandry,	 but who are structurally different from nomadic
pastorali sts:
"On the same principle, free peasants applying family labour
to land primarily for subsistence, selling only a small
portion of their produce in order to buy consumption goods,
and yielding up another portion to the state in the form of
tax, are in the same category as pastoral nomads who do the
same. ,,(82)
Khazanov, on the other hand, also criticises Bonte 83 and Lefbure
'analyses' which try to establish that 'original' pastoralism is a
distinctive mode of production (similar to Germanic society) where the
community is formed by the collective ownership of resources and the
autonomy of production. He points out that many nomadic groups show
corporate ownership of resources, while having considerable internal
social differentiation (84)
Furthermore, Khazanov, also points out that the segmentary lineage
system, as the political level of these societies, cannot be thought
of as equalitarian, undifferentiated or exclusive to stateless
societies (see below) (85)• Asad similarly states:
"By the late fifties and early sixties, functionalists were
able to argue that the segmentary lineage system was not
incompatible with centralised societies."86
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As such, it cannot be thought of as uniquely suited to nomadic
societies, nor constituting the principle of integration and
equalization therein. The equality of the segments, furthermore, does
not define the productive capacity or political status, but represents
a formal equality at the ideological level (87)•	 Moreover, when
inequality had been observed among the nomads of different societies,
some anthropologists have tried to explain it away and continued to
regard nomadism as a distinctive economic regime.
The mechanisms said to exist in pastoral nomadic regimes and allegedly
to guarantee political and economic equality - i.e. dissipation of
wealth because of increased needs, and/or the settlement of the rich
and poor nomads - do not account for the fact that there is unequal
accumulation of wealth. 	 Such analysis, moreover, seem to have a
tendency of explaining wider economic structures by the qualities of a
narrow population aggregate. () This is partly due to the arbitary
assumption that the relatively homogenous social group represents an
aboriginal system and the stratified social group a later development.
(89)
Asad's main concern was to show the theoretical unviability of a
distinctive nomadic society (90) (or the nomadic mode of production).
Khazanov, on the other hand stresses the following:
"The level of socio-political development in nomadic
societies and corresponding changes in the level are very
largely determined by the specifity of the societies'
relations with the outside world, and with the individual
particulars of the iatter.'1
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The above theoretical stance seems to be the most suitable for
	 a
comprehensive understanding of nomadic and pastoral groups in the
contemporary world.	 Not only does it account for such little
emphasised elements in nomad analysis, as central governments,
nomads-sedentary relationships, and the widely spread practice of
semi-nomadism with cultivation; it also clearly accounts for the
sedentarisation process, which has been mostly seen within the context
of the nomadic system and not emphasised as a process of change within
the wider structures of whole societies.
The sedentarisation process, moreover, is comonly held to be a process
strongly advocated and practised by centralised government.
	 The
official approach to the 'nomadic problem', however, have never been
uniform. Some governments preferred to completely eradicate pastoral
nomadism (i.e. Turkey and some regions of Iran). 92	Others have
chosen to pacify their tribal groups, by removing the perceived threats
associated with tribal nomadism - i.e. autonomy and the military threat
- through so-called agricultural developmental schemes based on the
settling of nomads (Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Egypt, Kenya etc). 93
	On
the other hand, the Mongolian experience of collective pastoralism
represents another route fdr bringing the nomads into the confines of
the central government without damaging the economic base of their
existence while at the same time achieving major political and
developmental goals (i.e. literacy, health care, and the establishment
of supplementary light industries).94
Even more Importantly, the sedentarisation route has been a favoured
option for the nomads themselves at times of difficulties (or
prosperity). To view the 'developments' and changes affecting nomadic
groups as arising from both internal factors and external factors seems
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to be the proper way to proceed in any regional analysis. This is not
to say that anthropologists generally have been unaware of external
factors, especially during the sedentarisation process.
	 In fact the
opposite is true and governmental policies have come under severe
criticism in relation to the nomadic population.	 This approach,
nonetheless, frees us to evaluate the nomads prior to, during and after
settlement, with equal emphasis on ecology, control of resources,
existing power relations and differentiation among nomads, existing
economic and political relationships with other groups and politics and
conflict situations from whatever source. Such an approach, hopefully,
will be followed throughout this work whenever appropriate.
C)	 Pastoral Nomadism in the "Middle East"
This section will try to bring into focus the type of nomadism in the
area comonly called the Middle East. The term will be used despite
its acknowledged western ethnocentricity, partly because some
anthropologists have to some extent institutionalised the term in
nomadic studies	 The area meant by those anthropologists is not
clearly demarcated, but seems to mean Arab and/or Moslem countries
(e.g. the Arab pastoralists, as well as pastoralists of Iran and Turkey
and the non-Arab nomads of the Sudan).(96)
Khazanov, however, does not accept this characterisation. He divides
the region into two areas: the Near East and the Middle East. The
first refers to countries from North Africa to Iraq, and from Southern
Arabia up to the fertile crescent. It also includes the Sudan and the
Horn of Africa.	 The Middle East refers to Turkey, Iran and
Afghanistan. (97)
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Khazanov's typology compounds the problem of ethnocentricity, even when
it seems to be more in tune with ecological zones of pastoral
activities. This section, on balance, will be mostly guided by the
former typology (i.e. not Khazanov), because it is used by a larger
number of anthropological accounts.
In describing the nomads of the Middle East, Cynthia Nelson wrote:
"It Is a characteristic of Middle Eastern nomadic coimiunities
that they are closely Involved with a wider society, that
they interact with cultivators, traders, administrators, and
men of religion, that they depend for their livelihood,
directly	 or	 indirectly,	 on	 economic	 and	 political
institutions whose centres generally lie beyond their
ininediate vicinity, and that they share a language and a
religion with a population which extends far beyond their
area of residence." (98)
Ernest Geliner similarly described Middle Eastern nomadism as being
"symbiotic nomadism". The partners involved In this relationship are
nomads, sedentarised peasants, and urban populations 	 Gellner
also speculated that the permanence of this relationship and the
specificity of this nomadism may be the central point around which the
cultural traits of the region are built (1I3) (i.e. the Islamic
religion and the political organisation).
Another characterisation of Middle Eastern nomadism is that it is
generally multi-resource. W. Swidler stated the following about Middle
Eastern nomads:
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"The data also clearly indicates (contrary to the idealised
view of nomadic peoples) that many nomads raise cereal crops,
and are sometimes engaged in complex and demanding forms of
cultivation and marketing. 	 It is unrealistic to consider
animal stock as the only form of capital or the only means
through which nomadic people derive their livelihood.hl(l).
D	 Other Features of Middle Eastern Pastoralisui
In addition to the above characterisation of the nomads in the Middle
East as a) being closely integrated with sedentary communities
(culturally and economically) and b) having a multi-resource economy,
combining agriculture and pastoralism, there are some further features
of their pastoralism which have been pointed out by several writers:
1)	 The herds may be composed of three varieties of animals -
camel, sheep and goat. Such species, however, have different
herding requirements; which means that there is a tendency
for specialisation in herding, both within groups and between
groups 
(1O2)	
The camel herders represent the most
extensively mobile group among the pastoralists of the
region, and inhabit the driest areas. They, therefore, need
to control large areas of land, which leads to larger social
units, and more advanced and institutionalised political
organisatfon (b03)• This is basically the difference between
the noble camel herders and other pastoral groups in the
region.
2)	 The pastoralists of this region have the least rigid
migration routes among all pastoralists, because of the
51
extreme dryness of the region. This means that they usually
follow the infrequent rains and the best available pastures
in and around their territories. (104)
3) Generally speaking, the pastoralists of this region regularly
migrate to agricultural areas with which they have numerous
historic, economic and cultural ties. This is especially so
in Arabia, where sometimes the agriculturalists	 and
pastoralists follow the ancient traditions	 of joint
utilisation of one ecological zone (herds are pastured on
harvested fields). Joint utilisation of land is, however,
more important in Turkey and Iran, because agricultural
utilisation is more extensive.05
4) Another feature of the pastoralism of the Middle East is that
the diet consumed in the tents is similar to that eaten in
villages (b06)• This symbolises the universal integration of
the two productive sytems into one regional economy. The diet
is composed of both agricultural and pastoral products.
E	 Socio-Polltical Organisatlon
Most anthropoligists stress the generally variable nature of the social
organisation of nomadic groups. (107) As seen earlier, two essential
and universal institutions exist among nomads - the family and the
community. The family generally refers to no more than two generations
of adults, Consisting of husband, wife and their children, unmarried
sons and daughters(108). The family more often than not coincides with
a separate productive household. The comunity, on the other hand, is
variable among nomadic people. It has, however, two main features, i -
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being based on kinship and descent, and ii - being related to key
resources.
Khazanov lists three possible levels of nomadic communities, which may
exist in full in some societies, or only in their lowest levels (b09)•
These are the following:
The nuclear community, which generally consists of a number
of families closely related to each other and tied by herding
activities, co-operative ties, and specific rights to pasture
and water resources. This kinship group forms the primary
face to face community.
2	 A number of the nuclear communities unite to form a higher
level of community; which meets for pastoral migration (or
summer camps), the enjoyment of shared resources, and
specific forms of mutual aid and social ties.
3	 Several communities of the second order unite to make a
community of the third order, with corresponding rights to
natural resources, and various forms of social, political
and economic ties.
The vagueness of the terminology for the above comunity types is due
to the fact that nomadic societies are rarely similar in their
organisation, or In the significance they give to each level of
comunity.	 Some Turkish pastoralists for example are only nuclear
communities with no higher levels of integration (due to the strong
pressures felt from the central government). In other societies the
primary nuclear community may be organised through kinship only, or may
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include associated and allied groups.1.
Richard Tapper, on the other hand, does not believe that the
co-operative herding units (the nuclear level kinship group) constitute
a cornunity in the Middle East. For him, these are primarily economic
institutions, which are neither stable nor significant politically,
The basic community according to Tapper is the 'primary sociological
Units or the 'basic political units'. Hence the summer camp group, who
are herding associates constitute the primary community, which is
usually based on the dominant lineage with a variable number of
unrelated associates and matrilateral kin, and specific rights to
resources.
Examples of such primary comunities among nomads are the lineage
(Fakhath) among Al-Murrah in Saudi Arabia; the camp clusters among the
Kababish of the Sudan, which come from the same clan; the camps (Fariq)
among Rufaa al hoi of the Sudan (who are based on descent and led by a
sheikh); and the minimal lineages of the camp clusters of the Baluch of
Pakistan (111)
Tapper also Identifies a higher level of community, which corresponds
to the primary reference groups and may include settled as well as
unsettled elements.
	 This community is usually above the level of
shuffling, fission, fusion and structural changes.
	 It exhibits,
furthermore, considerable historical continuity.
	 Tapper speculates
that the latter comnNlnity constitutes the tribe, while the former level
of community refers to the lineage based camp. (112)
The above demonstrates how anthropologists are unwilling, or unable, at
present to generalise about the nomadic communities of the contemporary
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world, even when they are focussing on a single region. The reason is
not only the wide variety of social structures among nomadic societies,
but also that anthroplogists have not yet agreed on the structural
importance of each level of integration, nor the terminology
appropriate for each (h13)•
While discussing the political stratification among pastoral nomads in
1979, William Irons offered a hypothesis in which he linked the
political organisation of the nomads to outside political threats,
population density, mobility and the existence of an encapsulating
nation-state. His thesis runs as follows:
In the absence of serious external threat, pastoral nomads
are unlikely to develop segmentary lineage systems or
stratified politics.	 Instead, relatively small political
units are to be expected. 	 These will be equalitarian in
organisation, and shifting in composition as individuals
migrate either for economic reasons, or to evade conflict.
Some East African and Arctic nomadic groups appear to fit
this pattern. (114)
2	 In a situation of low population density, high mobility and
the need to form large groups for military purposes, the
segmentary lineage system seems to be the ideal answer for
the nomadic political structures. This is because it allows
the temporary formation of large defensive groups, while
maintaining small face to face residential units. Internal
conflict In such societies is usually resolved by relocating,
or is only tolerated for short periods (when uniting for
military purposes). Despite the existence of chiefly
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authority, such societies are unstratified. 	 The examples
Irons give for such societies are: the Turkmen of Iran, the
Kazakh, the Somali and some bedouin nomads. (115)
3	 In a situation of high population density and low mobility, a
segmentary lineage system is less satisfactory because: a)
residence groups are larger, which means more contact and
conflict among individuals distantly related; and b) the low
mobility characteristic does not allow for relocating or
flight from conflict.	 In such situations institutionalised
authority becomes much more of a pressing need, especially
when external threats exist. 	 Stratification, for such
societies, is a solution to the maintenance of internal and
external peace. It is much more likely when the stratified
institutions can also serve other functions as well (i.e.
economic redistribution, or large organised productive
activities).	 Hence stratified nomadic societies maintain
segmentation in the structure of the administrative
organlsatione (116)
4	 NomadIc groups who are encapsulated within state societies
are by definition stratified, because they can take on the
form of organisation dictated by the state. The variance in
such cases is whether or not the state retains the
pre-existing indigenous institutions or not. When the state
uses tribal chiefs, they act as intermediaries and are
usually institutionalised within the system.	 Most nomadic
societies are encapsulated with wider political structures at
present (117)
62
Despite the attractiveness of Irons 1 hypothesis, not all nomadic case
studies agree with certain elements of it. This is because he places a
great deal of emphasis on mobility and population density. 	 For
example, Sweet has described the camel herders of the Arabian sub-type
of pastoralism as having a differentiated segmentary system (118)•
This is so because their high mobility (due to their dependence on
camels ) and their need to control large expanses of grazing territory
have dictated the need for fairly large social units with elements of
institutionalised and sometimes even centralised power structures
(119)•	 The Rawala bedouins of North Arabia are a case in point,
because they were able at the end of the nineteenth century to
establish a powerful state, after they seized control of a considerable
part of the Hadj trade and organisation. (120)
The Tuareg bedouins of North Africa are another example of
stratification among camel herding pastoralists. Indeed, the types of
stratification found among them include: the noble camel herding tribe,
sheep herding vassal tribes, a semi-serf agricultural population, and
even slaves. (121) The bedouins of Arabia and North Africa, moreover,
exist in regions of low population, so stratification in their case
cannot be due to low mobility or high population pressures.
Khazanov explains the variance in stratification and differentiation as
being the result of contact with external factors. 	 He talks about
undifferentiated, differentiated and stratified segmentary systems.
The undifferentiated are fairly isolated societies closely resembling
the classical example of a segmentary lineage system, headed by Sheikhs
but with no marked social differentiation. However, they can hardly be
called equalitarian (e.g. the Berber pastoralists and the bedouins of
Cyrenaica). (122)
	
By contrast, differentiated segmentary societies
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are ones with a fair amount of outside contact. 	 In such societies
there is no balanced opposition between groups. 	 They are
differentiated according to strength, numbers and leadership. 	 The
leaders of the tribe are also given significant privileges, like the
right to best pastures, a larger proportion of all revenues to the
tribe, and a percentage of military spoils, even when they have not
been present durng the raids. Thirdly, stratified segmentary societies
are ones in which the political differentiation had been consolidated,
institutionalised and centralised. This only happens when the tribal
leadership become linked to strong external forces, which supports
their internal position within their society, or prevents further
changes (i.e. a great external danger, outside revenues, or support
from neighbouring state structures). (123)
Khazanov characterises the majority of nomads and semi-nomads in the
Near East (the bedouins of Arabia, the nomads of North Africa, and all
arabized nomads), as having been in the past differentiated segmentary
systems, led by hereditary leaders of certain lineages, with stratified
social structures. (124)	 In any case, the former analysis relates to
conditions when the nomadic groups existed in relatively less
integrated societies. The nomads of the present in the Middle East are
all part of nation states, with varying degrees of economic integration
with the encapsulating state. They, therefore, can only be described
as stratified.
5)	 Pastoral Nomadism,, Other Definitions
Lefgbure's definition at the beginning of this section was used to
emphasize what anthropologists have classically seen as distinctive and
very important features of the nomadic societies. These elements are:
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a) the autonomy of the productive unit, b) the collective ownership of
resources, c) mobility, and d) subsistence based animal husbandry.
These four attributes have been used time and again to depict nomads as
being of a particularly distinctive nature, which is either prior to
sedentary agriculture or in polar opposition to it. Such depictions
include economic and political 	 independence, egalitarianism, a
distinctive social formation (or mode of production), an association
with stateless societies, and a cultural and ideological specifity.
Hopefully, the above discussion of some relevant anthropological
contributions allows us not to identify pastoral nomadism with any
particular stage of social formation, any one political organisation,
or any particular cultural trait.	 This is especially true of the
societies of the Middle East, when nomads integrate politically,
economically and culturally more often than not. This of course does
not negate the distinctive nature of pastoral nomadism as an economic
activity, nor the importance of mobility and subsistence animal
husbandry in the social organisations of the nomads. This stance only
allows us to look at each case specifically, with a vision unimpaired
by unfounded generalisatlon.
Two other broad definitions are possible for pastoral nomadism: one
presented by Salzman in 1980, and another by Khazanov in 1984. The
first states that nomadism is the "movement of the household during the
annual round of productive activities", (125) whIch limits nomadism to
central activities rather than marginal or recreational ones. These
productive activities, however, are left unspecified; because Salzman
believes It is most useful not to define the economic activities, way
of	 life,	 social	 and	 political	 orgarilsations,	 or	 cultural
characteristics by fiat, but rather to establish them by means of
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empirical observation. This reflects Salzman's theoretical stance that
nomadic societies (like all societies) are fluid and variable, loosely
integrated, flexible and adaptable. (126) This means that all changes
and developments are mostly forms of adaptation and response to the
existing conditions and the available alternatives (127) (this will be
discussed more fully below). In this way Salzman leaves room for all
non-pastoral activities which could be fitted within the social
organisation of the nomads - like cultivation or wage labour - which
may even lead to reduced mobility.
Khazanov is less broad in his definition, but still leaves room for
variation in political and social structures. 	 He defines pastoral
nomadism as:
"A distinct form of food-producing economy in which extensive
mobile pastoralism Is the predominant activity, and in which
the majority of the population is drawn into periodic
pastoral migration". (128)
Khazanov in his definition stresses food production as opposed to food
extraction (as in hunter and gatherer societies). He also emphasises
periodic mobility (rather than constant movement), and the involvement
of the majority of the population (as opposed to specialist herders and
ranchers) in pastoralist activities.
Neither of the above two definitions specifies a subsistence economy
for pastoral nomadism. This is because there is a general acceptance
that this last characteristic was generally true of the nomads of the
past, but cannot be said to exist for all pastoralists at present, who
could have been drawn into the world market system.
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The latter definition is perhaps more appropriate to the understanding
of pastoral nomadism proper, without deflecting attention from the
varieties of economic, political and social integration exhibited by
the nomadic people. By contrast, the former only lays stress on the
'movement' aspect of nomadism, and not the animal husbandry aspect. In
this way Salzman's definition seems to be more suited to the study of
sedentarisation and the reduction of movement, which is in any case the
context in which the definition is suggested.
II	 The Sedentarisatlori Process
The process of change that affects the nomadic groups through
sedentarisatlon is often perceived in accordance with the way nomadism
as a system is conceptualised and perceived. Hence, for some,
sedentarisation is a change from an earlier socio-political formation
to a later one. (130) Some view it as a radical cultural and social
transformation, creating what might be termed as 'the sedentarisation
problem', for modern states and their development policies. (131)
Others view It as a form of adaptation to outside resources and/or
opportunities, as well as to ecological, political and economic factors
(discussed below).
There has not been a great deal of anthropological literature
specifically about the process of sedentarisation in general. (134)
This is not to say that the settlement of nomads has not occupied a
prominent position in the minds of developers, governmental consultants
and academic writers of all persuasions. The twentieth century has
seen a tremendous increase in the desire for the settlement of nomads.
Governments, policy makers, development planners, and economists have
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been, in the majority of cases, consistently seeking to settle the
nomads, as they seek political stability, economic development, and
national progress.
The agents of change in most national settings have tended to regard
the nomads according to the least informed images. So nomads are seen
as irrational, destructive, backward and a danger to the national
cohesion of the society. 	 The nomadic population, aware of and
accustomed to such treatment, tended to frustrate and resist the
programes formulated for their settlement 133)• Such happenings have
caught the attention of writers of different backgrounds, and the
'sedentarisatlon' and 'nomads' problem became a familiar subject from
writers with varying degrees of involvement with the problem.
Settlement of the nomads, moreover, as an empirical phenomenon has also
received a great deal of attention, particularly in areas where
pastoral nomadism is prevalent - like the countries of the Middle East,
Mongolia and parts of Africa. These settlement processes have been
either seen as a progressive feature of the country's development
efforts, or as political ploys by national governments to subdue their
nomadic population. (134)
1)	 Sedentarisation as a Forced Process
There are three models for the sedentarisation process, which have been
elaborated by Frederick Barth in his account of the Basseri of South
Persia (135)•	 These models correspond to anthropological and
historical accounts of the settlement of nomadic groups at different
times. All emphasise the forced nature of the sedentarisation process.
They are as follows:
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Drought and Decline In this model, the nomadic people are
seen as extremely vulnerable to adverse climatic conditions,
or the spread of diseases. 	 The loss of animals (due to
extreme conditions of drought, and loss of pastures) leaves
the nomads without their economic base (animal herds), which
in turn leads them to settle in agricultural villages. This
process has frequently been seen in arid zones, and it is
dramatically illustrated by the great Saharan and Sahelian
drought of the early and middle 1970s. This drought resulted
in the displacement of nomadic groups throughout Africa. For
example, the Tuareg bedouins are now living in agricultural
oases without any of the necessary resources to return to
pastoralism, while the Somali nomads work in fishing
co-operatives on the coast at present.
2	 The Defeat and Degradation Model	 This model has two
versions.
	
In the first, pastoral people are defeated
militarily and forced out of nomadism in the process of
internal conflict and competition over scarce pastoral
resources. The tribe that is victorious takes control of the
territory, and the vanquished tribe has no option but to
retreat from nomadism.
The second version is that governments systematically pursue
the settlement of the nomad tribes in their territories, in
order to remove the military threat associated with their
mobility and social structure.	 This process has been
recorded by various anthropologists in some of the Middle
Eastern countries, like Bates on Turkey and Irons on Iran.
It is also a current theme for policy makers of the third
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world, who seek 'national integration' through settling and
'pacifying' their tribal groups (e.g. most Arab countries).
3 The Failure and Fall Away Model In this model, individual
pastoralists who are unsuccessful in building a viable
household productive unit, and who can not support
themselves, 'drop out' of the pastoral sector. They may take
their families into sedentary agriculture, or join the
employment market. A converse model is that of 'succeed and
surpass', which states that the extraordinarily successful
pastoralists, with large herds, are not able to properly
supervise them while in movement. Such individuals,
therefore, prefer to convert their capital into fixed assets
(land usually) to reduce the insecurity associated with
livestock herding.
This 'shaking down' of the pastoral population keeps the
balance between the static pastures and the expanding human
population, as well as the alleged productive homogeneity
among nomadic groups. So in this model there are two types
of 'drop outs': the ones who 'go under' (poor pastoralists)
and the ones who 'go over' (rich landowning pastoralists).
This model has been used repeatedly by anthropologists
seeking to explain the nature of nomadic societies as well as
the sedentarisation process (Lerebure, Dahi, Swidler).
2)	 Sedentarisation as an Adaptive Process
All three sedentarisation models have been criticised by Salzman, (131)
on three grounds:
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A) They seem to be potentially relevant for a particular kind of
nomadic society, namely those which are highly individuated
and have a low level of corporateness and few mutual support
structures (i.e weak tribes). Not all nomadic societies are
so structured, and as a consequence they do not exhibit this
kind of sedentarisation.
B) The models seem to imply that sedentarisation is both
irreversible and absolute.	 Such assumptions are not
warranted by the factors inducing the settlement, nor are
they supported by empirical data. Salzman points out that
the ecological conditions are obviously changeable, so a bad
year may be followed by a good year. Similarly, a military
defeat might only be a temporary setback, because the
strengths of tribal groups and central government may wane.
Salzman also reminds us that some nomadic groups who were
forcibly settled reverted to nomadism as soon as the
political pressure was lifted (e.g. the Turkmen of North
Eastern Iran). (137)	 Furthermore, some of the nomads who
'drop out', because of a period of economic setback are only
'nomads on the waiting list' as they were described by Nader
Nadivi. (138)
C) Salzman also rejects the notion that an agricultural
livelihood is opposed to a pastoralist one.	 He notes that
"the shift between nomadism and sedentarism, and between
pastoralism and agriculture, as a current circumstance and
set of activities, is in many respects not such an absolute
break." 139	He stressed that pastoralists often practise
agriculture, and that they often retain their tribal identity
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and the nomadic ideology even in settled conditions 140)•
These elements often facilitate the nomad's continued
incorporation within his group, his access to the tribal
resources, and his return to pastoralism if he wishes.
The above considerations prompted Salzman to propose a fourth model in
addition to the three mentioned above.
	
This model he labelled
"adaptation and response" and he described it as follows:
"Sedentarisation is seen not so much as a forced, coerced,
unavoidable process, to which no conceivable alternative but
annihilation could exist, but rather as (in many cases) a
voluntary, uncoerced shift from one available pattern to
another in response to changing pressures, constraints and
opportunities both internal and external to societies" (141)
The "adaptation and response" model stresses "the options available to
actors and the institutionalised resources that largely define the
options that make them possible". (142)	 This view of the
sedentarisation process is relevant in so far as it accounts for many
modes of Integration and adaptation that nomadic groups have exhibited,
both historically and in the contemporary world. It does not attempt,
however, to qualify the changes affèeing' the nomads through
sedentarisation, nor specifiy the activities taken over by nomadic
groups (combined or single).	 The three previous models seemed to
largely stress: I) conflict situations faced by the nomads, and ii) a
transferal to an agricultural economy.
Although Salzman does not reject the three previous models, he seems to
have a markedly different view of the sedentarisation process, and of
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nomadic societies. In fact he advocates a conception of all societies
not as strongly determined and invariant, as having a clear, unalloyed
nature, but as "fluid and variable, as being loosely integrated,
flexible and adaptable". (143) The features bringing the fluidity to
society are according to Salzrnan the "institutionalised alternatives"
in every society.	 These alternatives allow people to move from one
activity to another, from one orgariisational from to another, and from
one available system to another, without being buffeted by irresistible
forces.
In non-industrial societies, Salzman sees such alternative as being
institutionalised through three means: (144)
A) A deviant minority: For example a cult group, which maintain
an organisation and an ideology quite different from that of
the society.
B) Operational generalisation: This means the existence of a
variety of ongoing activities, common among all the
population and sometimes combined in the same household. An
example would be a multi-resource economy, where everybody is
engaged in several productive activities at the same time.
C) An asserted ideology: An organisational framework held and
expressed by all members of the society, which is sometimes
acted upon and sometimes not. An example forwarded by
Salzman is the segmentary lineage ideology, which is
sometimes (but not always) put into practice.
Through this conceptualisation of society, the sedentarisation process
is seen as having a large voluntary component, which makes use of
societal resources in the form of institutionalised alternatives.
Hence individuals when undergoing the process of of sedentarisation are
only making a shift between alternative behavioural patterns,
organisational forms, and ideologies, which are in some degree already
institutionalised and available to them. (145)
Salzman's hypothesis on social structures seems to spring from the need
to represent the sedentarisation process as not always being rigid,
absolute and irreversible. Yet in so doing he seems to have lost the
ability to account for situations of conflict
	 and contradictions,
which according to Salzman himself are real situations, often visited
upon large numbers of nomads (146)	 (When settlement is a forced
process). In a society of the kind described by Salzman, conflicts and
contradictions do not have a prominent place.
3)	 Sedentarlsatlon as an Attribute of Pastoral Nomadism
As was seen in the previous section, Khazanov believes that nomadism is
not an autarkic productive system. The reason behind this
conceptualisation is that nomadism as an economic adaptation is subject
to more limitations than other economic systems. These limitations
include the following:
1)	 A limited possibility for innovation:	 Pastoral nomadic
groups are characterised by strict specialisation because
each ecological zone is usually associated with certain types
of animals. This specialization until recently was practised
within the framework of the social structures of the nomads
(i.e. subsistence and absence of technological advances),
which gave little scope for innovation and progressive
development. This simply forced the nomads to reproduce the
same highly specialised forms of production with no
modification. (This is not the case for a modern pastoral
economy). (147)
2) The delicate balance between the nomadic population, the
animal population, and the natural resources (grass and
water) means that: a) the nomads are constrained from the
intensification of the productive cycle for fear of upsetting
this balance, and b) they are often subject to climatic
fluctuation and pulsations (sic) of different durations,
which render them unable to depend fully on the natural
resources at their disposal at different periods. (148)
3) Pastoral nomads are also subject to severe natural disasters
like prolonged droughts and epidemics, which are capable of
breaking up the whole structure of pastoral nomadism and
destroying whole comun1ties.49
4) Most nomads are not autarkic, in the sense that they are
dependent on agricultural products and handicraft goods from
villages and urban centres. Pure nomadic specialisatton does
not allow for the development of the skills needed for such
necessary Items. (150)
The above simplified version of Khazanov's argument led him to
speculate that economic stability and non-autarky can be considered as
almost indispensable attributes of a pastoral nomadic economy. This
leads nomads to chose between two alternative ways of overcoming them:
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firstly by sedentarisation, and secondly through the acquisition of the
needed product from neighbouring societies by different methods. (151)
The above shows that Khazanov sees sedentarisation as a necessary
adaptive process, which is practised by nomads not only for economic
reasons (outlined above), but also because of political and social
reasons. This is due to the fact that contact with the outside world
is a necessary and inevitable characteristic of pastoral nomadism.
This conceptualisation of the sedentarisation process seems to combine
both the three early models of sedentarisation (drought and decline,
defeat and degradation, and failure and fall away) as well as the
fourth one proposed by Salzman (adaptation and response). This is
mainly due to the emphasis on the nature of nomadism as an unstable
economic system with an essential characteristic of constant adaptation
to internal changes, as well as outside elements. This basically
creates situations for the nomads, when they are either naturally
disposed towards sedentarisation, or forced to sedentarise because of
ecological or political reasons.
4)	 Some Patterns of Nomad Integration
Nina Swidler has sketched three possible modes of nomad integration
within sedentary societies in the Middle East (152) These patterns are
as follows:
1)	 Dichotomized Economies: The nomadic communities of this type
cannot combine pastoral activities with cultivation or wage
work; the reason being that land right is either severely
restricted (to the pastoralist), or highly valued (for
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agricultural production). Land is therefore only available
through sharecropping, rental periods, or purchase. For such
nomadic comunities, the adaptational process initiates
accelerated pressures predisposing them for sedentarisation.
For example, a wealthy Basseri nomad in Southern Iran (with a
limited land right) may over time convert his pastoral
resources into privately owned land. This in turn leads to
accelerated affluence, which further increases the nomad's
land investment.	 This eventually results in the total
abandonment of the pastoral economy.
	
On the other hand,
pastoralists with insufficient animal holdings "bottom out",
usually becoming tenant cultivators.
Another example of such dichtomised economies is seen among
the Yoruk of South eastern Turkey. Due to their lack of
tribal estate, the Yoruk usually rented lands, for which they
paid in cash. This involved them constantly in monetarised
and market transactions, which distance them greatly from the
classical picture of nomadic production. 	 Dichotomised
economies are further associated with strong central
authority, in which land is highly valued.
2)	 Mixed Economies:	 These societies combine pastoral and
agrarian activities, both at the household and at the
conununity level. The degree of comitment to one or the
other of the subsystems is highly variable. Such economies,
furthermore, develop in regions where there are low
population density or weak penetration by central authority,
and/or where market integration is underdeveloped.
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Mixed economies may either show an impressive capacity for
productive growth, or appear to be self limiting.
	 The
reasons are associated with minimal conflict in the
behavioural requirements of each subsystem in the former
case, or the incompatability of subsystem demands in the
latter.	 Most importantly, however, the growth and
development capacity of such economies is influenced by the
regional economic and political factors that define land
values and structure the available options. 	 For example,
land may be undervalued because its agricultural productive
capacity is underexplolted. In such cases the predominantly
subsistence pastoral community is content to practise simple
agriculture, by obtaining and sowing seeds and relying on
seasonal rains.	 Once an initial step is taken toward
irrigated agriculture (in order to stabilize the agricultural
produce), the whole structure of the agricultural activities
may change. This is because the agricultural yield may be of
marketable quality, which plunges the community into a
totally different social structure and different comitment
to the agricultural subsystem.
Mixed economies are also associated with highly variable
animal holdings. 	 Prosperity in the agrarian sector,
furthermore, tends to be accompanied by larger flocks, but
smaller herds can be kept by less prosperous families using
available household labour. N.Swidler listed as examples of
such mixed economies the Sarhad Baluch of Iran (153), who
were studied by Salzman	 in the early stages of
sedentarisation. The Baluch nomads resorted to cultivation
after the suppression of raiding in 1928, and combined the
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two subsystems with wage labour in the 1970s. 	 Another
example is the Brahui trashumants of Baluchistan (154) (West
Pakistan), who have a habitat composed of two ecological
zones: the mountainous highlands of Sarawan and the Jhalawan,
and the flat plain of Kachhi. 	 Each of the Brahui tribal
units collectively owns scattered holdings in the two
ecological	 zones, which are never contiguous strips
incorporating both attitudinal zones.
Every tribal unit of the Brahui displays a wide range of
adaptational patterns. These may be fully settled irrigation
villages, transhumant villages combining agriculture with
pastoralism, or pure pastoral nomadic units. The
transhumants of the Brahui cultivate in their highland
villages from March to November, and then take their animals
to the lowlands during the cold months.
	 They, therefore,
enter each zone at its most productive time. 	 The
considerable advantages of such a mixed economy have led to
an Impressive potential for development, with the coimiunities
embarking on technological improvements in the agricultural
sector of their economy in the 1960s. This prompted Nina
Swidler to predict that they could become fully settled,
while hiring professional shepherds for herding, if they
cannot supply the labour needed.
3)	 Intersecting Economies: These are nomadic coninunities which
combine wage labour with a pastoral economy. 	 The nomads
provide temporary labour in the sedentary sector at peak
periods in the agricultural cycle, which gives them the cash
necessary to maintain a pastoral existance, even when their
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animal holdings are below subsistence levels.
	
Such
adaptation interrupts the downward spiral for poor nomads,
and allows them to maintain their memberships in camp groups.
An example of such adaptation would be the nomadic groups of
the White Nile District of the Sudan (155), who provide the
labour needed for cotton picking from January to March, which
is also the low labour demand period of the pastoral cycle.
The wages obtained are used to build up the nomad's herds,
which eventually allow the pastoralist to abandon temporary
agricultural work.
5)	 An Overview
Two themes are apparent in the above discussion of the sedentarisation
processes among nomads.	 The first deals with the nature of nomad
settlement, and the forced versus adaptive component in the process.
The early models of the sedentarisation process viewed it as mainly due
to factors that are mostly forced on the individual nomad (drought,
decline, defeat, degradation and failure). Underlying this view are a
number of assumptions about pastoral nomadism, which emphasise its
distinctive nature (as an early social formation, or as being directly
opposed to sedentary agriculture). So sedentarisation in this case is
either an absolute evolutionary change, or a process fraught with
social, ecological and psychological difficulties. The need to view
the process as adaptive became apparent to those observing the
variations of ways nomads seem to be engaged in agriculture and
integrated within their regional surroundings. 	 This is how the
adaptive model of sedentarisation was added to the previous three. It
became, however, the complete opposite of the other three, in so far as
it emphasised the voluntary, uncoerced nature of the sedentarisation
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process.
It is perhaps unprofitable to think in such stark terms about the
different ways that nomads undergo settlement, because in every
situation of sedentarisation - voluntary and forced - there is an
element of adaptation.	 This is true for ecological disasters,
political defeats and economic Instabilities. On the other hand, the
nomads who are incorporated and integrated within a regional or a
national system are faced with economic and power relations that
structure their responses, even when they seemingly react in a totally
voluntary adaptive way. Take for example the differences between the
land policies in the above discussions of the dichotomised economies
and the mixed economies. Land value and land policies determined the
choices that nomads face, and the prospects they look forward to.
Similarly, the nomads of the White Nile of Sudan, as a group, are well
defined in their regional economic surroundings (a subsistence group,
providing occasional labour), even when they appear to be working in
perfect harmony with the sedentary agriculturalists.
This is basically why Khazanov's view of the sedentarisation process as
one way for the nomads to adapt to their inherent economic instability,
as well as their contact and need for the outside world, seems to be
more appropriate at the present time.	 This view accounts for the
settlements resulting from the disintegration of the nomadic economy
(ecological disasters or poverty), as well as the sedentarisation
processes due to the nomads' Incorporation within national settings.
This is more significant today than it has been historically, because
nomadic soclo-economic structures seem to have acquired a subordinate
position to the institutionalised power and economic structures. This
is why most of the sedentarisation processes of the present time
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reflect rapidly weakening pastoral economies.
The second theme in the study of sedentarisation processes is concerned
with the different scenarios of the quality of change affecting the
nomads (individually and in groups). Hence we may expect that nomadic
groups either exchange their subsistance pastoralism for another
subsistence economy - i.e. peasant agriculture - or perhaps add on
subsistence farming to a modified version of pastoralism. On the other
hand, the quality of change may be more drastic in the sense that
individual pastoralists, or even groups of pastoralists, may enter a
modern surplus producing economy (as producers or wage labour). The
varieties of integration are numerous, because such factors are
dependent on the regional economy and the national setting of the
nomadic groups. Focussing on this aspect of the sedentarisation
process is very useful, for it directs attention away from the mobility
aspect - a secondary attribute of nomadism - to the soclo-economic
structure, which is the most important fact of any social system.
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Chapter Two
The Bedouins and Thir_etternent in Saudi Arabia
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Introduction
The final success in the establishment of Saudi Arabia is strongly
linked to the Islamic revivalist movement wahabism, and the role it has
played in creating the Ikhwan movement and army, which was the first
experience of organized nomad settlement in Saudi Arabia. The Ikhwan
movement played a major role in the spreading of Ibn-Saud's (King Abdul
Aziz, the first monarch of Saudi Arabia) political influence outside
Najd, which has been the centre of his political power.
This chapter will first look at the relationship between the state and
the tribal structure on the one hand, and the sedentarization of the
nomads on the other. In other words, it will explore the curious
maintenance of tribalism (in a transformed shape), despite the
continued effort by the government to settle the nomads and centralize
power.
It will go on to assess the various conceptualization of nomad
settlement in Saudi Arabia, as well as describe some of these important
processes. The effort will be focused on a critical approach to the
available analyses, and not on detailed description of these studies
and perspectives. The chapter seeks, by this approach, to create a
space in the study of the Saudi bedouin settlement, for some of the
recent transformations on the national scene (i.e. the rural
development of the 1970s).
Most importantly, however, the chapter develops a theme which
distinguish theoretically between the nomad and the bedouin, and also
between tribalisrns and bedouinism. In developing this theme the
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chapter is asking the following questions:
1. Are the early sedentarization prograrrvies and policies a
detribalization of the Saudi nomadic population?
2. Has the government pursued a consistent policy of
eliminating all the multi-dimensional characteristics of
tribalism (i.e. political leadership, economic integration
and social identification)?
3. What is the impetus for the detribalization process in the
Kingdom (if indeed it exists)? Is it a result of political
processes, economic ones, or perhaps a combination of the
two?
This theme of inquiry will only be partially answered in this chapter.
It will be, however, pursued in the coming chapters of the thesis.
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1) Nomads and Bedouins
The majority of the Saudi population is tribally organized. Tribalism,
however, have never signified an exclusively nomadic way of life.t)
Early examples of sedentary tribal comunities can be seen in the
carefully recorded early history of Islam. The Prophet Mohammed (peace
be upon him) comes from Meccah, a town inhabited by a particularly
powerful tribe (Quraish) who combined commerce and trading with herding
activities and some cultivation.
The nomadic tribes of Saudi Arabia, particularly since the Ikhwan
movement, can be divided between the predominantly settled to the
predominantly semi-nomadic and those who include large nomadic
sections. 2	The majority of the tribes, however, include sedentary
and semi-nomadic sections. 3	Very few tribes at present can be said
to be predominantly nomadic. 4 Al-Murrah tribe (the camel herders of
the Empty Quarter deserts) are reputed to be the most nomadic in Saudi
Arabia. In 1975, however, this tribe included some sedentary sections,
and its members were rapidly moving towards sedentarism.5
There is a clear and often recorded cultural unity between Saudi
pastoral nomads and the majority of the sedentary population. 6 This
unity does not only come from the fact that geneology is a vital
critereon for social differentiation, for both groups, but also that
they are linked by the comon heritage of the Arabic language and
culture, as well as the Islamic religion. The nomads of the peninsula,
moreover, are linked to the sedentaries at three levels, which have
been elaborated by Donald Cole in 1973. 	 These are the following:
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The nomads are invariably linked to sedentary villages and
settlement areas, within their tribal lands. This practice is
an ancient one, whereby a section of the tribe (a lineage)
settles in an agricultural settlement and maintains close
links with their nomadic kin. The settlement becomes a sumer
camp for the nomadic section, who enjoy a proportion of the
date harvest, while taking care of the animals owned by the
sedentary section. 8	An example of such long established
tribal organisation is among Al-Dawasir tribesmen in the
southern region of Najid. Most nomadic groups at present have
settlements and villages inhabited by their kin, and
frequently utiuised by them either for permanent settlement,
sumer camp or as a home base in short distance nomadism.
This has become more comon since the hujar settlement scheme
of the Ikhwan movement, which saw at least 200 settlements
created by the Saudi bedouins.9
2	 A nomadic tribe as a whole is most likely to be involved with
a regional urban centre. 0	This integration is not a recent
development, but seemed to have been practiced in pre-state
times. The relationship of the nomadic tribes to these urban
centres is originally social and poiiticai. 1	For example,
Hail in the north of Saudi Arabia is considered to be an urban
centre for the Shamar tribe. Most of Hail 's inhabitants come
from different segments of Shamer, and its leaders before the
Saudi centralised state were Al-Rashid, a leading lineage of
the Shammar.	 This traditional relationship also include
trading and comercial activities between sedentary and
nomadic population, which provide the bedouins with tools and
basic provisions like coffee, tea, sugar and other food
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suppi ies.
The relationship between the bedouin and the urban centres
have become more vital since the establishment of the Saudi
state. 12	This is because the nomadic bedouin is hardly
self-sufficient nowadays, except in activities directly
related to herding. He needs the town for social ceremonies
(like	 marriages,	 divorces),	 legal	 services	 (conflict
resolution in Islamic courts), as well as political legitimacy
for the tribal leadership and land grants for settlement.
3.	 In addition to the above relationships irnbedded in cormuon
decent and the traditional integration between the bedouins
and sedentary villages and urban centres, Cole emphasises a
third level of integration which is a result of the bedouin
becoming a military force for the state since its early
beginning. 13	This began with the Ikhwan movement when most
nomadic tribes joined the Jihad (holy war) for the revivalist
movement Wahabism and sacrificed a way of life for their
beliefs.	 The Ikhwan Mujahidin (holy warriors) among the
bedouins of the 1910s and 1920s, gave way briefly to the white
army and subsequently to the National Guard which became one
of the most effective military forces of Saudi Arabia. It is
mostly composed of bedouins from nomadic groups, and is headed
personally by Prince Abdul Allah (the present crown prince),
which means that it is mostly independent of bureaucratic
administration.	 It also stands in perfect balance to the
army , which is composed of non-bedouins and non-tribal, the
National Guard played a very effective role in the
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sedentarization process of all bedouin groups, because
itbecame the most frequently sought form of employment outside
pastoral ism. (14)
Thirty one Saudi tribes were listed by Mustafa Falalli in 1964.(15)
Not all the them, however, are nomadic ones. In fact a report about
nomadism in Saudi Arabia in 1965 listed fifteen important nomadic
tribes,(16) most of which include sedentary, semi-nomadic and nomadic
sections. 7	Each of these tribes is closely linked to a particular
area, which is considered their traditional tribal dirah (land),
incorporating their grazing grounds and their settlements (see figure
2.1).
The enumeration of the Nomadic sector like most Saudi statistics, has
been on the level of estimations and/or unreliable statistics.
Falalli's report discussed these difficulties, and the reasons behind
them with some detail.
	 He pointed out that the state's officials,
prior to his report, had assumed that the bedouin sector amounted to 75
percent of the Saudi popu1ation. 18
	This wrong estimate was due to
the lack of accuracy in the statistical procedure, as well as the
tendency of the rural (tribal) administrators to exaggerate the numbers
of the inhabitants of their regions.
Falalli's report, which was supported by data from the Department of
Statistics, estimated that the nomadic population in 1964 was about one
million, approximately 20 percent of the total population. 9	This
estimate was widely used until the 1974 census, which estimated the
nomadic sector at about 1.9 miiiion(20), i.e. over 25 percent of the
kindgom's population.
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FIGURE 2.1
The Principal Tribes of Saudi Arabia
SOURCE : Hajrah,H., 	 Public Land Distributio n in Saudi Arabia
Longman Group, 1982
9T
The sedentarization process, moreover, has been progressing rapidly
since the 1950s (the beginning of the seven year drought period
affecting the kingdom).	 This process has been estimated in 1975 as
reducing the nomadic population annually by 2 percent 2 . A recent
estimate puts the nomads at around 600,000 of all Saudis.
Perhaps one of the factors accounting for the confusion regarding the
numbers of nomads in Saudi Arabia is 	 the fact that the term
bedouin, which is a derivation from the term al-badawah (nomadic
pastoralism) is a term used to describe settled and semi _settled
nomadic groups, and not only the nomadic pastoralists. This has been
noted in some of the official reports and surveys about the Saudi
bedouin, who also advocated that the term be used only for the nomadic
individual(22). Nonetheless, the terms continues to be used until the
present time for any individual with nomadic background, current or
p rev i ouS.
Perhaps one of the major reasons behind the above tendency is
the fact that the division between al-badawah (nomadic pastoralism) and
al-hadharah (sedentarism or civilisation) is a deep and ancient
division, even though it has been mostly a conceptual one. So even
when the nomadic individuals tend to cross the line to sedentarism
frequently and easily, they remain deeply entrenched in their previous
set identity. Connected to this factor is the strength of the tribal
identification among most of the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia,
particularly those located in the central region (Najd). So settled
and semi settled groups from well known nomadic (i.e bedouin) tribes do
not cease to be bedouins when they are undergoing the process of
sedentarization, neither to themselves nor to others.
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Since the turn of this century, the process of transformation from
nomadic pastoralism to sedentary production has been either prolonged
or brief depending on the particular circumstances of the nomadic
group's settlement. For example the Ikhwan hujar (bedouin settlements:
1912 to the end of the 1920s) were constructed in a remarkably short
span of time, and involved a decided effort by the nomads to abandon
pastoralisni (see below). Other bedouin settlements grew gradually from
summer camps to full fledged agriculturally oriented sedentarized
comunities. The latter settlements involved the bedouins in
semi-nomadic, and semi-settled activities for long periods, before any
full economic transforrnation23
Despite the sometimes great differences between the motivation for
settlement and the qualitative nature of the sedentarization process,
and even the length of the time that bedouin settlements have been
established, all bedouin settlements in Saudi Arabia are called hujar
(singular Hijrah). The term hijrah (literally migration) is the term
used to describe Prophet Mohariined's (peace be upon him) flight from
meccah to Madinah, when an attempt on his life was organised by the
unaccepting inhabitants of Meccah. 	 It symbolises a flight from
ignorance to enlightenment, and from polytheism to the Islamic
unitarian faith. It was used to describe the settlements established
by the Ikhwan nomadic groups, who espoused 	 the Wahabi Islamic
revivalist movement and abandoned nornadism for the purpose of spreading
it. The term continues to be used at the present time for any recent
spontaniously established bedouin settlement as well as for the older
ones, both officially and informally.
The above	 not only signifies the strength of the Wahabi
ideological movement, and its influence in the Saudi social life; it
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also signifies the strength of identification with particular tribal
groupings. So the settlements of the 1920s share with the settlements
of the 1970s a particular characteristic, i.e. of being bedouin
(inhabited by members and sections of nomadic tribes). Even the
settlers in and around urban centres continue to call themselves
bedouin and are perceived to be so, even when they have had no or
little experience of nomadic pastoralism.
Tribalism as a phenomenon, therefore, should be separated theoretically
from Al-Badawah (pastoral nomadism). Tribalism is much more widely
spread and entrenched in contemporary Saudi society, while pastoral
nomadism seem to be quickly disappearing from the scene as we were told
by the available data.
Another distinction must be drawn between bedouinism and pastoral
nomadism. Bedouinism signifies current or past involvement in pastoral
nomadism. In other words, the membership of the individual of a tribal
grouping that has strong association with a nomadic way of life, be it
current or recent. Major bedouin (nomadic) tribes are well know within
the Saudi context and include Al-Murrah, Utaibah, Harb, Anazah,
Shaninar, Dawasir to mention only a few. Some of these tribes include
hadhar sections as well as whose separation has been long established.
For example Shammar, Dawasir and Harb have well established Hadhar
urban sections in Hail, Wadi Al-Dawasire, and near Madinah. These long
established hadhar tribal sections do not qualify as bedouin groups,
although they are associated with the encompassing tribal identity and
organi sati on.
In this work "nomad" as a category will be used to describe those
engaged in the economic function of pastoral nomadism, "bedouin" will
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be used to describe settled, semi-_settled nomads as well as those
engaged currently in pastoralism. In other words bedouinism is largely
a social category, which has also economic and political features.
These features include a closer association with animal husbandry, and
with the social organisation of the tribe. So bedouinism stands at the
extreme end of the tribal continuum in contemporary Saudi Arabia,
because the bedouins are the least integrated within the present
economic	 and	 social	 transformations	 affecting	 the	 kingdom's
population 24 .	 At the other end of the continuum is the urban
population with either no tribal affiliation or whose tribal
identification is only operative in very specific situations (i.e.
marriages, a form of social identification).	 The latter population
within their economic setting can be described as constituting the
majority of those engaged in the modern sector (i.e. administrators,
comercial interests and skilled educated labour).
The above classification may be challenged by those who emphasise the
relationship between tribalism and the economic and social structure of
pastoral nomadism. Nonetheless, there is ample justification for such
a view point in the Peninsula's specific social formation (see below),
and especially for any work attempting a study of the Saudi nomads in a
situation of sedentarisation. For example Cole in 1980 talks about the
Saudi bedouin nomads, the sedentarized bedouins, as well as the few
bedouin merchants and the one bedouin minister whose father is still a
bedouln herder. 25
	Tribal affiliation on the other hand, is wide
spread, and is a source of identity and pride for the majority of
Saudis. (26)
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2) Tribalism and the Sedentarization Policies
A Tribalism in the traditional formation
Aswas seen in the previous chapter, the essence of the tribe is a
matter that is not totally agreed among social scientists. 	 It is
clear, however, that it may represent economic, political and social
elements for the people thus organised.
	
In the past, the tribal
segmentary system was greatly influential in the political structures
of both the nomadic and settled populations of the Peninsula. 27	The
social status of the tribe was dependent on descent and occupation.
Helms elaborates:
The formation of Social status categories was determined by
two factors- descent and occupation - perceived by the tribes
as the basis of nobility. Tribes of greatest nobility were
those which were acknowledged to be of pure descent, asil or
sharif [original or honourable].
	
They also tended to be
larger, more nomadic and militarily independent than other
tribes. Among these tribes in Najid were the Harb, Shammar,
Al-Dawasir,	 al-Ujman,	 Al-Murrah,	 Mutair,	 Anza	 and
Utaibah."28
The tribe constituted the basic framework for the individual 's social
and political and economic activity, particularly within Najd and the
interiors of the Peninsula. The tribal structure bound the individual
to descent and to the family tree (the Arab's tribal organisation will
be discussed in Chapter 3); and its leadership was manifested in
particular tribal segments (e.g. Al-Rashid of Shammar and Al-Saud of
Anazah). The highest level of co-operation and cohesiveness was
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usually obtained in situations of conflict:
"This sense of Tribal Solidarity, asabiya, formed a network of
mutual obligations among tribal members and with their client
tribes that effectively became a form of nationalism"'29
It is generally accepted that nomadic tribes could represent the purest
and most cohesive of tribal structures. This is because nomadic
pastoralism provides a most effective (and conducive) format for
economic, political and social independence. This independence,
however, is not always obtained by all nomadic tribes. In fact many of
the client and weaker tribes have been nomadic ones (e.g. the Shararat
- the clients of Shamar, Al-Awazim - clients of Al-Ujman, and
Al-Rashaida - clients of Mutair). Sedentary tribes (or sections of
tribes), on the other hand, could represent client tribute paying
tribes to noble nomadic ones, or even constitute the basis for powerful
amirates (e.g. Al-Saud of Anazah in Ad-Dariyah, A1-Rashaid of Shammar
in Hail and Al-Shaalan of al-Rawdah among the settlements of Wadi
Sirhan).30
Settlement, on the other hand, is associated with the weakening of the
cohesiveness and the autonomy of the tribe's political and economic
structure. Nonetheless, even in the urban centres of central Arabia,
the tribal structure had greatly influenced the social formation of the
population. Helms describes how sections (and neighbourhoods) of urban
centres are dominated by tribal groupings (e.g. in Unaizah and Riyadh).
Settlements and urban centres, furthermore, keep hema (protected
territories) for grazing around their settlement, not unsimilar to the
nomadic tribes dirah. Even the political leadership of the Amirates is
vested, in most cases, in sheikhly families, often
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nomadic in origin (e.g. Al-Shaalan of Al-Rawalah, Al-Rashid of
Shanimar), and sometimes from powerful settled princely families (like
Al-Saud of Anazah who had settled in the fifteenth century). (31)
B Tribalism and the new social formation
Considering the strength of the tribal structure in the region until
after the turn of this century, and its deeply felt effects on all
aspects of the individual's life; it seems sometimes hard to accept
that the state which was officially proclaimed in 1932 was formed on a
thorough (and eventually successful) detribalization policy, a
detribalization that came about through the adoption of the wahabi
ideology, the breaking up of tribal loyalties and interrelations, as
well as the sedentarization of the nomads. This is a view point that
is taken by some of the analysts of the Saudi society. Abdulrahman
Said described the detribalization process as starting with the Ikhwan
movement and the first experience of planned sedentarization:
"There seems to be near unanimous agreement that the process
of detribalization of Saudi Bedouins had started prior to the
establishment of the Kingdom in 1932. The major landmark and
the real impetus to this process, it is suggested, started
with the creation of the settlements (Hujar) of the Ikhwan,
begun around 1912.,I(32)
Said, who agrees with this idea, also asserted that the main
motivational factor in the early settlements was religion, which
weakened tribal relations and authority over the individua1. 33 So
the more comitted the bedouin is to a religious existence, "the less
tied he became to previous loyalties and ethos". 34
	Said sees the
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best evidence for this point of view in the division that occurred
within tribal groupings during the struggle between the Ikhwan rebels
and Ibn Saud. "The defection of many bedouins from the armies of their
previous tribal sheikhs in order to join Ibn Saud's army", proves to
Said the weakening of tribal relations and the superimposition of the
state's authority over tribal leadership.35
The above outlook is adhered to by many of the writers on Saudi Arabia,
especially when the sedentarization of the bedouin had been a focus of
discussion.	 For example Al-Fiar sees the sedentarization of the
bedouin as a solution to the basic backwardness of noniadism in the face
of	 today's	 technology	 and	 developments. 36	This	 choice
(sedentarization) is taken up by the bedouins themselves, as well as
encouraged by national states.' 37	Al-Fiar also views settlement as
leading to national integration and detribalization, which are basic
ingredients to the development of the rural sector. 38	Similarly, M.
Asad sees the bedouin sector and tribalism in Saudi Arabia as having
been a prime target of the early policies of the Saudi leadership.
These policies, he asserts, are desirable to contain the negative
characteristics of the bedouin social and economic structures on the
nation.
While this chapter does not wish to negate that there has been a
process of detribalization occurring gradually among the Saudi
population and bedouins, this process however cannot be seen as
originating from the early policies of the Saudi leadership. In fact,
the early policies have been utilized exclusively to channel and
contain tribalism within a context that is beneficial to the
unification of the Kingdom, and supportive of the creation of the
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central government. Some factors may be remembered at this point,
which could be seen as supportive to the above statement. These are
the following:
a. The state that has been created in the early decades of the
twentieth century is not a novel phenomenon in the peninsula.
In fact, it is the third attempt by Al-Saud authority for the
establishment of a central state in the area, which extend
beyond their traditional power base in Najd. 40 Furthermore,
the cornerstone of the support that Ibn-Saud received has been
forthcoming from townsmen and the sedentary population, and
not merely from the Ikhwan who had abandoned the purely
nomadic (and therefore extremely tribal) mode of living.41
We, therefore, cannot conceive of the state as being
established on the destroyed remains of tribalism. In fact,
the Ikhwan army has been created with particular attention to
the nature of the bedouin, and was used as a military force; a
role that could not be played by the sedentary population, no
matter how loyal they are to the Sacdi leaderskfçi. (42)
b. The Saudi state has been built on the indigenous and the
traditional basis of the unitarian wahabi ideology, and its
alliance with	 a traditional	 power base	 (Al-Saud	 in
Ad-Dariyah). Furthermore, it was consolidated and spread
through the acceptance of the indigeneous population of the
region (nomadic and sedentary tribals). Its continuation was,
at first, sought through the support of international foreign
powers (i.e. the British in colonial capacity in the Arab
states).	 Subsequently, however, it was assured through the
discovery of oil, which gave the state a stable economic
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source.	 This economic stability was instrumental in the
continued incorporation of the important sectors of the Saudi
population within the confines of the state, and the
construction of modern government and economic sectors. These
sectors, moreover, were only emerging in the 195Os 43 and
radically updated in the 1970s (after the oil price increase).
We, therefore, must recognize that the traditional basis of
the Saudi society and state were predominant until - at the
very least - the 1950s, if not later.
c.	 Most writers in any case recognize the continued strength of
the social elements of tribalism in Modern Saudi Arabia.44
This strong social identification manifest itself in the
emphasise placed on tribal affiliation, which is operative
even in urban centres. Such emphasis is activated for social
identification, pride, and in marriage situations (non-tribals
are not allowed into marriage with tribals). 	 Furthermore,
other writers also emphasise the continued role of tribalism
in the political and economic sphere (discussed below). The
continued effectiveness of tribalism, moreover, is often noted
by those who focus on the study of the rural sector of the
Saudi Society. Tribalism in this basically traditional sector
is not merely confined to social identification, but could
take obvious political and economic importance (also discussed
more fully below).
The above represent the general outlook of this study on the issue of
the detribalization policy, and the general tendency of equating it
with the sedentarization process and the policies adapted to this end.
such a narrow viewpoint is highly misleading for it ignores other
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salient factors in the Saudi society - ' namely the nature of the state,
the wide spread nature of tribalism among all sectors of the
population, as well as the continued traditionalism of the rural sector
until very recently. Furthermore, such a tendency implies an equating
of tribalism with nomadism, and "detribalization" with the settlement
of the nomads. This is not in keeping with the above description of
the social formation in the peninsula prior to the central government,
nor to our theoretical understanding of the tribe which extend beyond
the nomadic productive system.
This is not to suggest that tribalism in Saudi Arabia has not passed
through major changes, and that those changes coupled with the other
political and economic development affecting the Saudi Society are not
in fact leading to an eventual detribalization; it is merely to
emphasise that we have to look more closely at the quality of these
changes, their progress, how they have been effective in the
construction of the modern	 Saudi Society, as well as their
relationship to the nomadic sector and the continuing process of
sedentarization. 	 In other words, the impetus for the gradual
transformation toward detribalization may not be seen narrowly in
sedentarizatlon, but in wide political and economic changes.
C.	 Tribalism and the Political System
A policy of detribalization suggests a deliberate policy for the
eradication of the political, economic and social aspects of tribalism,
by a social structure radically different from the tribal one. This is
not the case for Saudi Arabia. Niblock in his discussion of the Saudi
political system criticized the approach, frequently utilized by the
analysts of Saudi Arabia, which depicts Saudi development as a struggle
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between the forces of traditionalism and those of modernism. Niblock,
instead, lays emphasis on "the extent to which the old and new are
interlinked, with both forces serving comon purposes". 4 He goes on
to assert the following:
"These parts of the Social structure which are usually termed
'traditional ' have often played a central role in creating a
framework within which 'modern' economic development could
proceed; and the oderizatior prograuines nave often
constituted a key element in reinforcing the power of the
traditional structures of authority"46
He gives the example of the close linkage between the fundamentalist
wahabi movement (and its present representatives - the religious ulama)
and the formation and continuation of the Saudi political structure,
which had responded to the changing conditions of modern times. 47 He
also lays emphasis on the role that the tribal and bedouin leadership
played in the creation and the continued existence of the regime
through to modern times:
"The role of the tribal leaderships in the state structure
between 1926 and 1947 is perhaps the most clear: in return for
the subsidies provided by the public treasury and the
recognition given by Abd al-Aziz to their leadership and
administrative authority within their own areas - actions
which strengthened the standing of the leaders among their own
tribespeople - the tribal leaders secured and maintained
tribal (especially bedouin) loyalty for the regime"48
The secured loyalty of the bedouins to the regime (through their
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leaders and a network of subsidies) allowed the government to draw them
into its military institutions, which in turn strengthened and ensured
its position among the Saudi population, 49 and more particularly the
traditional sector.
Abir in a similar emphasis characterized the Saudi political regime as
an oligarchy:
"For from being an absolute monarchy, or a desert democracy,
the Saudi regime is an oligarchy, whose cornerstone is the
principle of consultation and consensus.'50
Abir, furthermore, specified the pillars of this oli ,9archy as beig t.ie
"Saudi royal house, the ulama [religious leadership] and the Umara
[tribal leadership] 1 The position of the tribal leadership in the
Saudi political structure is seen by Abir as third in importance after
the Royal house of Al-Saud, and the religious ulama.
The tribal Amirs' position of political independence in previous times,
have declined as the power and the authority of the Saudi Kingdom and
its government were consolidated and its administration expanded.52
Abir describes the process of incorporating the tribal leadership, i.e.
50 senior tribal Amirs and a few hundred sheikhs of secondary tribes
and sub tribes 53 - as happening since 1930 (the defeat of the
lkhwan), and the increased economic power of Ibn Saud (through the oil
revenues):
"Thereafter the Amirs potential to resist the concentration of
power in the hands of Al-Saud was literally nullified.
Subsequently, when faced with the choice of either integrating
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into the Saudi provincial administration and enjoying royal
patronage, or resisting Ibn Saud and losing whatever authority
was left to them, even the remnants of the Ikhwan leadership
opted for the former course.
	
Henceforth, the tribal Amirs
became part of the powerbase of the Saudi regime and have a
vested interest in its continuity. Together with the royal
house and the Ulama they are considered to be a component of
the ruling class."54
Despite the early thcorporation cf the tra ssvirs 	 tte poSiticl
structure, the tribal leadership authority have steadfly dec'ined,
especially since the reorganization and the strengthening of the
central government and the subsequent introduction of the five-year
development plans in 1970.(50)	 The extension of the government's
administrative and welfare services to the çrovfnces, furtruore, 	 I
began to erode the authority of the provincial Amirs and governors,
which were previously the government's sole representatives (between
1930 and the 1960s) among the rural popuiation.156)	 Despite this
gradual process of erosion of the authority of tribal Amir's in the
provinces and rural districts, the Au1rs are still c siie.red the. Uc'k.
between the rural population and Al-Sauds, especially since the recent
effort (in the 1980s) by King Fand to strengthen provincial governments
and his own relationship with the tribal Amirs.'57
Helen Lackner, on the other hand, believes that the Saudi political
structure has been built on the transformation of the traditional
nomadic tribal ideology for political ends:58
"The regime's existing political structure, based on family
rule with few concessions to western educated technocrats,
'U
could not be maintained without this transformed tribal
ideology which, with the addition of religion, gives the
regime a legitimacy based on the rewriting of history"9
This transformation affecting the traditional values, she assets, has
accelerated by the mid-1960 and the 1970s, because the traditional
social relations were labouring under the pressures of modern
developments and the modernization plans. 	 The newly formed social
structures, furthermore, were beginning to emerge slowly and
uncertainty in the last decade (1970s) with very little linkage to the
traditional exi stence. (60)
Lackner, furthermore, gave some examples of the manifestation of the
transformed tribal ideology and values in the Saudi political and
social life.	 These include:
1.	 The general assumption that all Saudi's have the right to an
official position and a regular government income. This, in
her opinion, is an extension of the system of subsidies
employed by the Saudi regime.
2.	 The value of . self-sufficiency and independence, which is
reflected in the very small percentage of the Saudi
individuals receiving welfare benefits (4 per cent). This is
seen by Lackner as the converse of the previous tendency, and
a value continuous with the bedouin ideology of independence.
3.	 The wide-spread nepotism, which is seen by the Saudi 's as the
traditional fundamental duty of any individuals to look after
the members of his family and tribe.
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4.	 The confusion created at the political level, which arises
from the large number of official and unofficial network of
contact with the higher levels of the government and the power
structure.
Regardless of whether or not we agree with Lackner's conceptualization
of the manifestation of the tribal relationships in the Saudi Society,
and their applicability to the Saudi Arabia of the 1980s; her analysis
is important in so far that as it lays emphasis on the basic
traditionalism of the Saudi Society, until the more recent economic
transformation of the 1970s and the 1980s. She also lays stress on the
usefulness of maintaining a "political system frozen at a point in the
transition between tribal rule and modern political structure' 62 in
the social setting of Saudi Arabia.
The above discussion, and the various points of view presented above,
appear not to be in contradition with the statement of this study (see
B of this section) that tribal relations have maintained a strong
position within the Saudi political and social organization until
recent times. This position of strength is even more effective within
the traditional rural setting, which have only started to experience
modern economic transformation in the 1970s and the 1980s. The
settlement of the Saudi nomads (which is often undertaken within the
rural sector) is, therefore, a process heavily influenced by these same
tribal elements within the society at large, and within the relevant
political and economic processes (relating to bedouin settlement). The
remainder of this chapter will describe this process, within a context
emphasising the previous outlook, and the impact and manifestation of
the new form of tribalism, as well as the new patterns of productions
on the Saudi nomadic population.
113
3) The Sedentarization of the Saudi Bedouin
Social change for the Saudi bedouin, through sedentarization, social
and economic transformations (in the region as well as inside the
bedouin sector), have been progressing rather rapidly since the turn of
the century. In fact, the early political changes in the Peninsula
(i.e. the centralization of power in Al-Saud's hands 1900 - 1932) are
invariably linked to a strong current of change among the bedouin
nomadic population - i.e. through the adoption ol t'ne 1sanñc 'Wa'nab
doctrin and the settlement in agricultural co,aünities. These 'JR1y
ideologically motivated transformations served to i) affect major
changes to the political and economic cohesive structure of the bedouin
tribes, and ii) make the nomadic groups easily manageable and
controllable for Ibn Saud (King Abdul-Aziz the first monarch of Saudi
Arabia), who is after all the accepted leader of the religious Wahabi
movement.
Since the creation of the Ikhwan bedouin army (the wahabi warriors),
and its pledge of allegience to the authority of Thn-Said, t)?e bedo?i/t?
nomadic tribes in the Peninsula have never returned to their previous
position of relatively high political and economic independence. This
is despite the fact that the Ikhwan leadership have revolted against
Ibn Saud (late 1920s) and that the hujar scheme (the Ikhwan
settlements) have largely failed in incorporating the bedouins as
farmers. The change for the bedouins, furthermore, progressed
increasingly rapidly in the 1950s and the 1960s after a period of
decline in the previous two decade (1930s and the 1940s). By and large
the reasons behind the second burst of change and transformation have
been economical rather than ideological; and they included factors
11
within the nomadic sector and factors outside it.
The first set of factors included a series of droughts in the 1950s and
the 1960s which rendered many Saudi nomadic groups impoverished of
their economic resources (grazing lands and animals herds), as well as
major changes in their relationship to the land resource (through land
reforms). The second set of factors included changes in the regional
economic setting, which opened many other work possibilities (largely
unskilled) to the bedouin groups, as well as various efforts by the
Saudi government to incorporate the impoverished nomadic groups into
peasant agriculture (but with more modern methods of production).
The literature on the sedentarization of the Saudi bedouin (which deals
with the above periods of change) is rather abundant. 63	In fact no
self respecting work on Saudi Arabia could fail to describe the Ikhwan
movements (and its hujar settlements) impact on the social changes of
the region at large, or on the bedouins themselves. Other works have
dealt with the "modern' agricultural settlement schemes (Wadi Sirhan in
the north of Saudi Arabia, and the Haradh settlement scheme in the
eastern region). For this reason, this work is not going to take pains
in drawing detailed description of the processes involved in the above
areas of interest. Instead, the effort will be to look critically at
the major conceptualization of bedouin settlement used in the
literature, within the context of the study's approach (regional and
national setting - see introduction), and the Chapter's emphasis (see
above).
A. Induced Versus Spontaneous Settlement
One of the major conceptualizationeof bedouin settlement utilized by
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the literature is the difference drawn by induced settlement (i.e. by
political means), and spontaneous settlement. The main point of this
conceptualization is to draw attention to the nature of bedouin
settlement during the Ikhwan movement, which have been induced by
planned religious teaching from Wahabi preachers, the encouragements
offered by the political powers (i.e. Ibn Saud) through subsidies and
gifts to the settlers, and sometimes, the almost forced settlement of
some groups by the Ikhwan zealots (see below). Induced settlement also
includes the government planned efforts for the sedentarization of
bedouins in agricultural schemes.64
By contrast, spontaneous settlement means individual or collective
group settlement, which is not induced by direct government action.
Ebrahim explains:
"Collective spontaneous settlement has occurred in Saudi
Arabia since 1942 in the form of hijar. A group of Bedouins
[sic] belonging to the same tribe or lineage applies to the
government for a land grant. The land is tsal?y ?acated in
their group's tribal territory around a water well owned by
the tribe"65
When no water well exists, water is drawn by drilling, and the bedouin
community is established around it.
Another form of spontaneous settlement is the shanty towns established
around urban centres by individual or sub-group settlements, or by
group settlement around the facilities of the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line
Company, which delivers Saudi oil to Mediterranean ports. The towns of
Ar-ar, Kaisorna and Nuayrihah, in fact, were established with such a
beginning.
The spontaneously settling nomads (individually or collectively) could
go into unskilled work (as labourers, drivers or the National Guard), if
they are shanty town settlers; or they could equally be landowners,
peasant farmers or involved in semi-pastoral activities (as well as
military work) for long periods,' 66 if they are rurally based.	 M.
Ebrahim also stresses that the settling nomads continue to identify
with their bedouin status, even as their children begin gradually to
identify with their urban surroundings.67
Other discussion of spontaneous settlement have been in relation to
Al-Murrah by Donald Cole. 	 He emphasised the role that the National
Guard have played in the gradual sedentarization of this generation of
Al-Murrah.	 Some members of Al-tlurrah are regular members of the
National Guard, but most are members of its reserve sections, 68
 which
require them to be on duty at certain times. 	 The sections of the
National Guard (regular and reserve) are mostly tribally organized, in
the sense that every unit is mostly composed of the members of a
particular tribal group with few members from outside it. 69	The
stationing of these sections and visits, furthermore, follows a tribal
criterion in so far that they are usually on duty outside their own
native locality (i.e. around major cities or in trouble spots).70
Lackners emphasized another important element in the process of
spontaneous settlement, which relates to the opening up of other work
opportunities for the nomads (often poor), which require a degree of
literacy and education:
"The bedu family thus realises that the only future for the
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younger generation lies in education which will enable the
children to gain access to some of the wealth which is
available in the Kingdom. Education will also help the young
ensure a living for their parents in old age."71
This search for education and improved work opportunities and
livelihood have driven many nomadic families to settling centres, which
have sprung more or less spontaneously. 72)
B Early Versus Recent Settlement_
The basis of this other conceptualization of bedouin settlement is also
to differentiate between the Ikhwan Hujar scheme (a major nomad
settlement period), and subsequent bedouin settlement. Al-Shamekh, who
had written a valuable study on the patterns of nomad settlement in
Gasim, set out the basis of this distinction:
"The term hi jar [hujarl which was applied to the 'early hi jar'
had a religious connotation. However, this term has come to
be applied to the more recent bedouin settlements. The same
religious term has been carried even through religion per-ce
has little to do with their establishment. The 'recent hi jar'
developed out of the recent spontaneous beclouin rural
settlement (post 1930), or as a result of migration from the
early hijar. Unlike the early hi jar, this settlement process
began primarily for economic reasons and sedentary life
amenities rather than a religious motivation. These
differences in motivation, circumstance of sedentarization,
and time, are the reasons for the dichotomy of 'early hi jar'
and 'recent hijar'"(73)
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Al-Shamekh, therefore, equate "recent settlement" with economically
motivated spontaneous rurally-based sedentarization processes, which
occurred after 1930 (the defeat of the Ikhwan movement, and the
abandonment of the hujar settlement scheme). In Gasim (his area of
study), "recent" settlements started only in 1942 and progressed very
slowly until the marked increase of the 1950s and the 1960s (five
recent settlements in the 1940s, twenty eight recent settlements in the
1950s and eleven settlements in the 1960s).' 74
 A1-Shamekh also
emphasized that the decline of recent hujar in the 1960s was not due to
lack of bedouin interest in settlement, but rather an nO5cato,, of t)e
saturation of the region, as well as the failure to gain permission to
use untested and unused sites.
The increase in spontaneous collective "recent" settlement by tribal
groups, according to Al-Shamekh, is due to the series of droughts of the
1950s and the 1960s. The development and the domestic economy of these
recent settlements, furthermore, grew gradually and they are generally
much smaller than early hujar. Their houses tend to be much more
dispersed (indicating security and the nomads' love for open space).
They also average at around 399 in population.76
The most important elements of the recent Hujar economy are agriculture
and semi-nomadism. Farming, which is practiced by nearly 40 per cent
of the population is mostly for domestic consumption, with only 25 per
cent of the crops marketed. The crops grown are wheat, dates and
alfalfa. Semi-nomadic activities claims 37 per cent of the population,
with trade having the third place of importance.
A very important factor in Al-Shamekh analysis is the surprising
similarity between the economy of the early hi jar (according to the
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interviews conducted with elderly Ikhwan), and the recent ones. Both
types of settlements, for example, farmed predominantly for subsistence
and practiced semi-nomadic activities.	 Semi-nomadic activities,
furthermore, involved movement with herds; an average distance of 22.27
km in the early hujar, and 13 km distance in the recent ones.
Moreover, the basis of the establishing of the recent settlements in
Gasim was the same as in early hujar. Clans and sub-tribal grouping
desiring sedentary conditions, chose a site for settlement (within the
tribal dirah or hemma) with an existing well or some water potential,
and then asked for permission to settle and a grant to the land of the
chosen site.77
Conflict and population movement among bedouin settlers, furthermore,
were also governed by the same principles of tribal divisions and
relations. Divisions and quarrels within the settlement drove lineage
to establish different settlements, or form hamlets around a central
area. 78	The splits in tribal groups was estimated by Al-Shamekh as
occurring after five years of settlement and at a populating growth of
500 peopie.9
Al-Shamekh'sanalysis of recent settlements in Al-Gasim region is highly
valuable	 in	 actually	 presenting	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 the
sedentarization process in a regional context. 	 It is, however,
doubtful that the dichotomy of recent versus early is highly relevant,
because the only difference seen between the early and the recent
settlement process is 	 in the internal motivational factors
(ideological versus economic). Furthermore, there seems to be a marked
similarity between the social base of the settlements in both periods,
as well in the economic organization. Two additional points of
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criticism could be offered:
1.	 The category of "recent" as described by A1-Shamekh (see
above) should also include shanty town settlers and bedouin
migrants to urban centres, because this type of settlement is
also motivated by economic factors.
2.	 Al-Shamekh'sanalysis relates to the early years of the 1970s,
which, in most cases, have been dominated by a traditional
subsistence based economy in the rural sector. This has been
reflected clearly in Sharnekh's analysis; and it is also most
probable that this is not the case at present, especially
after the third development plan and the agricultural
incentives of the latter years of the 1970s. The economic
dynamic in the last 12-14 years in the rural sector is vastly
different (this will be discussed fully in chapter four).
C. Other Views of the Saudi Sedentarization Process
One of the major contributions on the sedentarization process has been
offered by Ugo Fabletti in 1982.(8 Fabietti's emphasis in discussing
the sedentarization process has been on the land reforms, and their
impact on the sedentarization process of the nomads. 	 His approach,
furthermore, was toward placing emphasis on the following:
1.	 The encapsulation of the nomads in Saudi Arabia (i.e. their
placement within a larger and stronger political and economic
structure) does not only mean a direct super-imposition of a
larger structure on a more limited one (as in Africa), but also
the creation of changes and new social dynamics within the
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nomadic community (i.e. political, economic and social).
2. A highlighting of the changes occurring through the land
reforms to the nomads' traditional access to, and exploitation
of, the available resources.
3. A tendency by the Saudi government to exploit the inherent
productive instability of pastoral nomadism (especially in
view of the arid conditions in the country). Interventions,
whether ideological, economic or by planned settlement schemes
have always served the basic political goal of sedentarizing
the nomads.
Fabietti's main contribution, in this study's opinion,is in his ability
to link the bedouins' changing social status in the process of
sedentarization, not only with their political status as nomadic
bedouins, but also with their economic status as exploiters of pastoral
resources. The changes occurring in both areas (political and
economic), during the Saudi settlement process, are equally highlighted
and linked by this approach; and we are therefore able to appreciate
the full extent of the sedentarization policies, and their felt (or
potential) impact on the settlers.
Fabietti, therefore, places emphasis on the 1925 Law abolishing the
exclusive dirah system, or the traditional collective ownership of
tribal land.
	
This law, although very significant in its implication
for nomadic groups, did not create irmiediate alterations in the models
of nomadic life. 8	This is because no immediate or total
transformation of the models of nomadic resource exploitation was
imposed upon the nomads; except in the areas of hu.jar settlement, which
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are small by comparison, and which did not take seriously the
agricultural activities (partly because of the arid conditions, and
partly because of their involvement in military battles).
Another land distribution reform in 1968 (i.e. the Public Land
Distribution Ordinance) had more serious implications for the
sedentarization process, because it undertook the task of distributing
land to the bedouins, for agricultural purposes, free of charge. By
doing so, the law in effect comp'eted the ais of tmi formatio'ns from
the traditional formation (collective tribal pastoral access to the
resources) to sedentary modern patterns of production (sedentary
individual access).
Fabietti, furthermore, took the example of the Shararat bedouins of the
north who settled in the Hail region, and who were subject to this
law. 82
 He described how the law had deferential impact on this
tribal bedouin group, with the elites and the sheikhly families
benefiting more from the law - in terms of land appropriation, and some
families virtually cut off from the process of land distribution.
This type of concrete analysis of the impact of the sedentarization
process on the bedouin group, is often not utilized by previous studies
of the settlement of Saudi nomads. For example, Al-Shamekh draws
attentiontothesystem of Igta (i.e. the traditional grants of land by
the ruler to specific individuals and groups), which has been practiced
in the case of particular nomadic tribal groups for sedentarization
during the early and recent Hujar; but he never explores the long-term
internal impact of this traditional system of land distribution on the
group.
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The lack of sufficient exploration of this important aspect of the
sedentarization process was picked up by Helms, who offerred the
following coments:
"There is nothing in any of the references that clarifies
whether or not these [the Igtas] were land grants of a
specified size. Several factors lead me to conclude that they
were not. First, most of the tribes settled within or near
their own triba dirah; second, tribal thaikhs seected the
settlement site; third, some members of nomadic tribes did not
join the Ikhwan; and finally, environmental factors varied
between sites"83
Al-Shamekh, however, have stated that the size of the land granted
through Igta is dependent on the following variables:84
A. Size of tribe.
B. Number of settlers.
C. Prestige of tribe.
D. Quality of site.
The tribal leadership, furthermore, is the one responsible for the
internal distribution of the land grants and the traditional Igta of
land donations. 85	Their position as a link to the power structure
and authority, therefore, bestows upon them additional social status
(economic power in relation to the groups' resources), as well as
making them a determining factor in the process of distribution both
for the government and the group.
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4. The Hujar Scheme: The Ikhwan Settlement
Although this chapter mostly focuses on the settlement of nomads from a
general point of view, and a specific approach; the Ikhwan settlement
scheme serves as a very clear example of the Saudi policies toward
bedouin nomadic groups, and the sedentarization policies. Basically,
the Ikhwan movement could be considered as an ideological intervention
in the structure of pastoral nornadism, and the bedouin soci)
structure. This intervention had served the specific political goals
of i) the sedentarization of nomads, in order to control their tendency
for a higher degree of political and economic independence; and ii) to
serve the expansionist need of Al-Saud beyond their traditional power
base in Najd, and within a centralized context.
There is some debate as to the origins of the Ikhwan movement of the
20th century. Helms discusses the base of the debate:
"Although Al-Saud have encouraged Wahabi doctrine among the
badu ever since the mid-1700s, it was not until the
beginning of the twentieth century that Abd al-Aziz
actively began to Islamise the badu population, in the
sense that policies of control - economic, social, military
and religious - were institutionalized by a central
authority. It is not clear, however, whether this was a
process of his own initiation or whether it already existed
and only later came to his attention."
This issue is not basically important for our present purposes, because
the historical outcome for the Saudi bedouin groups remain the same in
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either case.
What is not ambiguous at all is the convient alliance between the
religious movement of Wahabism, and the political leadership of Al-Saud
(in Al-dariya) in the 18th century. Both leaderships (religious and
political) were quite aware of the implication of the alliance
politically, and in relation to the power balance in Najd. 87 Both,
therefore, went into this alliance with a full worldly realization of
the ramification of success, on their positions within the sedentary
sector of the Najdi population, as well as among the bedouins.
This clear alliance, with a large measure of political convience,88
continued to be one of the basis utilized by the Saudi leaders
(especially Abdul Aziz) for mass appeal and legitimacy in Najd and
outside it. It became especially significant when the bedouins in the
early twentieth century began to adopt the Wahabi fundamental doctrin,
after Ibn Saud had established a good power base in Najd (in Riyadh) as
well as expanded to Hassa.
The encouragements, incentives, rewards and teaching that the bedouin
received, in order to adopt the Wahabi cause and join the Ikhwan in
settlement scheme - therefore abandoning the nomadic pastoral existence
- are also well documented in the literature by writers of different
approaches. 90
 For their efforts on behalf of the movement, and
Al-Saud political leadership, the Ikhwan received cash, land grants
(within Najd), food subsidies and naturally the political influence
associated with political and military success.
Theoretically, the membership in the Islamic (Ikhwan) community should
have equalised any social differentials among the bedouins, and
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encouraged assimilation between tribes. This was only marginally true
in the Ikhwan settlement period. Steps towards this goal included the
1925 law, which was introduced by the political and religious
authorities, abolishing the dirah system.
	
They also included the
abolishing of the client system of the tribal structure. 9	Hence,
all tribes effectively became the clients of the central authority and
paid religious tax to it.
The organization of the settlements, as seen above, was heavily
influenced by tribal relations and even by the accepted mode of access
to the resources (i.e. settlement was in the traditional dirahs). It
was also affected by the traditional status of the tribe, its size and
its relative importance in the Ikhwan movement. The basic political
transformation is seen by Helms as originating from the power of Islam
as an ideology among the Muslim Najdi people (bedouin and sedentary).
The strength of the ideology facilitated Ibn-Saud's increase in
political legitimacy, his ability to undermine the tribal sheikh's
total authority among their groups, and his ability to contain bedouin
independence through sedentarization.	 Total Islamization of the
bedouln tribal groups, however, was not attempted because Ibn-Saud
understood that the best way to control pastoral nomads was through
their leaders, and through firm political and military control.92
The religious aspect of the movement, moreover, was overpowered for
Al-Saud by political demands and power needs.
The final destruction and dispersal of the movement was due to the
contradidions between the religious nature of the movement, and its
role as a military force and a political tool for the central
authority.	 The zeal of the Ikhwan for the fundamental values of
Wahabism	 included raiding British controlled Iraq, and opposing
all newly introduced practices in the Kingdom (like the use of the
radio, telegraph or even tobacco).
The final defeat of the Ikhwan rebels around 1930 was relatively easy
for King Abdul Aziz (he adopted the title in 1932, after the official
proclamation of the Kingdom).
	 This is due to the fact that major
divisions have occurred among the Ikhwan themselves. The movement,
moreover, seemed to have outgrown its usefulness after uniting the far
reaches of the Peninsula under the Saudi authority.
5. The Agricultural Settlement Schemes
There were two planned agricultural schemes in Saudi Arabia. Both were
constructed after the periods of droughts affecting the nomads in the
1950s and the 1960s. These droughts were the ecological factors in the
process of weakening the economy of pastoral nomadism. The generalized
poverty of the Saudi nomads because of these environmental conditions,
prompted the government to initiate relief efforts in the worst
affected areas.
The first such scheme was in Wadi Sirhan, 93 which is a group of very
shallow Wadis. These Wadis were used as pasture by the bedouins from
the Anzah and Shararat tribes, who were greatly affected by the
droughts. The relief project on their behalf was started in 1959.
Food, clothing and cash were distributed to 363,200 people in the wadi.
In 1961, however, "the relief campaign was terminated and an
agricultural settlement project started". 4 The scheme involved
distributing small plots of land, the digging of shallow wells, and
distributing small water pumps at the rate of one pump to each 10 to 15
farmers. The project was supported by a training centre and some
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agricultural extension services.
Wadi Sirhan settlement project was pronounced as a failure after three
years of its establishment. The bedouin settlers mostly abandoned
their farms, and returned to pastoralism, as soon as the environmental
conditions stabilized.	 Some left the project for urban centres and
unskilled work in the military, and in the private sector.
Ebrahirn's visit to the area of the project in 1979 revealed that only
ten settlements of the original 200 in Wadi Sirhan were still existing.
Most, however, did not practice farming, and were either involved in
the military, or dependent on working relatives in urban centres.95
The main reason for the failure of the project, according to Ebrahim,
was the half-hearted nature of the motivational attitudes of the
concerned governmental officials, their lack of understanding of
bedouin needs, and the meagerness of the resources available for
sett1ers. 96 This is also the opinion of Ugo Fabietti who also
emphasize the poor technical preparation given to the bedouins.
By contrast, the Haradh settlement scheme in the eastern region of
Saudi Arabia was intended as a show piece of nomad settlement. It was
started in 1964, and was intended for the settlements of Members of
Al-Murrah tribe within a context emphasising modern agricultural
production and large scale settlement of the nomads. In other words, a
total transformation of bedouin economic structure in terms of type of
production and means of production.
The project was targeted for 1,000 families and covered 45,000 dunum,
which included a training centre and a comercial centre. The scheme
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was targeted, eventually, at individually owned productive units (4 Ha
each), which was supposed to have been organized into a modern farming
community of small holders. The Haradh settlement scheme was also
condemned to failure because of series of errors in the stages of
planning and execution.	 The deficiency was not in the resources
allocated, but in the strong western approach utilized by the
developers. This resulted in the project never reaching the final
stages of its planning schedule (i.e. in settling bedouin con!nunities).
Instead it remained as a large government agricultural project, which
was later taken over by private investers.97
6. An Overview of the Saudi Bedouin Settlement
The Saudi government appears to follow the international standard policy
towards the nomadic population, in order to increase the level of
control over them (except in Mongolia), i.e. there is a clear policy
for the sedentarization of the Saudi bedouin.
The specific nature of the Peninsula's social formation, and the clear
cultural unity between the Saudi pastoral nomad and the majority of the
sedentary population on the one hand, and the ruling regime on the
other, have affected (and slightly obscured) the set path for
undermining the pastoral nomadic sector, both ideologically and even
concretely. This is because some of the shared traditional cultural
elements between the sectors (i.e. the social aspects of tribalism),
have been retained to a certain limit (due to their usefulness and
importance), and even sometimes utilized to undermine the bedouin
sector (i.e. political control through the tribal leaders).
Furthermore, the bedouin sector's size and felt importance in the
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traditional society, and during the formation of the modern Saudi
nation, have contributed to the setting up of certain political
measures to contain the sector within the confines of the state's
authority, without appearing to seek its total destruction. Religion
has been initially the means through which the sector was incorpoated
under centralized conditions.	 Subsequently, however, specific
political and economic measures were needed and utilized to retain the
sector under control.	 These latter measures have been through an
alliance with the tribal leadership, and an ability to contain
tribalism within a safe context (i.e. devoid of its real political and
economic dynamism). The land reforms, and the gradual transformation
of the Saudi economy, as well as the increased level of sedentarization
have set the tone for bedouin settlement since the end of the early
period of nomad sedentarizaton.
In assessing the study of the Saudi bedouin settlement, the following
elements may be highlighted:
1.	 Most studies have stressed the difference between the early
settlement pattern, i.e. the Ikhwan, and subsequent
settlement patterns. The differentiation set between the
ideological and the economic motivational factors in
settlement is legitimate; but it fails to draw any
distinction between the different patterns of production
that the bedouins may be engaged in. We need, therefore,
to draw such distinctions if we are to comprehend fully the
implication of settlement for the bedouin, i.e. distinction
between a subsistence economy, a wage based economy, or an
urban modern one.	 This can only be done through an
analysis of the regional economic setting.
131
2. Studies conducted in the latter years of the 1970s have
failed to recognize that there have been great developments
within the rural sector. Ones that have moved it away from
its traditional base, into closer proximity to modern
relations of production. This, has occurred through the
land reforms and the agricultural development progranine.
We need to understand these developments fully, in order to
have a clear understanding of the gradual transformation of
economy of the bedouin sector.
3. Spontaneous versus induced settlement could be useful in
some cases of settlement; but we must recognise that in
every case of settlement there are concrete elements
pushing for the sedentarizaiton of the individual (i.e.
inducing him/her to this choice). For example, collective
"recent" settlements in Gasim, because of economic
difficulties (droughts) is not induced by government
action, but are induced by poverty and economic need.
4.	 The social aspects of tribalism appear to have been
retained in settled conditions, despite the absence of the
previous social cohesiveness and independence.
Furthermore, tribal relationships in settlement appear to
retain some of its political and economic potency. Hence,
bedouin groups settle in their own dirah, are given Royal
grants of land (independent of beaurocratic procedure, i.e.
through their Amir), and the tribal leadership is given
administrative power and increased status. Population
movement, moreover, is controlled by tribal consideration
and relationships.
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As was seen in the early parts of this chapter, we must distinguish
theoretically between detribalization and the sedentarization of the
nomads. This is because tribalism extends beyond the confines of
pastoral nornadism and is an all encompassing social system.
Within the Saudi context this is even more important because tribalisni	 I
is shared by the sedentary and nomadic population. It has also been
utilized and retained by the society at large, as well as by the
political system within centralized and sedentarized cditions.
We have also emphasized in the early parts of this chapter the way in
which the sedentarization policies, in the early stages of Saudi history,
have not actively desired a total elimination of tribalism, nor the
destruction of some of its major components (i.e. tribal leadership and
some measure of economic potency). Instead, it sought to contain
tribalism within a context that is in keeping with the nature of the
state (I.e. a traditional legitimacy through the Islamic ideology and
tribal prominence), and the nature of the society.
The rapid transformations affecting the Saudi state and economy
(through increased wealth) have brought new forms and measures of
control within the powers of the state. These newer forms of control
(i.e. through economic and political incorporation, land reforms,
planned modern schemes for bedouin settlement) have been operative
quite frequently in the case of the Saudi bedouin, especially since the
development plans have been targeted to the rural and traditional
population (i.e. post the 1970s oil price increase). These emerging
patterns of production may be seen as a further important element in
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the gradual transformation of the traditional-rurally based population.
In this sense, they are an added and most effective element in the
gradual process of detribalization and transformation of the
traditional society.
We need to look at these emerging patterns of production nationally,
and specifically among the nomads, in order to understand the
sedentarization process, as well as the social transformation of the
bedouin sector.	 This should be done not only through focussing on
previous or current paths of social transformation in the bedouin
sector, but through a thorough examination of the available economic
options, and their social impact when practised. This is the task set
out for the remaining chapters of this study.
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Introduction
Common practice dictates that methodological issues occupy a small
section of the introductory pages of any work. In studies involving a
period of fieldwork, this practice means that issues like sampling, the
interviewing process, and sources of information are given the briefest
of treatment. This study, however, would like to highlight these
issues more than is customary. The reasons behind this decision are
the following:
1.	 Many text books exist which tell us how to conduct fieldwork
and research projects.	 These, however, may differ
considerably and tend to present a single approach to
methodology. (1) 44s a result, th sca r€s€cc'ac s
constrained by a need to follow a particular method, and
frustrated if particular obstacles exist, which prevent
him/her following the set route. Sociological research
enterprises, moreover, tend to ignore how vital it is for the
inexperienced social researcher to know precisely the
circumstances of the "doing" of social research The
standard treatment of methodological issues prevents us from
gaining valuable knowledge about how methods were followed
and how obstacles were overcome.
2. The emphasis on the "scientific" nature of sociological
enterprises places "the persons" and the "circumstance" of
research projects at the periphery of sociological research,
and its results Yet in reality this is rarely so, and
it is not the case in this work (see last section of this
chapter). Besides the obvious fact that the researcher is
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entering the process of study with a hypothesis that needs
supporting, he/she is also entering a process of engagement
with the "persons" and "social factors" that comprise the
object of study. The implications of this engagement are:
A)	 We cannot afford to ignore the role of interaction
between the observer and the observed. Any object only
gains its objectivity through the process of being
observed (4), That meacs that th frwe c1 rirence,
for the observer and the observed, are as important to
what is being discovered, as the technique through which
the investigation is being carried out.
B) Any resi1tthg kwiwedge Is ocy oi'e possibSe 'version of
the truth, or of the "objective" reality of the studied
object. (5)
The above became significant throughout the period of
fieldwork for this present study.	 It became, therefore,
important that methodological issues be highlighted and some
of the facets of the engagement be relayed.
3.	 Female researchers are faced with particular problems,
especially when the social environment surrounding the object
of study places an extra burden of customs and role models on
the female researcher. These rules and customs Snot only may
act as obstacles to the course of investigation, but are also
in themselves, facets of knowledge. Moreover, they need to
be highlighted for the benefit of future, similarly placed
female researchers.
1141
This chapter will be divided into two sections. 	 The first will deal
with the region of study, and more particularly Sajir, the locality of
the investigation.	 Some of the basic data and information will be
presented, which will serve as the background for further accounts in
the later chapters of the thesis.
The second section will deal with the methodological issues, like
sources of information, sampling and the interviewing process. 	 The
last section of this chapter will give an account of some aspects of
the "engagement 1' during the fieldwork period.
I The Region of Study
Asser is the region in which Sajir and the surrounding villages and
settlements are located. Asser lies west of Al-Washim region (the city
of Shagra and the surrounding areas), north of the town of Al-.Dawadmi,
and south of Al-Gasim region. It may be thought of as being nearly in
the centre of Najid, or the central region of Saudi Arabia. (See figure
3.1).
Asser is an agricultural region, rich in its water resources and soil
conditions. tt is also well placed between major urban markets like
Rlyadh, Gasim and Al-Dawadmi.
	
Its position along the major highway
connecting the northern region to the capital of Saudi Arabia has been
very beneficial to the spread of a reasonable level of modern amenities
and services. Asser has more than 40 villages and Hijars situated in
it. These vary in size considerably, but none reach a town or city
level in terms of population size, organisation or services. The older
villages (established before the Ikhwan movement) are traditionally
farming comunities, which have decreased in terms of size during the
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FIGURE 3.1
Location 
.2L Asser1
SOURCE ffajrah, H., Public Land Distribution in Saudi Arabia,
Longman Group, 1982,
1. Asser is spelt as AL - SABR in this figure. It has
been also spelt as AL - SERB and. ASSERR.
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early decades of the establishment of Saudi Arabia, through the effects
of rural-urban migration. 	 Some previously long existent comunities
are reduced at present to a handful of households.
Most of the other villages and bedouin settlements, however, had
benefited greatly during the 1970s and 1980s from the state initiated
push for the development of the rural and agricultural sector.
Settlement of these villages and hujars had been encouraged through the
new incentives created in the 1975 development plan for an enlarged and
more productive agricultural sector (these will be discussed more fully
in chapter 4). This was especially true of the villages and hujars
that included larger areas of arable land within their traditional
boundari es.
1) Sajlr In Perspective
Sajir is the largest Hijrah (bedouin settlement) in the region of study
(around 18,000 inhabitants). It is located right on the road
connecting Al-Dawadmi to Al-Gasim's two major cities: Buraidah and
Aunaisah. That road was paved in the 1960s and has been an
Instrumental element in the growth and development of Sajir and the
other settlements and villages surrounding it.
Sajir is called by its inhabitants the capital of Asser. This is
sorely resented by other residents of older villages and similarly aged
bedouin settlements. Nevertheless, Sajir is the centre of all the local
government agencies, as well as of most of the comercial activities.
If some of the other villages and settlements in Asser have any
governmental offices, they are usually smaller than the ones in Sajir.
Sajir's claim to fame is based in its role in the history of the Ikhwan
movement. It became one of the major hujars for the Utaibah tribe, and
in the past supplied around 800 warriors for the Ikhwan battles. It
was also partly involved in the Ikhwan rebellion of 1929 and 1930
against Ibn Saud. Another claim to fame came after the November 1979
incident of the Holy Mosque in Meccah (Al-Haram Al-Sharif). A group of
armed muslim fundamentalists siezed the Mosque, occupied it for a few
days, and began to broadcast messages against the government. This
group, which was composed of a mixture of Saudis and non Saudis, was
quickly defeated, and its members tried and executed.	 Its military
leader, however, was a native of Sajir, who is believed to be related
to some of the early rebels of the 1920s. 	 Sajir subsequently
experienced some tightening up and strengthening of the local civil
defence organisation, and some suspected sympathisers were arrested.
This issue, nonetheless, was not on this study's agenda, nor was it
attended to by the inhabitants. In fact they displayed the customary
loyalty and nationalism toward the political system.
Before discussing the founding and the history of Sajir, a brief
discussion of the qabilah (tribal) social organisation is necessary;
both in general terms, and more particularly the organisation of the
Utaibah tribe.
	 There are some different approaches to the
representation of the tribal social structure. Such variance reflects
not only the historians' and anthropologists' own viewpoint, but also
how the organisation is represented by the members of the tribe itself.
The Arabs' representation of al-qabilah social organisation and
segmentation is through the medium of the Arabic terminology for the
various parts of the human body. This reflects the image of descent
from a comon ancestor, and also a feeling of organic cohesion.
	 The
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terminology used by the Arabs for the various levels of segmentation is
the following:
1. Qabilah: The mother tribe or the macro level of social
organisation.	 The word comes from the term qablat al-ras
(the front of the head or the face) 	 It is the paramount
element of the social identity, and it also encompases all
lower levels of segmentation.
2. Aamarah: This term literally means the upper part of the
human torso (chest and neck) or a large building. This may
be represented by the term sub tribe, or a maximal lineage
group. It is not, however, a term always used by tribal
members to describe their own social organisation. Variance
in the use of Aamarah depends of the size of the tribe, and
the way it is actually segmented.
3. Al-Batin: Literally meaning the abdomen of the human body, it
is often represented by the term clan or major lineage. The
numbers of batins in any tribe or sub-tribe vary in different
social organisations.
4. Fakhath: The next level down from the clan or al-batin. The
word literally means thigh, and it is often translated by the
terms lineage or minor lineage. Lineages derive their origin
from a male ancestor, who lived about five generations ago.
This level of social identification is the most significant
for the tribal members within their own group. A lineage may
average around fifty households, but could increase in size
greatly.
5. Hamulah: A group of related kin; sometimes represented by the
term minimal lineage, which is a section of the lineage.
6. Al-bait or Al-'ailaii: The individual household, or family.
The most basic unit of the tribal social organisation, which
consists usually of an extended patriarchal family (elderly
mother and father, their Sons and their Sons' wives and
children).
As was mentioned before, this structure is not utilized in full to
represent particular tribal structures by the tribal members themselves
or by outsiders.	 Donald Cole described the social organisation of
Al-Murah tribe as composed of seven clans with each forming four to six
lineages	 Descriptions of Utaibah's social structure are no Jess
varied, in terms of the terminology used, the actual segmentation, and
also the names of the segments. Hamad Al-Jazer, the most distinguished
of Saudi historians describes Utaibah as having two sections -
Al-Bargah and Al-Rugah. Each in turn is divided into a large number of
lineages. Another representation pointed out also by Al-Jazer is a
subdivision of each large section into two sub sections (major
lineages), which in turn are divided into lineages
Al-Jazer does not use any specific terminology, but others do.
Al-Falaill, for example, described Utaibah as having two batins, each
divided into eight to ten fakhaths (two levels of segmentation) (8)
Hussain Al-Sajini agreed as to the two batins, but saw each of these as
divided into three fakhaths, each of which in turn incorporates a
number of hamulah (three levels of segmentation).
Figure 3.2 represents the social organisation of Utaibah as identified
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by the local tribal members. Extensive interviews with several of the
elderly original founders of Sajir and some of the local experts
revealed more complex levels of segmentation (or integration), and a
tendency to utilise all of the levels of the social organisation of
Arab tribes.	 This is due to the large size of Utaibah. 	 If we
consider for instance that one Fakhath (Al-Hanatish of Sajir) numbers
around 18,000 persons, and that another (Al-Hofat) occupies three
separate settlements, it is no wonder that Utaibah needs all of the
available levels of social organisation.
Hamad Al-Jazer named 27 lineage sections of Al-Rugah (10), some of
which are harnulahs in Sajir. For example he named Thawi-Muhaiya, who
are the leading hamulah in Sajir (The Amir's family), and also
Al-karashmah, who occupy a separate hamlet of Sajir. 	 Those two
hamulahs, however, were never mentioned as separate fakhaths by the
local experts, despite being very large minimal lineages or hamulahs.
The representation, nonetheless, shows a degree of fluidity in the
tribal social structure. Al-karashmah themselves maintained that they
are a separate lineage and named themselves as such, which is a
reflection of their lineage's rapid growth, in terms of numbers and
importance.	 Comonly, however minimal lineages or hamulahs never
identify themselves separately from their Fakhath or the major lineages
they belong to.
Sajir, by all accounts, (11) was established in the same year of the
battles of Turbah and Khurmah, which heralded Ibn-Saud and the Ikhwan
entry into Al-Hijaz. These battles occured around June of 1919. These
accounts seem to be reinforced by the fact that no mention of Sajir and
its military leaders is ever seen during the period before this date.
Sajir in the heyday of Al-Ikhwan used to supply Ibn Saud's army with
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800 mounted warriors (12)•	 A sister settlement of Al-Hofat was
established in the same year, but was substantially smaller. Only 300
Hofat warriors joined the battles of Ikhwan. Despite the fact that a
bedouin settler of Sajir insisted that the settlement of Sajir had been
established long before the Ikhwan movement,
	 his own testimony
repudiates this claim. He stated that the permission to establish the
settlement had been granted to Al-Hanatish by Ibn Saud. 	 What this
means is that Ibn Saud had already established his authority over the
tribe, which suggests a date after 1912 (when the first llkhwan
settlements were established).
Sajir had passed through a series of consecutive leaderships, of which
Al-Muhaiya leadership was the most prominent and enduring, according to
the present Sajirans.	 This seems to be, however, 	 a function of
selective memory (13) and the fact that Al-Muhaiya leadership has
lasted since the begining of the 1930s. 	 Ausailah, the sister
settlement for Al-Hofat lineage was established in the same year, and
had passed from the leadership of Ibn Merwi to Ibn Twaig, and finally
to Ibn Tune, the present Amir.
Both of these settlements were in the past of a source of irritation
and intimidation for the surrounding villagers in the region. This was
due to their excessive zeal for the ideology of Ikhwan, and their total
absorption in its military battles.	 The villagers of Al-Burud, for
example, would receive bedouin zealots from Sajir and Ausailah, who
would strongly advocate a certain type of Islamic dress and/or
intimidate them into sending mounted fighters into the Ikhwan battles.
Not more than three men in this village have ever actively espoused the
cause, or gone into battle, despite being on the side of Ibn Saud all
along. (14)
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2) Sajir at Present
Nothing visually can dispose the traveller to think of Sajir proper as
a capital of anything, or as having as large a population as it really
has.	 It is a sleepy, dusty, fairly large village that sprawls for
about five kilometres along a major highway. Modern buildings stand
side by side with traditional and mud houses, with the majority facing
the road. The development of Sajir seems to have progressed along the
highway, with almost	 all of the comercial and governmental
institutions competing for attention and accessibility along it.
There is, nonetheless, a perceptible new tendency to develop Sajir in a
more regular pattern toward the western side of the road. J4ost of the
schools, residential houses, and amenities are in the process of being
congregated in this direction. Sajir is also developing in leaps and
bounds, with every visit revealing substantial changes and newly
erected buildings. It is conceivable that the ten coming years could
see Sajir changing beyond recognition.
The strength of Sajir lies in the extensive agricultural land
surrounding it, especially to the west of the settlement. During the
field work, there were two major paved roads leading only to the
western farming regions of Sajir. These roads, however, stop about 30
kilometres from the highway, which is hardly sufficient for an
agricultural region extending more than 100 kilometres from east to
west. The farms and hamlets of Sajir, moreover, are not always located
near those two roads. To reach them one has to travel on desert tracks
for a considerable time before arriving at the destination.
The majority of Sajirans do not live in the settlement itself, partly
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because they prefer to live on their farms or in outside hamlets, and
also because Sajir does not seem to encourage residential living. It
does not have a nucleus around which amenities, roads and houses
congregate, unlike older and more traditional villages and settlements.
In such villages, the mosque is the focal point from which all other
functions radiate. There, the area in the middle of the settlement is
where the older houses are located, children are found playing, and men
congregate in the evening to drink coffee and discuss matters. Sajir by
contrast sprawls without any coherent pattern, except that of the
comercial logic, and accessibility of the highway.
Sajir has the foil owing administrative functions:
1. The Amirate of Sajir, which ho3ds controJ DJ)Jy DVeY' t)
settlement itself and the secondary hamlets.
2. The Police, which serve a larger area than Sajir, extending
over all the smaller settlements and villages in the region.
The police, however, are connected administratively to the
Amirate, which means a measure of power in the hands of the
local administrators.
3. The Civil Defence Centre. 	 This deals with fires, natural
disasters and rescue operations, as well as other functions
relating to the Ministry of Interior's role in the locality.
The centre also serves all of the villages and settlements
nearby.
All of the above local agencies are directly connected to the
Ministry of Interior in Riyadh.
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4. The Rural Council, which administers all the affairs of 41
villages, settlements and hamlets.	 The council 's functions
relate to town planning , electrical power, roads, sanitation
and the issuing of permits for all matters relating to
construction and comercial activities. The Rural Council is
attached to the Ministry of Rural and Bedouin Affairs.
5. The Regional Offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and the
Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank. These provide the
extension services needed by the farmers of more than 20
villages, settlements and hamlets, as well as providing
credit services and some trained personnel.
6. The Social Services Regional Office. This services more than
30 comunities in the area.	 The office services include
monthly payments to the needy (widowed females, the disabled,
and poor families), as well as providing financial help to
those who suffer from any natural disasters.
In addition to the above local government agencies, Sajir has six
schools, providing elementary education for boys and girls (two
separate schools), secondary schooling (two separate schools), one
high school for boys, and one teacher training school for girls. There
is also one fairly large medical clinic, which does not, however,
provide full services. People in the area with serious illnesses have
to go to one of the larger cities like Shagra, Dawadmi and Aunaisah.
There is also a local court.
None of the above functions have large organisational structures. Most
of them are housed in small buildings (sometimes traditional brick
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ones) with a small number of employees.	 What is provided is a limited
service, as well as a source of employment for the local people,
especially the male high school graduates. Local people sometimes
complain of long waiting periods for essential services as well as the
need to exert pressure on the central governmental agencies in Riyadh,
which in turn provide the funds and the necessary organisational
structures for the needed amenities.
Having these services based in Sajir is a source of irritation and envy
for the people outside it, even when they are as close as fifteen
kilometres. They perceive these services as being monopolised by the
inhabitants of Sajir, in terms of benefits and employment. The dearest
wish of people in other settlements, for example, is to have their own
high school or teacher training school for girls, as well as SAAB or
MAW offices. These feelings exist among other bedouin comunities as
well as the sedentary villagers. 	 Visits to Ausailah and other
settlements showed this tendency very clearly. In some cases the
people of Ausatlah and Al-Burud, the closest two comunities, preferred
to boycott certain local offices or schools rather than accept the
necessity of depending on the ones in Sajir.
This generaitsed tendency creates a degree of confusion in the
administrative organisations. For example, the people of Al-Burud
refuse to rely on the Sajir local administrative office for the
education of girls. Instead their girls' school is administratively
controlled by an office in Al-Dawadmi (more than 100 kilometres away).
Ausailahs' girls' schools are also not controlled by the Sajir office,
nor by Al-Dawadmi office. They are instead, affiliated to the one in
Shagrah (approximately 100 kilometres distance). Moreover, people with
minor ailments travel long distances to larger clinics or hospitals,
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rather than taking advantage of the one in Sajir. The same tendency
seems to affect other facets of the local administrative functions,
which creates an atmosphere of distrust and division. Sajirians,
however, are unaffected by such feelings, despite having the same
measure of antagonism toward other settlements and villages. They take
comfort in knowing that they have the most important settlement in the
surrounding area, and the most conveniently located. In 1983, the area
of 41 settlements served by the rural council had the following
industrial and comercial activities:
- 24	 brick laying factories.
-	 5	 welding shops
- 14	 shops for mechanical work
-3
- 12
- 117
- 78
-6
-7
- 16
-2
-1
-1
car sale shops
petrol stations
business ventures
restaurants (adjoining the petrol stations)
butchers
bake ri es
dressmakers (for men and women)
barbers
water bottling plant
carpeting shop
Despite not being able to have access to data relating to Sajir
specifically (It does not exist), the above functions are located
mostly in 7 of the 41 settlements in the area. Sajir is the locality
for substantial numbers of the most important commercial and industrial
activities , especially the ones relating to agricultural machinery and
services. Nearly all of the above activities are employers of a
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foreign labour force, composed of other Arab nationals, Pakistanis,
Indians, Afghanis and Philipinos. 	 The local people are owners of
comercial enterprises, and/or civil employees.
The nearest sedentary villages and bedouin settlements to Sajir,
visited during the field work period, are the following:
1. Ausailah: The bedouin settlement of Al-Hofat lineage of
Utaibah, it is fifteen kilonetres south west	 acct
is located directly on the main highway (population 1,800).
2. Al-urud: A sedentary traditionafly farming village about 300
years old, also 15 kilometres south west of Sajir. Its 800
population come mostly from a lineage from Harb, who also
hold the leadership of Al-Burud. Other tribal groups live in
the village, and some are closely related to the dominant
lineage by a process of intermarriage.
3. Artawi Al-Ragas: Another settlement for Al-Hofat, 18
kilometres south from Sajir (3 kilometres from Ausailah).
Population 900.
4. Al-Khofafyah: Another Hofat settlement, 36 kilometres south
of Sajir. Population 360.
In addition to the above fully fledged settlements and villages, five
bedouin hamlets on Sajir's agricultural lands were visited. These are
the following:
1.	 Al-Tasrir: 35 kilornetres into the farming lands of Sajir.
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This is inhabited by Al-Ghadhabin, who are variously reported
as numbering 170 or 500. A more realistic number, based on a
field visit, would be somewhere in the middle of the above
esti mates.
2. Al-Hobabyah: About 20 kilometres away from Sajir. Inhabited
by Al-Karashmah, who number around 400 persons.
3. Al-Dyaryah: 30 kilometres distance from Sajir. Inhabited
by Al-Hizman lineage who number around 400 persons.
4. Al-Rajhyah: 40 kilometres distance from Sajir. 	 Also
inhabited by Al-Hizman.	 Its population is not precisely
known, but may be similar to Al-Dyaryah, if not slightly
more.
All of the above hamlet settlements lie west to Sajir proper, on the
extensive farming lands of the settlement.
Section II
1) Methodology and the Interviewing Process
I initially became interested in Sajir during visits to my native
village of Al-Burud, during the latter years of the 1970s.	 This
bedouin settlement was growing substantially both in size and
importance, and was gaining a reputation for being an example of a
successful voluntary agricultural settlement for a bedouin coniiiunity.
My interest intensified when furnished with some basic knowledge of the
settlement's history, and its role in the Ikhwan battles for the
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unification of the kingdom.
In the endeavour to make Sajir the target bedouin community for this
study of sedentarization processes, and the agricultural sector in
Saudi Arabia, I was encouraged by my connection to Asser, and more
particularly to Al-Burud village.	 I imagined that the social
difficulties for a female researcher would be substantially lessened by
such a basic connection. 	 That, however, did not prove to be the
reality of the situation. In fact, the whole endeavour became partly an
effort to combat the limitations imposed by my identity and my social
and cultural connections to the region.
These limitations will be discussed more fully in t(e fin& part of
this chapter. Suffice it to say here, that the eventual decision to
focus on issues derived mainly from the interviews conducted with the
bedouin farmers, was in part due to my inability to gain full access to
the responsible local agencies of the government, the male dominated
working place, and the whole of the significant social environment.
Even the interviewing process was limited by the social restrictions
governing male-female interaction and the woman's place in the social
order.
It is partly due to these difficulties, that the fieldwork period
extended longer that expected. The initial pilot study was carried out
in December 1982 . During 1984 and the larger part of 1985 I made a
series of short and extended stays in the region. The period between
April and June of 1985 was dominated by the process of interviewing the
bedouin and sedentary farmers.
The data upon which the whole of the latter part of this study is based
were obtained through the following sources.
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(1)	 The central government agencies that play a vital role in the
national development of the agricultural sector. These are:
A - The Ministry of Agriculture and Water
B - The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank.
Data obtained from the above agencies were in the form of
published and unpublished reports and official data relating
to the state of agriculture generally, and more particular
information about the region of the study. This data forms
part of the discussion in chapter four of this study.
(2)	 Data was obtained from the local governmental agencies.
These include: The Amir's office, the offices of the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Bank, the local
municipal authorities (the rural council), and the local
educational institutions. Related information was also
forthcoming from the social security office, and the medical
clinic.
From the above offices, data was gathered about the
population of the region and comercial functions, the
agricultural and pastoral activities, and the basic outline
of the region's statistics. Some of this basic information is
relayed in the previous section of this chapter. The major
part, however, forms sections of chapter six and seven of
this study, which deal with the agricultural and the
livestock breeding activities.
159
Despite the fact that the process of the interviewing of
local officials and the gathering of information was mainly
conducted over the telephone or by written messages (see last
section of this chapter), I found that the offices of the
Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Bank, which deal
with economic matters, were the easiest to penetrate. The
Arnirate offices, which employ the most prominent of the local
inhabitants, were able to provide basic statistics and
information, but were never avi\a\e for proonged
interviews or discussions, even in written form. This may be
due to the political and sensitive nature of the Amirate
offices and the fact that their employees are traditional
local people. The agricultural services offices, by
contrast, are employers of urban and more trained personnel,
who deal with less sensitive matters.
(3) Data and composite information about Sajir was also enhanced
by a series of visits to all of the nearest villages and
settlements. Such visits provided valuable information about
the relationship of Sajir and its population to other
settlements and comunities. It also provided a better
knowledge of this settlement by a process of comparison with
other settlements, settlers and other social factors. This
was particularly true in the case of the land distribution
systems (discussed in Chapter 6) and the process of
segmentation in the social organisation (discussed in the
previous section of this chapter).
(4) Data was also obtained through a process of group discussions
and personal interviews with the farmers in Sajir. The group
i6o
discussions provided an early basic knowledge of the
conditions operative in agricultural regions.	 They also
illuminated some of the particular issues and problems that
are significant for Sajir's farming conuiunity. The process
of group discussions was never planned in the early period of
the fieldwork, but seemed to evolve naturally during
prolonged visits to farms or farming hamlets at the outskirts
of Sajir. During such visits, all the neighbouring farmers
would be invited by the host household. 	 They tended to
remain after the meal, and out of curiosity would join in the
discussion with the host farmer. The early group meetings
were invaluable in the planning of the questionnaire and the
personal interviews. They remained a vahiable too? fo the
fieldwork, and could be easily arranged through the kind
assistance of some friendly farmers.
A similar group discussion was arranged with the managers of
the large farming operations. These foreign managers (one
Jordanian, two Americans) had long experience of farming in
the region, as well as a high level of skill and expertise.
Their views and perception of the farming operation, and the
practices employed by the bedouin farmers, were invaluable in
creating a more balanced view of the situation.
More than 45 personal interviews were conducted with bedouin
farmers, 38 of which were according to the final form of the
questionnaire. The personal interview questions consisted of
76 items of inquiry (see appendix 1), which were designed to
shed light on the following issues:
i6i
1 - The settlement patterns as experienced by the bedouin
community of Sajir.
2 - Forms of economic adaption and social transformation
operative among the bedouin farmers in Sajir, both
within the traditional structure (pastoralism) and in
the modern sector (employment and agriculture).
3 - Basic information relating to the farming operation, in
terms of land, labour, cultivation and production of
agricultural goods.
4 - The perception, attitudes and commitment of farmers
toward the agricutura opratiov.
The sampling process was originally conceived as being through a random
selection of farmers from the lists of names available from the local
offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Bank. This
proved to be a very naive plan, in as much as it assumed that the
farmers could be located, reached and finally interviewed. No plan
could have been further from a correct estimation of the reality of the
situation. Sajir and the surrounding area does not have a developed
postal service.	 As such, there are no addresses to be found or
reached. The majority of farms, furthermore, are in remote desert
areas, which means that only a very well informed or long time resident
could find the way to these farms. Engaging the help and services of
such a person was not possible in this case (see last section of this
chapter).
The early attempts at random interviewing proved also very
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unsuccessful, because of the lack of a link to the chosen households.
With hindsight, this should have been expected because of the abrupt
manner of those attempts. The early rejections, nonetheless, were very
discouraging.
Not having the links to direct my halting efforts into the direction of
personal interviews, another plan took shape. I would start at the
centre and work my way toward the outskirts of Sajir, in a process of
random visits to farming homesteads, until my sampling quota was
satisfied. This again proved to be an unsatisfactory plan because of
the following reasons:
1) There was a great deal of uncertainty in its implementation,
in terms of both the physical surroundings as well as the
eventual outcome. Desert tracks may appear strong and
decisive at first, but they have a habit of dividing and
subdividing until they sometimes disappear completely.
Secondly, even when a homestead is reached, there is no
guarantee that acceptance is forthcoming. Finally, the need
to have an established link to the farming households and
some sort of companionship of the "male relative" variety
(see the next section) was also becoming very clear.
2) I also wanted to include a larger number of the newly
sedentarized bedouins in my sample. This meant that I would
have to go further into the more remote and newly settled
farming areas. Working from the centre would prejudice the
sampling process toward the older settlers of Sajir.
For the above reason, no further attempt at random sampling was made.
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Instead, the "snowball" sampling method was adopted. Once access to
individual homesteads was achieved and a definitive link was
established, all further interviews were solicited through the
assistance and guidance of the previous interviewee.	 This method
proved very effective, because I caine recommended by neighbours,
acquaintances and also usually accompanied by a son of the previously
interviewed farmer. 	 "Snowballing", however, in this case was a time
consuming process, which required a great deal of pleasant socialising
and prolonged visits to establish trust and friendly intentions. These
visits, moreover, had to occur in the afternoons and/or weekends when
the heads of the households were back from work.
A further 25 interviews were conducted 	 the detr frrs of
Al-Burud. The sample this time included nearly all of the farmers in
this village, and it was substantially easier to achieve than the one
in Sajir. This was due to my familiarity with the area, as well as the
already gained experience of the interviewing methods. 	 The second
batch of interviews was intended to see what differences existed
between the sedentaries and the bedouin in the agricultural sector,
especially in the area of perceptions, attitudes and comitment to a
farming livelihood.
Al-Burud was chosen, not only because it is the most convenient
sedentary village in this case, but also because there is not a
similarly sized sedentary farming community nearby.
	 To insist on
similarity of size would have meant travelling much further north
toward Al-G asim, which has a different social and natural profile to
that of Asser.	 It would also mean having to go through the whole
process of field work again.
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2) At the Sharp End of Sociological Research
When I arrived in Sajir for the start of this project, I was armed with
a letter of introduction from my sponsoring university, an official
blanket request for assistance, and a great deal of enthusiasm and
hope. I anticipated that this would be enough to pave the way for any
social researcher, especially when met with the custornery good will and
generosity of the Saudi people. Although this was partly true, there
also turned out to be substantial obstacles which were created by some
of the social and cultural factors governing my own life and the lives
of the local people.
These difficulties are derived from three sources:
1. I was a woman, trying to penetrate an area of the social
system that is basically male dominated.
2. Being a native of the region meant that I had a good deal of
comitment and obligation to conform to local customs, and
codes of behaviour. This is not only because it was natural
and expected, but also because I personally could not afford
to be seen not conforming to a minimum of expected behaviour.
3. I was also hampered by a social identity that can be easily
identified and placed within the regional social structure
(i.e. sedentary from Al-Burud, and from a particular group of
people).
These three elements are interconnected, and cannot be isolated
completely at any point of time or in any particular situation.
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Retrospectively, they combined to create a situation of opposition and
conflict to the study, which was often clearly exhibited. At the time
of field work, however, certain manifestations of the existance of the
above elements were obscured by past socialisation, and the natural
capacity for adaptation, acceptance and justification. Certain
limitations, for instance, were accepted without any real thought or
objection because it was more convenient to do so. The primary example
of this was the abandonment of the original plan to reside in Sajir
itself. This idea was opposed by my people in Al-Burud, and received
with scepticism and incredulity from the Sajirans. Why would a woman
think of living alone in neighbouring settlement, when she has a
perfectly good home not more than fifteen kilometres away? Not even
the customary high regard for education and knowledge could overcome
the objectionability of such a proposition.
If the idea had been pursued, it would have been quite beneficial to
mutual understanding, integration, and acceptance within the
settlement. It might have also lessened the considerable difficulties
of the interviewing process. Any initial hostility would probably have
been overcome by time and the neighbourly duty among Moslem people.
Another feature of the same process is a certain lack of persistence in
pursuing objectives (i.e personal interviews with local officials, and
the chasing up of denied data), because I have intimate first hand
knowledge of the implications of rejections, and the repercussions of
too strong an image of "aggressiveness and assertiveness" for a local
woman, In this respect I behaved more like the "observed" than the
"observer". A stranger to the social system would have been blissfully
unaware, and/or unaffected by such considerations.
At the heart of the above issues are a) the severe limitations of the
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physical mobility of a female researcher generally, especially in rural
areas, and b) the regulations governing female social conduct, and
male-female interaction. 	 The need for a paid driver was recognised
from the outset, and that was provided by engaging the services of a
Philipino one.	 The inability to have access to the male dominated
working environment was also recognised, but its effect on the actual
process of the gathering of the data was not expected to be a major
obstacle.	 That, however, was not true.	 In concrete terms, the
following became sigrifitait a tie ¶vor ane momentum:
1)	 Islamic laws and traditions do not allow females to interact
with strange males, without the presence of a male relative
(husband or blood relative who are related closely to the
woman). This is especially observed for women who need to
travel long distances which might entail contact with strange
men. This Islamic law is not always practised in the urban
centres (out of necessity).	 It becomes, however, very
significant in the rural areas, because a) the traditions are
observed more frequently, and b) long distances are being
travelled in sparsely populated areas.
As a Moslem, the unacceptability of my position as a
researcher, who had to interact with strange men continuously
and travel long distances, became quickly realised. 	 What
this meant in real terms was to have a male relative
accompanying me at all times. This of course could not be
managed easily. In fact my early arrangement with an elderly
male relative was abandoned on the second day, due to the
physical fatigue he experienced. It became a daily problem,
which involved many kind people, both males and elderly
females (if no male relative could be found). The later
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stages of the interviewing process allowed a nephew to
accompany me for three weeks, and his place was taken over by
my husband for a further three weeks. 	 Even when these
arrangements were followed, the whole process was socially
questionable, and sometimes criticised.
2. The need for a guide would not be fulfilled by male members
of Sajir, because of the aforementioned element. 	 Various
attempts to seek help in this regard were met by sincere
apologies, and the remark that this is a very difficult
situation.	 Attempts at soliciting the help of elderly
females was also not acceptable to the local people. At one
point I thought I might be successful in engaging the
services of a local woman, mainly because I offered to pay
for them, but this proved unacceptable to her family.
3. The interviewing process proved to be highly uncomfortable,
both for me and my interviewees. Islamic beliefs dictates an
elaborate covering and dress for women, which are not
conducive to comfort for any long periods of time. The
farmers were also ill at ease, and some were reluctant to
enter a process that involves more than one hour of
interaction.
The entry into an interaction with the farmers, moreover,
typically took long to accomplish.	 This is because I was
ushered to the female side of the house, and could only begin
to interview after a series of messages back and forth from
the males' sitting room. Nonetheless, the above difficulties
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were overcome by the extreme generosity of the farmers, and
their respect for the education.
4. Personal interviews with the local officials were conducted
mainly through written messages and telephone conversations.
Attempts at prolonged discussions were not encouraged,
especially when it entailed more than the basic information
and data. In fact, several bold steps to interview
officials, by actually visiting their houses, were graciously
turned into pleasant social visits with the females of the
family.
What this meant was not only an exclusion from the working
place, but also an inability to gain exstensive second hand
knowledge by way of prolonged discussion.
5. Interaction with the bedouin farmers was also sometimes
hampered by my local identity. The problem was not in being
a sedentary from Al-Burud as such; many sedentaries live and
work in Sajir after all. It was rather due to the atmosphere
of rivalry and distrust between those neighbouring
coninunities. Familial connections were also elements to be
tackled and tolerated. Some particularly unpleasant
encounters were explained later as arising from tension
between families. Moreover, the residents of Al Burud
criticised me openly for being more interested in Sajir's
comunity rather than my own.
6. The bedouin farmers and the local officials who agreed to
extend a helping hand were always gracious and chivalrous,
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but a mite condescending. Inquiries were not always treated
seriously, and answers could be given flippantly. The
implications of a woman extending beyond the male-female
divide, especially on issues relating to public life, become
sometimes a diversion and a source of mirth. 	 In some
instances that was a useful attitude, because particularly
generous and helpful men were expansive and unstinting in
their effort to educate me about local matters. 	 This
attitude, however, was always irritating and sometimes
limiting.
In listing the above problems, I do not mean to establish an image of
struggle, or a particularly hard fight to establish legitimacy, and an
eventual success against all odds. In fact it is hopefully a.
successful example of the ability of a female researcher to work within
the context of a Moslem and traditional society. The project would not
have been conceived without the existence of Saudi educational
institutions (my sponsoring university for example), which advocate
women's education. The help of the enlightened local men, especially
those playing a key role in the research process, allowed me to bring
my project to life, and (I hope) contribute in a modest way to the
accumulation of knowledge.
My intentions here have been to highlight the pitfalls that a female
researcher might encounter; and also to point out some significant
aspects of the society and how these reflected on the actual process of
the research, both in terms of limitations and implications. I hope
to have drawn attention to two issues: (1) a female researcher
investigating public versus private aspects of social life, and (2) the
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need to be reflective when choosing the locality of any research. Some
of the problems could have been lessened if the researcher was not a
member of the local scene.	 The roles and codes of behaviour for a
female researcher (which are the major issues here) can be relaxed for
a "stranger', and deviant behaviour can be more easily forgiven and/or
undamaging to her life.
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Chapter Four
The Agricultural Sector
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INTRODUCTION
1. Relevance To This Work
The study of the agricultural sector in Saudi Arabia is vital to this
work for two sets of reasons. The first set is derived from the nature
of pastoral nomadism and the actual sedentarisation practices of
nomadic groups in Saudi Arabia. As seen in the previous chapters:
1. Pastoral nomadism in the area can be considered as a
multi-resource system, which include agriculture as a major
ingredient of these resources
2. Settlement in agricultural Hujar, villages and hamlets has been
the dominant form of the sedentarization process in the Arabian
Peninsula, and especially favoured by the Saudi sedentarization
p01 icies.
For these two reasons alone, it is imperative that we gain a proper
understanding of the sector in order to evaluate the quality of change
affecting the nomadic groups through sedentarization. There is,
however, another set of reasons which makes it even more imperative
that we look closely at this sector of the Saudi economy, starting from
the land reforms to the development policies. This is because of the
following:
1. The "Encapsulation" process of the nomadic groups (see chapter
2) can be affected, not only through the imposition of a larger
economic structure on the more limited one of pastoral
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nomadism, but also through the introduction of changes that can
block the mechanism for its social reproduction and cohesion.
In Saudi Arabia the land reforms have been the tool for such a
process, as well as the key element that helped in the
restructuring of the rural and agricultural sector. 	 The
changes introduced by the land reforms and distribution
policies changed the balance between the economic systems
traditionally practiced by the Saudi rural population. It also
altered the landholding pattern traditionally dominant in Saudi
Arabia. The nomadic groups were the most affected by these
land reforms.	 The whole of the agriculture sector, however,
began to experience a slow process of change as regards land
utilization, which became apparent in the 1970s after the
agricultural sector began to receive the benefits of the
modernization programe instigated by the government.
2.	 The middle of the 1970s marks the beginning of a centrally
devised development plan for the agricultural sector. 	 That
plan came after a period of three decades of stagnation in
terms of output and contribution to the national economy. This
was brought about because of the dominance of the oil economy
on all aspects of Saudi life.
	
The agricultural development
plan, which began in 1973 by the introduction of subsidies for
agricultural machinery, accelerated in the years between 1974 -
1980.	 Subsidization increased and crop price supports were
introduced, the most important of which is the wheat price
support of 1979.
The agricultural development plans mark the second departure for the
rural economies and population after the land reforms and distribution
ilk
policies. The increase in the use of modern agricultural technology,
and the increase of agricultural output, coupled with the marketing
opportunities, moved the sector away from its traditional nature to one
steeped in modern relations of production. The ramification of such a
change on the nomadic and traditional population is 'far reaching,
especially for those who are just entering the agricultural sector. It
is, therefore, imperative that we gain full understanding of the
policies and programmes designed for agricultural development. 	 The
nomadic groups, although heavily involved in the market economy,
generally had no prior experience of modern agricultural production.
They are, therefore, completely dependent on what the state provides in
terms of land, agricultural machinery and services.
This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will deal
with the agricultural sector, its main characteristics, human resources
and physical resources. A great deal of discussion will be devoted to
the underground water resources, which are seen as the key element for
the development of agriculture in the Kingdom.
The second section will deal with land ownership under the traditional
ideologies and economic systems. It will also discuss the Saudi land
reforms and distribution policies which were the main force behind the
newly emerged landholding pattern.
The third section will discuss the policies and incentives formulated
by the Saudi government to stimulate the development of the
agricultural sector. The effort will be mostly to assess and evaluate
their effectiveness and impact generally.
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2. Initial Consideration
One of the most important facts about the agricultural sector in Saudi
Arabia is that it has been virtually isolated from the direct impact of
the oil prosperity until the later years of the 1970s, and more
particularly in the 1980s. This was the case despite the fact that 65
percent of the Saudi population in 1970 were characterized as rural.
Approximately 70.8 percent of those or 46 percent of the total
population, were employed in the Agricultural sector. 	 In 1975,
however,	 the agricultural sector contributed 3.7 percent to the
national GOP. The insignificance of the agricultural contribution may
be attributed to the dominance of the oil sector.	 It nevertheless
reflects the unimportance of the sector generally in the national
economy.
The isolation of the agricultural sector, which is agreed upon in
principle by all commentators on the Saudi society, is viewed
differently according to what the writer wishes to highlight. Ragaei
El-Mallakh writes:
Agriculture has benefitted from increased oil revenues in the
form of improvements, including expanded markets, cost
reductions in transportation, and increased supply of modern
inputs such as fertilizers, improved seeds, machinery and more
readily accessible sources of credit. (1)
El-Mallakh also highlights the diminished role of agriculture in the
Saudi developing economy, mainly because of the vast oil revenues. He
contrasts its role with the role of the same sector in poorer
countries. For El-Mallakh, the importance of developing the sector
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stems from two elements. First, the release of labour to other sectors
through increased productivity, especially to the industrial sector.
Secondly, for fulfilling its role as the feeder of the population,
which will increase self-sufficiency.
J.S. Birk and C. Sinclair, on the other hand, have stressed the
traditional nature of the agricultural sector. They point to the fact
that the Saudi economy was tiny prior to the 1970s oil price increase,
and how rapidly it has grown since then:
"This is not simp'y an acadeinc obser'atot ....
	 t oc o
Imense practical significance.	 Because of the rapidity of
growth, many Saudi Arabians have been left behind stranded in
the traditional sector." (2)
The writers point out the fact that the modern sector, which began to
emerge in the 1950s, was confined to the construction of the state and
urban infrastructure, as well as social amenities, such as schools,
hospitals and clinics. Urban areas enjoyed the majority of investment
expenditure In Saudi Arabia:
"The size of the country and the difficulties of communication
meant that the impact of development was confined to urban
areas where only a small proportion of the population lived.
The bulk of the Saudi Arabian population neither saw the
changed urban skyline, nor felt an appreciable change to their
way of 1ife."3
So what are the changes that affected the sector? Birks and Sinclair
point to the fact that the majority of the Saudi population were
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neither willing nor able to participate in the newly emerged labour
markets, because of their continued lack of modern sector experience
associated with urban living. Access, however, to grants, loans and
money gifts was possible, which raised the income level of the rural
people without the need to leave the rural areas.
"The monies directed toward the modernization of small-scale
farming may have the contrary impact to that which is intended:
they withdraw labour inputs from the land, but ensure that the
population remains rurally oriented.
	 As a result, the
agricultural sector is preserved in its relatively unproductive
form."4
El-Mallakh and Birks and Sinclair offer two points of view that are
common among academic observers, and which differ in very important
ways.	 One difference is that the former is more positive and
optimistic, while the other is negative generally.
	 The other basic
difference is that El-Mallakh is focusing on the agricultural sector,
as it relates to the dominant urban economies, while the latter writers
are focusing more on the inner structure of the sector.
Both approaches, however, share one thing in comon. 	 Both were
published in 1982, during the term of the third development plan 1980 -
1985, and both skip over very important and far reaching governmental
policies for the development and restructuring of the agricultural
sector. These developments include the land reforms, the agricultural
policy of 1974, and the updating of the policy in 1979. All of these
developments were operative in the later years of the 1970s and more
particularly in the 1980s.
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Subsidies have existed in the Kingdom for a long time, and are not
wholly new even to the agricultural sector. 1948 marks the origin of
formal subsidies in the Kingdom:
"The year 1368 A.I-1. (1948) may be regarded as a turning point
in the history of development in Saudi Arabia, since it marks a
period of historical innovation and the start of the
government's new role in originating and leading the process of
economic development ... Modern port facilities were completed
in Jeddah (in 1368 A.H.) ... The first municipal electricity
system was introduced for Mecca 1370 A.H. (1950'!. The first
formal institution for higher education, the Sharia Col7ege,
was opened tn 1369 (1949) and the first teacher's trathir
college in 1371 A.H. (1951)."
Since then, the government has provided various kinds of direct as well
as indirect subsidies and assistance to a large number of operations,
organizations and groups in order to increase the goods and services in
the country.	 These subsidies were in the form of educational
subsidies, organizational subsidies, social benefit subsidies and
agricultural and food subsidies. In 1965, the appropriation for direct
subsidies was SR 605.7 million, or 19.53 per cent of the total
budget. 6	By 1981 the total amount of subsidies had increased 37
fold to SR 22 billion or 9.07 of the budget.7
Agricultural subsidies began in 1973, and a major subsidy for the
Kingdom was adopted in 1975, and incorporated within the second
development plan (1975-1980). This policy will be described more fully
in the third section of this chapter.
	 The major characteristics of
the subsidies during this period is that they were geared generally
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towards input subsidies, as opposed to output subsidies.
	 Input
subsidies includes land, which is provided free of charge, seed
fertilizers, trees and machinery. Output subsidies, although existing
in a small way, were limited in nature. The agricultural bank dealt
with most of the input subsidies, while output subsidies were
incorporated with the function of the Ministry of Agriculture.
1979 marks a significant departure for output subsidies and
agricultural development as a whole. K. Khuthaila writes:
"By 1979, the government had realised what was happening to the
agricultural sector as a result of the relative neglect,
especially from a distributive point of view."8
What followed was a spectacular increase in the allocation for
agriculture and water resources in the budget, from SR 1.854 in 1978/79
to SR 3.112 million in 1979/1980. Wheat also was singled out for a
spectacular increase in output subsidies. This resulted in what might
be called a wheat cultivation revolution, that set the tone for Saudi
agriculture in the 1980s.
The guaranteed success of the wheat cultivation operation, coupled with
the increased availability of credit and subsidies from the
agricultural bank and the Ministry of Agriculture, has been
Instrumental in significant structural changes within the agricultural
sector In two ways:
1.	 Some aspects of the sector, the production side specifically,
have moved away from its traditional nature towards a
productive sector based on modern technology and modern
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relations of production.
2.	 The sector became attractive to the private sector and a high
level of investments were directed toward it from urban based
capital, as well as rural areas.
These elements will be discussed more fully in section 3 of this
chapter, and will be demonstrated in chapter 6 on the agricultural
operation in the study's region. 	 The point made here is that the
stagnation of agricultural production in terms of its nature and actiia)
output, which has been an iTnportant characteristic for a "tong period of
time, has unfortunately overpowered all other considerations, in the
course of the study and Investigation into this important sphere of the
Saudi economy. Another important factor contributing to this has been
the aridity and desert environment of Saudi Arabia,, which is sees,
to the present, as a major obstacle to agricultural development. This
was reflected in a scarcity of literature and/or brief and sketchy
analysis, which may be valuable sources of information, but is not
sufficient for a good understanding of the process of change. 	 A
comprehensive study of the agricultural sector past and present is
still waiting to be written.
This chapter does not propose to fulfill that responsibility. It is
merely an attempt to highlight and examine certain policies for
development, that were vital in transforming the sector and very
significant when it comes to the restructuring of the rural economy and
population. These policies are the land redistribution policy as it
affects the agricultural sector, and the policy for the subsidization
of the agricultural operation.
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SECTION I
The Agricultural Sector: The Human and Physical Resources
This section will be divided into seven parts, which will try to deal
with all aspects of the agricultural sector.	 It will start with
of agriculture
general characteristics and place in the national economy and then go
on to discuss agricultural land and population. An emphasis will be
placed on the sector's water resources, because they are generally seen
as the key element in any consideration of the development of the
agricultural resources in Saudi Arabia.
1.	 General National Characteristics
There are important considerations on the national level that must be
kept in mind when examining the state and the role of the agricultural
sector in the Saudi economy. Some have already been touched upon in
the preceding section, but these and others will be crystalized at this
point:
A.	 The Saudi economy is based on the revenues received from oil
sales, so it is not dependent on agriculture as a source
generating foreign exchange for Imports of goods and services
necessary for development. (9) Rather, the push for the
development of the ' sector is seen as a means for the
diversification of the economy, and a response to the pressures
placed on the Saudi government to promote the well being of the
rural population as can be seen in the third development plan
1980-1985:
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"The need for a sound agricultural sector has long been
recognized and supported by the government. This need
for prudent level of strategic food production and the
opportunities for good levels of agricultural incomes
underlie the agricultural policies and plans of the
government •• ,,(1O)
The comitment of the government to such a scheme is apparent
and is supported b, the avai'iabi'tity of IinanciaI and physical
capital resources, but the process is urged on by the need to
find a rapid solution to a prominent problem. The urgency of
the problem led to the adoption of a rapid growth development
plan.	 The speed with which this plan was formulated and
implemented, and the radical nature of the changes that it
proposes In relation to the reality of the sector, is at the
very least overly ambitious. This point will be discussed more
fully in the third section of this chapter.
B.	 El-Mallakh highlights another feature of the Saudi economy that
has direct reference in this case. He talks about the problem
of the domestic market growth, or lack of it, necessary to
absorb expanded output, that is often faced by poorer
developing countries:
"Saudi Arabia's oil revenues provide an indirect but
very important advantage in this respect as the
domestic market is limited by size only.
	 Income
produced by the agricultural sector can be retained by
the rural population, increasing purchasing power for
the farmers which is reflected in stronger demand and
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larger markets for the output of the non-agricultural
sector. ,,(11)
El-Mallakh's assumption for the forecast of such a balance is
based on the idea that the agricultural producers will be able
to profitably sell all their products in the expanded market.
This may be a reasonable assumption theoretically, but it does
not reflect a proven reality. The level of importation and the
lack of firm restriction on imported foodstuff must be
considered. Another issue is the quality and price level of
the national agricultural produce, and their ability to compete
with untaxed, unlimited foreign importation.	 The Saudi
entrepreneurs and traders have long been established within the
Saudi social structure, and their interests could well
represent a force in the Saudi econoin.y, which might be in
opposition to the interests of the agricultural operators.
C.	 The development plans of Saudi Arabia have a clear-cut policy
for the improvement of and the greater participation by the
private sector for overall economic development. The emphasis
is on:
"A major role in the development for private
enterprise,	 especially in the progress of the
productive sectors. The government will do its utmost
to stimulate and assist private-sector activity.u112)
The comitment of the government to promote private enterprise
is clearly demonstrated in the management of the development of
the agricultural sector. Free granting of land to individuals
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and companies, and generous loans for the setting up of
agricultural	 operation	 as	 well	 as	 various	 forms	 of
agro-industry, have been extended to the private sector.
This comitment, however, eliminated other options, which will
be returned to at the end of this chapter, and has not been
free of obstacles. The difficulties have been seen mostly in
the area of marketing, which prompted the government to
intervene in the case of wheat. The inclusion of a traditional
sector into a free market modern economy was bound to be
fraught with difficulties, especially if we consider the
limitation of physical resources of the country (arable land
and water), and the state of the rural productive forces in
relation to skill and capital resources.
D.	 In 1970 the "agriculture and nomadism" sector was traditional
in nature. That was not only in terms of production, but also
organizationally so.
	 The rural population are the most
conservative socially in the Kingdom. The isolation from the
modern sector may have contributed to this characteristic.
Birks and Sinclair claim that the opposite is true:
"The isolation of the rural population from the modern
sector was thought, in an illogical way, to stem from a
sound policy pursued by the ruling family who, whilst
desiring modernity, felt that too great an involvement
of nationals, particularly those from traditional
environments, would be harmful to the Kingdom."13
This point of view might not seem as far fetched, if we
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consider the history of opposition faced by the regime from
tribal groups and the religious elements in the early years of
statehood. Regardless of the reason for the traditional state
of the rural population, the important point is that it has
retained major elements of the traditional social structure.
These are manifested in the retaining of traditionally based
leadership organizations, which have been empowered with state
approval. The regional organization and distribution of state
services and apparatus has thus remained heavily influenced by
traditional consideration.	 This had significant influences
over the implementation of the policies originating from the
urban based modern sector. The distribution of public land has
been an area where traditional factors were most active (see
section II in this chapter). Nepotism, tribal and inter-tribal
rivalry have contributed to a restructuring of landownership,
based on a traditional regional balance. 	 This will be
discussed more fully later. Landownership, however, is not the
only area in which tradtlonal values may be active. Access to
regional state apparatus and services, in addition to the
ability to assimilate those services, is another area
potentially vulnerable to the dominance of traditional values.
Examples of this are the educational services (especially for
girls), the extension services of the Ministry of Agriculture,
the social service offices, and the Municipal services. 	 All
these services, if available, are open to controversy and/or
manipulation, which may exist within the group or the region,
or between various groups that share them. 	 Developmental
planning and policy making, theoretically speaking, must
safeguard against these practices. Conflicting policy origin
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(traditional versus modern) may be detrimental to a coherent
devel opmental policy.
E.	 The vastness of Saudi Arabia has given rise to an impression
that there can not be a high degree of competition over
landholdings, be it agricultural, residential or for settlement
purposes.	 This has been enforced by the state policy of
distributing free land to Saudi nationals. The low population!
land ratio has been another reinforcer of this impression.
Considerations of this kind do not emphasise the availability
of the physical and economic resources needed for agricultural
activities, nor the suitability of areas for human settlement.
Better indicators for population pressure over land are the
following:
a. Percentage of arable land with good terrain and soil.
b. Availability	 of	 economic	 water	 resources	 for
agricultural and residential purposes.
C.	 The accessibility of the location, in terms of
available services and marketing potential.
The first two of the previous elements will be elaborated on,
when the water and land resources are discussed in this
section.	 The third element of the accessibility of the
agricultural location will be discussed in section III of this
chapter when marketing is discussed.
2.	 Physical Characteristics of the Sector
Saudi Arabia is the largest continuous area of land that does not have
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surface fresh water resources, in the shape of rivers or lakes. The
vastness of Saudi Arabia (more than 2 million square kilometres or 200
million hectares) represent more than 1.5 percent of the globe's
surface. (14) The cultivated land constituted only 0.13 percent of the
total area in 1965, while the total area utilized for agriculture,
range and forest represented 2.335 percent of all lands.
Saudi Arabia's environment is characterized by a dominant desert
climate. The temperatures are high, rising to over 40°C (and as high
as 50°C) during the summer in most of the country, except the Western
highland strip (see figure 4.1). There is also a great deal of change
in temperatures between sumer and winter and day and night (winter
night temperatures may fall below zero). 99 percent of the country is
an arid or semi arid zone, utilized only for grazing when the rain
falls and grazing plants grow. The annual average rainfall does not
exceed 100 nm.	 The Western highland strip is the only exception to
this, because it is affected by monsoons which may raise the average
rainfall up to 500 nm.
	 The northern parts of Saudi Arabia, moreover,
may be affected by Mediterranean wind systems, with an average annual
precipitation between 25 to 75 nih.	 Rain fall of this level is not
important for agricultural cultivation, but is very important to
nomadic pastoral I Sm.
The general scarcity of water fall, and the high evaporation ratio (due
to high temperatures) and low relative humidity have contributed to
drought for periods of up to seven years. Saudi Arabia is also subject
to high wind which carries sand and soil and reduces precipitation
effecti veness.
The soil conditions generally are characterized by salinity. Salts are
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Figure 4.1 Main Agricultural Areas of Saudi Arabia
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found in all surface and underground water, and they accumulate in the
soil as a function of years of irrigation, the high level of
evaporation and poor drainage. The presence of saline soil conditions
can directly damage some plant growth, and may also lessen its
permeability to a great degree and make it unfit (physically and
chemically) for cultivation.
There are three very arid desert zones in Saudi Arabia (see
figure 1):
1. The Rub Al-Khali (empty quarter), the largest sand
desert in the world which measures over 1000 km from
east to west and 500 km from north to south.
2. Nafud, which extends to the north west. This desert is
characterized by a red sand with broad flat salty
stretches.
3. The Dahana, a long arched strip of sand dunes linking
the Nafud and Rub Al-Khali.
3.	 The Traditional Irrigation System
From the previous description, It is quite clear that almost all of the
land in the Kingdom is too dry to support more than periodic livestock
grazing, and true grasslands are almost non-existent. Ground water,
however, has been the basis for agricultural production for most areas
in the Kingdom. The extraction of water traditionally has been
dependent on surface ground water and was done manually. These types
of wells were quickly depleted due to the evaporation factor and also
because they were mostly dependent on the rain fall level. The early
breakthrough in agricultural production began with the introduction of
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deep artesian wells that were dug deeply into the ground to reservoirs
of underground water.	 The first such wells were dug by the oil
companies during the exploration period (1930s). 	 By the 1960s such
wells had spread to most agricultural areas of the Kingdom, as well as
urban ones.
	 The change from traditional to modern water extraction
methods remained for a long period of time the only marked change in
the agricultural operation.
	 Pumps and engines needed for such
conversion were privately purchased, but were later subsidized by the
government (since March 1974) for 50 percent of the cost.
Irrigation remained largely traditional up to the late 1970s, possibly
the early 1980s.	 It was based in all regions (excluding the Asir
region, where dry farming was possible) on the flooding mettiod. This
method centred on the use of the open canal system. Central canals
carry the water from the water source to secondary canals made of mud.
When a particular cropping area is being irrigated the canals are
broken manually to allow the water to flood the plot.
After irrigation is completed, the canal is sealed off again, and
another plot is irrigated in the same way. The central canals, and the
secondary ones, were traditionally constructed of packed mud. Later
development allowed the farmers to layer the central and secondary
canals with cement which reduced greatly the level of maintenance and
drainage of water.
This traditional method of irrigation was characterized by the
following:
1.	 Labour intensity: The level of family or hired labour needed
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for such a traditional agricultural operation is high in
comparison to the ones based on modern technological advances.
The gradual withdrawal of the national labour force from this
sector because of the opening up of other employment
opportunities (i.e. government service, military organisation
and the service sector) contributed to reduced availability of
farm labour. This in turn resulted in higher wages for farm
hands, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s, when migrant
labour from the southern states of the Prabian Peninsula
flocked to find work in Saudi Arabia. The higher wages in the
majority of cases could not be paid by the rural population,
which resulted in total abandonment or neglect of the farming
operation.
2.	 Limited Growth Potential: The traditional method of irrigation
is limited by its own nature. Land holdings were traditionally
small, and still are at present.
Hassan Hajrah (the author of Public Land Distribution in Saudi
Arabia, and who served many years in the Ministry of
Agriculture) presented some data that showed that 55.6 percent
of the total nunier of land holdings did not exceed 1 hectare,
while 91.9 percent did not exceed 10 hectares. Only 8 percent
constituted holdings in excess of 10 hectares. 5	The limited
nature of the method appears clearly from the tendency for
small landholdings. The availability of water or lack of it
may also contribute to the limited growth potential, in terms
of the size of the cultivated land, if not output.
3.	 High Evaporation and Drainage Levels: The flooding method of
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irrigation has been criticized as wasting valuable water
resources. This is because the open canal system is prone to
high evaporation levels, which is a cormion feature of this hot
desert climate. The level of drainage, moreover, is high
before the irrigation operation is completed or even during its
execution.
4.	 In addition to the previous point, which may be categorized as
negative, the flooding method is currently recognized as one
means for combating the gradual salinization of the top soil in
the arid and semi arid zone. Flooding the soil with excessive
amounts of water facilitates drainage of harmful salts before
evaporation takes its course. This had not been emphasised
before the introduction of the sprinklers system, but gradually
became more apparent as the irrigation methods underwent great
development in certain parts of the Kingdom during the 1980s.
These developments were based on the introducing of technologically
advanced irrigation systems (sprinklers and central pivot irrigation
systems), which did away with the first three problems of irrigation.
A full discussion of this will follow in chapter 6, because the new
methods of production could be included in the new formation of the
agricultural structure and are a direct result of the state's push for
growth.
4.	 The Population and Output of the Agricultural Sector
Khalid Majid Khuthaila wrote in 1984:
"The importance of the agricultural sector of the Saudi economy
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is not so much reflected in its share in the GDP of the country
as in the percentage of the population and labour force engaged
in activities characterised as part of the agricultural
sector. (16)
Khuthaila's contension is unambiguous and fairly agreed upon by all
commentators; but when it comes to actual statistics regarding the
rural population, particularly the agricultural one, figures vary
greatly, even in the case of official Saudi statistics. 	 Let us
consider some examples of the relevant statistics. The Economic Report
published by the central planning organisation of the Kingdom
pertaining to the years 1970-1971 informs us that the percentage of
persons working in the agricultural sector has dropped from 46 percent
(465,000 persons) of the total male work force in the year 1966, to
about 40 percent in the year 1970. Alternatively, according to the
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency annual report in 1981, 46 percent of the
labour force was engaged in the agricultural sector in 1970, but 65
percent were characterised as rural. 	 Yet again, the FAO production
yearbook for 1970 puts the agricultural sector at 66 percent of the
Saudi population - and subsequent issues up to 1978 maintain that the
agricultural sector does not fall under 61.4 percent. J. S. Birk and
C. A. Sinclair put the percentage at 51.7 of the total labour force in
1975 (530,000 persons).7
The lack of coherence in the official statistics may stem from the
f ol lowing:
1.	 The lack of accuracy of the national census procedure, due to
lack of experience and training for the personnel.
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2.	 Confusion in the actual defining of the agricultural sector, in
terms of including and excluding the nomadic population within
that sector. In 1970, the nomadic sector was estimated at 15
percent of total population.
3. The dispersed nature of the Saudi rural population and the
frequent movement of tribal groups, either for pastoral
activities or between settlement areas inhabited by the same
tribal group.
The Saudi official definition of tte agricutura sector incudes
nomadic agriculture, settled farming, fishing, range resources and
forestry. All the statistics pertaining to absolute number and
percentages of the labour force in agriculture show that it is
declining, sometimes dramatically in percentage terms if not in real
numbers. The Economic Report of Saudi Arabia in 1980 reported that in
1970 there were 445,800 persons or 40 percent of the national labour
force in agriculture. By 1975 the number of persons was 426,100 or 28
percent of the national labour force. Ministry of Planning estimates
for the third development plan (1980-1985) put the decline in real
nuriters at about 100,000 persons, from 39.8 percent to 24.2 percent for
1975 to 1980. (see table 4.1).
The share of the agricultural sector in the GOP has been decreasing
relative to other sectors, but not in absolute terms. 	 In 1963,
agriculture contributed 10.1 percent of GOP. By 1969, it had declined
to 6.1 percent.	 The trend continued in the 1970s where the share
reached 0.9 percent in 1976/77. It is now fifth in terms of importance
after oil, government, commerce and industry.
	 The value of
agricultural produce marketed, however, increased from SR 1.0 billion
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TabIc 4.1 Enp(oymcnc by Economic Activity, 1975 and 1980
Avcra;c annual groils rac
197510
(per ccnt)
2.2
Agriculture	 695.0	 39.8	 598.6	 24.2	 -2.9
Mining	 3.4	 0.2	 7.3	 0.3	 16.5
Oil and rcfincrict	 27.4	 1.6	 36.0	 1.5	 5.6
Manu(acturing	 74.4	 4.2	 104.2	 4.2'	 7.0
1Jilitics	 16.1	 0.9	 31.5	 1.3	 14.4
Construction	 172.3	 9.9	 330.3	 13.4	 13.9
	
988.6	 56.6	 1,107.9 .	 44.8
2 Services sectors	 15.3
Tradc	 153.6	 8.8	 310.6	 2.G
Transport	 114.5	 6.6	 214.6	 6.7	 I
Finanec and Ljtisincs
	
13.1	 0.8	 34.6	 1.4	 2l.services
Consisiunity and social
	
230.0	 13.2	 482.	 19.!	 163SC(YICCS	 ___________	 _________	 ___________	 _________
	511.2	 29.3	 1,042.3	 42.2
3 Govcrnn,cnta	 246.7	 14.1	 321.0,	 13.0	 5.4
Total (I 2+3)
	 1,746.5	 100.0	 2,471.2	 100.0	 7.2
Notes: a. Civilian employment only. b. This govcrnmcni. figure includcs an estimated 49.6 thousand daily workers not classified as civil
Servants.
Source: MifliStl'y of Planning Estimates for the Third Development Plan (1980-5)
Tabc Na. 4.2 -	 Changca us Agricultural Production"
Crop	 ,4g'a 1369f70(1949/S0) 4rea137*577ii(195.5f7) Area 1380/83K (196013)
itt Heaares	 '	 itt Hectare:	 '	 hi Hcc(are:
Ficid crops	 67,838	 71%	 155,400	 79%
	
175,929	 72%
Vegetables	 04,128	 4%	 003,000	 1%	 033,132	 14%
Dates	 21,572	 23%
	
023,900 . 18%
	
-022,281	 9%
Fruits	 02,226	 2%	 005,100	 2%	 011,487	 5%
Total	 95,764	 L00/	 187,400	 100%	 242,829	 100%
Source: Hajrah, Hassan, Public Land Distribution
in Saudi rab.ia, Lngtr. Groip LtÔ., 1.%2,
P.62.
Ernploymcnt
1975	 1980
Economic activity 	 (thousands)	 (per ccitt)	 (thousands)	 (per ccitt)
I Producing scctors
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in 1970/71 to SR 1.8 billion in 1976/77 (18) (These figures are not at
constant prices, so inflation may have played a part in the observed
increases).
Traditional agricultural production centred on cereals and dates.
Wheat, sorghum and millets were the most prominent of the field crops.
Field crops are widespread in the Kingdom. Wheat and barley are grown
in all the regions, especially Qasim, the north and the centre of the
country. Sorghum and maize are grown in the southern region (Asir,
Jizan and Najran). Alfalfa, however, is the most dominant single crop
in the Kingdom. It is usually grown underneath palm trees, and if not
used domestically as animal feed, it can bring a high market price.
Vegetable and fruits are usually grown in settlements and viflages
close to urban markets, where transportation is most convenient.
Table 4.2 shows the changes in agricultural production from 1949/50 to
1960/63, in terms of estimations of hectares per crop. What it shows
is an increase of total area. The area for date production remained
constant, while field crop areas increased significantly without
changing their relative share. The most substantial changes were in
vegetable cropping in the 1960s because of their high profitability at
the time.
The lack of accurate information on food production is a major obstacle
to presenting a real picture of the situation, but it appears that the
1970s saw further increases in vegetable and fruit production, while
wheat became the most important cereal produced in the country, with an
annual growth rate of 9.8. The year of 1979, however, saw a sharp
increase in the wheat produced, which was due to the output subsidy
provided for the wheat crop (see table 4.3).
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TABLE 4.3
LAND AREA USED FOR GROWING WHEAT, 1398 TO 1404 A.H.
YEAR	 ESTIMATED HECTARES 	 ANNUAL GROWTH RATE
1403/04	 83-84	 506,000 *	 175%
1402/03	 82-83	 184,000	 168%
1401/02	 81-82	 68,571	 181%
1400/01	 80-81	 24,410	 160%
1399/1400	 79-80	 9,395	 88%
1398/99	 78-79	 5,001	 431%
1397/98	 77-78	 942	 -
* Projected using the growth rate of 175%
Source:Unrxb1ished study submitted to the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank.
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5.	 The Arable Land
Arable land is the agricultural area showing cultivatable land with
adequate water resource. 	 In 1970/71, there were 524,725 hectares
cultivated in Saudi Arabia, of which 403,654 hectares were dryland and
78,362 hectares were irrigated. That means that almost 80 percent of
cultivated land was situated in the South Western region of Asir, where
dry farming is possible. 	 Table 4.4 shows that there was a 12.8%
increase in cultivated land in 1975/76.
	 The increase, however, was
mainly in perennial and orchard crops. The uncultivated area was shown
to be larger than the cultivated one, which was seen as a good basis
for agricultural expansion.
Recent studies have also shown that, contrary to popular opinion, the
Kingdom has a large amount of land which can become cultivable,
provided the right amount of water were available to it. 	 Soil and
water surveys were completed in 1970 (19) and they showed the
following:
1. Due to the availability of ground water, there are good
opportunities in Saudi Arabia for utilizing much of the public
arable lands which have not been cultivated previously.
2. It Is possible to raise the productivity of present cultivated
areas through the application of chemicals, improved seeds,
machinery, agricultural methods and development of agricultural
production facilities.
From the previous points, it seems clear that expansion on the strength
of availability of underground water is concentrated mainly in areas
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TABLE 4.4
TOTAL LAND AREA, AND SIZE OF FARMS IN SAUDI ARABIA
1390/91 AND 1395/96 A.H. (1975/76 AND 1970/711
1975/1976	 1970/1971	 TOTAL CHANGES
1395/96 h.H.	 1390/91 A.H.	 IN 5 YEAR PERIOD
Total Land Area (Hectares)	 1,213,462	 1,391,274	 (-)	 12.8
Uncultivated Hectares 	 621,549	 866,549	 (-)	 28.3
Cultivated Hectares	 592,001	 524,725	 12.
Dryland Hectares	 357,713	 403,654	 (-)	 11.4
Irrigated Hectares	 91,126	 78,362	 16.3
Perennial & Orchard Hectares 	 143,162	 42,709	 235.2
Number of Farms	 180,670	 180,789	 (-)	 0.1
Cultivated Area as a
Percent of Total Hectares	 48.8	 37.7	 29.4
Uncultivated Area as a
Percentage of Total Hectares 	 51.2	 62.3	 (-)	 17.8
Average Size of Cultivated
Hectares	 3.28	 2.90	 13.1 -
Average Size of
Uncultivated Hectares 	 3.44	 4.79	 (-)	 28.2
iirce: Ministry of Planning, Third Develo pment Plan, 1400-1405 A.H.
(1980-1985 A.D.), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1980, Table 4-4, p. 139. Quoted in
unpublished report submitted to the Saudi Arabian Aqricultural Bank.
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previously uncultivated (extensive growth). The presently cultivated
areas may achieve growth in production by better agricultural practice
(intensive growth).	 Regional surveys conducted by the Ministry of
Agriculture, and presented by H Hajrah, predicted that 82,550 hectares
of previously uncultivated land could be added to 396,467.4 already
cultivated. This means that the agricultural area could be expanded by
approximately 20%.(20)
Hajrah's figures were based on six studied areas out of eight (two were
unsurveyed at the time), and they are represented by figure 4.2 showing
the areas of expansion. A comparison between figure 4.1 (showing the
existing agricultural areas in Saudi Arabia) and figure 4.2 would show
that expansion is mainly in the already identified and traditional
agricultural areas. 21	That suggests to this researcher that the
water resources are already being exploited in the majority of cases.
The figures presented by Hajrah, as well as the previous point, makes
it very hard to accept the extreme optimism of Ragai El-Mallakh, who
predicted that the half million hectares under cultivation in 1971
would be able to reach 4.5 million hectares according to the study of
arable land and water resources.(22) This can be disputed even when we
consider the unsurveyed areas, because these two areas are the desert
area of the Rub Al-Khali (empty quarter), and the Arabian shield.
Subsequent surveys of the latter region have shown very low water
potentiality and it was not recomended for agricultural expansion.
6.	 The Water Resource: A Scarce Commod1ty
The water resources of Saudi Arabia, and agricultural expansion based
on the availability of these resources, is not without controversy23.
The discussion revolves around the following points:
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Figure 4.2
ZONES FOR
AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION
Source: Hajrah, H., Public Land Distribution in Saudi Arabia,
Longman, 1982, P.89.
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1. The nature and size of the water resources.
2. The viability of long term and extensive agricultural expansion
based on water availability.
Underground reservoirs of water are the main supplier for irrigated
agricultural activities. The sea water desalinization plants, based on
the east and western coasts, are too far and expensive to be considered
for agriculture expansion in the northern and central regions of Saudi
Arabia.
They are also limited in their productive capacity. Competition for
water between urban, industrial and agricultural uses places a great
pressure upon existing underground water resources. it is, therefore,
very important to establish clearly and coherently the level of water
availability for agricultural purposes, and to regulate the use of
those resources for the betterment and continued existence of the
sector.
As seen above, the studies conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture
showed that the water availability justified a 20% expansion rate on
existing agricultural land. Table 4.3 shows data originally from the
Grain Silo and Feed Mill Organisation, which purchases wheat from
producers.	 The figures were estimated by analysts from the
Agricultural Bank to show the areas used for growing wheat alone in
Saudi Arabia.	 The table shows that there have been spectacular
increases in the area for wheat cultivation since 1980/81. In 1981/82
alone the area increased by 181% over the previous year to a total of
68,571 hectares. The projection by the Ministry of Agriculture for
agricultural expansion specified 82,550 hectares of arable land (land
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with suitable soil and sufficient water supply), which means that by
1982/83 the projected figure of 184,000 hectares is more than double
the recommended expansion rate. The year 1983/84 would show more than
five fold increase over the expectations for agricultural cultivation.
These projected figures were realised and even surpassed in 1982/83 and
subesequent years.
The above suggests various explanations: a) that the estimates of 1970
were on the conservative side, b) that subsequent surveys showed
greater water resources, or c) that the expansion outstripped available
water supply. Any economic expansion must be sustainable in the long
run to achieve its objective and to benefit the human forces involved
in it.	 This point was brought forcefully to this researcher's
attention during the period of field work, mainly because the regfon
studied (which is an expanding agricultural region) has experienced in
the past eight years a substantial lowering of the groundwater level.
Water level in the south of this region used to be reached in wells at
60-61 meters below the surface in the late 1970s. At the moment the
water level has dropped to 180 meters below the surface. (An average
yearly drop of about 15 meters). The depth of wells however, has not
been changed yet (450-500 meters), and one official in the region said
that it is possible to reach other reservoirs of water if wells were
dug to about 1000 meters below the surface. 24 The drop of the water
level has caused some farmers to lose a whole year's crop of wheat.25
When the problem of water shortage is encountered by the farmer, an
expensive and time consuming operation can be effected to lower more
pipes into the well until it reaches the water level. The pump, also,
is sometimes lowered deeper into the well to allow it to pump to the
surface.
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Asser, where Sajir is located, is a traditional and long established
agricultural region. It is also one of the most expensive regions in
the Kingdom in terms of cost and depth of wells (See table 4.5). There
are also variations within Asser as to the level of water in the wells,
which is most shown in table 4.5. Some farmers in Sajir and the
surrounding areas, however, have expressed concern about the viability
of continued and sustained agricultural activities in the region.
Their concern has been echoed by some specialists n the field, although
the government's official surveys remain optimistic. In 1987 surveys
by King Faisal 's University in Dhahran (in the eastern region) were
very positive about water availability.(26)
7.	 The Nature of Groundwater
Abdulrahman Al-Zaidy discussed groundwater resources in the Kingdom at
some length.' 27
 His study has been extremely useful for furthering
this researcher's understanding of the complicated geographical issues
involved here. The country, geographically speaking, is divided into
two sections:
1.	 The Arabian shield, which corresponds mainly to the western
areas of the country. This area is characterised by the
existence of two agricultural areas. One is the mountain zone
(south west) which receives about 200 m of rainfall and over
which dry farming is possible; the other is the irrigated
agricultural areas of the desert and the coastal regions. The
irrigated regions receives the runoff water from the monsoons
affecting the higher mountain zone, which collects in some
areas as shallow infiltrated alluvial aquifers.
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2. The Arabian shelf or the sedimentary formation, which covers
about two-thirds of the Arabian peninsula and corresponds to
the north, east and south of the country. This part of the
country is an area of irrigated farming. 	 The groundwater
supply comes from underground aquifer systems, which house
ancient fossil water formations. 	 There are about 30 known
sedimentary aquifer formations which can be grouped into four
major systems.
The first two, Paleozoic and Triassic, are the oldest
formations and are closed systems; this means that there is no
seepage from them to other systems, and that they hold on to
infiltrated water. The third and fourth aquifer systems, the
Cretaceous and the Eocene, are open systems, which means that
water from the Cretaceous is transferred into the Eocene (the
largest system of the four) through sub-surface faults. The
water from the Eocene reaches the land surface through
terrestrial and submarine springs in the eastern part of the
country, and the Arabian Gulf.
This brief description of groundwater resources opens up the
discussion to the controversy (scientific and unscientific) of
whether or not those groundwater resources are renewable.
Peter Beaumont, in his study of water resources and their
management in the Middle East, states the basis of the
controversy.
"With these large aquifersystems there is dispute as
to the degree to which natural recharge is occurring at
the present day in extreme arid areas such as Egypt and
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Saudi Arabia.	 Part of the problem is that we still
have little idea as to how much runoff is generated in
these regions during the rare, but often locally
intense rainfall eventsu.(28)
The two closed aquifer systems, the Palaeozic and the Triassic have
been identified as mainly fossil water aged between 16,000 and 35,000
years.	 Water salinity has been shown to increase with the age and
depth of the aquifer system.	 (29)	 Tests of water salinity can be
used, therefore, as an indicator for depletion rates, along with the
level of the water table. Another indicator can be through measuring
the rate of discharge and recharge in the aquifer system. Discharge
occurs through wells in the closed system and through wells and springs
in the open ones.
The rate of recharge is disputed among scientists.
	
Beaumont lists
some studies that have shown that the rate of recharge may be greater
than what was previously believed. These studies have shown that even
when annual precipitation totals are as low as 80 m, about one quarter
of this amount can percolate downwards and recharge the groundwater
systems (Dincer, Al-Mugrin and Zimerman 1974). A. Al-Zaidy, on the
other hand, lists other studies that show that there is little or no
recharge in the aquifer systems (Pike 1970, E1-Khatib 1974). Al-Zaidy
furthers this argument through listing the following facts:
1.	 Analysis of water samples from different aquifers, in different
parts of the country and at different depths, had shown that
the age of the water can be estimated to be from 22,000 to more
than 30,000 years.
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2.	 Natural recharge occurs only in the shallow groundwater,
whenever runoff water exists and the soil conditions allow it
to collect in shallow aquifers (usually in the western side of
the country). Fresher water relatively speaking has been found
in those aquifer systems.
From the discussion above, it appears that up to 1981 (when the studies
were published), there has not been a consensus of opinion among
scientists regarding the level of the renewability of the groundwater
resources in the Kingdom.	 Agricultural development is not the only
area for which water is vital; urban and industrial development also
have great demand for a steady and dependable supply of water. The
semi-arid and arid zones have always been regions where man's chief aim
has been the provision of a sufficient volume of water for agricultural
and domestic needs.	 Water management, however, has moved from the
realm of the village to the hands of government. Beaumont strikes a
cautionary note:
"What is still lacking in most countries of the Middle East is
a conceptual overview of the role of water in the process of
economic development.	 To date water seems to have been
regarded by most governments not only as a prerequisite for
development, but it seems to have been assumed that if water is
provided development will occur."30
Beaumont also directs attention toward a) a more sophisticated approach
to water resource planning, which will balance demand against
ecological and socio-political factors; b) ambitious major schemes
which requires large physical and capital resources when smaller
schemes may have sufficed; and c) the need to limit demand by the price
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nec han ism.
Al-Zaidy takes a harder line as regards the water resources of Saudi
Arabia:
"Available water resources in the country not only are under
full utilization, but in some areas, such as the sedimentary
part of the country have been overexploited, causing increased
salinity in pumped water. ,,(3l)
The salinity of the water, mentioned by Al-Zaidy, leads to increased
salinity of the top soils, which will threaten the existing agriculture
and which is not easily rectified.
	 Irrigated cultivation in the
western region is not in a much better position. The shallow
infiltrated groundwater, although recharged naturally by runoff water
from the mountain regions, is under full utilization and may not be
supportive to expanded or intensified agricultural development.32
It appears that the management of the water resources presents a
formidable challenge to the policy makers in any arid or semi-arid
environment. Availability of water must not be taken at face value and
must be measured with an eye on the delicate balance of the ecology, as
well as the viability of long-term development. High expectations
based on wrong calculations may risk high costs in terms of financial,
human and natural resources, as was seen in some Middle Eastern
countries. Libya's Kufrah agricultural project is an example of such
miscalculation.	 10,000 Hectares was developed for animal feed
(Alfalfa).	 It was expected that 40 years of irrigation through 102
wells would produce a 20-36 m fall in the water table. After only one
year, however, the water level had already fallen by 5.15 	 In
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other cases of large-scale irrigation projects, salinization became a
major problem because the drainage system was not satisfactory.4
The previously mentioned projects were state initiated, which meant
that a high degree of planning was involved, as well as a large body of
experts.	 That, however, did not mean that they were successful in
reaching their goals. But equally, agricultural planning that is left
in the hands of private developers runs greater risks to both the
developers themselves and the natural resources on which the nation
depends.	 This is because the individual owners of agricultural
operations may have no interest in or access to an ecologically sound
agriculture plan. Most agricultural operators, in fact, are interested
in the maximisation of their profit at any given time especially if
they lack knowledge or experience.
Emulation of the developed region's agricultural methods, for whom
water is no problem, with no regard for the national capacity (human
and natural), is a recipe for disaster.
	
Iran in 1968 had to
nationalise its water resources to combat the process of depletion of
groundwater reservoirs, due to the greater extraction level brought
about by the use of modern agricultural technology (e.g. water pumps),
as well as the fast rate of expansion. Saudi Arabia, being more arid
than most regions in the Middle East, can only be more at risk in this
respect. It must, therefore, be more aware of the dangers of depletion
of underground reservoirs of water. If this is not so, then the future
of the agricultural sector can only be in question.
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SECTION II
Land Reforms and Distribution Policies
Understanding the development process in Saudi Arabia, which does not
have a long history either of central state formalized policies or of
social and economic research efforts, can be a task fraught with
difficulties. The recent nature of every aspect of modern development,
coupled with the dualistic nature of the social and economic structure,
added to a scarcity of literature, can make full comprehension an and
integrated analysis appear elusive, even to a native social researcher.
One major problem arises from the tendency of official statistics and
most of the accepted major works to deal with generalizations, and not
to	 highlight	 contradictions	 within	 the	 development	 process:
contradictions that may be in the form of deviations from the expected
development process, or within the already existing development
policies.
An example may clarify the previous points in relation to landholdings
in Saudi Arabia. According to official statistics, landholdings in the
country are small,	 averaging about 6.77 hectares in 1975/76.	 The
cultivated hectares, however, are even smaller, averaging about 3.28
hectares. 35	The statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture state that
only 8 of the total landholdings are in excess of 10 hectares. The
land distribution policy only grants 5-10 hectares per individual and
400 hectares for corporations. The Iirevolutionu of wheat cultivation,
on the other hand, is based on modern agricultural irrigation methods,
which covers a minimum of 25 hectares per irrigation system.
Consider the position of a social researcher arriving at the scene of a
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hectic and developing agricultural region, in which a 25 hectare
cultivation is considered a small farming enterprise by both the
private individual owners and the general public.	 In fact less than
100 hectares under cultivation is considered uncompetitive.
Considering the recency of modern agricultural enterprises, and the
preceding establishment of the land distribution policy, the researcher
is faced with the dilemma of placing this trend in some parts of the
country towards larger farms in the national context.	 Various
explanations could be considered:
A. The researcher may be in the heartland of the 8 percent of the
landholding population who are large landowners.
B. It could be a case of a recent and differential development,
which has not been reflected in the statistics.
C. On the other hand, it may be a case of arrested development of
the statistics.
The issues arising from encountering such a situation as regards
landholding give rise to a set of questions that may not be a
reflection of the overall national context, but are vital to
understanding this particular situation. Answers if acquired can be
revealing in relation to certain understated aspects of broader
national development. The major questions in this instance were the
following:
1. What constitutes the percentage of the population of large land
holders, and what qualification is required to enter such a
grouping? The issues involved here relate to landownership
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under the Islamic system which is the foundation of Saudi
society, as well as the recency of private individual ownership
of land, especially in the nomadic sector of the population.
Another issue is the recent nature of modern agricultural
methods, which facilitate the ownership of productive and large
agricultural lands.
2. How does the individual ownership of large agricultural land
relate to the land distribution policy, which favours small
agricultural enterprises? This is important since there has
been simultaneous development of both types of ownership, which
indicates that there is differentiation in the land granting
system.
3. How compatible are the policies of land distribution of
agricultural land with a) the general development policies for
agriculture, b) the general trends apparent in the agricultural
sector, and c) the future preservation and continuation of the
present growth rate iii terms of human and natural resources?
This issue will be discussed more fully in the third section of
this chapter.
In order to tackle the issues outlined above, it is necessary to
examine two particular areas. The first is land ownership, as outlined
by the different ideological systems existing in the country and
operative through the land granting policies (the most important of
these being the land distribution policy of 1968). The other area for
study is the agricultural subsidy programme, which has been a major -
if not the only - influence in the development of this sector, and
which will also be discussed in the next part of the chapter.
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1.	 Land 0wnersip and Land Distribution Policies
The right to use, own and allocate land in Saudi Arabia at present is
profoundly influenced by the Islamic laws expressed in the Holy Quran,
and the fundational doctrines taught by the Sunna and Hadiths (36) of
prophet Mohammed - Peace be upon him. Since the official doctrine of
Saudi Arabia is the Islamic Shariah (law), it is then natural that the
law-enforcing body combines both religious and social aspects of the
leadership.
Customs and traditions, on the other hand, also exert a heavy influence
on the concept of landownership in Saudi Arabia. These are derived from
two socio-economic groups: the nomadic patoralists (El-Badia), and the
sedentary people of the towns and villages (E7-)-Iadhar). The kinship
structure was the dominant feature in both coiiuiunities; and their
customs were in part derived from such principles of their economic
system, as do not run contrary to the Islamic religious principles.
Another source of customary practise is derived from the historical and
political influences which existed for some time in parts of the
Arabian penisula, namely the Ottoman Empire. 	 The Ottoman rulers
brought certain modifications to land tenure, needed to incorporate the
non-muslim subjects in their regions of influence. These changes were
originally derived from the Shariah (Islamic laws), but were also
influenced by secular European models to make them more adaptable to
the empire's needs.
	
The Ottoman code of land tenurial systems was
introduced to the Arabian peninsula in 1858, but it only affected the
most important and rich areas like Al-Hijaz (in which the two holy
cities of Neccah and Madinah are located), the agricultural region of
Asir on the Red Sea, and Al-Hassa in the Eastern region.
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The modern state, therefore, inherited a triple legacy as regards land
tenure: the first pertaining to the Islamic principles, the second
pertaining to the customs and manners of the traditional society and
finally the classification and bureaucratization introduced by the
Ottoman Empire. Each of these will now be considered in turn.
2.	 Land Utilization under Islamic Laws
Appropriation of land in the Islamic tradition arises from the concept
of utilization. When the land is used, reclaimed or made utilizable by
a person, then he would have priority in its use. A very clear
distinction was drawn by the Islamic laws between land left in a state
of nature or abandoned, "dead" land (Mawat or Mushaa), and land made
fruitful by cultivation or other uses.
Any person utilizing previously unutilized land has the right of
ownership.	 This was shown by a great number of Hadiths (the prophet's
sayings) as in the following "He who utilizes Nawat land, that
land becomes his OWn", and "He who arranges to use Mawat land becomes
its owner. All land not belonging to anyone belongs to Allah and his
Apostles, and to you afterwards. On the other hand, any person
utilizing another's land does not obtain anything in return except his
own costs. The Prophet - peace be upon him - said: "Whoever plants in
the lands of others without obtaining their permission, the cost he
incurred should be repaid, but he does not own the harvest."
The Islamic Shariah defines full possession as the actual use and
development of land for the purpose intended. (38) An example would be
a person building a house, which fulfils the condition of utilization,
or a person preparing land for cultivation and providing a water source
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(a well), which in this case fulfils the purpose of agricultural
utilization.
Mawat land (dead), also called white land, belongs to Allah primarily,
which means that it belongs to the Muslim community or the public
right. The Muslim people are the only agents of Allah, which means
that individual muslims have the right to utilize Mawat land. There
are two way of acquiring the titles to ownerless land:
1. By direct utilization
2. By acquiring it through Iqta or donation
The Iqta system is the bestowal of ownerless land upon an individual by
the Imam (the leader of the Muslim comunity), for the purpose of
utilization. There are strict rules governing the Iqta system, which
are as follows:
1. The Imam does not donate previously utilized land or owned
land.
2. Whoever leaves donated land unutilized for three years loses
his right to that land.	 This was clearly decreed by the
prophet's Khalifa Omar Ibn Al-Khattab.
3. The donated land must be utilized properly and for the purposes
intended.
4.	 The Imam or government donates land only to people who
contributed good service to the coninon interest, or to people
217
where the donation fits the common interest.
5.	 The evidence of utilization must be firm.
	
Ornar Ibm
Al-Khattab, the second Khalifa said: "Water is the basis of
revival such as digging a spring or a well.
	
If a person did
this, then built on or farmed the land, his work creates the
complete revival. If he did nothing on the land except extract
water, he will however have the right of ownership only for the
area of the spring or well."
From the previous points, it is apparent that the forefathers of the
muslini community sought to erect a very firm and just system of Iqta or
donation. Ownership through Iqta or direct acquistion is firmly based
on continuous utilization, which is the only form of land appropriation
in the simple and traditional early society.	 The most prominent
feature in the Islamic system of tenure is the absence of the concept
of land as a marketable commodity. Individuals and groups, moreover,
have the right to occupy and use land at any time within the framework
of the community.	 (This point of the Islamic law facilitated the
traditional patterns of land tenure in the case of subsistence
agriculture and nomadic pastoralism).
There are three types of ownership under the Islamic law:
1.	 Comunity ownership:	 This ownership extends over all Muslim
and conquered land, even if previously cultivated. 	 It also
extends over forests and pastures. The Muslim community as a
whole is the owner of these lands, and the Muslim ruler has not
power to control or legislate for these lands.
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2.	 The Public Domain:
	 The ownership of these lands is still by
the community, and it extends over all the fallow lands. The
State has the right of legislation, control and donation of
these lands.
3.	 Private Appropriation:	 The individual, or a group of
individuals, have the right to utilize fallow land (Ilawat and
ownerless), whether they are authorised by the ruler or not,
but the individual has the right of appropriation only as long
as he maintains his utilization.
Although Islam niaintalns the right of the individual to own land, it
also has strong measures to control unjust appropriation of large lands
by the individual. This comes through the qualifications of continuous
utilization, and by the Islamic inheritance laws which give the
individual's heirs collective ownership (female heirs inherit half what
the male heirs inherit). Muslim individuals have no right to dispose
of their inheritance upon their death, except for a religious endowment
for the holy places, or the poor in the Muslim community.	 Another
measure of control of unjust appropriation was the precedents set by
the early Khulafa (plural of Khalifa) of the Prophet Mohammed- Peace be
upon him- as in the case of this Hadith:
"Abu Bakr (The first Khalifa) donated land to one follower and
gave him a deed, and brought witnesses among whom was Omar Ibn
A1-Khattab (the second Khalifa).
	
When the follower came to
Omar to stamp the deed he said: 'Stamp it? Is all this for you
who have no people?'1
The implication of Omar's words is to discourage the appropriation of
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large landholdings by one individual. Only when a large Iqta is meant
to be enjoyed by a large kinship group, is it deemed appropriate and
just.
Another feature of the Islamic concept of rights in land, besides the
absence of marketability and the concept of continued utilization, is
that it allows the development of customary laws arising from the
structure of the existing societies within a fundamental framework.
That framework modified pre-Islamic practices without harming the basic
structures of the societies in question.	 The absence of conflict,
however, was a function of the basic nature of those societies and
their rulers as well as a function of their environment, as will be
seen in the next section.
3.	 Customary and Traditiona' Laws of Land Ownership
Since pre-Islamic times, the Arabs of the Peninsula have practised two
types of land tenure: subsistence pastoral nomadism, and subsistance
agriculture as practised by sedentary people.
	 The pastoral nomadic
land has always been more extensive than cultivated land in the Arabian
Peninsula. In fact more than eighty percent of the area has been and
still remains pastoral land.	 This is because nomadism is the most
efficient system for the use of the vast arid regions of range land.
Nomads travel with their flocks to almost any place, where they can
find forage and water. All pastoralists are partners in the use of
water, pasture and firewood. 	 Collective ownership, however, only
operates at the group level. From the point of view of the nomad, any
land considered as necessary for the survival of his group and utilized
thus, is held in some form of collective ownership by the group. These
lands have been specially identified by the utilizers, and strict
220
measures have been enforced for their protection.
The Dirahsystem, which incorporates Hema (protected) territories, was
born out of the tribal structure and has been practised since
pre-Islamic times, and was carried over in the establishment of the
sedentary tribal groups. This facilitated the maintenance of an area
of land, surrounding a central territory, which is reserved for the
sole benefit and utilization of a particular comunity to the exclusion
of others. The Prophet Mohammed - Peace be upon him - confirmed some
aspects of this system, particularly the utilization aspect, and the
collective ownership of water, pasture and firewood, bi 	 e
reported to have said in one Hadith: "There is no Hema except for Allah
and his Apostles."
The above words of the Prophet implied some modification to the JJema
system, and gave the representatives of Allah and the Muslim comunity
(the Prophet, the Khalifa and the Imam) some say in the utilization of
the protected land. In fact, Hema lands were used as pasture for the
horses and camels used In war, during the lifetime of the prophet.
Later, during the days of Omar, the second Khalifa (Caliph), these
lands were also made available to the animals of individual poor
Muslims as well as the common interest of the community.
It is apparent that the Islamic concept of land ownership did not come
into sharp contradiction with the existing practices. That is
mainly because of the qualification of ownership by the utilization
purpose.
	
The adoption of Islam by the population gave them the
Conuliunity right of utilization.	 Existing utilizers have inalienable
right to their land, even in the case of non-Muslims who
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have only to pay taxes. The practice of Iqta (donation), on which land
distribution is based, can only be exercised by the Imarn on white
(previously unutilized) land.
The tribal sedentary people, who called themselves the "people of the
palm", lived in permanent residence in towns and villages where
occasionally there would be surface water, or where ground water is
near the surface, creating a natural oasis which supported the
existence of agriculture and commerce. The oasis dwellers were mostly
congregated in the most favourable areas, such as the highlands, where
there is sufficient rainfall or natural springs, or the bottoms of
Wadis (valeys), ad 'sthere tte 'iitr tb\
represented in the modern Saudi Arabia by the Western highlands,
Al-I-Iassa and Qatif in the eastern provinces, and to a limited extent in
Najd. and the lowlands of Hijaz. The residency of a corrtnunty 'In oases
and settlements represented to outsiders a permanent utilization of the
area, and therefore ownership by a comunity.
In most cases the "people of the palm" were not only cultivators or
merchants; they also kept animals, for which pastures were needed.
This was provided by maintaining a form of Hema system around the
settlement, used variously for the grazing of animals, as a line of
defence against intruders, and for the purpose of expansion if needed.
The areas of common grazing were owned collectively by the settlement,
while other areas (white land) were open for cultivation under the
utilization rule. Agriculture however in most arid zones of the
Arabian Peninsula was solely dependent on the availability of water.
The individual right to land was worthless without a constant supply of
water to that land.
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Conflict between the two economic groups, the nomads and the sedentary,
was dependent on the balance of power; which in turn was determined by
the control of natural resources, trading routes and the alliances
between different groups. 3 Despite the obvious differences between
these two groups economically, there were similarities in the social
structure arising from the dependence on the kinship system as the
dominant determinant of the group's cohesion. The leaders of the tribe
were the adminstrators, the military leaders, and after Islam the
religious leaders. They were the regulators of access to all resources
and the mediators of disputes arising form internal or external
conf 11 cts.
The Islamic Shariah sought to regulate the life of the Arabs, and set a
just moral code that discouraged infringement of the rights of others
and encouraged brotherhood in Islam. It did not, however, seek to
erode the basic elements of the existing society.
4.	 The Ottoman Empire Code of Land Tenure
The Arabian Peninsula was in political and cultural isolation for a
long period of time before the Ottoman Empire entered it. Even then,
the sultans were only interested in the richer fringes of the Arabian
peninsula. This included the Hijaz (west of the Peninsula, where the
holy places are situated), the highlands of Asir (south west), and a
small section of the north east which is imediately adjacent to Kuwait
and Iraq, and where the two rich oases Qatif and Hafuf were located.
In the interior (the inner deserts and most of the northern region),
the Ottoman had no power or control, mainly because they knew the
difficulties that would be encountered from the environment, as well as
the tribal groups.
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The decrees, ordinance and legislation issued during the Ottoman Empire
(AD 1300-1922) were mainly for the application in other Muslim
countries under their dominance(40), and more particularly to the holy
citiess in Al-Hijaz. The terminology set out by the land legislation
was basically derived from the Shariah law, but they also set a firm
control by the state over land, and established firmly the
marketability of owned land.	 They were encoded as follows:
1.	 Miri property (Amiri property or princely property) denotes
land held in some degree of communal ownership, and over which
the state has the power of administration and legislation. The
miri lands are the following:
a.	 Mawat or Mushaa Lands: These are the "dead" lands, and
the vacant deserts.
b.	 Kharaj or conquered land:	 These are cultivated or
productive lands conquered by Muslim force of arms.
The inhabitants, Muslim or non Muslim, have the right
to remain in those lands, but the state enjoys the
right of taxation and administration.
c.	 Waqf Land:	 This is usufruct land, once given as a
relgious endowment to the holy places and the poor
Muslims, now administered by the state which uses these
revenues to propagate Islamic foundations 	 (e.g.
schools, mosques).
2.	 Mulk Property: This denotes private property, including lands
over which full rights of disposal and alienation are
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exerci sed.
In the Ottoman land code, identification and registration of land
titles became recognized and possible. As seen before, this was most
relevant in the west of the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Hijaz); but the code
became more significant after the establishment of the Saudi state,
because it set a model for state control and land legislation.
5.	 Land Distribution Policies by the Saudi State
It is possible to view the modern state's land policy in different
ways. One is to see it as designed mainly to serve fundamental
political requirements, which revolve around the affirmation of the
state authority in endeavouring to remove any risks that may ensue from
the continued independent existence of any socio-economic structure
(e.g. the Dirah tribal system), and also the firm establishment of the
state as the controller of the national resources. This view has been
espoused by many writers, especially those who are concerned with the
tribal groups of Saudi Arabia.41
The second possible view is to look at the land policies as emerging
through evolutionary stages of development, that seek to establish the
rights and interests of the state as an institution through developing
the concept of the public sector without creating conflict between the
secular and the religious attitudes, and at the same time preserving
continuity with the past. This is the view adopted by Hassan Hajrah in
his study of public land distribution in Saudi Arabia in 1982.
The above two views, although very different in terms of implication,
are similar in so far that they agree that the establishment of state
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authority has been high on the agenda of the Saudi land policies. The
Saudi leaders have been faced with the great challenge of reforming the
traditional and customary practices (that are largely unrelated to a
strong central government) into state inspired and initiated modern
practices, while maintaining a legitimacy that stems largely from the
same source as the old traditional and customary practices.
The role of the Saudi leaders as the upholders of the Islamic faith and
of the accepted leaders (Sheikhs) of the tribes, defines in part the
perceived legitimacy and the type of action that is taken as part of
the government's policies. The administrative body, moreover, was
being formed and developed at the same time that the policies were
being formed arid developed, which meant that the implementation of
those policies could not be swift and effective.
Taking into consideration the strong ideological and traditional legacy
that the newly emerging state is facing, it appears that Al-Ftajrah's
view of the land policies is more likely. That, however, does not
negate the validity of the first view as regards the nomadic
comunities. It is possible to view the interests and political
requirements of the state as the main contender in the arena, or
perhaps the pole upon which necessary weights must be positioned at
different stages, without jeopardising its strength and balance. The
management of the shape and the position of these weights has been the
challenge facing the leaders in Saudi Arabia especially in the early
stages. The influences of the ideological and traditional elements
have been clearly exhibited in the gradual development of the land
policies which will now be discussed.
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6.	 The Development Process of Saudi Land Reforms
The first attempts to reform land use were embedded in the
identification of the emerging state as Islamic.	 King Abdulaziz was
the Imam of the Saudi Muslim comunity, before he was proclaimed King.
As Imam, he is accountable to Allah through maintaining the Shariah
laws. King Abdulaziz thus added to the strength of his personality and
leadership among tribes the power to rule, providing he kept to the
precepts of the Islamic faith.
The Ikhwan movement was the vehicle for the spread and acceptance of
the proposed state. It was also an effort to alter and intervene in
the economic system of pastoral nomadism (see chapter 2) through
encouraging settlement in agricultural Hujar.
Even before the official proclamation of King Abdulaziz (Ibn Saud) as
the King of Saudi Arabia in 1932, a law was passed in 1928 virtually
abolishing the Dirah system.	 The law was designed to abolish the
nomadic tribal practice to regard the land occupied by each group as
its absolute possession, as long as they can maintain their ability to
protect it from the encroachment of others. This law's legitimacy was
directly derived from the Islamic principle that everything on earth
belongs to Allah, and that Muslim people are His representatives who
share the utilization of what can be found. King Abdulaziz, supported
by the Muslim Ulama of the time, was following the path set by the
Prophet Mohammed - peace be upon him - when he declared "there is no
Hema (protected territories) except for Allah and his Apostles". The
implication of this law was to declare the traditional pastoral nomadic
utilization of land as an incorrect utilization.
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According to this interpretation of Shariah laws, King Abdulaziz as the
Imam was replacing aggression, which was seen as an inherent element of
the nomadic pastoral system, with calm and Islamic brotherhood.
The 1928 law was basically of an ideological nature rather than a
juridical one, (42) which meant that the law in itself did not cause an
immediate alteration in the models of nomadic life. It did, however,
contain the seeds for the formation of other land policies that are
juridical in nature and which can be enforced by the strengthened state
apparatus.
The period after 1928 saw the following developments:
1. The breakup of the Ikhwan movement, which was mainly composed
of the members of the different nomadic tribes, after the
abortive insurrections of 1929 and 1930. This power struggle
was fought over the interpretation of the Islamic laws as
regards innovations introduced into the traditional society and
the relationship of Ibn Saud with neighbouring states and
western powers who were seen as the enemies of Islam by the
Ikhwan zealots.
2. The military establishment of the Islamic state as led by [bn
Saud, which now controlled not only the central tribal region,
but also Al-Hi jaz and the eastern region with local inhabitants
who were profoundly influenced by the previous controlling
powers.
What followed was a long and arduous struggle by the government to
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contain the significant differences between the various systems of
customary laws, traditional practices and the perceived interests of
the different socio-econornic groups.	 The overriding concern was to
preserve the authority of the state, as H. Hajrah explains:
"First there can be acceptance or rejection of pre existing
land claims.	 King Abdulaziz	 accepted many	 of the
administrative customs in the new state temporarily to avoid
friction, but he changed the administration gradually to put
all powers in his hands as Head of State. This was acceptable
as a custom of all rulers as Amirs, where they managed the
whole affairs of a community, large or small, as absolute
rulers. ,(43)
King Abdulaziz also realised with his farsightedness that tribal claims	 I
to land could not be dismissed easily. He therefore saw fit to give some
of the tribal leaders, the Sheiks, limited rights of disposition for
the purpose of settlement or distribution among their peopie.144) His
actions were perceived as legitimate as an absolute ruler, as well as
the Imarn of the Muslim comunity.
By following up the precendent of the Prophet and his Khulafa for Iqta
(donation), he was trying to accomplish two things: a) avert the
conflicts that may ensue because of the complete devolution of the
tribal Sheiks' authority, and the resentment that may be created among
the tribal members; and b) reward those who had helped in the effort to
create the new state, which was seen as a contribution to the Islamic
religion and the nation.
Iqta or donation by the King was selective and did not affect all the
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tribal territories, because some of the tribal Sheiks had proved
themselves hostile during the Ikhwan conflict. The tribal groups,
moreover, were not all powerful in terms of numbers and status. The
Ottoman empire also had previously granted some tribal groups a title
to their land in the western region. King Abdulaziz did not want to
create hatred by rejecting their claims, and accepted them as long as
they were not clearly against the precepts of religion. Sedentary and
dry farming areas were managed according to custom and Sharia, so that
the rights fell to the first seasonal occupant.
During the early period before the establishment of the state's
administrative body, policy emphasis was centred around the gathering
of power and authority in the lands of the leaders, especially the
tribal ones. When certain rights were given as land grants, or by the
ruler's permission, these rights were clearly derived from the
authority of the state and aimed at particular purposes - such as
sedentarization or merely local administration. Any deviation from the
set purposes of the state would mean the violation of the basic Islamic
Shariah that the state rests on.
The second stage of development, since 1952, was marked by the setting
up of the judicial and administrative body capable of formulating and
enforcing the state's authority over public land. The state which was
created in the twentieth century needed to translate the old style of
personal authority to a modern structure and bureaucratic system. The
first necessity was to set up a judicial body which can legitmately
deal with an illegal land claim made without the state's permission.
This judicial system has to be based on satisfactory interpretation of
the Islamic laws. Various royal decrees and ordinances were passed,
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which will be listed below chronologically:
1. In 1952 an ordinance of Shariah courts was issued. 	 Its main
functions were a) to unify and organise the systems of the
Islamic courts in the whole state and to counsel other courts,
and b) to interpret the basic principles of the Islamic faith
and adhere to the Quran and the prophet's sayings.
The creation of such a Shariah law department was designed to
put an effective stop to the numerous faiths existing in the
peninsula, which may present differing interprettions of the
Islamic fundamental laws. What resulted was the adoption of
the Hanbali faith as the official faith of the Kingdom.
2. After the establishment of the aforementioned judicial body, an
ordinance was passed in the same year which contained two
articles which were imediately relevant to the control of
land appropriation. 	 Article 85 set firm regulations for the
issuing of appropriation deeds for a property. Any court which
has been asked for such a deed, should write to the
municipality, the Waqf (religious endowment) Department, and
the Ministry of Finance, and enquire from them as to whether
they have any objection regarding the issuing of the deed. If
they have no objection, the appropriation deed may be issued
after being published in the official papers for a period of
one month.
Article 86 of the same ordinance dealt with the issuing of
deeds to undeveloped (t1awat) land. It also decreed that deeds
can only be issued after the financial authorities were asked
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for guidance, in addition to the set procedure of Article 85.
The two articles were meant to co-ordinate and control the
issuing of appropriation deeds which had been in great demand
nationally. These deeds were previously given by the religious
courts through lodging a case and giving an oath, with the
appropriate presence of witnesses to the claimant's right of
ownership according to the utilization principle.
These institutional and bureaucratic procedures, however, had
wide ranging implications, which were not universally accepted
by the religious faiths in view of their differing
interpretation of the fundamental Islamic law. The controversy
was related to two areas:
a) the state's right to control the growth and utilization of
undeveloped land, and b) the need to show that continuous
utilization has been effected. The Hanbali school of Quranic
interpretation maintained that any action of granting
undeveloped land by the prophet Mohamed - Peace be upon him -
was made by him in the name of God and therefore was perpetual.
The Malki and Hanafi schools, on the other hand, believed that
in the matter of granting undeveloped land the prophet had
acted as head of state, and that therefore the normal need to
show use would operate.
3.	 In 1957, the controversy was finally resolved by a ruling of
the Grand Mufti (Chief Justice) of the state.
	 The ruling
stated: "He who utilized the land claimed it as his own,
whether or not he had permission from the Iniam.
	 He who
surrounded a land by stones, it became his own free of charge.
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When an interested person got it he had to utilize it or leave
it. Any dispute or interpretation by one municipality or
another will be refered to Shariah. Anybody trying something
else is not going in the right direction.'45
The Chief Justice's ruling confirmed the individual right to
land utilization, regardless of the state's permission.
However, it did not rule on the issuing of deeds for properly
utilized land, which meant that there has not been any major
contradiction between the previous decree and the 1957
religious ruling.
The situation at this point was highly complex and confusing.
Claims to land were variously based on previous utilization,
present utilization, the community right of tribal groups by
virtue of settlement or utilization, deeds previously issued by
the courts, land grants to specific groups or individuals by
the King, and written documents issued by the leaders of the
communities in the presence of witnesses.
4.	 Two Royal decrees in 1967 and 1968 put a stop to further
confusion of this sort.
	 The first ruled that anybody who
henceforward alleges land appropriation of utilized land, shall
have his allegation disregarded. The second ruled that
undeveloped lands are owned by the government, that the
appropriation of such land by anybody is not recognised, that
deeds supporting such appropriation were cancelled and that the
claimant could be penalised. 46
 Agricultural and rural lands
particularly were affected by this ruling, because its major
aim was to regulate collective and individual appropriation or
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utilization of undeveloped lands which is not sanctioned by the
authorities. This in effect completed the gradual process of
disposessing tribes of their tribal space.
The land policies of 1967 and 1968 are often cited as the start of the
modern phase of land policies in Saudi Arabia. This is partly true
because it was the start for clear and unequivocal state authority over
public lands.
	
It also set the stage for a classification of public
land according to utilization	 and exploitation needs for both the
state and individuals. Lands which were previously effectively managed
and utilized by tribes were taken over in the public interest , such
as forestry areas, land with mineral rights, and the majority of
pasture lands. 47	The laws of 1967 and 1968 also made possible the
passing of the Public Land Distribution ordinance in 1968, which was
administered by the public land management department of the Ministry
of Agriculture, and which will be discussed in point 7 of this section.
Despite all	 of these modern sector developments, fundamental
traditional elements remained operative. These are the following:
1.	 The basic right of the ruler as an Imam and the leader of the
tribes to grant land according to the Islamic Iqta system. The
Royal orders of this kind were listed by Hajrah for the years
1964-71 (Table 4.6). These and previous donations were outside
the ordinance of 1968, and the powers of the public land
management department.
The individuals or Sheiks of tribes, who received those
donations of land, were free to execute their rights according
to the stipulation of the Royal Iqta.
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Areas in donurns granted according to Royal Orders, from 8/1/1384 toTable No. 4.6
817/91 (1964.71).
Area	 No. of Uti/i:ers
(Beneficiaries)
Madinah
	
55
Tail
Ha'il
Bishah
	
115
Qasim
Qasim
AI-Howa
U naizah
Al-Hassa
Al-Hassa	 6
Yanbo'a
As-Salsalah
	
69
Tarabah
	
206
Tathlith
	
42
Qasim	 5
Qasim	 2
Qasim
Total 509
Area
Distributed
8 .5 18 .7
27.1
2,880
3.828
250
1.000
708
100
75
400
JO
5,199
2,238.2
652.2
500
3.250
100
29,736.2
No. of
Royal Order
624
20.399
15.032
17.447
17.719
1 6.677
24.879
936
27,647
3,909
12,285
10,668
(1.808
19.172
5.194
9,550
14,654
Dae of
Royal Order
8/1/1384 (1964)
26/8/1384 (1964)
15/7/1384 (1964)
14/811385 (1965)
19/S/I 385 (1965)
20/8/1385 (1965)
29/10/1386 (1966)
21/11/1386 (1966)
4/12/1386 (1966)
24/2/1387 (1967)
22/6/1387 (1967)
18/5/1388 (1968)
2/6/1388 ((968)
10/9/1388 (1968)
8/3/1391 (1971)
29/4/1391 (1971)
8/7/1391 (1971)
Source: Hajrah, H.	 Public Land Distribution in Saudi Arabia,
Longman 1982, P.79
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2.	 The traditional and deep rooted social values regarding the
community right of ownership of the land on which they are
settled remained operative. What this led to was the survival
of villages and bedouin communities with recognized rights to
territories. (48)	 The survival of this traditional custom had
significant implications on land grants even after the 1968
law.	 It also affected the modern land distribution policy
whose principles were formulated by an administrative body from
the public sector.
In theory, land allocation according to the new policy is open
to all Saudi nationals in any territory. The reality was that
there was preferential treatment for those who have a
traditiona' right. This is partcuar\y signi1icant when we
consider that there are large nomadic populations who do not
have specific titles to land, but who need socio-economic
equality with their settled and urban compatriots.49
3.	 The traditional leaders of the tribal groups retained their
position in their comunities. 	 Their function, however, was
considerably modified. Prior to 1959, they were able to retain
their customary powers including that of land allocation and
distribution. That right was abolished by a Royal decree in
1959, and the central government assumed this responsibility in
accordance with	 religious practices.	 Allocations and
donations by the local Amirates (Sheiks, regional governors)
before that date could be confirmed by the local religious
courts. H.M. the King, however, may grant the local Amirs the
power to allocate land, and that meant that the territories of
the concerned comunity fall outside the land distribution
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policy.
The local Arnirs, therefore, derive their power from the King or his
representatives (e.g. Prime rlinister or Ilinister of the Interior at
present). The limits of jurisdiction of the local Amir are not very
clear, but his authority extends over the settling of local disputes,
general administrative responsibilities, and as a representative of the
community's interests. The influence derived from such an
administrative position is considerable, and it has the potential to be
either positive or negative to the comunity at large depending on the
personality of the Amir and his relationship with all different
factions of his community, as well as with the central authorities.
The differentiation between local Ainirs' power as regards land
distribution is another element of the system that does not encourage
the application of a uniform policy regarding land distribution.
Differentiation may occur at two levels. One is between the policy of
the state and the practice of the Amir, which will result in
differences in the pattern of land holdings operative in different
rural communities. The same can hold true on the level of the size of
territories over which the community right of ownership is exerted.
(50) Second, differentiation in landholding patterns may occur at the
level of the individual community depending on the Amir's practice.
Favouritism may be shown to those who are closest to the Amir, in terms
of shared interests or kinship ties.
7.	 The Present Public Land Distribution Ordinance (PLDO)
1967/68
There are three very important characteristics of the current land
distribution policy administered by the state:
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1. It only affects unutilised, unowned land, which means that
there is no element of redistribution in the implementation of
its principles.
2. It recognises all claims prior to the Public Land Distribution
Ordinance of 1968 (PLDO), because the various systems of
distribution effective previously were basically derived from
the acceptance of Islamic concepts of land proprietorship as
interpreted by Sharia.
3. It is the first system of land distribution in Saudi arabia
that is based on modern executive procedure. 	 Considerable
planning was involved in the setting up of its principles, and
in determining the economic benefits of land allacatton in
terms of the land's productive capacity and the ability of the
individual to utilise the land.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water, in association with the tlinistry
of Interior, were jointly responsible for the execution of the public
land distribution ordinance (PLDO). Its stated aim was that:
"Development of new lands and enlargement of existing farms by
private entrepreneurs will be facilitated by the recent PLDO
and will be further encouraged by Government technical
assistance and grants."5
The expression of "public land" in the ordinance means any land wherein
the following condition are fulfilled:52
a	 It should be free from existing rights of proprietorship or
238
appropriation.
b	 The economic advantages of its utilization should be clear.
c	 It should be outside the boundaries of the inhabited areas and
their related interests in both towns and villages.
The principles of the ordinance were as follows:
1. Each individual would receive a minimum of 5 hectares to a
maximum of 10 hectares (this was considered a normal
economically viable size). Up to 400 hectares can be allotted
to any single company however.
2. The individual, groups of individuals or company ¶.'Iho received
land grants must utilize it according to the Islamic rule, in
order to gain the right of ownership. The period specified by
the ordinance was 2-3 years.	 If utilization however is not
effected, the individual loses his utilization right and the
land is returned to the public domain.
3. Local committees were formed to deal with the process of
distribution in the different regions. These committees were
constituted	 of	 representatives	 from the	 Ministry	 of
Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior and the
Ministry of Justice, in addition to two representatives of the
local people. These local members of the comittees must not
be employed by the government in any capacity.
	 The local
comittees report to a central committee, which makes the final
recomendation which is then implemented by the public land
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management department.
The individual allottee may not be granted more than one land unless a
previous grant has been completely utilized, and his otinership
estalished. The ordinance also gives the Ministry of Agriculture the
task of supervising the allotted land from the technical point of viet,
and the right to check that the utilization function is performed. If
this is not done by the set time, then advance notice is given to the
allottee two months before cancellation may take place.
Yet these measures to guarantee the economic benefits of the policy are
largely theoretical, as H. Hajrah explains:
"In theory the state has the powers to take action but in
practice the special characteristics of the Saudi Kingdom
produce flexibility.")
The "flexibility'1
 stated by Hajrah means that lands once granted were
seldom returned to the public domain.
	
Time extensions were often
allowed for land utilization, and the allottees' ownership was
confirmed. Land grants before the PLDO became subject to the same
rules of utilization set by the ordinance, but the size of these
granted lands and their location were never affected by the new rules
of land distribution.
The year 1972 saw 28,410.1 hectares distributed to 4750 users. 	 The
total number of hectares announced for distribution was 301,786.5 (see
table 4.7). The average size of the distributed hectares per user did
not exceed 10 in the majority of the cases, but two regions (Al-Ula and
Qatif) had a larger average size of distributed land. This may be
2t0
Tablc No. 4.7 Arcas(in hcctarcs) prcpared for distribution according to PLDO and
having watcr potential.
Area	 Land	 Land to be	 Area Delivered No. of	 Prnn.cpd
Al-Joaf
Tabuk
Taima
Al-Ula
Qasirn-Bucaidah
Qasiin-Unaizah
Ha'il
Bis hah
Naj ran
Wadi Dawasir
As-Sulail
Al-Hassa'
Qatif
Al..Kharj
Shakra
A1-Aflaj
Az-Zutfi
As-Serr
Total
Announced
for
Distribution
1,700.0
44,904.7
336.0
1,434.0
84,590.0
9,575.4
62,895.7
7,270.0
2,000.0
3,600.0
13,205.0
37,840.0
12,485.0
8,120.0
800.0
1,200.0
400.0
9,430.7
301,786.5
	
----------------.
	
- -- I------
Announced	 co UciUzers	 UciUzers Dscrbucion
for	 Progratnne
Distribution	 over 3 Years
	
1,317.1	 1,921.9	 260	 1,000.0
-	 16,399.4	 2,972	 13,365.7
- .	 -	
-	 336.0
-	 1,002.0	 41	 3,143.9
	
7,991.7	 2,199.5	 358	 8,459.0
-	 165.9	 28	 3,191.8
	
.52,526.4	 1,536.0	 340	 ,289.5
426.9	 -	 727.0
-.	 194.2	 48	 2,000.0
	
4,550.0	 360.0	 73	 '1,200.0
191.8 .
	 109.0	 14	 '4,401.6
	
4,416.0	 1,076.7	 187	 974.7
50.1	 918.7	 25	 4,161.6
582.1	 1,956.8	 377	 1,956.7
-	 -	
-	 700.0
-	 300.0	 27	 1,200.0
- .	
-	 400.0
- .	 . . -	
-	 3,143.5
	
72,052.1	 28,140.1	 4,750	 56,651.0
Source: Hajrah, H., Public Land Distribution in Saudi Arabia,
Longman, 1982, P.99
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because a certain number of companies had applied for grants of land in
those regions, which raised the average acreage per user.
There have been considerable regional differences between the zones
over which the PLDO operates. The differences are due to a) ecological
factors, such as water availability and soil suitability, b) the state
of agricultural production before the PLDO implementation, and c) the
degree to which the region can be classified as urban. These three
elements have been most inf1uentia
	 in determining the genera)
character of agricultural production in any one given region. They
also determine who will be benefitting from the new era of land
distribution, be it the already established farmers with adjoining
farms to the area to be distributed, or bedouins who had relied on
pastoral activities before. The more urbanized areas, however, could
accomodate tribal applicants from other regions more easily than
remote and closed communities. The newly emerging agricultural regions
were to be built on a pattern closely resembling the PLDO view of
viable agriculture (i.e. small owner occupier farms). Other elements -
such as the marketing possibilities of agricultural goods due to the
availability or lack or road links, and the estimated cost of
establishing agricultural production - can also have considerable
influence on how the agricultural operations develop.
Gasim in the north is one example of an agricultural region of a rural
settled population with strong agricultural traditions. After 1950, as
a result of the rising national income from oil, commercial business
grew in the region. The increase of wealth enabled land holders and
farmers to be expansionary. When water was discovered in abundance, a
new era began for Gasim. It became less isolated and grew in size
gradually to become one of the largest agricultural areas in Saudi
242
Arabia. Land holdings were uniformly traditional in size before 1966,
but new property patterns began to emerge after that year due to
unplanned taking of land by utilization.
	 This was a result of the
availability of new technical and economic opportunities with a
basically traditional attitude to land acquisition.4
Gasim then can be characterized by a slow but strong local initiative
in the pattern of land appropriation.	 The PLDO pattern of land
granting in the asin region vas	 upoieP o	 toriTg	 tTn9
resources as well as expansion."55
After considering some of the complex factors that may govern the
result of the PLDO's implementation, it is possible to highlight some
of the basic characteristics of this policy:
1. It is limited by its nature. The policy can only affect the
pattern of land holdings in the newly cultivated regions. It
has no power to assess or modify any previous pattern that
exists within the national setting.
2. It encouraged the pattern of small traditional farming concerns
for individuals which were prevalent at the time.
	 It had,
however, a different and more favourable policy for companies
and agri-business enterprises, in terms of size of land
allocated.
3. The utilization principles remains, as in the past, dependent
on the ability of the individual or the company to initiate and
complete production. This previously was mainly through the
application of human labour. The changing economic and social
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circumstances at present, however, give the well-off a
preferable position in agriculture.
	 It also gives the large
already established modern farmers an unfair advantage in terms
of expanding.
4. The policy was formulated before a coherent and well
established national agricultural development policy was
formulated. So its principles were not necessarily compatible
with the rural development programe that was initiated in
1975.
5. Although relatively speaking the PLDO was reasonably well
organised in terms of assessing the agricultural productivity
of public land of Saudi Arabia, it was dogged by shortages of
experienced and skilled employees, and its impleinentatthn
process was also affected by the traditional considerations
outlined previously. Nonetheless, the PLDO's many positive
contributions include:
1. The identification of the areas and magnitude of
agricultural expansion.
2. It helped to settle nomadic groups, who did not have
the right to specific areas, or who had experienced
economic decline due to drought or loss of pastures.
3. It took the first step for the development of the
agricultural sector, especially among the majority of
the rural population, who had no contact or experience
with the modern sector.
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8. An Overview of Saudi Land Reforms and Distributions
Overall, then, the path of development of the land reforms is a gradual
change from a pattern of ownership that was predominantly collective to
a pattern predominantly individual. 	 This was achieved, not only
through the process of gradual social change, but also through a policy
that perceived the latter form of ownership as the most beneficial to
the nation.
The Islamic laws sanctioned inidividual ownership through continuous
utilization, but on the whole encouraged collective utilization of
natural resources. The Islamic view of ownership is also reflected in
the inheritance laws which divide the property between inheritors
strictly. There was, moreover, an absence of the concept of land as a
marketable commodity. The traditional conditions of the peninsula also
favoured collective utilization of land in the form of the Dirahsystem
among nomads, and the comunity right in settlements and villages.
The state which has emerged in the twentieth century had to build a
social structure that corresponds and conforms to international
standards, and also fulfils the function of economic growth. 	 There
were perceived inherent dangers in some of the traditional systems to
the continued existance of a centralised government, and therefore the
well being of the Saudi nationals.
The transformation of the social structure had to take a careful path,
that eliminates the potentially harmful elements in the traditional
structure without removing any of the legitimacy of the state, as the
ruler of a basically traditional population.
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The state's adherence to Islam and the Shariah principles was one way
to consolidate its position among the deeply religious and conservative
population, which would allow it then to effect changes that are not
basically opposed to religious thought.
The tribal sector was the first target for a particular type of policy
which achieves transformation without any radical changes. This was
done through abolishing the DirahSystem (the economic function of the
tribe).	 Yet still through the leaders of the tribes, especially the
powerful ones, the state maintains a advantageous link with the group.
Wealth and welfare can then be distributed where it is needed without
creating a generalized upheaval in all rural areas.
The same period marks further development of the individual ownership
pattern, which was supported by the development of the Islamic judicial
system, and the adoption of the Ottoman land code. Once the change was
substantially accepted, and the state structure was strengthened, it
became possible to introduce modern land policies that are acceptable,
but not radical in nature. The new policies removed the burden of' the
traditional land grants from the Saudi leaders, without affecting the
already established pattern, and avoiding conflict with the traditional
elements.
Another characteristic of the Saudi land policy is that it is
dualistic.	 There are strong elements in it that encourage the
development of large landholdings. 	 This is through (a) actual
traditional land grants, (b) the utilization aspect as it operates at
present, and (c) governmental policies to encourage large private
enterprises. Yet at the same time the state has a modern policy (the
PLDO), that encourages small farming operations. This stems from the
2b6
conflict between an ideology strongly influenced by traditional
factors, and a policy derived mainly from the modern sector. This has
resulted in a considerably differentiated landholding pattern. These
may be exhibited in one region or between different regions.
Although it is not possible at present to determine who in fact are the
large landowners (because the process is too recent, and the data too
fragmented), it is possible to speculate on the basis of the degree of
likelihood. The social position and economic circumstances surrounding
certain social groupings allow us to make a judgement.
	 For example,
peasant farmers and poor recently settled nomads are the least likely
to have the ability and experience to expand in terms of land holdings.
Even if land is obtained through the PLDO, and financial assistance is
received through the Pgrictura	 ank, te size ol t'ne 'ianà anO 't'ne
lack of experience in modern agricultural methods make it likely that
these groups will stay locked in a traditional and non-expanding
economic operation.
On the other hand, tribal (previously nomadic) groups who have access
to land through a donation to their Sheikh or Aniir are in a much better
position to develop landholdings that are larger than the national
average. This is not only because there are no restrictions on land
size granted by Amir or the ruler, but also because the access to land
ownership came earlier in most cases. 	 What this means is that
individuals have a better chance to develop landholding and expand
their operation through revivification, while gaining experience of and
links to the modern sector.
Success, however, is not always guaranteed to agricultural settlements
or settlers of this kind. That is because the ecological factors may
2not be favourable. The size of land donations (from the ruler or the
Amir), moreover, can vary according to socio-political circumstances.
Sedentary rural communities, who have a strong agricultural background
and hold community right over established farming areas, have an even
higher likelihood to develop large landholdings. They in most cases
are in areas that have better potential and are sufficiently
established to participate more actively in the new areas of employment
and markets of the modern sector. That in turn develops the attitude
and economic ability that allow some to trn to larger agricultural
enterprises. This may be done through expanding existing landholdings
or utilization, large land grants, and/or purchase.
The differentiation in landholding operates at the level of different
settlements and villages, and also at the community level. Social
status and close kinship ties to the social leaders are favourable
factors for large landholdings. If this is coupled with economic
ability and modern sector experience, then success within the present
structure of the agricultural sector is highly likely. That is because
the policies for agricultural development favour large, highly
commercialized farming operations, or rurally based agri-business.
This issue will be discussed in the coming section.
SECTION III
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND SUBSIDISATION
Agricultural subsidisation in general has been used in Saudi Arabia for
the following purposes:
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1. Encourage people or firms to enter into farming and increase
agricultural production.
2. Assist the existing operators to expand their production by
providing better input free or at lower prices and/or by making
available cheap credit.
3. Improve the existing methods by introducing better seeds,
fertilizers and technology.
4. Provide adequate returns to the operators by guaranteeing the
market.
5. Enable the local producers to survive and compete with the
foreign suppliers.
Agricultural subsidies, as mentioned previously, began in 1973. The
royal decree no. 52 authorized the subsidisation of agricultural
machinery to encourage farmers and agricultural productivity. Since
then, the government has added subsidies for engines, pumps, seeds,
fertilizers, animal feed, dairy and poultry equipment, fishing
equipment and for drought relief (see table 4.8).
There are three agencies administering agricultural policies, including
subsidisation.	 The first is the Ministry of Agriculture and Water
(MAW), which was established in 1952. The second is the Saudi Arabian
Agricultural Bank (SAAB), established in 1967. Thirdly the Grain, Silo
and Feed Mill Organisation (GSFMO), established in 1972 but not
operative until September of 1977. The three agencies provide the
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TABtE NO 4.8
STARTING DATE OF VARIOUS SUBSIDISATION PROGRAMMES
ROYAL DECREE NO
(Resolution of Council of
PURPOSE
	
Ministers)
	
DATE
Inputs
1. Agricultural Machinery
	
52
	
1973
2. Chemical Fertilizers
	
516
	
1974
3. Feed Concentrates
	
668
	
1974
4. Engines and Pumps (Irriga t ion)
	
515
	
1975
5. Dairy Equipment -
Transportation Cost
	
731
	
1975
6. Poultry Equipment
	
924
	
1975
1.	 Date aln, Trees
	
1977
8.	 Fishing Equipment
	
562
	
1977
Outputs
1. Rice and Wheat
	
688
	
1974
2. Corn
	
1418
	
1974
3. Local Sheep and Camel
	
1867
	
1975
4. Barley and Sorghum
	
1977
5. Date
	
1977
Other
1.	 Emergency Drought Relief
	
1418
	
1974
Source: Mohammed M Rizk and Sayeed S. Sayeed, Government Subsidy, 1st part,
serial no 3, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 1976. Also Department of International Economic
Productions, racts about_programmes of Government Subsidies and loans to the
Private Sector, up to 30.4.1396 A.H; Ministry of Finance and National Economy,
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1977.	 -
Quoted in unpublished SAAB internal paper, 1983.
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various input and output in agricultural subsidies in the Kingdom (see
table 4.9).	 Agro-industrial loans are also provided by the Saudi
Industrial Development Fund.
As table 4.9 shows, the majority of the input subsidies are
administered by SAAB, while the wheat output subsidy is adminstered by
the GSFMO. MAW provides a mixture of input and output subsidies, the
most important of which is free land. The roles of MAW, SAAB and GSFMO
in the subsidisation programme will be discussed in this section. The
major part of the attention, however, will be focussed on wheat
production and subsidisation. This is because wheat has emerged as the
main agricultural produce of the country as a who?e aaJ
particularly of this study's region. 	 Wheat also has been the main
beneficiary of attention in the government agricultural development
programmes, especially as regards output subsidies.
The obvious benefits of the subsidization policies have been apparant
generally in the accelerated growth of the agricultural sector, in
terms of output and land utilization. The 1980s have seen Saudi Arabia
achieving self sufficiency in wheat, eggs and poultry meats, and
approaching self sufficiency in milk production. 	 Land utilisation,
moreover, has increased spectacularly since the begining of the third
development plan term (1980-1985).
There are, nevertheless, certain problematic areas, which will be the
subject of the later part of this section. These problems cast a few
shadows over the bright hopes generated by the "success story of
wheat", and the huge efforts of the agricultural agencies of the
central government.
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TABLE NO 4.9
TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES PROVIDED BY THE THREE AGENCIES
Ministry of
Agriculture
1. Land (Free)
2. Potato Seed (Variables
but roughly 85%
3. Fertilizers (50%)
4. Date Palm Trees
(SR 50.00/Tree)
Output
1. Rice	 (SR 0.30/kg)
2. Corn	 (SR 0.25/kg)
3. Millet (SR 0.15/kg)
4. Barley (SR 0.15/kg)
5. Dates (SR 0.25/kg)
6. Sheep SR 20/head
(discontinued 1979)
7. Camel SR 66/head
(discontInued 1979)
Saudi Arabian	 Grain Silo and Feed
Agricultural Bank	 Mill Organisation
Input	 IF%DUt
1. Animal Feed	 50% N one
2. Agricultural Machines 45%
3. Engines	 50%
4. Pumps	 50%
5. PouLtry Equipment	 30%
6. Dairy Equipment	 30%
7. Transportation of
Cows	 lOOC
8. Fishing Equipment
Variable
Output	 Output
None Wheat Price ()
Until 1P76 - 0.30/kg
1977 - 1970 2.25/kg
1979 - 1904 3.50/kg
1084 - Present 2./kg
Intended to stay at
titis price until 1989
Source: Various Governmental Agencies papers (PL lisied anJ LkpAflsId)
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1.	 The Role of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water in the
Subsidisation and Development Programme
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water has the primary responsibility
for developing agriculture in the Kingdom. It is responsible for
providing overall leadership, guidelines and co-ordination for all of
the other agencies participaitng in the development efforts. Among
several of its activities, MAW distributes land to farmers and
agricultural operators free of charge. It also provides subsidies on
fertilizers, potato seed, dates, date palm trees, animal production
(till 1979) and cereal production (corn, barley and millet); and it
provides improved varieties of seeds and animals, carries out
agricultural development projects of new lands, and reclaims existing
irrigated land.	 It also provides various agricultural protection,
veterinary and agricultural extension services.
Land distribution and the PLDO have been discussed in the previous
section.	 What remains to be seen is the actual process of land
distribution. By 1980, for instance, MAW had distributed 98,850
hectares free of charge to agricultural producers. The distributed
land was equivalent to 16.24% of the overall area under cultivation in
1980 (56), which totaled 609,000 hectares. Since that time and during
the 1980 - 1985 development plan there have been spectacular increases
in the demand for land by agricultural companies and firms, who wished
to enter the expanding agricultural market. This was anticipated by
the PLDO, which in its principles provides allocations for firms of up
to 400 hectares, and up to 4000 hectares for special projects.
Table 4.10 shows the number of plots and hectares allocated for private
individuals and firms up to 1984. The substantial increase in
Plots
0
3
3
20
21
17
29
76
123
643
1.225
FOR COMPANIES
Hectares
0
520
1,200
1,007
429
523
2,662
8, 268
34,691
205,931
171,697
YEAR
1968 - 74
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
FOR INDIVIDUALS
	
Plots	 Hectares
	
5711	 38,884
	
767	 5,209
	
189	 1,091
	
971.	 5,682
	
4130	 34,205
	
1559	 7,813
	
6075	 29,018
	
1225	 6,282
	2709	 13,413
	
8480	 47,695
	
9192	 55,332
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TABLE NO 4.10
LAND DISTRIBUTION BY THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency Annual - Reports, quoted from Middle
Et Rxrt March - April 1987, P9.
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allocation to companies since 1980 indicates a shift in the trend in
both agricultural production and land distribution practices. 	 This
shift was in favour of allocating increasing numbers of progressively
larger plots to the corporate sector. 	 In 1983 alone five companies
received 127,500 hectares
The shift in land allocation reinforced, if not heralded, the newly
emerging structure of farming in the Kingdom: a structure dominated by
highly mechanised units owned by businessmen. 	 This trend was also
reinforced by the loans and activities of the Saudi Agricultural Bank,
which will be discussed later.
It is interesting to note that almost all of the large agricultural
projects and companies are owned by urban businessmen and merchants.
Table 4.11 lists most of the largest agricultural companies in the
Kingdom. All were established by urban commercial interests, who were
attracted by the opportunities and the ecoiomc tts 	 rtc.t
through the agricultural subsidisation progranhlle.
Although the Ministry subsidises a large number of crops and seeds,
none was as successful in generating increased productivity as wheat.
That is because wheat, since 1979, began to 	 receive	 substantial
output subsidies (see Table 4.9).	 This output subsidy offered the
farmers a guaranteed price of about six times more than the world
market price. It also gave wheat producers a ready made market in the
shape of the GSFMO which began to operate In the same year.
The GSFMO operation will be discussed later, but suffice it to say here
that wheat production in the Kingdom is now far above domestic need.
There is also a severe shortage of storage capacity. In 1984 Saudi
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Table 4.11
Major Agricultural Companies in Saudi Arabia
-	 National Agricultural Development Co. 20% State owned. The
rest private.	 About 65,000 hectares in several locations in
the Kingdom. Most projects are managed by a US company in
partnership with Sulaiman Olayan, a major figure in the Saudi
business community.
- Harath Agricultural and Animal Production Co. Government
sponsored farming scheme, originally established to encourage
settlement of nomads, later opened to private investors (see
chapter 2)
-	 Hail Agricultural Development Co. Privately owned, chaired by
the Governor of Hail, Prince Magrin Ibm Abdul-Azfz. This
company is the largest producer of. wheat; 110,000 tons
harvested 1984-85.
-	 Tabuk Agricultural Development Co.
	 Founded in 1982 by Prince
Abdul-tlajid Ibm
	 Abdul-Aziz, Governor of Tabuk.	 Produced
60,000 tons of wheat in 1984-85.
- Saudi Arabian Agricultural and Dairy Co. Originally
established as a joint venture between Prince Abdullah al
Faisal (75%) and Alfa-Laval and Lebanese interests. Plans to
have 25,000 milking cows.
-	 Al Khorayef Brothers, agent for John Deere. 10,000 hectares.
- Al I4atanfa Chicken Farm. Owned by Sulaiman al Rajhi (one of
the richest merchants in Riyadh, who started as a money
changer). The company covers 100 sq kilometers; 120 million
broilers/hens and 420 million eggs.	 It supplies nearly one
half of the Kingdom's chicken meat and one quarter of its eggs.
- Saudi Agricultural Development Co. Joint venture between
Prince Khaled ibm Abdulah and Sulaiman Olyan. Owns various
poultry operations.
Source - Various issues of Middle East Economic Digest. Reported in
Middle East Report, No 145 March-April 1987 p.10.
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Arabia gave Bangladesh 50,000 tons of wheat in food aid; and in 1985 it
started selling wheat to several Gulf States.
The fertilizer subsidy, on the other hand, had been instrumental in
encouraging small producers, as well as large ones, to improve their
farming operation and boost production by applying fertilizers. Table
4.12 presents the total tons of fertilizers subsidised by MAW. 	 It
shows that fertilizer use has increased from 18,570 tons to 151,500
tons, an over 8 fold increase, in nine years.	 The biggest jumps
occurred in 1981 and 1982, largely due to increase in 1:ertiVizer se
for wheat cropping.
The MAW's other roles in agricultural development are through research
and agricultural extension services. As seen before, the MAW studies
were responsible for identifying the areas of arat 1 e 'avct, xc! it 'gas
able to distribute these through the P100. 	 It also established 93
extension offices in all the major agricultural areas (58)•	 These
provide veterinary services, crop management services, and major crops
research units, for the benefits of the local farmers.
The total subsidies paid by MAW have decreased since the setting up of
the GSFMO, which handles the wheat subsidy. The decrease was also as a
result of the discontinuation of per head camel and sheep subsidies.
MAW now ranks third in the total amount of subsidies provided by the
three agencies. Table 4.13 shows the distribution of subsidies made by
MAW by purpose and rank.
It shows that there has been a shift in the amount of subsidies paid by
the Ministry, which resulted in the animal subsidy losing its first
rank of importance. In 1982 nearly one half of the total subsidies was
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TABLE NO 4.12
FERTILIZER SUBSIDIES PAID AND TOTAL TONS OF FERTILIZER USED EN
SAUDI ARABIA, 1974 TO 1982
FERTILIZER SUBSIDIES IN MILLION SR
	 TOTAL TONS OF FERTILIZER (1000 TONS)
YEAR_______________________________________ _________________________________________
LOCAL UA	 IMPORTS	 TOTAL	 LOCAL 1A	 IMPORTS	 TOTAL
57.05
36.44
11.89
12.36
9.77
6.71
3.79
13.65
3.92
155.58
17.29
1982
	
18.44
1981
	
11.77
1980
	
7.92
1979
	
5.58
1978
	
2.08
1977
	
2.29
1976
	
3.20
1975
	
2.56
1974
	
1.93
TOTAL:	 55.77
AVERAGE: 6.20
75.49
48.2].
19.81
17.94
10.85
9.00
6.99
16.21
5.85
211.35
23.49
52.67
33.64
22.62
16.42
7.56
8.33
11.14
8.46
7.55
168.39
18.71
	
98.83	 151.50
	
58.16	 91.80
	
23.43	 46.05
	
25.54	 41.96
	
19.63	 27.24
	
13.60	 21.93
	
8.00	 19.14
	
18.61	 27.07
	
11.02	 18.57
	
21C.%1	 WS.2'
	
30.76	 49.47
Source: Subsidy Department, Ministry ot Agriculture and Water, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Rjyadh Saudi Arabia, January 1983.
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1
4
6
5.47
15.05
75.57
45.85
8.05
2.76
3.58
9.85
49.47
30.02
5.27
1.81
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TABLE NO 4.13
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES MADE BY THE
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER BY PURPOSE AND RANK
SUBSIDIES PAID IN 1982 ONLV	
J 
SUBSIDIES PAID FROM 1974 - 82
PURPOSE
AMOUNT	 % OF	 AMOUNT	 % OF
(MILLION SR)	 TOTAL	 RANK	 (MILLION SR)	 TOTAL	 RANK
Animal
Cereal
Fertilizer
Dates
Date Palm Trees
Potato Seeds
1,235,05
393.09
211.95
149.27
13.69
7.17
61.29
19.51
10.52
7.41
0.92
0.35
1
3
4
5
6
TOTAL
	
152.75	 100.00	 -	 2,010.22	 100.00	 -
Source: Unpublished study from the Research and Studies Department, Saudi Arabian
Agricultural Bank Head Office, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1983.
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paid to the fertilizer subsidy. Following it were dates (30%), cereal
(10%), date palm trees (5%), animal (about 4%), and potato seed (2%).
2. Agricultural Credit and Subsidies through the Saudi Arabian
Agricultural Bank (SA1
SAAB has perhaps be^n the single - nest effective agent in the
transformation of the agricultural sector, and the transferal of modern
technology to the essentially traditional production operations. The
role of SAAB is to provide the agricultural operators with interest
free loans and credit.	 It is also responsible for the payment of
certain subsidies to a gricultural Droducers.
	 These subsidies are
listed in Table 4.9, and include agricultural machinery, engines,
pumps, poultry and dairy equipment and fishing equipment. SAAB,
therefore, is responsible for the most important elements of
agricultural development in the Kingdom at present. 	 I
The Bank provides two types of loans:
1.	 Short term loans for inputs on a seasonal basis. These inputs
include fertilizers, seeds, ploughing, fuels, and farm hands'
wages. These inputs are mostly not covered by any subsidy
policy, and the farmers are required to repay the loans for
them fairly soon after the farming season.
2.	 Medium term loans. These are loans for agricultural machinery,
land improvement, irrigation equipment, construction of farm
buildings, the buying of livestock and poultry, and other items
needed to operate the farm. These loans must be repaid over a
period of ten years after obtaining the credit.
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The short term loans have always formed a very small percentage of the
total credit extended by the SAAB, and the demand for them has been
decreasing substantially in recent years. In 1982 short term loans
accounted for 1% of total loans extended by SAAB. They totalled SR
29.46 million which represented 556 loans only (5%).
The medium term loans formed the cornerstone of the bank's activities.
These have increased from SR 4.26 million in 1965 to SR 2,903.44
million in 1982 (see Table 4.14). Of the total of SR 8.7 billion given
through medium term loans since 1965, specialised projects received
19.48% or SR 1.70 billion (see Table 4.15). The Bank also lent SR 1.46
billion (16.65%) to buy farm machinery, and SR 1.46 billion (4.80%) for
spare parts. 29.71% of total loans went for engines, pumps and
drilling.
As seen in Table 4.15, specialised projects have started to be the
largest obtainer of credit from SAAB since 1978 and have steadily
increased since 1980. In 1982 25.40% of all loans went to agricultural
projects (see Table 4.16). These projects were mostly large wheat
producing projects, dairy farms and egg and poultry projects.
The trend continued in later years and was reinforced by the new
regulations of the bank's lending code. The new code was meant as a
way of tightening up the lending operation. The new regulations
stipulated that no new loans are to be extended to those who were
unable to meet their annual repayment scheme. Old and traditional
deeds, moreover, were now unacceptable as security against new loans.
Good feasibility studies of new agricultural operations and projects
must be submitted in order to obtain credit. These regulations were
designed to reduce the huge pressure of demand experienced by the
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TABLE NO 4.14
TOTAL SHORT TERM AND MEDIUM TERM LOANS
PROVIDED BY THE SAUDI ARABIAN AGRICULTURAL BANK
1965 TO 1982 (IN MILLION SR)
LOANS
YEAR	 ______________________________	 AVERAGE
SIZE OF
SHORT TERM	 MEDIUM TERM	 TOTAL	 LOAN
	
GROWTH RATE
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
29.46
39.23
22.73
15.29
43.71
17.29
8.24
7.18
3.54
2.92
2.27
2.58
3.01
1.68
1.54
1.08
0.30
0.13
2,903.44
2,491.64
1,105.95
693.79
541.96
472.55
261.19
138.32
32.76
16.68
14.29
14.05
13.13
12.20
10.48
12.10
8.63
4.26
	
2,932.90	 78,323.51
	
2,530.8?	 56,081.35
	
1,128.68	 57,056.22
	70 8	 29,845.61
	
585.67	 28,853.50
	
489.84	 22,914.27
	
269.43	 13,675.42
	
145.50	 8,953.63
	
36.30	 6,705.54
	
19.60	 4,316.48
	
16.56	 4,284.11
	
16.63	 3,795.40
	
16.14	 3,704.34
	
13.88	 3,777.11
	
12.02	 3,220.74
	
13.18	 4,190.27
	
8.93	 4,644.86
	
4.39	 7,023.36
15.89
59.18
21.07
19.56
81.81
85.18
300.83
85.20
(-) 0.42
3.04
16.28
15.47
(-)
	
8.80
47.59
103.42
TOTAL
	
202.17
	
8,747.42
	
8,949.59
AVERAGE
	
11.23
	
485.97
	
497.20	 37,393.72
	
58.11
% OF TOTAL
	
2.26
	
97.74
	
100.00
Source: Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank, Eighteenth Annual Report, 1401/02
A.R. (1982) and earlier issues, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, S.A. 1982, p 26.
Quoted in unpublished internal SAAB study.
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TABLE NO 4:16
DISTRIBUTION OF SAUDI ARABIAN AGRICULTURAL, BANK LOANS OF 1981
BY PURPOSE (IN SR MILLION)
PURPOSE
Engines
Pumps
Well Drilhin
Agricultural Machinery
Spare Parts
Vehicles
Land Cultivation
Farm Buildings
Animals for Breeding
Fishing & Book-keeping
Miscellaneous
Agricultural Projects
TOTAL LOAN
NUMBER
20,156
17,059
330 Tractors
31,496 Accessories
4,509 ha
0.67 million ha
149
PERCENT OF
AMOUNT	 TOTAL
	
350.60	 11.95
	
404.53	 13.79
1T..S1
	
107.09	 3.65
	
336.00	 11.46
	
242.32	 8.26
	
65.26	 2.23
	
98.58	 3.36
	
745.00	 25.40
2,932.90
Source: Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank, Ei ghteenth Annual Report
1404/02A0, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 1982, pp 27-28. As reported in SAAB
unpublished internal study in 1983.
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Agricultural Bank. They were also meant as a means of combatting any
unproductive and inefficient agricultural growth. 	 The enforcing of
these regulations meant that a great number of traditional farmers and
agricultural operations were partly excluded from the credit facility.
This is because they had been the most likely to be delinquent in their
loan repayments, and the least likely to produce a good feasibility
study for agricultural projects.
The issuing of a formal acceptable deed of ownership of agricultural
land is a lengthy and complicated process, which is partly controlled
by the government central agencies. What this amounts to is that the
farmers are often reluctant to start the processing of the deeds of
their property (60), even if in fact they possess the ability and
knowledge for such an endeavour.
In 1982, there were 54 SAAB offices in the Kingdom .34 of these were
developed offices able to operate with adequate staff (61), The main
branches, however, are situated in the major urban centers of the
Kingdom. This created a bias in the Bank's lending operation towards
farmers and agricultural projects situated near those urban centers.
Another bias is also apparent if we compare the amounts lent through
the Bank's different branches. In 1982 SAAB reported that it had lent
SR 2,903,445,663 through its 12 major branches. 	 Of that total, SR
1,544.72 million, more than half was lent through the three branches of
Riyadh, Al-Kharj and Buraidah (62), The first two are located in the
central region; the third is the largest city of the northern region.
This may indicate that the lending operation of SAAB has favoured the
newly emerged agricultural sector in the center and north of the
Kingdom over the more traditional in the south west of the country.
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This trend has continued in later years. In 1985, for example, 80% of
SAAB's loans went to the agricultural sector in the northern and
central regions (63)	 Such a bias may stem from the following reasons:
1. Large landholdings in the agricultural sector have been
emerging predominantly in the northern and central regions,
which have been shown to have vast areas of uncultivated arable
land. These lands, moreover, are thinly populated unlike the
agricultural areas in the south west. The modern methods of
cultivation, furthermore, require larger plots of land which is
not the dominant pattern in the traditional farming areas.
This consequently has discouraged small farmers from enjoying
the benefits of agricultural credit and subsidisation in the
Kingdom. Virgin land projects were therefore destined to be
the major beneficiary of the development programe.
2. Wheat production has been targeted since 1977 for a massive
development scheme. The ecological and economic structures of
the central and northern regions have been ideal for such a
development. That is because modern wheat cultivation requires
huge and level areas of land, which is not available in the
mountainous and hilly Asir region. It also required a high
capital investment level, which may have discouraged small
farmers from entering the modern wheat production operation.
3. The recency of the operational structure of the governmental
agencies administering the agricultural programe and policies,
coupled with the huge size of the country, may have contributed
to the favourable position of the agricultural regions nearer
to the centre. The push for accelerated development did not
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allow time for the gradual growth of the apparatus of the
central agencies. 	 This, no doubt, excluded some of the
remotest agricultural areas from experiencing and benefiting
from the development policies.
Despite all of the above limitations of SAAB as an agent of overall
development in the country's agricultural sector, it is without doubt
responsible for the spread of modern agricultural machinery and
mechanised farming units in the Kingdom. 	 The generous subsidies
provided by the government through SAAB for dairy, poultry and egg
production, as well as modern irrigation equipment, has been
responsible for the increase in output in those areas of the
agricultural sector.
3	 The Grain, Silo and Feed Mill Organisation
Since the begining of the GSFMO operation in 1977, it has been main'y
concerned with the adminstration of the wheat price subsidy.
	 It
receives the wheat ouput from the farmers, stores the wheat and pays
farmers the set price by kg. The price svpport 'as at its 2'igit
during the years of 1979 to 1984 at SR 3.50/kg. The farmers are now
paid SR 2.0/kg, and this price is guaranteed to continue until 1989.
The wheat price support has been the fastest growing subsidy in the
Kingdom. By 1982, the total amount paid by the GSFMO was SR 1,252.80
million, which is 20% of the total agricultural subsidies paid by the
Kingdom. It was estimated, however, that 70% of the total subsidies
paid to farmers since 1965 and up to 1985 was paid by the GSFM0.64
The spectacular increase in wheat production was not only a direct
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result of the premium price given to the farmers. It was also due to
the advantages offered by the existence of the GSFMO organisation.
These advantages include the guaranteed elimination of the costs of
storage and marketing of wheat. 	 There are no limits placed on the
amount of wheat bought by the organisation, or sold by the producers.
The price support of wheat and the GSFMO were successful in reversing
the negative trend of wheat production during the 1970s. After a minus
7.57% (see table 4.17) growth rate between 1973 to 1980, the annual
growth rate reached 181% in 1982. The fall in wheat production during
the 1970s was due to the fall 'in demand, and t?e ?i prices s3ffrd ftsr
wheat.
Since the begining of the wheat development programe, a considerable
wheat producers' lobby has been created.
	 That lobby has been
instrumental in combatting any changes to the present policy of wheat
subsidisation. In 1984, for instance, the go'JernT%ent ivposecS 	 "ierj
quotas on the largest producers. The wheat lobby, however, persuaded
the goverment to revoke that order. Since then the government has
resorted to delaying payments to the largest producers, which has not
been a very effective means of halting the wheat production bonanza.
Meanwhile, the GSFMO undertook a crash programe of erecting silos,
which were to relieve the severe storage problems and speed up the
wheat receiving operation. Storage, nevertheless, continues to be a
problem for both the GSFMO and the producers themselves 65 .	 The
economic burden of the wheat programe has been a major problem for the
government since the decline in the oil prices and the reductions in
the national budget.
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TABLE 4.17
TOTAL PRODUCTION OF VARIO1JS CROPS (BOTH SUMMER AND WINTER CROPS)
1393/94 TO 1399/1400 A.H. 1973/74 TO 1979/80
IN THOUSAND TONS.
* Highest production
(a) Figure derived by multiplying the total donums times the average
productivity.
Source: Central Department of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook,
17th Issue, 1401 A.H. (1981 A.D.) and earlier issues, Ministry of
Finance & National Economy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, S.A.,
1982, pp. 489-505. The Yearbook did not report figures for 1398/99
A.H. Quoted in SAAB internal paper 1983.
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4.	 Some Problematic Issues in the Agricultural Development
Plans
Despite the obvious gains of the "success story" of agricultural
development in Saudi Arabia, there are major problems that plague it.
Difficulties can only be expected from the implementation of such a
radical programme in an arid zone with a traditional agricultural
sector.	 The major problems, however, were not in the process of
implementation, but in the process of formulation. This section will
highlight some of these problems, because they do not receive the same
amount of attention that the gains corn and.66
The gains and developments in the agricultural sector in Saudi Arabia
have captured the attention and imagination of the popular press
nationally and internationally, partly because of the low expectation
generated from an agricultural development plan in such an arid zone
with a very traditional rural population. A degree of success has been
proved possible, which is not surprising if we consider the economic
capabilities available to the government. What remains to be seen is
whether or not the development progranw has chosen its targets wiseJy,
and has reached its set goals satisfactorily.
The one term that may describe the problems inherent in the development
progranine and subsidies is "lopsidedness". 	 This is clear at many
levels. At the structural level the policy has favoured growth over
balanced and integrated development. It also favoured the production
side of agricultural development over the development of the
agricultural market and consumption practices.
	 One mode of
agricultural production, moreover, was favoured over other modes of
production.	 At another level, furthermore, certain agricultural
activities were pushed ahead of agricultural education and research.
2'TO
The subsidisation programmes, it seems, have run ahead of actual
development of the sector. The resulting growth has therefore been
artificially supported. This is painfully clear when we consider the
labour force involved in modern agricultural production operations.
The Saudi nationals comprise the owners, managers and high officials of
the agricultural sector. Foreign labour comprises the skilled workers,
the researchers and the manual workers. This is especially true in the
highly mechanised agricultural schemes and operations. 	 In one large
wheat producing and dairy farm visited by this researcher, the only
Saudi working in the project was the owner. 	 Even the white collar
workers and drivers were not Saudis.	 The continuation of these
projects in the long run is an overriding concern.
The major elements of lopsidedness in the development plan are the
following:-
(1): Growth versus Integrated Development
The agricultural development policies, as mentioned above, were the
government's response to certain features of the economic situation in
the 1950s and 1960s. These were: a) the dominance of the oil sector in
the national economy; b) the stagnation of the productive sectors in
the national economy, especially the agricultural one; c) the increase
in rural - urban migration, especially by the male labour force; and d)
the increasing differentiation between incomes and lifestyle of the
rural and urban population in favour of those in cities and urban
centres.
The continuation of these features would have posed countless problems
to the Saudi goverment. It would also have threatened its legitimacy
211
in the eyes of its traditional population.	 In 1972 Saudi Arabia had
been 40 years in existence, but the modern sector had not started to
grow until the 1950s. The 1974 oil price increase, and the substantial
surplus in the national budget, allowed the government to think
ambitiously of rural development. The rural infrastructure, however,
was largely rudimentary. The educational services, communications and
the state apparatus were either in infancy or dominated by traditiona'
values and customs.
Agriculture was also largely traditional in nature, and the rural
population were lacking modern skills and experience. This was clear
to the Saudi officials, who began in the early 1970s a determined
effort to develop these aspects in the rural sector. In 1975, however,
these efforts were at an early stage, but the government nonetheless
adopted a high profile accelerated growth model of development as
regards the agricultural sector.
The aims of the development policy, according to the third development
plan, were: to increase the output and contribution of the agricultural
sector, to develop a prudent level of strategic food production, and
increase the level of agricultural incomes (67)	 The question arising
here is whether or not increasing output, the level of strategic food
production and incomes of producers does amount to "development" or
not.
The obvious answer is no.	 Output may be increased through rapid
exploitation of the limited natural resources of the nation. It can
also be increased through the erection of large argicultural projects
and firms without greatly affecting the majority of the rural
population, as was partly the case in Saudi Arabia. Raising the level
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of production and output of strategic food, on the other hand, does not
necessarily mean independence. 	 Saudi Arabia in its effort to raise
wheat production had to import most of its agricultural machinery,
seeds, fertilizers, pesticide, herbicide and most importantly skilled
labour from the developed countries. Manual labour was also provided
by foreign sources.
The raising of incomes to the agricultural producers, moreover, does
not amount to development, if not accompanied by self-sufficiency and
efficiency. It may only be another method of the redistribution of the
oil wealth, especially to those who least need it in the n.raJ and
urban sector. This would be the case if the targets of the policies
were not the small and traditional producers in agriculture.
If the agricultural policies had been intended to promote a balanced
development of agriculture, with an emphasis on increasing stategic
food supply at minimum cost to the environment and nation, then all the
positive elements of development would logically follow through. There
would be an increase in the strategic food supply and the incomes of
operators.	 There would be improvements in the use of the scarce
resources and in the conversion of fallow land for productive uses.
There would also be a reduction in the imbalance of trade and an
improvement in rural living standards.
An integrated development plan of the agricultural sector must first
consider the infrastructure of the sector: its land, natural resources
and labour resources.	 Its basic aim must be the construction of the
elements needed to achieve development.	 These elements include the
reconstruction of the land utilization system in line with the set
route of development, establishing the basic links between the modern
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sector and the rural one, the promotion of agriculutural education and
research, and the establishing of a well organised and modern marketing
operati on.
The emphasis placed on growth by the development plan in 1975 have
greatly distorted the development process. The policies which were
implemented to spur growth were not always harmonious with earlier
policies, nor were they consistent with an overall development of the
rural sector. The land distribution policy is a case in point. How
can individual farmers owning 10 hectares of land, allocated to them by
the PLDO, participate in modern agricultural production, in which the
smallest irrigation machine requires 25 hectares of land?
The traditional farmers were left behind in the interest of growth
because their landholdings were not in keeping with the emerging
patterns of cultivation. This of course resulted in a sector dualistic
in nature, with the majority of improvements and growth concentrated in
the arena of large farms and agricultural firms, which in the majority
of cases originated from the urban and modern sector.
4,
(2): Production Versus Marketing
A major element of integrated development, as one agricultural
economist put it Uj5 the simultaneous development of production,
marketing and consumption sectors. Otherwise the end result will be
frustrations and the waste of the nation's scarce resources." (68)
This unfortunately has been lacking in the Saudi agricultural
development programme. The lack of development of the marketing system
is operative at two levels: a) the continuation of a traditional and
inefficient marketing system for local and foreign produce, and b) the
2T
continuation of free and excess imports of goods currently produced in
the Kingdom.
The various incentives in agriculture and the subsidization prograrre
have been mainly on the production side of the agricultural operation.
The end result of these incentives has been a substantial growth, which
will increase further in the coming years. The marketing system,
however, did not receive any substantial improvement even in the 1980s.
What was more surprising and ridiculous was that the importation
policies have not yet been sufficiently altered to encourage and
justify local growth.
A report by Han Marhatta submitted to SAAB in September of 1982 shows
that importation of wheat, eggs and poultry were increasing even when
the local production had increased. Furthermore, a dairy farmer has to
compete with a manufacturer who imports dried milk which is subsidized
by the government and makes yogurt, buttermilk (Laban) or even so
called fresh milk69.
Local vegetable produce, which has high production costs, cannot
compete with freely imported goods which have been produced cheaply.
The retailers and consumers would naturally prefer the cheaper and
better quality imported goods. A survey of the vegetable and wholesale
market in Riyadh was conducted by Abdul Rahman Al-Seikh in 197O.° A
similar and briefer survey was conducted by an informant of this
researcher, as part of the field work effort in 1987 (discussed in
chapter 6). What was striking is the similarity between the findings
of Al-Sheikh and those of the later survey. Both surveys found that
al-dalal (literally, auctioneer), also called the middleman by the
farmers, who customarily handles the auctions and sale of the
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agricultural produce to local middlemen and retailers, was the only
link in the agricultural operation who was guaranteed success and
profitability.	 Al-dalal receives between 2.5% to 5% of all
transactions. The retailers were subject to market and demand
fluctuation, and the local producers were the least likely to benefit
from the traditional marketing system.
The main reasons for such a position are: (a) the lack of restriction
on agricultural imports, even of items also produced locally; anc \i)
the lack of a modern marketing system with storage facilities and links
to all the national urban markets. 	 Al-dalal does not buy from the
farmer, nor does he store goods.	 He only handles the sale, having
regard to market conditions. If the goods are not sold shortly after
delivery, they are returned to the farmers. In most cases further
transportation to other urban markets is out of the question because of
the perishable nature of the goods, the long distances involved, and
the increase of the costs to the farmer. Unwanted goods are therefore
usually destroyed.
The sale of agricultural produce, on any given day, is governed by the
amount of similar produce received at the market, be it local or
imported. The imports, which are usually transported and stored in
refrigerated trucks have the best chance of succeeding, in as much as
they are: produced cheaply in their country of origin, better packed,
untaxed upon entering the Kingdom, and of better quality. Local
producers, however, must sell at any price to reduce their loss. The
result of all this is waste, disappointment and discouragement of local
production. Farmers throughout the field work period maintained that
vegetable and fruit cropping is unprofitable, and insisted that the
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selling prices did not even cover the transportation cost.
The recent development in agriculture, which created highly mechanised
and modern farming operations, has introduced certain modifications to
the previously drawn picture. Greenhouse producers of vegetables and
fruits have better packing and transportation methods, which have
raised the quality, size and life cycle of the vegetables and fruit
produced locally. These produces, moreover, have been pushing for the
creation of a modern system of marketing, which will include better
storage and transportation faciities. Scçr	 cç, t atia
agencies of the government have been resistant to the creation. of a.
co-operative marketing operation.
	
In 1987/88 there have been two
refusals to this demand from the large producers' lobby. On the other
hand, there have not been great strides in changing the importation
policies.
The reasons for such resistance to co-operative marketing and the
alteration of the importation policies (as regards goods produced
locally) is not very clear.
	 It could be, however, due to the
pressures felt by the government from import based businesses and
coninercial ventures. The habits and attitudes of the general public to
consumption, moreover, 	 have not yet been attuned to the value of
encouraging local products.
Wheat production posed no such hazards to Saudi producers. They were
guaranteed success, no matter what the conditions of the market. The
worry of storage and marketing has been largely transferred to the
shoulders of the government. This resulted in huge mountains of wheat
stored in official siloes. What can be the use of subsidisation and
huge investment if the local producers cannot sell? It would have been
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a better investment to look at developing the market before products
were grown. Once producers, especially small ones, have to close their
operations because of the deficiency and the inefficiency of the
marketing system, it is highly unlikely that incentives can bring them
back to the agricultural sector.
3: Wheat versus Other Agricultural Products
The U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, called the Saudi wheat
programme crazy". 71 While the motivation and validity of such a
statement are at the very least questionable, unfortunately this view
has some basis in purely ecoonic trs. Saudi 	 t
1984 paid SR 3,500 per ton of wheat produced locally. Since then it
spends SR 2,000 per ton of wheat. Yet by importing wheat it can pay SR
600 per ton of wheat received at one of its major ports. 72 The
development programe, however, was not concerned with the pure
economics of the matter. It sought to restructure and develop the
agricultural sector through heavy investments, because importation in
the final analysis was seen as mainly benefitting the producing
countries.
Wheat, as one of the staple foods of Saudi Arabia, did actually merit
investment. The level of investment and attention, however, have
tended to disadvantage the other needed staple and other products which
should be and could be produced in the Kingdom. These products include
oats, millet, sorghum, barley, vegetable and fruits. It has also
spurred growth by encouraging sections of the non-rural population to
go into agriculture. What this amounted to is the greater use of the
natural resources without a great diversification of agricultural
products and local food supply.
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The government's decision to support wheat at the premium level, and
its purchase through the GSFMO, has distorted the resource allocation
for both the government and the local producers. Nothing has been and
is as profitable as wheat since 1977. The inflexibility of the price
support and subsidisation programme, and the failure of the government
to implement policy changes as soon as they were needed (1983-1984),
continued and multiplied this process of misallocation of funds.	 It
also created a surplus of wheat and problems of storage that the
Kingdom can do without.
Furthermore, wheat production even at its highest level of
profitability, production, and efficiency is not a self-sustaining and
independent operation. It relies heavily on foreign expertise,
technological equipment, foreign spare parts and a foreign manual
labour force. John Block, the U.S. Agricultural Secretary, might not
have been overly concerned about the Saudi wheat programme if he had
anticipated the increase in U.S. exports of agricultural machinery
generated by the Saudi producers' demand, who have based their wheat
producing operations on the American and Australian models of
producti on.
Moreover, the extraction of water has rapidly increased with the growth
of agricultural activities and wheat production. The digging of wells,
however, is a very expensive operation (see Table 4.5 in section II)
and it is no longer covered by a subsidy from SAAB. What this means is
that the heaviest drain of the water resources has to be by those who
can afford digging a well for each one or two of their irrigation
systems.	 The increase of the amount of water during irrigation is
considered one method of increasing productivity and yield per hectare
in an arid zone like Saudi Arabia.
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Land productivity and the nutrient content have been adversely affected
by the cultivation of wheat year after year in the same plots. Crop
rotation, a basic element in efficient farming, has been championed.by
the Ministry of Agriculture's extension services. 73	Their warnings,
however, have not been heeded by the majority of small and large
producers, which resulted in a gradual decrease in the rate of tons
produced per hectare. The reason for such a situation does not only
stem from the farmers' inexperience and lack of agricultural education,
but also from the lack of incentives for crop rotation and the high
profitability of wheat production.
The development plan for the agricultural sector would have been more
positive, if it had identified its targets more carefully, and been
ready to alter policies and effect changes more quickly and
efficiently.	 The	 resulting	 growth	 would	 not	 have	 been
counterproductive in the long run.
	 A slow, self sustaining and
balanced development of a larger number of agricultural products, which
affect the majority of farming areas in the Kingdom, would have been
preferable to a situation of waste and rapid exploitation of the
natural resources.
The above three areas of contention in the evaluation of the
agricultural development programmes were only sketched in outline.
Contained in each one of them are specific issues which need some
highlighting, two of these are the following:
A)	 There has been a lack of strong and and concentrated effort in
the development of the national agricultural and traditional
expertise in the rural side. This has been compromised to the
easy option of recruiting
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foreign expertise and labour. Specific policies could have
been implemented to control the unnecessary growth of this
tendency within the agricultural sector, as well as nationally.
Efforts in this direction would have reduced the, negative
effects of wealth, which is generated from the predominantly
oil economy.
B) The traditional occupations, be it traditional farming or
nomadic pastoralism, have not been accorded their due share of
respect, attention and development efforts. Little attempt was
made to build new structures resembling the old. Agricultural
production was offered to the nomads as a better option for the
improvement of their living conditions and economic status.
The traditional occupations, which are usually based on the
collective exploitation of the natural resources, have been
gradually altered through the land distribution and the
agricultural development progranune to a new structure in which
individual and modern relations of production are dominant.
A modern co-operative farming structure would have been an
option that is not wholly alien to the traditional environment.
It would also have been a better method for conserving and
controlling the use of the limited natural resources.
The Islamic traditons and hereditary laws, moreover, tend to
favour collective ownership between family members and blood
relatives.	 This has been the major reason for the
fragmentation and "morcellement (74) (parcellization) of
agricultural land at present and more particularly in the past
when small landholding was more dominant. Co-operative farming
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would have done away with this problem. The PLDO policy of
granting adjacent lands to brothers could have been taken a
step forward towards a model where collective farming is
possible. This would appear more realistic, if we consider
that villages and settlements are usually formed by kinship
groups, who strengthen their blood alliance with marriages
between cousins and other close relatives.
5) The Saudi Agricultural Sector and Rural Development
So far, this chapter has avoided any reference to the theoretical
conceptualization of the literature on rural development. 	 This is
mainly because the vast area of 	 st.tov os	 ccc t
this study of nomad sedentarization. It is necessary, however, to try
to place the regional development wittrin ore aspeti. cf t1' tj SYf
rural development, namely that of planned and policy-inspired social
change.
A. The General Context of Development
Since 1973 and the oil price increase, all aspects of the Saudi
experience of development have been state inspired, and financed by the
oil revenues. The Saudi government's ambitious programe for
development was not conceived mainly through the development of the
rural sector, but through the diversification of the economy through
industrialisation in the oil sector. The latter programme included the
construction of the industrial cities of Jubail and Yanbu at a cost of
more than SR 200 billion or $60 billion (completed in 1987). These two
cities were built to house the industrial projects of the predominantly
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publicly owned Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC)
SABIC projects (of which there are ten) are capital intensive, highly
technical and petroleum based industries (six are petrochemical
companies).
The heavy investments by the Saudi government into the above industrial
projects and the General Organisation for Petroleum and Minerals
(Petromin) are seen by observers as the major step toward the
diversification of the economic base of Saudi Arabia. 76 The
agricultural sector, by contrast, has received substantially less
attention than the industrialisation programme, 77 despite having an
impressive level of subsidization and investment.	 Its allocation in
the national budget, furthermore, had decreased in recent years Since
the high point of SR 3.5 billion for agricultural projects in 1982/83,
the figure decreased to SR 2.7 billion in 1983/84, and the Saudi
agricultural bank was only allocated SR 2 billion in the same year.
(78) The development programe for the agricultural sector,
furthermore, is predominantly through private enterprise; and it is
not as well integrated as the industrial sector (see previous
sections).
Niblock noted in 1982 that systematic social research activities into
the socio-economic consequence of the development of the Saudi society
have been hampered by the general official sensitivity to many of the
important Issues, and the general lack of knowledge of the decision
making process. 79 He also notes in another context that academic
works on the oil rich Gulf states are mainly focussed on those aspects
of direct concern to external interests; such as issues relating to
maintaining the access of western powers to the Gulf oil, or the means
through which petro-. dollars can be recycled back into the Western
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econoniy. 80	Some of these works can also be °well-paid literature
that is merely propagandist", 8	which may well originate in the Gulf
area, as well as outside it.
	
Another element obstructing systematic
study of Saudi Arabia is the unavailability of basic statistics (until
the 1974 census), and their unreliability even when they exist.(82)
Nonetheless, the available literature on Saudi development may be
viewed as representing two broad approaches. Firstly, there are works
which originate from conventional economic analysis, 83 and which base
their discussion mainly on the pure economic indicators of the Kingdom.
These indicators are highly impressive and include a GDP per capita
that was calculated at $11,260 in 1980 (only $100 less than that of the
United States). 84	They also show a rapid economic growth and a
process of transformation of the national productive sectors. 	 The
absorptive capicity of the economy has also been a major area of
national emphasis recently, which is seen as a good projection of the
Saudi economic future.
Studies of this kind are of course well aware of all the limiting
factors (characterised as traditional) in the country, i.e. labour,
political and ideological issues, which impede economic development.
These, however, are viewed through an evolutionary perspective, which
sees them as bound to lessen with the spread of education, and the
final transformation and modernisation of the economy.
The second broad approach is through works that highlight these problem
areas in an effort to characterise the nature of the political,
economic and social structure. 85
	These efforts, however, are
hampered by the limited nature of the data available (see above).
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Included in such approaches are invaluable studies of the labour
issues, 86
 and the dependent nature of the Saudi political economy on
Western powers (both historically and at present), especially on the
United States of America.87
Studies of the latter kind increase our understanding of hitherto
little discussed areas of the Saudi political economy, but on the
whole they do not amount to a systematic treatment of economic
development from an alternative approach.	 Certain studies exist,
however, which attempt to conceptualize the process of development
throught a dependency theory perspective. 88 Rosernarie S. Zahian
offers a historical account of the dependent relationships between the
Gulf States and the Westernpowers involved in their territories before,
during and after the discovery of oil. She shows how the dependent
economic relations existing in the pre-oll era have beer. traxsfocuied.
and strengthened by the discovery of the new resources available in the
region. The western powers have spared no effort, especially in
relation to guaranteeing political protection of the leading national
elites, to induce the oil producing nations to enter into economic
relationships with them.89
More recently there have been some studies which explore the Saudi
development policies in terms of the country's external political and
economic partners. For example William Ouandt in 1981 characterised
the oil sector in Saudi Arabia as heavily influenced by the Americans,
despite the final complete takeover of Aramco in 198O.90) He goes on
to describe the economic development of Saudi Arabia as centrally
influenced by American assistance. 9 All aspects of the
modernisation programes were designed in consultation with American
companies and experts. These include the national airline, the
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desalinisation project, the hospitals, the military institutions, and
of course the petrochemical complexes in Jubail and Yanbu. 	 He
concludes that the Saudis cannot avoid a close connection with the U.S.
economy, and that the future of Saudi Arabia depends in large measure
on its relationship with the United States. (92)
A recent PhD thesis in 1984 takes the same view of Saudi development.
Khalid Khuthajla sees a double dependency: one that characterises the
economy as dependent on oil revenues (export specialization), and
another that guarantees that the route to development is not
autonomous. 
(93 
The dependencg ertie y	 tV	 s my n
the countryss trading partnership with the United States, Japan and
other Western countries, who supply almost all of its food supply,
industrial capital goods and consumption goods. 	 Saudi exports,
moreover, reflect the same partnership, despite having marginal oil
exports to third world nations.
	 Another dependent feature lies in
foreign presence and influence through two means: a) the western and
foreign controlled management of the major industrialisation and
non-industrialisation development programe, and b) its dependence on
recruited foreign labour for all sectors of the economy, including the
government. Khuthaila concludes that the dependency perspective is a
useful tool to analyse Saudi development, because it brings into sharp
focus the basic elements characterising the Saudi society and economy.
(94)
Some of Khuthaila's analysis is reminiscent of Jacqueline Ismael's
analysis of the Kuwait economy, which she characterises as a dependent
surplus economy. 95	Kuwait, according to Ismael, specialises in the
world economy as an oil producer, a market for the commodities of the
industrial world, and an exporter of financial capital. This economic
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structure involves the recirculation of the capital accumulated through
oil exploitation back into the dominant capitalistic system.
	 Any
accompanying development of the regional productive sectors is highly
dependent upon the incorporation of capitalist technologies, and geared
toward the accommodation of a single resource export economy. 	 The
latter type of dependency theory analysis is often criticised as having
a centralist	 view of development, since it interprets all areas of
social change through the effect of external factors. 96	It is also
determinist in nature, since it gives no option but the continued
existence of the dependent relationship. (97)
Nonetheless, the obvious advantage of a dependency approach to Saudi
Arabia's development is two fold. On the one hand, it unrnasks certain
political and economic tendencies which are hidden by a powerful
indigenous state, and a strong ideology. Both of the latter elements
have tended to reject some of the aspects of the 'westernisation'
process of development. 	 Secondly, it also highlights all of the
problematical issues inherent in the Saudi economic development, which
are somewhat ignored by conventional economic analysis (i.e. the
moderni sati on approach).
B. The Agricultura1 Sector
The above sketchy but necessary profile of the study of Saudi
development is mainly designed as a background reference to the study
of the agricultural sector in the country, which takes note of the
national development strategy. 	 A good deal of rural development
literature follows the modernisation approach or the dependency
approach. The first characterises the rural sector as traditional,
which gradually acquires 'modernity' through an integration within the
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larger political and economic systems. This process takes place
through the transferal of technical, social and cultural factors from
the modern urban economy to the traditional sector.8
By contrast, the dependency approach views the rural sector and
population in the less developed countries as remaining in a
subordinate position to the urban interests and population. Any
processes of social change are mainly designed to syphon off economic
surplus; and to generate internal patterns of exploitation, in addition
to the unequal relations between the the underdeveloped country and the
advanced industrial nations. Other and later strands of this
perspective on rural development eniphasise the possibilities of the
existence of several differing modes of production (traditional or
subsistence) within the context of the rural sector, which have
differing relationships to the dominant capitalist urban sectors:
either by being a source of low wage labour, or as an indirect
consequence of the dominant capitalistic modes of production.'99
While there has not been any systematic study of the Saudi agricultural
sector in the context of either of the above approaches, it is perhaps
more appopriate to view the developments in the rural side of the
economy in the light of planned social change. This is because the bulk
of systematic social transformation is a recent phenomenon, which
started in the 1970s. These mostly policy instigated transformations
take note of the modern rural development programes and strategies
which evolved internationally during the postwar period and were
re-emphasised in the 1970s by international agencies like the World
Bank. 100 The state's role in these rural development strategies is
prominent, and they include policies on land, technology, employment,
education and research. D. Lea and 0. Chaudhri define these policies
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as dependent on sociopolitical perceptions of governments:
"The degree of commitment and consequent action is determined
by the nature of the state and its national and international
freedom of choice in pursuing an independent and consistent
strategy". (101)
Norman Long distinguishes between two broad approaches to rural
planning in the third world: the improvement approach, and the
transformation approach. 	 The first aims to encourage agricultural
development within the existing peasant production systems, while the
other attempts to establish new forms of agricultural and social
organisation. The latter approach makes a radical break with existing
peasant systems in terms of scale of operation, production techniques,
and soclo-legal structures.' 102
	Both these approaches can of course
co-exist within the same national boundaries.
The content and goals of rural development policies are dependent on
the ideological orientation of the state. For example the improvement
approach was taken up by colonial governments in Africa, India and also
by the post colonial Indian Government (1952) in its community
development programes.'°3 The transformation approach likewise may
take the shape of a free market model, or that of collective farming in
socialist countries.
The Tmprovernent approach allows for the continuation of existing land
and social institutions, while initiating change through improved
extension work methods which encourage increased production and a
gradual	 change to cornmercialisation.	 The difficulties often
encountered in such an approach are sometimes attributed to the
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essential conservatism of the peasants, as well as an alleged tendency
to benefit larger landowners who are best placed to take advantage of
the capital allocations for improved technology, agricultural credit
and the gradual corrunercialisation of agricultural production.
The transformation approach, on the other hand, calls for a greater
level of intervention in the rural sector, and it may be designed to
change the existing systems of land tenure, production methods, and the
balance of the national labour force between the rural and urban
economies.	 The objectives of the policies in the implementation of
transformation are dependent on the socio-poitica1 nature of t'ie
government, and the particular problems it is facing. The majority of
the transformation policies in Africa (through settlement or
resettlement projects) were through the allocation of private plots to
farmers, but there were also some attempts at counal forms of land
tenure (notably collective farming in Tanzania). Centrally controlled
marketing systems and technical services, as well as subsidisation and
credit progrannnes, are major features of the transformation approach.
These, obviously, vary a great deal between the multitude of the rural
transformation models existing internationally. 	 Any study and
evaluation of these models, moreover, requires a great deal of
appreciation of the concepts employed, the interpretations offered by
the power-holders and a detailed knowledge of the regional setting.
The whole process is also complicated by ambiguous policies which deal
differentially with the separate national sectors, or even within the
rural sector.(104)
David Lea and D. Chaudhri, in another vein, distinguish between three
pure types of rural development programes, 105 which do not exist in
practice, but are distinguished by the following emphases:
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1. Emphasis on reciprocity, originating in a strong value
orientation which emphasises the group's welfare more than the
individual interest. Successful examples of this type of
programme include the Kibbutz farming in Israel.
2. Emphasis on social control and ownership programmes.	 These
are post-colonial and socialist strategies, which include
collectivization in the USSR, communes in China, and the
Tanzanian Ujamaa Villages.
3. Emphasis on market systems progarrines. 	 These include the
reformist model of rural development in Japan, which is based
on redistributive land reforms, and the technocratic attempts
at rural development in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Within the last orientation of rural development programmes, three pure
models of rural development strategies exist.U06)	 These are the
following:
1	 Free Market Model. The main characteristics of this model are
the following:
A	 Large private and comercial farms.
B	 Wage based employment.
C	 An objective to increase output and create investible
s u rp 1 us.
D	 Large landowners as the main beneficiaries.
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2	 Reformist flodel. Its main characteristics are the following:
A	 Small, owner/cultivator, labour intensive farms.
B	 Unpaid family labour.
C	 Objectives to increase output and redistribute
income.
D	 Middle peasants ('progressive' farmers) as the main
beneficiaries.
3	 Technocratic Models with the following characteristics:
A	 Various tenancy systems co-existing with large
private farms.
B	 4age based empoyment inode.
C	 An	 objective	 to	 increase	 output	 and	 keep
profitability high.
D	 Landowning elite as the main beneficiaries.
There is of course considerable overlapping between the various aspects
of the strategies and approaches to rural development in a regional
setting, in relation to the above models. They are, however, helpful
in this effort to evaluate and understand Saudi Arabia's objectives
and results in implementing rural reforms and policies.
C. Saudi Rural Development
In the light of the above, there are three marked stages in the Saudi
rural policies:
1.	 Early land reforms (1928 to early 1960s) that were mainly
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designed to transform the structure of pastoral nomadism in
the country by encouraging settlement, and changing land use
among the nomadic population.	 These reforms underlined the
Saudi commitment to private ownership of land.
2	 Later land reforms (through the PLDO, 1968) which allowed two
types of development:
A) One, continuous with the traditional form of land
tenancy in the agricultural sector, which enouraged
small owner(occupier, TabOUr irttni
	 ticI,	 f
production.	 These reforms were based on land
distribution of 5-10 hectares of land to private
individuals. The main beneficiaries of these reforms
have been landless nomads and peasants.
B) Another policy of land distribution, which is
targeted to encourage big commercial agricultural
enterprises by artocating Targe sfzed land' to
companies and corporations (400 hectares). The main
beneficiaries of this policy are the existing large
farmers and the urban based commercial interests. We
may also include within this tendency the land
allocations through the traditional Iqta system,
which tended to favour the tribal elites of the
country and produced similar consequences.
3.	 Upon these differential land distribution policies, a new
policy for the development of the agricultural sector in the
mid 1970s was built. The main objectives of this policy were
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a) increasing output, b) redistribution of income and wealth,
c) transferal of technology, and d) expanding the role of
private enterprise in the development of the agricultural
sector. The route for such objectives lay through huge
agricultural credit facilities, subsidisation of agricultural
machinery and the price support for wheat.
The outcome of such policies was two fold.
	 One was a total
transformation of the production methods, especially for those large
landowners who are better placed to benefit from the wheat price
support (still operative). The other was to improve production among
the smaller landholdings through the application of better agricultural
methods and technology.
From the above we can see the two approaches to rural development
(outlined by Long) co-existing in Saudi Arabia - namely that of
transformation and improvement. It must be remembered, however, that
the agricultural sector is basically limited in Saudi Arabia, because
of its arid conditions, and the uncertainty of its water resources.
There is also a certain amount of overlapping in the policies of the
government between the reformist and the technocratic models, because
there is an element of redistribution of wealth, especially when we
consider the implications of the subsidisation and wheat price policy
for the smaller farmers.
In another vein, the Saudi Arabian economy is marked by its wealth as
an oil exporter, and the recency of its development efforts. The gap
between the existing skills of its labour force, and the skills
requirements of its agricultural policies (emphasising transfer of
technology), have been temporarily filled by the recruitment of skilled
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and unskilled foreign labour. This tendency may discourage policies
aimed at the development of the indigenous labour force, and encourage
the dependent nature of the whole economy on the oil revenues and
western technol ogy.
The 'modernisation' approach to rural development, moreover, does not
take account of the ideological elements embedded in the Islamic tenure
and inheritance laws. This may lead in the future to the gradual
fragmentation of landholdings, which is not in keeping with modern
agricultural production. 	 The push for commercialisation in the
policies is also not backed by the development of the market, but it is
dependent largely on the state's financial ability to carry the cost of
the wheat programe. This latter programme may be criticised by the
modernisers, as well as those of differing orientation, because it does
not meet either the logic of the 'free market' nor that of an
integrated self-perpetuating independent economy.
	 This in turn is
because it is wasteful of valuable financial resources, as well as of
finite water resources.
Conclusion
As seen in section 1 of this chapter, the Saudi agricultural sector
suffers from severe limitations that affect its natural resources, as
well as its human resources. The limitation of the natural resources
is in relation to the availability of underground water, and the
ecological condition associated with a desert and semi-arid zone. The
limitations of the human resources, however, were mostly due to the
lack of development, and the isolation experienced by the rural
population from the modern sectors of the economy during the formative
years of the 1950s to the early 1970s. This resulted in stagnation,
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and a prevalence of very traditional methods of production.
The land reforms, which were virtually the only form of change
experienced by the agricultural sector, were designed at the beginning
to serve political ends. 	 Not until 1968 and the PLDO were they
redirected to promote development and growth. The land distribution
policies, when they were implemented, were dualistic and incoherent.
Some policies (the Iqta system) originated from the traditional values
still strongly upheld by the nation at large, and by the rural
population. Other policies (PLDO) originated from the modern sector,
but were designed for the continuation of a traditional agricultural
operation, as regards size and method of operation.
The land policies resulted in a differentiated pattern of landholdings
among the rural population. That differentiated pattern may only have
been incipient in the year before the agricultural incentives and the
development programe, but it was quickly realised after interest in
the ownership of agricultural land grew nationally. The land policies,
moreover, were not designed to promote agr(coiCurdT grawtá	 ñti
already existing and more productive areas, like the regions of dry
farming, but to expand production wherever possible. 	 These virgin
areas were within the boundaries of some traditionally cultivated areas
in the Kingdom, especially in the central and northern regions, because
the underground reservoirs of water were mainly situated there.
The development plan for the agricultural sector might have taken note
of the limited nature of the sector's resources, natural and human. It
nevertheless proceeded to promote a pattern of growth that is not in
keeping with the ecological factors prevalent in the Kingdom, nor with
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the general overall development of the agricultural sector. The wheat
programme, for instance, promoted a burst of cultivation according to
modern methods, which allowed vast areas of land and huge amounts of
underground water to be exploited without greatly benefiting the
national economy at large, nor all of the agricultural producers.
Subsidisation can be a great tool for developing the agricultural
sector if its targets are the majority of the agricultural producers
and products, as was the case in Japan. Subsidisation in Saudi Arabia,
however, seems to have limited targets like viheat, poultry, egos avd
dairy production. The larger producers and the more experienced groups
in the modern sector were also favoured with the best conditions for
modern agricultural production, like larger plots of land and larger
agricultural loans.
The disparity between the skills needed for the developing patterns of
production, and the pre-existing skills and experience in the
agricultural sector, has been a problem for the agricultural producers
themselves and for the state. Recruitment of foreign skills and labour
was the only option open for effecting such quick growth and
development. This resulted in a reliance on foreign labour for almost
every aspect of the production process - and not only for skilled work.
Those who do not have and cannot obtain the skills needed either cannot
participate in the development process, or produce at greater cost to
the environment.
Regardless of the above issues, the development programe planted the
first seeds of a modern agricultural sector. The capital that has been
invested by small and large producers, and by the state's generous
subsidies and initiatives will be maintained as long as possible. It
297
is, therefore, imperative that urgent steps are taken to reduce and
counteract the effects of past policies and generalise the development
over a larger number of products and producers, without losing sight of
the delicate balance of the environment.	 Agricultural research,
education and skill must be developed in order to gain a degree of self
sufficiency. The small producers and the traditional farmers must be
targeted for greater assistance, as regards landholdings and loans.
The importation policies must be adjusted to encourage present and
future production.	 The incentives must be generaUsed ard at
reasonable	 levels, which will	 ensure continued commitment to
agricultural production and farming. Development must also include all
areas of agricultural economy such as marketing and consumption.
The implication of the past existence and future continuation of the
present policies are far reaching, especially for those traditional
groups who have little experience of the modern sector and the modern
production methods.
	
The sedentarized and non-sedentarized nomads,
whether they were able to participate in the development process or
not, have special problems to contend with. That is because they are
among the most predominantly traditional groups in the country, and the
least likely to have the modern sector experience and agricultural
skill needed for the present pattern of production.
The nomads, moreover,
	 are targeted by previous	 policies	 of
sedentarization and land distribution to be included in the
agricultural sector. The sedentarized nomads are, therefore, the most
vulnerable of all groups to problematic areas inherent in the
development process.	 They are also the most dependent on what the
agricultural programe offers. Their previous experience and economic
orientation do not have the elements needed for the success and
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continued commitment to an agricultural economy.
This is not to suggest that there are basic inherent differences
between nomadic groups and sedentary groups. The difference lies only
in the degree to which either group is equipped to participate and
succeed, participate and fail, or not participate at all. Some nomadic
groups are, in fact, advantaged as regards landholdings in the
agricultural sector (as was seen in sction II of this chapter). Whether
or not they are sufficiently equipped in other ways to succeed, and be
active ingredients in the development process will be considered below
when the case study's population is focussed on.
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Chapter Five
The Patterns of Sedentarizatfon In Sajir
305
Introduction
The target population in Sajir is presumed to have already undergone a
comitment to sedentarism, by being in actual fact practising farmers.
The comittment to settlement, however, did not occur at the same time,
nor was the path to sedentarism unvarying.
This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first task of the
first section is to define the variable "sedentarism", in order to have
a clearer conceptual view of what the sedentarization process entails.
It will also go on to detail three periods of nomad settlement in Saudi
Arabia, which are a reflection of the previously studied history of
nomad sedentarization (chapter 2), and the agricultural sector (chapter
4).
The second section of this chapter will deal with the data of the
interviews relating to the settlement patterns. The date of
settlement, along with other variables - like past experience of
pastoralism, non—rural work experience, and incentives for settlement -
will be examined thoroughly in the light of the previously outlined
settlement periods. The final sections of this chapter will give
details of the forms of agriculture previously practised by the bedouin
farmers, as well as emerging forms of pastoralist activities in the
region.
Section I
1.	 Sedentarlsm as a Variable
Sedentarism appears at first glance simple to measure, because it has
been customarily looked at as meaning reduced mobility and increased
residential stability. However, Nina Swidler highlights two areas of
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weakness in such a view point: (1)
1. To link analytically the idea of sedentarism mainly
with residential stability stems from the habitual
identification of pastoral nomadism with the
secondary atiribute of mobility, rather than that of
the primary atribute of pastoralism. Nomads in fact
move to perpetuate and facilitate their economic
capital, i.e. livestock. The adoption of such a
viewpoint in the conceptualization of nomadic
pastoralism reduces full comprehension of the
variety of modes of integration that nomads adopt in
order to develop their productive forces in a
changing environment.
2. Another area of weakness highlighted by Swidler
relates to the comon practice of equating the
process of sedentarisation with forced
sedenterization; which is often practised by
centralised governments to reduce the nomadic
groups' mobility, and therefore increase control
over them. Forced sedentarization has been met by
resistance in many parts of the world and has caught
the attention of writers, both academic and
literary. Focussing on this served was to draw
attention away from the variety of ways in which
some nomadic groups actually choose to reduce their
mobility, for various reasons, while continuing with
the pastoral activities in some form or another
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The various options practised by nomadic groups, in a process of
sedentarism, do not only imply an element of free choice. They may
also imply a situation of conflict between the continued existance of
pastoral nomadism in its original form, and the policies practised by a
centralised	 government	 in the wider structures that include
sedentarized nomadic groups. 	 These policies may range from laws
governing pastoral land use to policies of education and health; or
more importantly, general developmental economic policies that do not
take into account animal wealth or nomadic groups.
Changes, moreover, within the wider structure of the society may induce
nomads to curtail their migration pattern in order to enjoy certain
advantages generated from a source of national wealth, the introduction
of modern technology, and improved productivity.
The point being made here is that sedentarism, in the literal sense,
does not signify the completion of the integration of nomads in a wider
society.	 It is merely an important symptom of the sedentarization
process. Sedentarism, therefore, must be measured with an eye on the
elements that make up the nomadic economic systems. It is only then
that a more comprehensive picture of the degree of sedentarism can be
drawn.
The adoption of such a point of view does not mean a pre-conceived
judgement of the study's population. That remains to be seen from the
data available, and must begin by looking at factors affecting the
Saudi nomads' sedentarization during the various periods of their
settlement in the national setting.
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2.	 The Periods of Settlement
From the study of nomads and the sedentarization process in Saudi
Arabia (see chapter 2), it is possible to conceive of the process as
occuring in three stages. These are:
1. The early stage of nomad settlement (1910 to the
early 1930s). This stage was dominated by the
Ikhwan movement, which initiated a hitherto unknown
push for settlement among the nomadic tribes of
Saudi Arabia. The main characteristic of this stage
is sedentarization through ideological intervention.
2. The intermediate stage of nomadic settlement
(1940-1960s). This stage was dominated by a process
of sedentarization motivated by two elements:
A. The productive instability of pastoral
nomadism, keenly felt by the Saudi bedouins
through the following:
1. Ecological circumstances like droughts,
and loss of good grazing pastures.
2. Juridical	 and	 policy	 inspired
interventions	 into the	 dynamics	 of
pastoral nomadism, through land reforms,
B.	 The opening up of other opportunities for wage
employment generated by the setting up of the
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modern	 state	 public	 sector	 (military
institutions,	 the	 administrative
organisations), and the oil industry.
The first element disposed the Saudi bedouin toward
settlement, and the second facilitated a degree of
integration with the national setting.
3.	 The recent stage of nomad settlement (1970s up to
the present). This period is characterised by a
voluntary self initiated push for a more settled
state by large numbers of the nomads of Saudi
Arabia.	 This push was motivated by new economic
opportunities opening in the rural economy, which
were instigated by the state's agricultural
development progranne (especially after the second
development plan of 1975). It is also marked by the
heightened effectiveness of the governmental
institutions concerned with various aspects of the
agricultural sector (the Ministry of Agriculture and
the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank), which began to
receive substantial funds after the 1973/74 oil
price increase. Settled agricultural activities
during this period were markedly different than in
previous periods, in terms of profitability and
patterns of production.
The process of change is necessarily continuous, which means that there
would be some overlapping of factors between those three stages of the
sedentarization process. For example, wage labour as a source of
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income for individual nomads began since the start of the oil
exploration in the 1930s, and increased in importance after the state
institutions began to grow in the 1950s and the 1960s. At present, it
remains as an important source of income for settled and unsettled
bedouins; but it is also accompanied by more important income
generating activities like agricultural production and/or commercial
activities.
The ideological element involved in the first period of settlement,
moreover, continues to be effective nationally at present; and it is
clearly exhibited in the religious orientation of the Saudi state and
population . Furthermore, the factors most effective in the recent
period of nomad settlement had their origin in earlier periods. For
instance, land distribution (through the PLDO) began after 1968, and it
became increasingly more important after the agricultural development
programme of the 1970s.
The above demarcation of settlement periods reflects only the most
important factors influencing the process of nomad sedentarisation at
different stages of the development of the Saudi society. It also
reflects historically important periods, which began with the
establishment of the nation state and continues to the boom of oil
revenues experienced in the 1970s.
3)	 Factors Affecting Nomad Sedentarisation in the Early
Stage
The earliest period of sedentarisation on a large scale in Saudi Arabia
was induced by the teachings of the Ikhwan movements, which began in
1910 and declined in the 1930s.	 The movement was headed by King
Abdul-Aziz, who was the paramount political power in the central region
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of Najd at the time (3)• The struggle for the spread of the Wahabi
ideology was the means by which political power was achieved over the
nomadic tribes; and it eventually led to Ibn Saud's complete control
over sedentary villages and more urban regions like Al-Hijaz and Asir
(4)•
The Wahabi preachers stressed to the bedouins that heaven's gates were
open to those who espoused the return to fundamental Islam, and
abandoned the the unruly life of nomadism. The Islamic zeal of the new
converts persuaded them to accept Ibn Saud's offer to settle in
agricultural Hujars, and replace their tribal loyalty by Islamic
brotherhood. 5	The nomads who espoused the cause saw fit to forgo
their nomadic life and their animals for their convictions and heavenly
rewards. They were also encouraged by grants of land and subsidisation
by Ibn Saud.	 These subsidies included food, ammunition and cash
assi stance.
By 1930, 200 Hujar existed in the Arabian Peninsula	 Tribal
affiliation however proved to be too strong , and settlement was
generally based on tribal nembership.	 There were two factors
encouraging this tendency: a) offers of settlement were given to
important tribal sheiks, who then urged the members of their group to
undergo settlement; and b) the traditional intense rivalry between
tribal groups was carried over to rivalry over land grants and
assistance.	 The tribal leaders of sub-groups, as well as paramount
sheiks, were quick in seeking a place of settlement of their own.
Nomadic settlement in this period was marked, therefore, by a general
withdrawal from the nomadic economy, by abandoning migratory movement
and the exclusive dependence on animals. Substantial aspects of the
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tribal social structure were, nonetheless, retained and practised.
4)	 Factors_ Affecting 	 Nomad	 Sedentarization	 in	 the
Intermediate Stage
This period of nomad sedenterization presents a completely different
picture, in that it is mostly influenced by economic factors rather
than motives of an ideological nature. The inducements and rewards for
settlement, moreover, were not as clear cut as in the earlier stage.
This made it necessary for any nomad or nomadic group to weigh their
options and present circumstances very carefully before making any move
toward sedentarism. Factors affecting the sedentarization process at
this stage were more complicated; and included the following:
A) Factors Affecting the Dynamic of Pastoral Nomadism:
1. Raiding by nomadic tribes on sedentary cultivators, other nomadic
groups, and caravan routes had been previously an important economic
resource for nomadic groups facing economic difficulties due to
droughts or animal diseases. The practise of raiding was completely
prohibited in the 1920s 7), and looting was only allowed in the Ikwhan
battles. For some time, however, the political leadership (personified
by Ibn Saud) was unable to enforce this law, especially in isolated
areas. As the central government gained in power, and its armed forces
were being strengthened by bedouin recruits from all over the regions
of Saudi Arabia, it became possible for raiding to be completely
stopped. Nomads facing ecological difficulties with reduced numbers of
animals thus had no options but to rely on state help, or to seek other
means of economic livelihood.
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2. The land reforms which began in 1925 and culminated in 1968 had
profound effect on the dynamic of the pastoral nomadic structure
(discussed more fully in chapter 4). The 1925 law abolished the dirah
system, which gave tribal groups exclusive utilization and control of
certain pastures.	 The system was based on complex inter-tribal
agreements and alliances. The state, through the 1925 laws, became
effectively the controller and regulator of all tribal pastures.
Moreover, it decreed them open to all individuals according to the
Islamic principles.
The law did not make any difference in the beginning on how nomads
utilized pastures. They continued to move in the customary fashion,
and no alteration was immediately apparent in the model of nomadic
life. Trespassing in other tribes' territories, moreover, was a common
practice even before this law, and had been possible under precise
inter-tribal agreements. (8) In the long run, however, the 1925 law
had important consequences, especially after the introduction of
motorised transport.
Trucks and water tanks made it possible for nomads to exploit pastures
and water resources that they had not previously been able to utilise.
This led to greater freedom of movement of tribal nomadic units, and
therefore greater utilization of good pastures as opposed to poorer
ones. This eventually led to overgrazing and sometimes total
destruction of some pastoral resources. (9)
Another side-effect of the 1925 law was that tribal groups lost
interest in protecting their own dirahs and preventing them from being
overused. There was also considerable difficulty in enforcing the
Hema system, by which a good pasture would be prohibited to all tribal
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groups for a few years to allow it to regenerate.
When free access began to be practised, the effect on animal wealth was
initially beneficial, and the number of animals increased with the
greater opportunity for good grazing. Soon, however, those same
animals began to deplete good pastures and the reverse began to take
place.
The 1925 law was a direct intervention in the nomadic sector, which
sought to promote access to the resources in a manner which contrasted
with the traditional rights of utilization of resources. It also
undermined the tribe's political and economic independence and
authority, and replaced it with dependence on the state and its
authority. The tribes, therefore, lost one of their principal
functions, that of protection and management of the comunity's
interest as regards access to resources.
In 1968, another land reform (the Public Land Distribution Ordinance or
PLDO) was further instrumental in completely altering the traditional
system of access to the resources. It reinforced the 1925 law and went
further to replace collective community ownership with private
individual ownership. Theoretically the law gave every Saudi citizen
the right to apply to the competent authorities for a piece of land in
any region of the Kingdom, but in reality land distribution assumed a
pattern based on tribal membership and comunity right of access°.
Tribal sheiks, moreover, were heavily involved and instrumental in the
distribution process.
Land distribution based on tribal and community membership has tended
to have a triple effect:
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A) It derives its legitimacy from the traditional system and
therefore tends to strengthen some aspects of the tribal
social systems, notably that of exclusivity.
B) It encourages social differentiation between groups and within
groups; because it depends on the access and the relationship
to the local Amir, and his own relationship to the state's
authority.
C) It replaces the traditional collective right of access to land
with the right to private property among the nomadic sector of
the population.	 This in turn opens the door to the new,
previously unexperienced, comercialisation of resources.
The land distribution policies, then, altered the relationship between
the nomads and their spacial environment. 	 The old patterns had
encouraged and made possible a dependence on livestock as an economic
resource; while the new patterns did not take into account animal
wealth, and encouraged alternative means of livelihood - namely
cultivation and a sedentary way of life.
3. Perhaps the most effective factor encouraging nomad sedentarization
has been the ecological difficulties affecting the equilibrium of the
nomadic pastoral economy.
	
Periods of drought all over the country
during the 1950s and the 1960s affected profoundly the numbers of
livestock and reduced nomadic productivity.	 This, coupled with the
degradation of pastures, left many nomadic groups on the brink of
starvation. (11)
These developments prompted the government in the late 1950s and the
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1960s to take action on behalf of those groups through agricultural
projects. These projects were aimed at settling the nomads, and also
at introducing improved agricultural methods to the worst affected
regions. The first project was Wadi Sirhan agricultural project (1958)
in the Northern region, which was targeted at the Shararat bedouins.
The second project was the I-laradh Agricultural Scheme (1963) in the
Eastern region, whose target population was the Al-Murrah tribe.
Neither of these two projects was very successful in its goal to
incorporate the targeted bedouins into the planned agricultural
schemes.	 This was due to a series of management errors, which
essentially did not take account of the bedouns' socl&t
characteristics, nor of their own desires and opinions (this was
discussed more fully in chapter 2).
These agricultural schemes, however, were the first attempts by the
government to Introduce modern agricultural machinery and methods into
the rural sector. They became subsequently a model for traditional
farmers and spontaneously settling nomadic groups.
The severe hardship encountered due to droughts in this period, and the
Inability of the government to cover the vast areas affected by them,
left the greater part of nomadic groups with no option but to turn to
other economic resources. This meant in most cases a partial or total
abandonment of the pastoral economy.
B) Factors Affecting the National Economy
In addition to the above factors affecting the dynamics of nomadic
pastoral production, there were additional factors originating in the
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national setting, which greatly affected the sedentarization process in
this period. These factors included the following:
1)	 The face of the national economy was changing slowly but
surely since the discovery of oil in 1938 in quantities deemed
commercially exploitable.
	 After the second World War,
revenues rose from $5 million in 1950 to nearly $1 billion in
1968.	 These revenues allowed the Saudi Government to
establish and expand its public institutions, as well as
introduce educational and health services. The setting up of
ministries, military institutions and the nucleus of the
service sector opened up opportunities of employment
previously unavailable to the majority of the population. The
nomadic groups were, moreover, experiencing substantial
difficulties due to the factors outlined above, which greatly
disposed them towards alternative modes of livelihood.
The modern sector was virtually restricted to the urban
surrounds of Jeddah, Riyadh, Damam and Dhahran (the site of
the oil industry). It consisted of the expanding government
bureaucracy, small scale construction activities, and a
growing number of trading concerns. 2	Despite the limited
nature of the modern sector, it offered avenues for salaried
work for a substantial number of bedouins. These were mostly
In the military institutions, like the National Guard, the
Royal Guard and as personal guards for members of the Royal
families.	 Low-skill employment like driving, construction
work and labouring jobs in the oil industry were also eagerly
taken up by members of the tribal groups.
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Incomes derived by the heads, and male members of bedouin
families working in the urban sector, maintained the rurally
based family units. This process diversified the economic
basis of nomadic pastoral units from one based exclusively on
subsistance to one combining wage labour with the traditional
subsistence economy.	 This development was for many nomadic
groups the first step towards a more settled state.
2)	 The decline and stagnation of pastoral nornadism was matched by
a stagnation in the agricultural sector of the economy (see
chapter 4), which prevented major increases in productivity
and maintained the vast majority of the rural population at a
subsi stence level.
The rural economy had to await the early 1970s, and the
economic boom of national wealth, before any major efforts for
its development could be undertaken. The aridity of Saudi
Arabia was, moreover, hardly conducive to spontaneous growth
of a viable agricultural economy. Even the two government-
instigated agricultural projects had very little impact on the
overall rural sector. Farming techniques were largely
traditional (see chapter 4), and the rural infrastructure was
very poor.	 The marketing of agricultural products was
moreover, traditional in method and limited in scope.
The limited nature of agricultural activities in this period,
in terms of productivity and profitability, meant that nomads
settling in the countryside were not experiencing a very great
level of change. They tended to combine subsistence farming
with subsistence pastoral activities (in the shape of
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semi-nomadic or short range nomadism). Their cash incomes
were mainly derived from wage labour in the military and
low-skill work, and also from cash grants from the state.
Settlement in this period meant a respite from the economic
difficulties of pastoralism, a greater opportunity to take
advantage of health and education services, and a chance to
enter into wage labour. This period, however, contains the
seeds for the more marked developments in the 1970s because of
the land reforms of 1968 (PLDO) which paved the way for the
land distribution of the 1970s, and also because of the
establishment of the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (1969),
which became in the 1970s and 1980s the major agent for the
development of the agricultural sector.
5)	 Factors Affecting Nomad Sedentarization in the Latest
Stage
This stage is characterised by a burst of wealth, that was generated
from the 1973/74 oil price increase. National income rose from $1,150
billion in 1970 to $29 billion in 1980. Prior to 1970, developments
were mainly concentrated on communications, infrastructure, social
services, and the development of government organisations. Rapid
development before this period was impossible because of the relatively
modest oil income. By 1975, and the second development plan, the
picture was vastly changed. Capital by this stage would be released to
a rural based development strategy, aimed at increasing agricultural
production, and improving the quality of living for the rural
population. Qualitative changes were taking place in the rural
economies, and in the sedentarization process of this period.
Transformation, moreover, was more marked, and affected a large
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percentage of the rural people.
	
Some of the elements affecting this
period were the following:
1) Major resources of underground water were discovered in
consequence of extensive exploration by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Water in the 1960's. These discoveries
improved the general expectation of the policy makers toward
the likelihood of the success of any strategy aiming to
improve agricultural sector. It also increased the
expectations among the rural based populations.
Modern water systems were being rapidly, and more extensively,
introduced into the areas of irrigated agriculture.	 These
were based on deeply dug wells, and modern pumps. 	 This
process was heightened and supported by the activities of the
agricultural bank which offered the farmers extensive credit
and subsidsation facilities.
2) Land utilization had been, at the advent of this period,
largely transformed in principle from its mixed traditional
forms, i.e. collective pastoral utilization of land and small
traditional agricultural landholdings, to a form that
conformed to the land policies of the government. The main
characteristics of the latter are a commitment to private
ownership, and a tendency to promote differing systems of land
ownership, one designed for small cultivators and the other
designed to encourage large commercial agriculture (see
chapter 4). The PLDO was by the 1970s able to operate in the
major agricultural regions of the kingdoni.13
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3) The Agricultural Bank (1969), which was operating in the early
1970s on a restricted level, received in the latter years of
the 1970s substantial funds. This enabled it to finance a
much improved service to an increasing number of the rural
population. The Bank's credit covered water systems, land
preparation and modern farm machinery. All loans were given
to farmers under very generous terms; and the greater number
of items needed for agricultural production were also
subsidised by the government.
4) 1979 marks a major new development, which generated a
substantial increase of agricultural activities. These were
based on wheat cultivation, which benefitted from a price
support that guaranteed the producers substantial profits (see
chapter 4). This marked a significant departure for
agricultural producers, and encouraged more of the rural and
urban population to enter the sector.
5) The increased salaries, grants and profitability of commercial
ventures in the rural and urban economies during this period,
generated wealth and well-being on the national level. This
made It possible (in most sectors of the economy) to recruit
foreign labour - skilled and unskilled - to cover some of the
gaps left by the lack of skill and training, and/or the lack
of inclination for manual labour. The process was encouraged
by the relaxed governmental policies toward this tendency.
The above factors had a far-reaching effect on the process of
sedentarization of nomadic groups in Saudi Arabia. Firstly, there was
a greatly increased level of disposition toward settlement, because the
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rural standards of living had dramatically improved.
Secondly, there were qualitative changes in the sedentarization
process. The first period of sedentarization had been a move from one
subsistence economy to another, while the second period offered a
diversification of the economic structure of pastoralism (by adding
cash from wage labour to subsistence agriculture and/or pastoralism).
By contrast, the latest period saw a move to comercial farming and
markedly different relations of production, by way of using modern
agricultural methods and machinery; and the growing ability and need to
employ wage labour in the settled state.
Thirdly, the process of settlement, which had been influenced in the
previous periods (1940s up to the 1960s) by the job opportunities and
the general development in the urban and public sector, was now also
influenced by the increased levels of incomes in the agricultural
sector. This, undoubtedly, encouraged a process of integration
markedly different than that of previous periods - namely one based on
a positive dynamic originating within the rural sector itself.
II	 Patterns of Settlement In Sajir
This section will attempt a comprehensive look at the patterns of
settlement among the interviewed persons. It will take the date of
settlement as the main variable in the analysis of the data derived
from the interviews. This section, by virtue of being the first
empirical look at the target population, will also include such basic
information as the age, educational level, and work experience of the
bedouin farmers interviewed. Such variables, however, figure to some
extent in the subsequent analysis of the patterns of settlement.
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It will also take its guidance, in the ordering of the settlement
variables, from the previously outlined stages of nomad sedentarization
in Saudi Arabia.	 This will serve to establish whether or not such
demarcation is actually useful in understanding this case of bedouin
sedentarization, and what differences (if any) exist between bedouins
who had settled at different stages.
1	 Lineage Affiliation
As was seen earlier (chapter 3) the overwhelming majority of the people
of Sajir come from Al-Hanatish lineage (of Al-Talha Clan) of the
Utaibah tribe. This was also reflected in the sample of this study
(see table 5.1). Those who were not Hanatish were mostly from Al-Taiha
Clan (seven in number), while three were from lineages belonging the
Al-Rugah sub-tribe. No bedouins from other tribes, or from the other
large sub-tribe of Utaibah (Al-Bargah), were encountered in the samp'e.
The process of settlement, and subsequent land distribution to the
tribal members of Al-Hanatish, follows closely the pattern of the Iqta
system (discussed in chapter 4).	 Permission to settle the site was
initially granted to the Sheik of Al-Hanatish in 1919 - the approximate
date for the establishment of Sajir (see chapter 3). Subsequently, the
Amir Ibn-Muhalya, the father of the present Amir, was given a land
title to the whole of the lands traditionally associated with the
settlement. This deed enpowered him to distribute the land among his
people for the purpose of settlement.
What this meant in real terms was that Sajir's lands were outside the
powers of the Public Land Distribution Ordinance (1968), and that
landholdings could be easily transferred to the Hanatish settlers (by
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TABLE 5.1
LINEAGE AFFILIATION
Lineage	 Number
28
7
A1-I-ianati sh
Al-Talha Clan
Other Lineages
A1-Rugah Sub-Tribe
TOTAL
TABLE 5.2
AGES OF THE INTERVIEWED
AGE CATEGORY
3
38
Number
25-30
	 6
31-40
	 6
41-50
	 13
Over 50
	 10
Do Not Know
	 3
TOTAL
	 38
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the same process of Iqta) in the Islamic courts, and by written
documents of the Amir.	 This accounts for the exclusivity of the
settlement, as well as the existing exceptions to the general rule.
The Amir's decision to grant land to settling households outside
Al-Hantish lineages is taken as a sign of his generosity and
flexibility by people from other bedouin settlements and villages in
the region (discussed more fully in chapter 6).
2	 Ages of those Interviewed
The ages of those interviewed ranged from 25 to 90 years. The majority
of the bedouin farmers interviewed were over 40 years old (see table
5.2). Other younger age categories were also represented in the
sample. The dominance of the older age category is due to the teidency
to interview heads of the households during the sampling process,
unless absent from the farm.	 This is because households are
predominantly extended family structures, and a sampling process that
does not seek out heads of households would risk repetition of already
obtained data from the same household. Interviewing the head of the
households also extends the relevant data over a larger number of the
settled bedouins.	 The age variable will be discussed later in the
light of subsequent information.
3	 Level of Education
The level of education was markedly low for the majority of the
interviewed bedouins (see table 5.3). Twenty nine of the interviewed
had six years or under of formal education, or none at all.
Approximately 26% of the sample were completely illiterate, while more
than 50% were either barely literate, or of a very low educational
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TABLE 5.3
LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Category
Illiterate	 (1)
Literate	 (2)
Six Years or Under
7-12 Years
Over 12
Nu,nber
10
7
12
8
1
TOTAL	 38
(1) Does not read or write, or reads a little.
(2) Reads and writes, no formal education.
TABLE 5.4
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF PASTORALISM
Yes	 29
No	 :	 9
TOTAL	 38
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level. Only one had formal education exceeding twelve years (a high
school diploma). The level of education will also be examined along
with other variables in the subsequent discussion.
4	 The Experience of Pastoralism
Twenty nine of the interviewed bedouins had direct personal experience
of pastoral actijities. These included long-distance nornadism,
semi-nomadic and herding activities. The nine individuals who had no
experience of pastoralism will be accounted for in the coming
discussion of the date of settlement, and its relationship to other
variables like age and previous work experience (see table 5.4).
5.	 Previous Occupations and the Non-Agricultural 1,'ork
Experience
The majority of the persons interviewed were previously engaged in
pastoral activities, or non-rural work requiring low skills and/or a
low level of educational attainment like driving, trading and also
employment in the National Guard (see table 5.5). Pastoralism was the
previous occupation for more than half of the bedouins interviewed,
while low-skill work and the military accounted for eight of the cases
in the sample. Only five were earning their living previously by
employment in the civil service. Three of those interviewed, moreover,
had no previous employment other than the present; but they were young
men aged 27, 27 and 28. This element will be clarified further below.
The bedouins' statement of their occupations, however, did not exhaust
their non-rural work experience. In fact all but one of those who said
that their previous occupation was pastoralism, also had other
non-pastoral work experience (see table 5.6). The majority of this
Fastoralism
Military Work
Civil Employment
Unskilled Work (Driving,
Construction and Trading)
No previous occupation
(Young Men)
22
4
5
4
3
TOTAL	 38
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TABLE 5.5
PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS AMONG THE INTERVIEWED
TABLE 5.6
PREVIOUS OCCUPATION AND PAST WORK EXPERIENCE
AMONG THE INTERVIEWED
PREVIOUS OCCUPATION
PASTORALISM OTHER TOTAL
Work Experience
1) Military	 13	 2	 15
2) Military and Unskilled
Work	 1	 4	 5
3) Unskilled Work (Driving,
Construction)	 3	 2	 5
4) Religious	 2	 0	 2
5) Civil Service and/or
Commerce	 1	 5	 6
6) Military and Teaching	 1.	 0	 1
7)None	 1	 3	 4
TOTAL	 22	 16	 38
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work experience, however, was in military employment, unskilled work or
religious employment (as Imams of Mosques).
Only two of the twenty two pastoralists were also engaged during a
period of their life in civil employment or teaching. Military work and
unskilled work experience also figured highly among those who had
alternative employment, but they were more likely to be involved in
civil employment than the previous group. This factor will also be
shown clearly in individual cases later in the next section.
6.	 Date of Settlement
The data were organised in such a way as to reflect the periods of
nomad settlement stated in Section I. The majority of the interviewed
bedouins in Sajir were found to have settled during the intermediate
stage of nomadic sedentarization (see table 5.7), especially in the
1960s.
The sample might have reflected a larger number of the early settlers
if no effort was made to include more of the recent settlers (see
chapter 3). The settlers of the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s were mostly
living in hamlets around Sajir, which were organised on a minimal
lineage or lineage basis. The date of settlement, moreover, as stated
by the interviewed bedouin reflected a subjective judgement and did not
always follow the same criterion, especially among the intermediate
settlers.
For example some individuals may mark their settlement by the time they
had broken from the family unit, and taken salaried jobs. Other would
mark it by the time the whole group had taken up residence in Sajir.
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TABLE 5.7
DIVISION AMONG THE PERSONS INTERVIEWED
ACCORDING TO PERIOD AND TIME OF SETTLEMENT
PERIOD OF	 TIME OF	 NUMBER OF
SETTLEMENT	 SETTLEMENT	 SETTLERS
The early period of settlement Before 1940 	 10
In the l94Os	 2
The intermediate period of
settlement	 )	 In the 1950s	 5
)	 In the 1960s	 14
In the l970s	 6
The most recent period of	 )
settlement	 )	 In the 1980s
TOTAL 38
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Two individuals marked it, moreover, by the ceasation of heavy
semi-nomadic activity, which involved the family unit in annual
seasonal outings to the desert in search of good pastures.
On the whole, however, residence was the main criterion, for the
interviewed bedouins, especially among the early and recent settlers.
The intermediate settlers were the most likely to differ in their
criterion for what signifies settlement. This analysis, nonetheless,
will use the stated date of settlement, and will not take it to mean
the cesation of semi-nomadic activities as will be shown later.
The 1960s was a period when a large number of the bedouins in Sajir
were induced to turn away from primary dependence on livestock and
settle. The individual settling in this period represents an extended
family structures, tiic%	 j	 dude fathers,	 oter, t,,
nephews and their families.
	 The later settlers (1970 and 1980)
represent even larger units, which included in three of the seven cases
a whole lineage, and a minimal lineage in another case.
7)	 The Date of Settlement and Other Variables
In an effort to find out if any differences exist between the
individuals settling at various stages, the data was organised in
tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 for every individual case in the sample.
	 The
organisation of the three tables, moreover, followed the already set
periods of settlement, as well as a chronological listing according to
the year of settlement. This is to see if any significant differences
exist between the settlers in any one group.
Careful examination of the cases (outlined in the tables 5.8, 5.9,
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TABLE 5.8
YEAR OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER VARIABLES AMONG THE EARLY SETTLERS
DATE OF AGE EDUCATION PREVIOUS PASTORALISM NON-PASTORAL URBAN
SETTLE-	 OCCPN	 EXPERIENCED WORK	 RESID-
MENT	 (EXCLUDING	 ENCE
PRESENT ONES)
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
7-
8-
9-
10-
X(2)	 CW	 X
X(2) BC W	 Yes
SN	 H	 Yes
N	 M(M)	 Yes
SN	 U	 x
X(3) M, U	 Yes
X(3)	 es
X(3	 C,v	 Yes
SN	 M	 Yes
X(3)	 CW	 Yes
1903 (1)
	
55
1903 (1)
	
45
1919	 56
1919	 90
1919	 42
1919	 50
1919	 40
1919	 54
1919	 47
1919	 45
9 Years
12 Years
6 Years
L
L
12 Years
6 Years
L
9 Years
CGE
CGE
LT
P
UtD, PD)
U(D)
CGE
CC E
P
CGE
1)	 Families settled in Meccah at this date, but came to Sajir in 1919.
X(2) Their families never practised pastoralism in Sajir.
X(3) These four individuals said that they had not experienced semi-pastoralism in a major
way. They were, however, required as young boys to take sheep flocks out for
grazing.
L	 Literate
I	 Illiterate
CGE	 Civil Government Employee
LT	 Livestock Trader
U(D, PG) Unskilled (Driver, Personal Guard)
U(D)	 Unskilled (Driver)
P	 Pastoralist
N	 Nomadic
SN	 Semi Nomadic
CW	 Civil Work
BCW	 Business and Civil Work
M	 Military Experience
U	 UnskiUed
M (M)	 Military (Mojahid)
X	 None
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TABLE 5.9
YEAR OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER VARIABLES AMONG THE INTERMEDIATE SETTLERS
DATE OF AGE EDUCAI'ION PRE\'IOUS PASTORALISM NON-PASTORAL URBAN
SETTLE-	 OCCPN	 EXPERIENCED WORK
	 RESIDENCF
MENT	 EXPERIENC
(EXCLUDING.
PRESENT ONES)
1- 1948	 55	 6	 P	 SN	 M	 Yes
2- 1948	 47	 L	 ME	 SN	 H	 X
3- 1950	 50	 I	 P	 SN	 R W	 X
4- 1952	 DK(1) 6	 P	 N	 l\1, U	 Yes
5-.	 1952	 50	 L	 P	 SN	 I'.'	 Yes
6- 1953	 57	 1	 P	 SN	 C	 Yes
7- 1956	 28	 6	 ME	 SN	 H, U
	
Yes
8- 1960	 27	 9	 X	 X	 X	 X
9- 1960	 25	 5	 D	 x	 H, U
	
X
10- 1961	 60	 BAInRS(2) P	 SN	 H, T	 Y
11- 1963
	
54	 9	 P	 N	 K	 x
12- 1964	 42	 I	 P	 SN	 U	 Yes
13- 1965	 27	 12	 X	 SN	 N	 N
14- 1965	 45	 5	 P	 N	 U	 X
15- 1965	 50	 I	 P	 SN	 H	 X
16- 1966	 52	 L	 P	 N	 H	 X
17- 1966	 32	 6	 ME	 SN	 H, U	 Yes
18- 1967	 28	 12	 X	 x	 X
	 Yes
19- 1967	 35	 6	 P	 SN	 H
	 N
20- 1968	 35	 I	 P	 N	 U	 x
21- 1969	 DK	 I	 P
	 SN	 K
	
x
(1) DK stands for - I do not know
(2) RS stands for Religious Studies
L-
SN -
N-
P-
ME -
M-
U-
C-
D-
X-
Literate
Illiterate
Semi-nomadic
Nomadic
Pastoralist
Mililtary Employment
Military Experience
Unskilled
Commerce
Driver
None
PP
ME
P
P
P
P
L
6
5
6
1-
2-
3-
4-
5-
6-
7-
1970
1970
1971
1977
1978
1978
1980
DR
47
35
49
38
56
30
SN
SDN
SD N
SON
SN
N
SDN
U
'U
'U
'U
R
x
Yes
Yes
Yes
x
x
x
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TABLE 54•
YEAR OF SETTLEMENT AND OTHER VARIABLES AMONG THE RECENT SETTLERS
DATE OF AGE EDUCATION PREVIOUS PASTORALISM NON-RURAL
	 URIJAN
SETTLE-	 OCCP'N	 EXPERIENCED WORK
	 RESII)-
MENT	 EXPERIENCE	 ENCE
(EXCLUDING
PRESENT ONES)
L
	
Literate
Illiterate
P	 Pastoralist
ME	 Military Employment
N	 Nomadic
SN	 Semi-Nomadic
SDN	 Short-Distance Nomadic
M	 Military Experience
U	 Unskilled
R
	
Religious
DK
	
Don't Know
x
	
lone
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5.10), both individually and as groups showed the following tendencies:
1. There is a definite relationship between the recency of
settlement and the educational level of each group.
	
Four
cases in the early period of settlement had a formal education
of 9 or 12 years (40 percent). The second period had five
cases of at least 9 years education (approximately 24 percent)
and six cases of illiteracy (approximately 28 percent). The
recent settlers, on the other hand, had no cases of an
education level over 6 years in school and three cases of
illiteracy (approximately 43).
Younger men who settled more recently (1970s - 1980s),
moreover, were on the whole less likely to have had a formal
education than men much older in the other and earlier periods
of settlement. This was not wholly surprising because
pastoralists on the move do not have educational facilities;
except for literacy classes in some of the suniner camp sites.
2. The early settlers in Sajir were not only more educated, but
they also accounted for all the individuals whose previous
occupations were in civil employment. Previous occupations
among this group were mostly outside pastoral activities.
Only two individuals said that they were pastoralists before
becoming farmers, one of whom was a 90 year old original
founder of Sajir.
Fourteen of the intermediate settlers said that pastoralism
was their previous occupation (67 percent of the group), while
six of the recent settlers (86 percent) were pastoralists
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before turning to their current livelihood. The three young
men who did not have any previous occupation are shown in
table 5.9 as spending 9 to 12 years in school.
3,, The early period of settlement accounted for six of the nine
cases who had no personal experience of pastoralism. Four of
these individuals had an educational level of 9 or 12 years of
school, and all six had non rural work experience, which
involved in five cases a period of residence in urban centres
(see table 5.8).
A contrasting picture is drawn by table 5.10 of the recent
settlers interviewed. Almost all of the persons of this group
are of very low educational level, if not illiterate. They
also come from a pastoralist background, with very little
experience outside the rural sector; except for the membership
in the National Guard. Moreover, they tended not to have a
period of residence in an urban centre.
4,	 The intermediate group of settlers presents a more complex
picture.	 As was seen earlier, they stand in the middle
between the two other groups in terms of education and
experience of pastoralism.	 Other tendencies exist within
these group, which are the following:
A - Age and the educational level of the individuals in this
group have an inverse relationship (see table 5.11). Six of
the eight men under 40 years old had an education of six years
or over; while eight of the eleven men over 40 years old had
an education of less than six years.
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TABLE 5.11
AGE AND EDUCATION AMONG THE INTERMEDIATE GROUP OF SETTLERS
EDUCATION LEVEL
AGE CATEGORY(1)	 UNDER 6 YEARS	 6 OR OVER	 TOTAL
Under 40 Years	 2	 6	 8
Over 40 Years	 8	 3	 11
DoNotKnow	 1	 1
Total	 11	 10	 21
(1) None of the men in this period of settlement were aged 40.
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B - Age also seemed to have a relationship to the type of work
experienced by the men in this group (see table 5.12). Seven
of the eleven in the older age category had been engaged in
what may be termed as the traditional occupations of the
bedouins in Saudi Arabia, i.e. military and religious work.
On the other hand, younger men were more likely to have
engaged in unskilled work and/or military employment. 	 The
tendency is strengthened when we consider the present
occupation (outside farming) of the three young men who have
had no previous work experience. Their work outside farming
at the moment is comerce, civil employment and teaching.
This is of course due to their higher educational level (9 and
12 years of schooling).
C - There was a marked difference between the settlers in the
1960s and settlers in earlier years in terms of urban
residence. Ten of the fourteen settlers in the 1960s had no
period of residence in urban centres; while five of the
settlers between the 1940s and the 1950s (out of seven) have
had a period of residence in urban centres. The former group
(settlers in the 1960s) in fact tended to resemble the
settlers of the recent period in this respect.	 This point
will be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.
5.	 Another marked difference between the three periods of
settlement was in the type of pastoralism experienced.
Whereas members of the first group, in the majority of cases,
did not have any personal experience of pastoralism, the
second group were in the majority semi-nomadic.	 The third
group, on the other hand, were engaged in four cases out of
339
TABLE 5.12
AGE AND WORK EXPERIENCE AMONG THE INTERMEDIATE GROUP OF SETTLERS
WORK EXPERIENCE
AGE
Under 40
Over 30
Do Not Kiiow
Total
MILITARY
AND	 MILITARY AND! COMMERCE OR
RELIGIOUS OR UNSKILLED TEACHING 	 NONE	 TOTAL
	
1	 4	 0	 3	 8
	
7	 2	 2	 0	 11
	
1	 1	 0	 0	 2
	
9	 7	 2	 3	 21
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the seven in short distance nomadism. 	 This point will be
discussed more fully in the following section.
8)	 Pastoralism and Associated Activities
The Utaibah tribe is characterised by recent literature as semi-nomadic
(see Chapter 7). This is because it has been one of the major nomadic
tribes to have espoused the Ikhwan cause, which induced many of its
members to settle (partially or wholly) on designated sites during the
Ikhwan years.
Since 1919, the Al-Hamatish lineage have found their settling niche in
Sajir, which they considered their home; and in which part of their kin
remained settled after the disintegration of the Ikhwan military force.
Moreover, they came to Sajir (in groups or individually) whenever they
felt a need for settled conditions (either as pastoralists during the
summer months, or for permanent residence). The process of
sedentarisation in Sa,jir, however, did not mean an immediate ceasing of
all pastoral activities. Some of the children of the founding
households, In fact, had experienced semi-pastoralism or some herding
activities (see table 5.8); and the same is more true of households and
groups settling in subsequent years (see table 5.9 and 5.10).
A	 Forms of Pastoralism Practised
As seen before (table 5.4), 29 of the interviewed bedouins had personal
experience of pastoralism. The division among these persons according
to the type of pastoralism experienced is as follows:
1	 The majority (18 persons) were engaged in Semi-pastoral
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activities.
2	 Seven individuals were practising pure nomadic activities.
3	 Four of the most recent settlers were involved in short-range
pastoral i Sm.
The above types of pastoral activities will be discussed more fully in
chapter seven on animal wealth, because they relate more closely to
herd composition. Suffice it to say here that semi-nomadic pastoralism
relies on sheep or mixed herds (sheep, goat and a limited number of
camels); and it also ivtvol',es so	 farssv	 ctts.
furthermore, live in settlements or shanty towns (around urban centres)
f or most of the year.
Short range pastoralism, on the other hand, is also classified as
semi-nomadic (see chapter 7), but it involves restricted movement
around a home base for most of the year. Herd composition in this
category Is also characterised as mixed. Pure nomadism relies heavily
on camel herds and involves Tong distance migratory movement.
It must be emphasised at this point that the settled community of Sajir
no longer practise the above patterns of livestock breeding, except in
very few cases (discussed in chapter seven). This section only related
to past practices, and is indicative of the process of sedentarization
experienced by the Al-Hanatish lineage.
The semi-nomadic activities in Sajir had the following characteristics:
1	 Mixed herds of sheep and camels in the majority of the
3t2
eighteen cases (although three said they had only herded
sheep).
2	 The periods spent away from the settlement were restricted to
seasonal grazing of animals in nearby desert pastures (usually
in Al-Nafaud desert) during winter months. These outings
involved almost all of the members of the family, except the
men who may be away for work in other regions of the country.
The type of habitat for most of the year depended on whether
or not the family owned a built up mud house in Sajir. Those
who did not, lived in tents around the settlement. Daily
grazing was also practised by the women and younger members of
the family.
3	 Most of the men were also engaged in salaried work. These
were mostly in the National Guard, which involved a period of
absence from the settlement, and from their families. Other
forms of low-skill wage labour were also taken up by some of
the younger men.
4	 All the semi-nomads in the sample were engaged in cultivation.
It was, however, not dependent on irrigation among this group
until the 1960s (discussed more fully below). Dry cultivation
was mostly carried on by the older members of the family, but
it involved very little labour until the harvesting period.
Short-range pastoralism among this bedouin coriinunity seemed to have
evolved during the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s. Its spread was
associated with the introduction of motorized transport and water
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tanks. Short-range nomadism has the following characteristics;
1) Restricted movement of the households around a home-base
(Sajir in this case), for most of the year. The summer months
were spent in camps near the settlernents,or in designated
sites in the desert.
2) The animals owned by the short-distance pastoralists were also
mixed herds of sheep and camels, which were grazed in desert
pastures for most of the year.
3) The short-range pastoralists were tent-dwellers who had
practised no cultivation in all of the four cases until the
time of settlement.
4) Men of this group of pastoralists were also engaged in
salaried work especially in the military institutions.
Seven of the individuals who had settled in Sajir came from a purely
nomadic background, one of whom was the 90 year old original settler.
The other six came from camel herding family units, who moved
extensively throughout the year. That, however, had not prevented the
interviewed men from taking up sedentarised work. Dry farming,
moreover, was practised by four of the six cases during their nomadic
livelihood.
3i.4
B	 Forms of Cultivation
Most of the bedouins interviewed in Sajir were engaged in farming
activities. This is particularly true of those who were early
settlers, or who had a semi-nomadic pastoral background. The form of
farming that they predominantly practised, in the past, is rain fed
cultivation (baal). This irrigated form of cultivation began to spread
among Al-Hanatish in the mid 1930s; and it remained the only form of
cultivation until the 1960s, when modern water systems began to spread
in the region.
The baal method of cultivation is highly unreliable, because the seeds
are sown in anticipation of the rain in winter. The resulting crops
(mainly wheat and barley) are dependent on the amount of rain water
that they have received, which means that crops are either poor or
non-existent in dry years. The bedouins interviewed in the majority of
cases never adopted peasant farming methods (animal powered irrigation
from surface wells). The exceptions were among the early settlers, who
had reduced their pastoral activities more significantly than the
semi-nomads of the sample.
In the mid 1960s, deeply dug wells, engines and pumps were introduced
to the region.	 These innovations marked a turning point for the
cultivation activities among this bedouin community. The new
irrigation methods were highly attractive, in that they increased the
water supply, decreased the amount of labour involved in water
extraction, and extended cultivation in terms of area and harvest (due
to the increased amounts of water).
The latter years of the 1960s were characterised by increased demand
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for landholdings, due to the need for farming sites with deeply dug
wells. Farming methods, however, remained traditional in so far as
irrigation was through open canals (see chapter 4) and machinery was
little used on the farm. Farming methods were only to change
dramatically in the latter years of the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to
this period, marketing of the produce was rarely practised by Sajir's
bedouin comunity.
The introduction of the new and improved water systems and farming
methods gradually encouraged the semi-nossad'ic group to rely lass
their pastoral activities, and engage more in farming as a livelihood.
It also encouraged more of the short range pastoralists and the nomadic
households to seek permanent settlement in Sajir.
C.	 PastoralIsm at Present
The majority of those interviewed in Sajir said that most of their kin
were now settled in Sajir.	 Some, however, had cousins and elderly
uncles still practising pastoralism in the surrounding region. Two
persons among those interviewed had undergone settlement without their
extended family (mother, father, sisters and married brothers), and had
joined cousins in hamlets of Sajir. Al-Kamashmah lineage (in Hobabaih
hamlet) were the most notable of this latter group. Approximately half
of their minimal lineage were still short-range pastoralists in
Al-Nafaud desert, adjoining Sajir's lands. All of the nine cases who
had relatives in the desert came from the hamlets around Sajir, who are
among the most recent settlers of the region.
There are marked changes affecting the activities and life style of the
pastoralists at present. The coments of the nine individuals on these
3I6
changes are the following:
1	 They use motorised transport to move the household and the
animals from one place to another. They also use small pick
up trucks to herd camels.
2	 They use large motorised water tanks, which they fill from
time to time from the farms of their relatives in Sajir.
3	 Some own houses, which they do not use frequently. Some also
share in the ownership of the farms of their relatives in
Saji r.
4	 Women no longer herd the livestock away from the tent, and
salaried herders are sometimes employed.
5	 The movement of the household is very restricted, and involves
removing the animals from one pasture to another in a very
limited spatial surrounding. Comercially obained feeds and
fodder, moreover, are used when they are needed.
6	 Their lifestyle is more comfortable and some use machinery
(other than cars) like electric generators, and televisions.
The above comments provide us with a striking picture of the current
activities of pastoralism (in this case at least). Pastoralism seems
to have evolved dramatically in the last two decades, due to the
increased wealth of the bedouin groups, and the increased use of
motorised transport and water tanks.
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The reasons outlined by the relatives for the continuation of the
pastoral activities of their kin is as follows.
a) The lack of disposition by the elderly heads of the household
toward permanent settlement, and their love of the desert.
b) Their inability to acquire any land in Sajir through Iqta.
c) The prices of livestock had increased greatly in recent years,
and the pastoralists are reluctant to let go of their large
herds of animals.
Despite listing the above reasons, those ntervee	 £ae
commented that it is only a matter of time before their pastoralist
relatives settled. This is mainly because the younger members of the
families are greatly disposed toward settlement; which they perceive to
be of greater advantage to them, mainly because of the educational and
modern facilities.
Only one short-range pastoralist family was encountered during the
field work.
	 They were camped near their relatives' settlement, and
they had just acquired a landholding in 1984. This piece of land was
managed by the eldest son of the family, who was permanently settled in
the hamlet.
9)	 Incentives for Settlement
As seen before, this chapter outlined three periods of nomad
settlement, with very distinct factors operating in them. This section
looks at the incentives for settlement
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as reported by the interviewed bedouins. It will also organise the
data according to the already set time periods to see if any
differences exist between the three periods, as regards the reasons
behind the decision to settle.
Table 5.13 shows clearly that these were indeed differences in why the
bedouins in Sajir chose settlement at different stages of time. All
early settlers, as expected, said that they had settled for Jihad (Holy
War), and to pursue the teaching of the lk'hwan movement. Even those
two individuals whose families settled before 1919 said that their
fathers had come to Sajir to participate in the spread of the religious
movement. The 90 year old settler said that most of the families
settling in Sajir in this period had sold or given up most of their
livestock to better serve the Ikhwan cause, and follow the Wahabi
teachi ngs.
By contrast, the intermediate period (1940s to the 1960s) was
characterised by a decline in the pastoral economy (due to droughts or
reduced incomes), as well as an increase in job opportunities outside
pastoralism. The reasons stated by the settlers of this period, in the
majority of the cases, were in perfect accord with the above reasoning.
Fourteen of the twenty one persons settling in this period actually
stated that their reason for settlement was either because of loss of
animals through disease, or because their incomes had declined in the
drought years. Two bedouins, on the other hand, stated that they had
desired to farm and educate their children. Another four put their
reasons for settlement as stemming from their desire for an improved
livelihood and easier working conditions.
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TABLE 5.13
INCENTIVES FOR SETTLEMENT
Periods of Settlement
I
N INCENTIVE FOR SETTLEMENT EARLY PERIOD 	 INTERMEDIATE	 RECENT PERIOD	 SUB
C	 PERIOD	 1970 UP TO	 TOTAL
E	 1940 - 1969	 PRESENT
N_____________________________ ________________ __________________ __________________ _______
T
I For Jihad (Holy
 War)	 10	 a	 o	 10
V____________________________________________ _________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________ __________
E
S Decline in the pastoral
nomadic econouy and/or
F animal loss
	 0	 14	 a	 14
0 _____________________________ ________________ __________________ __________________ _______
R
Desire to be cultivators
S and/or to educate
E children	 a	 2	 a	 Z
T___________________________ ________________ _________________ _________________ ______
T
L For an improved and
E easier livelihood 	 0	 4	 2	 6
M___________________________ ________________ _________________ __________________ ______
E
N To own agricultural
T land	 0	 0
Do Not Know	 0	 I	 1.	 I 0	 I 1
Sub Total	 I 10	 I 21	 I 7	 138
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Some of the statements offered (among the intermediate settlers) to
explain why they had settled were the following:
"We were very poor, our livestock died and we had no other
alternati ye".
"We wanted to settle for comfort; and to give an education to our
children".
"Father wanted to farm, and become a ndern hathar (sedentary) person"
"Pastoralism alone is a hardship, we wanted to farm as well as keep our
animals".
A sedentary way of life, moreover, was not perceived to be an obstacle
to the continued reliance on animal wealth. A degree of sedentarism,
furthermore, allowed men to take up military work and other jobs while
maintaining close contact- with the less mobile households. Ownership
of land was also becoming an important factor in the nomads' perception
of what settlement could yield to their advantage. One settler said
that they wanted an improved livelihood through settlement, and the
chance to farm.
Then again, the settlers in the recent period (1970s up to the present)
reflected in their stated reasons for settlement the factors most
influential in this period.	 Five of the seven individuals said they
had settled because they wanted to own agricultural land in Sajir. The
spread	 of	 improved	 agricultural	 methods	 (in	 irrigation	 and
cultivation), and the loans and subsidies provided for the farmers by
SAAB and MOAW changed considerably what the bedouins sought from
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settlement. Since the beginning of this period agricultural land
grants were continuously being requested from the Amir of Sajir. The
demand increased after 1970, expecially from large minimal lineages
with connections to the settlement of Sajir.
Many hamlets of Sajir sprang into existence during the 1970s, formed by
the settling minimal sections of Al-Hanatish and other lineages from
Al-Taiha clan. Examples of these settlements are: Al-Hobabyah (1971),
which is inhabited by Al-Karashmah minimal lineage; Al Tasrir hamlet
(1970), inhabited by Al Ghadhabin (a section of Al Nawami lineage); and
Al Rajhyah (1975), which is inhabited by a section of Al Hizman
lineage.
Settlement in this period was motivated by a desire to engage in
farming, which became highly attractive not only to the bedouins of
Sajir, but also to bedouins and villagers in other comunities in
Asser. Many sedentary families, who had migrated previously to urban
centres for work, returned during this period to their villages to
establish modern farms on family plots or unoccupied land.
The numbers of settlers in this period in Sajir are larger than what
might be suspected from the incidence of recent settlers in the sample.
This is not because they represent hamlets, or minimal lineages; but
also because many semi-nomadic groups who had settled partially in
other areas, came to Sajir to seek agricultural land for permanent
settlement. An example of this tendancy are the Al Hizman from Al
Rajhyah hamlet, who had initially started to settle in 1948 (see table
5.9, number 2).	 Their agricultural land, however, was acquired in
1975, and is approximately 40 kilometres away from Sajir.
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10.	 Case Studies of Settlement
Perhaps the most effective means for the illustration of the patterns
of settlement, and some other associated variables, is through
presenting examples of the cases in the sample. the case studies were
chosen because they serve as primary examples of the settlement
patterns; or because the bedouin farmers were precise in their detailed
answers.
Case 1 (Number 7 in table 5.8)
This man was born in 1945 to a family of early settlers n Sajir.
During the early years of his life, his family was practising some
semi-nomadic activities which took them sometimes on spring outings to
the desert. Throughout the year, the family lived in a built up house
in the settlement, and the young children had to take the sheep herds
out for grazing.
Baal and date-palm cultivation were practised since 1930, and were the
only form of cultivation until 1965 and the modern water systems
(engines and pumps). In 1958, when he was 13 years old he was sent by
his father to school. By 1967, he was able to take employment in the
civil service in Riyadh, which he continued to hold for five years
(continuing his education at night while working). In 1972 he
transferred to Sajir's municipal authority and established a farm on
his family's original land. He enlarged that land by a grant from the
Amir, and by cultivating unowned lands surrounding it. He now owns the
whole land jointly with his brothers, and has a third occupation as an
Imam of a Mosque.
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Case 2 (No 9 in table 5.8)
This man was born in 1938 to a family of early settlers, who were
heavily engaged in pastoralism until 1960. Their semi-nomadic
pastoralism depended on herds of sheep and camel, and took them
annually to the desert during winter and spring.
They also practised baal and peasant agriculture until 1965. Since
1957, however, this man had been employed by the National Guard's
regular forces, which involved periods of residence in the Eastern
Region of Saudi Arabia.
In 1974 he resigned his post, and cacs tack to Sr to start ?aruñng
on his family land, which he enlarged (like the previous case) through
a land grant. He owns it jointly with his brother, and has no other
employment.
Case 3 (No 1 in table 5.9)
Born in 1930, this man practised semi-nomadic pastoralism with his
family around Sajir. When aged 18 (1948) he joined the National Guard,
where he received an education equivalent to elementary schooling. His
military rank rose considerably and he was stationed in many urban
centres. In 1980, he boughta piece of land in Sajir, which he left in
the care of a foreign manager. In 1981 he retired and came to Sajir to
administer his farm. He now owns a commercial enterprise in Sajir.
Case 4 (No 4 in table 5.9)
This man was born to a camel herding nomadic family, who moved
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extensively around the country.
	
In 1952 their camels died and they
came to Sajir to join their lineage. 	 From 1956 to 1965 the family
practised baal (rain fed cultivation) and owned a small date palm
garden. Meanwhile he worked for a while as a labourer in Riydah and a
railroad worker in the Eastern Region, and finally joined the National
Guard. In 1969, he came back to Sajir and had been farming since then.
He enlarged his family's land by a grant from the Amir.
Case 5 (No 19 in table 5.9)
This man's family had been among the Ikhwan settlers in Sajir. However,
they returned to pastoralism and the desert after the Ikhwan defeat.
Since that time they had lived as semi-nomads elsewhere in the country.
In 1967 their animals died, and the elderly father died shortly
afterwards. The whole family returned to Sajir then, where they were
granted a small piece of land. The man interviewed joined the National
Guard reserve forces, and started farming their land.
Case 6 (Number 3 in table 5.10)
Born in 1950 to a family of short range nomads, this man lived the
first eighteen years of his life exclusively as a pastoralist.
	
In
1968, however, he joined the National Guard, through which he received
an elementary education.	 His family followed him wherever he was
stationed In Al-Hijaz (outside urban centres), and maintained constant
contact.
In 1971 he came to Sajir for permanent residence, and a piece of land
was acquired through a grant. His elderly father refused to settle on
the farm, and continued in pastoralism with the other members of the
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family in the nearby deserts.
Case 7 (Number 7 on table 5.10)
He was born in 1955 to a short range sheep herding family, who began to
use motorised transport, and water tanks in 1975. Their movements,
however, were always restricted and they maintained contact with their
lineage in Sajir (Al-Karashmah).
In the early years of the 1970s, they were offered a grant of land from
the Amir (via their cousins in Sajir) which they refused.
In 1980, however, they camped permanently in Sajir's desert and applied
for a land grant, which they received in 1982. The eldest brother of
the interviewed bedouin settled in the Al-Hobabyah and started
cultivating wheat in 1984. The rest of the family continues to live in
their tent outside the settlement with their considerable livestock
holdings. Their desert outings are restricted at the present time.
This man received no education, but he is now employed as porter to a
school in Sajir.
Conclusion
Section I of this chapter outlined three stages of the nomad settlement
in Saudi Arabia, which are based on study of history of the
sedentarization process (chapter 2) and also on study of the
agricultural sector (chapter 4). The settlement patterns of the
bedouins in Sajir were also examined in Section II, in an effort to
find out whether or not these outlined periods are actually significant
in this case. On the whole, the patterns of settlement in Sajir
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conformed to the expectation derived from the outlined periods; but
they also included certain other elements, which will be pointed out at
a later stage of this section.
The settlement patterns in Sajir thus came in the following stages:
1. The early Hanatish settlers in Sajir were motivated
by the teachings of the Ikhwan movement.	 They
settled for Jihad and were actively engaged in the
Ikhwan battles for the unification of the kingdom.
Settlement for this group of bedoun meant an
addition of subsistence farming to subsistence
pastoral i Sm.
2. The intermediate settlers (1940 to 1960s) were
largely induced to settle because of the economic
hardships they were facing as pastoralists, and by
their need to engage in a cash economy through
taking employment in the urban based labour markets,
especially the National Guard. The bedouin economy
in this period experienced a marked diversification
of its economic base, but pastoralist and farming
activities remained largely subsistence-based and
traditional.
3. In the latest stage of settlement in Sajir, there
was a great influx of Al-Hanatish and other related
lineages to Sajir to take advantage of the new forms
of agricultural production, which promised better
working conditions (through the adoption of modern
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machinery), a greater income and increased levels of
assistance from the government. The ownership of
some agricultural productive land was the primary
concern for present Sajirans during this period of
time. The influx did not only include those who
were settling for the first time, but also the men
who were working in other regions of the Kingdom.
The settling nomads, moreover, were to experience a
marked change to their life, because settlement
meant an active and concentrated engagement in
comercial farming.
Thorough examination of these three groups of settlers revealed
significant differences between them as regard to education and modern
sector experience. On the whole the early settlers, by virtue of being
more sedentary, were better able to enrol in schools, and therefore
engage in employment that exposed them to the expanding urban and
modern sector. The group who had remained in a pastoralist economy
till the beginning of the 1970s were the least likely to have had
received an education, or engaged in urban based employment (except the
military).
Another very important development in the 1970s in Sajir was the
evolution of pastoralist units that are very well integrated in the
cash economy of the country. These groups utilise all the modern
technology that is of use to them; and they also receive cash incomes
through the wages of some of their members, livestock trading, and even
some farming activities. Their movement is restricted to the
surroundings of their home base in Sajir, where part of their kin are
permanently settled. They also employ, in some cases, salaried
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herders.
Another feature of the settlement pattern of Sajir is an early marked
interest in landholdings through the appropriation of privately owned
date-palm gardens and baal sites. The interest grew in 1965 when
engines and pumps were beginning to be utilised for water extraction,
and farming became a real possibility for the bedouins of Sajir. The
subsequent heightened interest in the 1970s, and the 1980s was in part
a continuation of the same process, as well as a rational response to
the new incentives in the agricultural sector.
The data also suggests that the sedentarization process had been
gradual prior to the developments of the 1970s. Those who had settled
early were seen to be actively engaged in pastoral, as well as
non-pastoral production. Residential stability had not prevented the
bedouins from relying on livestock as a source of livelihood. This is
primarily because the sedentary agricultural production was on a
subsistence level; as well as being limited in nature and requiring
very little physical labour
Various forms of pastoralism have also emerged which combined the best
and most suitable of the non-pastoral activities with the traditional
ones. Mobility was then adjusted to suit the emerging pattern of
production. The later developments, which required the settling nomads
to engage in radically different forms of agricultural production, are
less compatible with the traditional occupation. They also require new
levels of comitment to sedentarism in order to produce successfully
and gain maximum advantage (agricultural activities will be the subject
of the next chapter.)
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The forms of pastoral production that emerged previously, as well as
the present cash-based pastoralism (seen among some bedouin groups) in
Sajir may well be transitory in nature; but they also require us to
re-evaluate our notions of sedentaristn. That is because the reduced
levels of mobility (or even sedentary conditions) had not elimated the
primary dependence on livestock, nor did they signify complete
settlement.
On the sedentarization process, some noteworthy points re evideie (roar
the previous analysis. These are:
A) The early interventions in the social-economic structure of
pastoral nomadism in Saudi Arabia, through "ideological"
means, were not as decisive as the later "economic" elements
affecting this bedouin comunity. In fact Al-Hanatish
continued to practise pastoralism, either in their (Ikhwan)
settlement, or even by returning to the desert. The recent
factors, i.e. ecological difficulties, policy-instigated
economic interventions (like the new principles of land
utilization), and the opening up of other avenues for
livelihood were much more effective in transforming the
pastoral economy, and enouraging the settlement of these
bedouln nomadic groups.
B) The levels of rationality and adaptability displayed by this
bedouin comunity, in their short history of settlement, lead
to the conclusion that there is not a problematical cultural
change involved in the sedentarization process. In fact, as
soon as any suitable, profitable and advantageous development
had presented itself, the bedouins were ready to take it up
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and adjusted their ways to accommodate it. Peasant
agriculture did not offer better standard of living, and it
also required significant labour withdrawal from the then
dominant pastoral economy. Hence, the bedouins preferred
baal, which is a more suitable addition to subsistance
pastoral i sm.
As soon as economically advantageous, technological
developments became available, the disposition towards
agriculture increased until it became the dominant activity.
This is, of course, contractory to the generally held opinion
in Saudi Arabia, that bedouins have a cultural bias against
agriculture. It is also sometimes a conclusion reached by the
commentators	 on	 the	 failed	 (government-instigated)
agricultural schemes for settlement	 (See chapter 8 for a
comprehensive discussion).
C) The above characterisation of the settlement process is
possible, when the bedouin conuiiunity is advantaged by having
the necessary resources for settlement (i.e. a settlement
area, tribally owned arable land, and a more 'decentralised'
patterns of settlement). This is not to say that the role of
the state, and the national context have not been decisive in
actually providing the resources and the economic
opportunities to this community. It is only to draw attention
to a possible comparison with less fortunate bedouin
communities in Saudi Arabia, who may appear less adaptive or
less successful in their settlement pattern (like bedouins in
shanty town communities around urban centres, or desert
nomads).
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0)	 A final conclusion, drawn from the above, is that we can not
study the bedouins and the sedentarization process of Saudi
Arabia without emphasising the national setting, their status
within, and relationship to the prelavent power and economic
structure. They share this characteristic with most of the
other Saudi communities (except the most isolated of groups),
because most of the significant political and economic
happenings are very closely associated with the decisions and
the policies of the state. These policies, moreover, tend to
define the nature and forms of the available choices.
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The Agricultural Operation
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter will look at the agricultural operation generally in
Sajir, and more particularly at that among the interviewed farmers. It
will be based mostly on the data of the interviews conducted with 38
farmers, and on the information obtained from the Ministry of
Agriculture's offices in the region. The information gained through
personal observation, group meetings and discussions will also form
part of the analysis in this chapter.
The particular nature of the farmers in Sajir, as sedentarised
bedouins, or recently settled nomads should be highlighted at this
particular point; but their situation must not e tout of in
isolation from the general conditions prevalent in the economic
environment that they are engaged in. Many of the factors operati'e i'n
their situation are shared by the rest of the agricultural operators in
the region, even those from sedentary villages and farming communities.
This chapter will focus mostly on the basic elements of agricultural
production, namely land, machinery, labour and output. Agricultural
credit and incentives will be discussed. The problems highlighted by
the farmers themselves, and observed in the course of field work, will
be alluded to throughout, as will other pertinent issues such as other
economic resources and the forms of land appropriation. Animal wealth,
however, which is a major element in the economic resources of
sedentarized nomads, will be left out of this chapter because it merits
closer scrutiny In the next section of this work.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first deals with the
general features of agriculture in Sajir, while the second and main
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section looks at the various elements of agricultural production among
the persons interviewed.
I	 The General Features of Agriculture in Sajir
The visual impact of the farming region of Sajir does not
correspond to the classical and corrinon place view of a farming
area, even to that of old and traditional farms in Saudi
Arabia. For a first time visitor, in the months between April
and October, farms in Sajir do not look as farms should, nor
are they immediately recognised as such from a distance.
Driving on the main road which connects Al-Dawadimi in the
central region to Aunaisah in the north, and which cuts across
the centre of a number of settlements including Sajir, small
clusters of buildings can be seen to the left and the right of
the road. These clusters are divided by long distances of four
to five kilometres. A sure indicator of a farm passed during
that period is the glitter of the metal tube of the irrigation
systems, the siloes, and the storage units in the hot sun.
There is very little greenery around the farm buildings, and
date-palm trees are rarely grown in large numbers around wells,
except in the older farming locations. Once one draws nearer
to the farming land, the signs become clearer. The land shows
signs of previous cultivation: leveled earth and bails of
straw are sometimes stacked to one side of the field. When the
farm buildings are approached, the agricultural machinery and
storage units come into view. The tractors, ploughs,
harvesters and other machinery are parked under a metal
structure that shades them from the sun.
366
There are usually small
	
storage units for fertilizers,
equipment , wheat and other items. Small rooms are built in
brick to accomodate farm hands and other workers. The owners
of the farms, in the majority of cases, do not live on the
farming area. They may live in Sajir's centre or in hamlet
settlements around Sajir, which are usually formed by a group
of kin or relatives. 	 Some built their homes in an area of
their land that is uncultivated and which is conveniently
located nearer the main roads.
Farms are generally connected to the main roads by dirt tracks,
that may continue for 10 miles or more.	 The dividing lines
between farming properties, however, are not iriiiiediately
apparent to the inexperienced observer because there are no
fences or hedges. 	 Instead there are 'ines of raised earth
connecting land marks which serve as boundaries between
properti es.
The expected hustle and bustle of people and animals on the
farm gives way in Sajir, during the summer months, to the
soothing quiet of the desert and the rhythmic sound of the
irrigation pump. Small or large herds of sheep and camels may
be passed along the way, usually herded by farm workers, who
appear alien to the environment in their Sudanese, Egyptian or
Pakistani national dress.
The months of November to March present a completely different
picture. Circles of bright green dominate the horizon divided
by desert white. The air is fresher and more humid, and the
long tubes of the irrigation systems rotate slowly over the
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fields sprinkling water, which appear from a distance like low
rainbows of bright colours. The farms in Sajir come to life
during the wheat cultivating season. The owners and workers
are mobilised into action, ploughing, sowing, fertilising and
at a later stage harvesting and storing.
The farming activities are mostly dominated by the constant
vigilance over machinery and irrigation systems; ensuring that
all is in working order and that the water supply is adequate
at every stage of production. The machinery on the farm can be
divided into two categories:
a) Fixed machinery - usually refers to all machinery
required for the water supply and the well.
b) The movers - this refers to all moving machinery such as
tractors, ploughs, irrigation systems, harvesters and
other agricultural implements.
1)	 The Water Source
Wells in Sajir are dug to a depth of 500 metres below the
surface. The water from the underground reservoirs rises in
the well to about 190 metres from the surface. The well is
divided into two parts. The lower one is small in diameter and
can only accomodate the pipes that come into contact with the
water. The upper section is wider and can accomodate the
water pump.
After the lower pipes are installed, the water pump is hooked
unto them and connected to the surface with more pipes. The
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water pump is powered by an engine, which is installed near the
opening of the well.	 In the 1970s 20 pipes were needed to
reach the water level each pipe measuring 3 metres in length.
The subsequent increase in land and water utilisation have
increased the number of pipes required in each well, to about
85 pipes by 1987. This represented an average increase of 5
pipes per year for an annual depletion rate of the water
resources of 15 metres. 10 - 12 years of irrigation have thus
seen the water table lowered 150 to 180 metres (see chapter 4).
The endeavour to reach the water table by lowering more pipes
into the well is not a straight forward operation. Some wells
are dug under old regulations which means that the lower shafts
of the wells cannot accomodate more pipes, or that the upper
sections are not large enough to accomodate the lowering of
the water pump after a certain depth. 	 This means that the
water pumps may not be able to operate efficiently, or that the
well will have to be abandoned at a certain stage.
The cost involved in installing water systems is as fo) lOWS;
1) The digging operations - between SR 220,000 to 250,000
for a well of 500 metres depth.
2) Engine - between SR 8,000 to 340,000 depending on the
engine's size and capacity.
3) Pump - SR 80,000.
The last two items are covered by a 50% subsidy rate when the
loan is obtained through the Saudi Agricultural Sank. Well
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digging, however, is not covered by any subsidy but credit can
be obtained from SAAB for this operation. Other expenses are
the price of 85 pipes, a diesel tank and the spare parts for
the fixed machinery.
Other farm installations include:
1)	 Small storage units for seeds, fertilizers, straw and
other needed items.
2)	 A collection tank for water which requires a smaller
water pump.	 The water collection structures were
traditionally small and the water was constantly pumped
from the well during irrigation.	 Nowadays, the water
tanks are large pool-like structures, which allow the
farmers to collect enough water for the irrigation
operation at any given time. It also ensures that the
water pressure is constant, which increases the
efficiency of the modern irrigation systems.
	 A
structure of this kind costs between SR 10,000 and
12,000.
3)	 The storage unit for the wheat grain; which may be a
modern metal silo for the large producers, or a
traditionally built brick structure resembling a three
sided enclosure in which the grain is stored and covered
with a large piece of canvas cloth.
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2)	 The Moving Machinejy
The basic machinery that must be available to the farmer in
Sajir, in order to conduct a modern agricultural operation is
the following:
A) The tractor - the major implement for earth moving. All
farms in the area have at least one tractor. They cost
between SR 120,000 and 400,000 depending on size and
power.	 The attachments that may be bought with a
tractor are the following:
1) Disc plough (SR 18,000). This plough is used for
digging, turning and burying. It is most
efficient at penetrating deep in the soil
surfaces, but not so efficient at turning and
burying. They are mostly used for new areas of
cultivation or for particularly hard soil.
2) Mould board plough (SR 15,000). This is more
comonly used by the farmers in Sajir, and it is
used for digging, burying and turning.
3) Chisel plough (SR 12,000). A deep penetrator of
the soil, but not efficient at turning and
burying.
4) Field cultivator.	 Comonly called mishd (comb)
(SR 8,000).	 This plough is used for loosening
and weeding. It penetrates to about 10cm in the
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soil and is preferred in the region for the
levelling of the ploughed fields.
5) Soil leveller (SR 5,000).	 This may be used to
prepare the field for sowing and planting.
6) Grain and fertilizer drill (SR 8,000).	 This
implement combines two functions, sowing and
fertilizing. It is comon and necessary for aV
wheat growers.
7) Baler (SR 20,000). This is especially needed if
the wheat straw is to be exploited fully. There
are other versions of balers for alfalfa and
other animal feeds.
B) The harvester - commonly called combine (SR 250,000).
This machine combines the functions of cutting,
threshing and cleaning of the wheat crop. Ownership of
a harvester is a niist for almost all wheat growers in
Sajir. Those who do not, have to rent it at harvesting
ti me.
C) Central Pivot Irrigation Systems (CPIS). Comonly
called al-rashash (the sprinkler). This is the single
most effective agent of the modernisation of wheat
cropping in the country and of the increase in its
output. These are massive tubes on wheels that revolve
around a central pivot. The water is pumped into these
tubes and it is then ejected through sprinklers that run
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across the underside of the tubes. 	 They come in a
variety of shapes and sizes. The length of the tubes
ranges between 45-56 meters and covers an area of 25 -
60 has of cultivation.	 The cost of the CPIS may be
between SR 120,000 and 400,000.
The irrigation system may be hooked directly to the well by
pipes, or to a large water tank. The latter method insures a
constancy of water pressure, which increases the CPIS
efficiency and life cycle. The CPIS is operated by a button
near the central point, but depends, for its operation, on the
precise knowledge of when and how to effect irrigation of the
crop.	 The water level has to be monitored constantly
throughout the cropping season and the speed at which it moves
must be precisely fixed.	 The CPIS is not covered by any
subsidy programe.
The minimum cost to an average farmer for a well and the basic
machinery associated with wheat cropping is very high, even
when we do not include the cost of fuels, farm buildings, farm
hand wages and transport vehicles. The cost to the farmer
would be the following:
45%
45%
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Market Cost
	
Subsidy Rate	 Cost to
in SR
	
Farmer
50%
50%
45%
45%
45%
45%
45%
Well Drilling
Small Engine
Water Pump
Tractor
Mouldboard Plough
Field Cultivator
Soil Leveller
Seed Fertilizer
Drill
Baler
Harvester
1 Small CPIS
220,000
80,000
80,000
120,000
15,000
8,000
5,000
8,000
20,000
250,000
120,000
220,000
40,000
40,000
66,000
8,250
4,400
2,750
44OO
11,000
137 ,500
120,000
TOTAL COST TO FARMER	 SR
	
654,300
or $
	
174,480
Although well drilling and the CPJS are not covered by any
subsidy programe, the farmers could receive credit from SAAB
if they meet the leading requirements of the Agricultural Bank
of:
a) having a formal and modern deed for their lands and
b) meeting all previous annual repayments of their loans.
What this means is that the farmers who lose a crop because of
water shortage or disease in a season would have to pay the
3V
full cost of any machinery needed in the future, because they
cannot go to SAAB for credit. The large successful farmers in
Sajir usually own all of the previously outlined agricultural
machinery, sometimes two or more of each one, depending on the
number of wells and the number of fields that they possess - as
will be shown below.
3)	 Agricultural Land. Projects and Landholdings in Sajir
Arable land in Sajir was estimated by the regional agricultural
officials to be 55,000 hectares in 1979, but agricultural
holdings did not exceed 500 in number 1 . By 1982, however,
the same office estimated that the number of agricultural
holdings had increased to 1200-1400 farms2.
The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank extended 498 loans between
1981 and 1982 totalling SR 153.4 million, covering land
holdings totalling 41,812.3 hectares. Of these only 3,854.9
hectares were cultivated 3 . By 1983, the SAAB regional office
was sufficiently developed to haad7e regiorni? credit
transactions.	 Between then and 1986 SR 304.4 million was
loaned, representing 765 credit transactions. The number of
farmers served by SAAB in the region, however, did not increase
substantially, remaining approximately at the same level of
1483 farmers.4
If we assume that the figures submitted by MAW and SAAB's Sajir
offices are accurate, it would appear that the majority of land
holdings were created between 1979 and 1982. The increase in
value and number of loans after 1982 may represent the
following:
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A)	 Reclamation of new land holdings which do not exceed 24%
of all available land in the Sajir region.
B)	 New loans obtained by already established land holdings
and farms.
C)	 Large agricultural projects on uncultivated lands.
These lands could be recently acquired or established
farms with large uncultivated areas.
It must be stressed at this point that the regional offices of
MAW and SAAB, which are located in Sajir, serve the farmers in
an area that extends beyond the boundaries of Sajir itself. In
fact nine villages and settlements in the area rely on Sajir's
offices for agricultural services and credit. 	 Sajir's
agricultural land, however, is the most extensive of all lands
in the region. This has been confirmed by the agricultural
officials in the area, although there is no specific data
relating to its size.	 This is also reflected in SAAB's
statistics regarding agricultural projects in the region. In
1982 there were eleven projects which obtained credit from
SAAB. Seven of these were within Sajir's boundaries.5
By 1986, the large agricultural projects were sixteen in
num!er. 
(6) 
These were for livestock breeding, poultry, eggs,
wheat and animal feed projects. The largest of these projects
are the following:7
1)	 Prince Abdul-Rahman Al-Saud wheat and animal feed
project.
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This was the largest obtainer of credit from SAAB in the
region. The loan, however, was paid by SAAB's main
branch in Riyadh which meant that information on the
size and capacity of this project was not available
locally. The project itself is located in a relatively
remote area of the region which was not visited by this
researcher.
2) Falah Al-Muhaiya wheat and animal feed project.
This is a 716 hectares project on which construction
began in 1983.	 It involves the cultivation of 537
hectares of wheat and 179 hectares of animal feeds
(alfalfa, grasses), and was funded by a loan of SR 11.2
million from SAAB. Al-fluhaiya is a relative of the Amir
of Sajir, the sheikh of Al Hanatish lineage.
3) Abdul Allah Al Hubayb grain and animal feed
project.
510 hectares were devoted to wheat production and 425
hectares for animal feed production. This project
obtained 11.1 million SR in credit and was operative in
1983. The owner Is a resident of Riyadh, who had been
the director of SAAB for many years, before turning to
agricultural activities.
There are other smaller wheat projects in the region as well as
a number of livestock, poultry and egg production projects.
Some of these projects are the following:
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* Four projects for sheep rearing: these range in size
from 1,000 to 3,600 head of sheep. Credit obtained for
these projects ranges from SR 2.8 to SR 5.2 million.
All are owned by members of Utaibah tribal lineages
residing in Sajir.
* Two projects for poultry and egg production. The former
project capacity is 480,000 chickens per year, while the
latter produces 8,250,000 eggs per year. Each obtained
credit from SAAB amounting to SR 2.3 million.
Land holdings in Sajir are very large compared to the national
average of less than 10 hectares for 91% of the rural
population (see chapter 4). The smallest holding encountered
during the field work was 25 hectares. Land holdings, however,
may reach 1000 hectares (as was seen above) in agricultural
projects.	 The average landholding according to agricultural
officials in Sajir is between 100-150 hectares.
The general categorisation of farms, according to the local
population, is the following: (8)
Small Farms:	 Less than 100 hectares in size.	 This would
acconriodate 1-3 central pivot systems, depending on the size of
the area covered by the irrigation system (30 - 60 hectares).
Medium Sized Farms: 100 - 300 hectares. These accommodate 3
to 10 central pivot systems.
Large Farms: More than 300 hectares. These may accommodate
more than 10 irrigation systems.
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The size of the land holdings does not always define the area
of cultivation, nor the number of users. The area cultivated
may represent only 50% or less of the landholdings of an
individual or a family.
	 Landholdings, moreover, may be used
collectively by a number of households or by 2 or more joint
owners, usually from the same family. This will be discussed
more fully in the next section, when the data from the
interviews is analysed.
II	 Agricultural Operations among the Farmers Interviewed
Most of the farmers interviewed were suprisinqly fortJwo2lñng
with information relating to their agricultural activities.
Most were specific about the size, output, income and credit
facilities of their landholdings. They were also outspoken in
outlining their own problems and the problems of the area
generally, if they actually felt them to exist. Some displayed
insights that surpassed those of the agricultural officials in
the region. Rather than answering "I do not know 1' they tended
to ridicule questions for which they had no answer. 	 Their
pride in what they have accomplished in their agricultural
operations was very clearly displayed.
The only area where farmers were not always forthcoming, as
regards their agricultural activities, was in reporting the
area of cultivation In their landholdings. Some felt a need to
stress that the entire area of their landholdings was
cultivated. The reason for this tendency may stem from the
specification by the Islamic laws that all the granted land
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must be cultivated within three years of appropriation (see
chapter 4). This was confirmed at one point, when a farmer
accused the researcher of working for the government, and
therefore seeking such information regarding the size of the
land and the cultivation.
Other reasons for such reluctance may be due to their pride and
their desire to be seen as fully productive. Alternatively,
they may have included all areas that were cultivated at a
certain point in the past. 4hatever the reasons, the
subsequent analysis of the data showed that there are
inaccuracies in some cases. These wUl be discussed more fU
later in this chapter, and the effect on the analysis will be
pointed out.
1)	 Other Economic Resources
The farmers interviewed were predominantly wheat cultivators,
but the majority had other resources besides farming ( see
table 6.1). While six said that farming was their only
economic activity, ten were involved in three or more income
generating activities. Wage employment was the most comon of
these resources, with the military as the most comon employer
of the wage earners (see table 6.2). Some farmers said that
they had retired from the National Guard, and were receiving a
pension. These have not been included in the wage earning
category, because a pension does not represent an economic
activity as such.
Thirteen of those interviewed said that they received
substantial revenues from livestock trading and included it in
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TABLE 6.1
SOURCE OF INCOME VARIATION AMONG THE FARMERS INTERVIEWED
TYPE
Farming Only
Farming and Livestock Breeding
Farming and Employment
Farming and Commerce
3 or More Resources
TOTAL
NO
6
7
10
5
10
TABLE 6.2
TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT AMONG THE FARMERS WHO ARE ALSO WAGE EARNERS
NOTYPE
Civilian workers in local administration
in Riyadh
Military employment (National Guards)
Religious employment (Imam)
Teachers
Driver
4)
1) 5
7
2
2
1
TOTAL
	
17
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their economic resources.	 Five were involved in commercial
activities such as grocery shops, real estate and construction.
Animal wealth will be discussed more fully in the next chapter,
and will therefore be excluded from the present discussion.
There was no comon pattern of agricultural production among
these farmers who were involved in farming only, except that
they tended to be in the older categories. 	 Their farm
operations, however, were spread among aU the categories of
farms, in terms of size and pattern of production.
2)	 Major Characteristics of Land Ownership
This section will deal with the four most itn9ortartt elements
associated with land ownership in Sajir.	 These are:
A - forms of ownership
B - forms of appropriation
C - size of landholdings
D - size of cultivation
A.	 Forms of Ownership
The overwhelming majority of the interviewed farmers owned
their farms jointly with another person, or a number of
persons.	 26 of the 27 farmers who are joint owners, owned
their land jointly with other members of their extended family
like brothers, nephews (brother's son), male cousins, or
uncles.	 Only one person said that a female relative (his
mother) was a joint owner of the family land. This will be
conunented on later in this chapter.
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The number of joint owners, in the cases of collective
ownership, ranged between two and ten. Joint ownership also
coincided with an extended family situation. 	 This was
particularly clear when the farmers were asked about the
division of the proceeds of the farming operation. Nearly all
said that the income went into the same household and it was
equally shared. Only two of the joint owners said that the
family is thinking of dividing their land assets between the
family members owning it.	 These owners concerned were two
brothers in one case, and three cousins in the other.
The incentive for joint ownership in all the cases observed was
attributed to the desire to keep the family together, even in
the cases of small landholdings.	 None of the joint owners
alluded to the size of the farm, nor to the economic sense of
keeping it intact. The landholding in the majority, if not all
the cases, was acquired by the head of the household for the
benefit of all the family members.
The individual owners, who numbered eleven, said that they
prefered to own their lands individually.
	 Two of them,
however, did not have any surviving brothers, nor close
relatives in the area. All had two or more incomes, and nine
of them were from old established families in Sajir. 	 The
landholdings ranged between 50 to 330 ha with a majority in the
"medium sized farms" category. These owner will be discussed
further below, because they represent a deviation from the
majority of farmers interviewed.
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B.	 Forms of Land Appropriation
Land is usally acquired in Sajir through a grant from the local
Amir (Sheikh of Al Hanatish lineage). 	 This is because the
former Amir, the father of the present one, was given a deed by
King Abdul Aziz entitling him and his people to
	
the lands
associated with the settlement of Sajir. He, therefore, had
the right as the Sheikh of the tribe to distribute these lands
among his people according to his discretion.
It is interesting to note here that the people of other
settlements and villages often refer to the Amir of Sajir as a
generous distributor of land among his people.	 It is often
said that if Ibn-Muhaiya was not far sighted and flexible in
his practice of land distribution, Sa.jir wou?d aa &'€
large a settlement as it is now.
Comparisons are often drawn between him and the Amir of a
neighbouring	 settlement,	 who	 has	 similar	 rights	 of
distribution.	 The latter is described as greedy and
restrictive in his land distribution practices.	 It was
observed during the course of visits to the settlements nearby
that three small settlements were established by factional
groups, who had broken from the settlement headed by this
ill-regarded Amir. This may be due to his land distribution
practices, which alienated some members of the settlement he
heads.
Nevertheless, the people interviewed from Sajir were in no mood
to communicate such information about their Amir, or his land
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distribution practices.	 In fact, no overt criticism was ever
mentioned, especially by the men encountered in the course of
the fieldwork. Some women, however, expressed some dismay
about the number of people from other lineages and tribes who
have benefitted from the Amir's practises of land distribution.
One woman said on one occasion: "Our Amir treats strangers
better than us." She was referring, however, to the mayor of
Sajir, who is not a member of the local tribe, and who has
considerable influence in the area.
The fact that the researcher herself was in a sense a
"stranger" may have contributed to the lack of criticism or
coment. Competition over land and jealousy between the locals
in settlements and villages is comonpiace in Saudi Arabia.
The rights of the Amir, however, are taken as a matter o1 lact
among the people for whom such land distribUt j Ofl practices apply.
No land grant can be distributed unless there is a judicial
case to be answered. These cases are usually put by past
utilizers, who feel a right to the granted land, and bring them
forward to the courts.
The majority of those interviewed were granted their lands by
the the local Amir either partially or wholly (see table 6.3).
Twenty said that their lands were acquired by a grant from the
Amir. In one case the land was given personally to the father
of the farmer interviewed by King Abdul Aziz. Purchasing of
the land occured in twelve cases among the farmers, and four of
these involved the whole area of the farm. Six of the buyers
were individual owners (see table 6.4).
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TABLE 6.3
FORMS OF LAND APPROPRIATION AMONG ALL THE FARMERS INTERVIEWED
NUMBER OF FARMERSFORM OF APPROPRIATION
- By Local Amir
Granted
- By King ?bdu1-Aziz and
Local Acnir
Purchased
Inherited
Part Granted, Part Bought
Part Inherited, Part Bought
Part Granted, Fart Inherited
TOTAL
19
1
4
3
6
3
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Table 6.4
Forms of Land Appropriation by Collective and Individual Owners
Forms of Appropriation	 Collective Owners	 Individual Owners
Granted
	
18
	
2
Pu rchased
	
3
	
1
Inheri ted
	
0
	
3
Part Granted, Part Purchased
	
2
	
4
Part Inherited, Part Purchased
	
1
	
1
Part Granted, Part Inherited
	
3
	
0
Total	 27	 11
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Inheritance was cited by only eight of the land owners. This
is not surprising considering the recency of land ownership
among the settlers in Sajir. 	 Those who mentioned the
inheritance factor had, in the majority of cases, an old claim
within the Sajir area (site of an old well or date-palm
garden), on which further grants by the Amir were based.
The data becomes more interesting when we look at the pattern
of land appropriation among joint or collective owners, and
individual owners.
	 From table 6.4, we can say that land
granting by the local Amir was mostly based on an extended
family or joint owner basis.
Conversely, the incidence of land purchase was higher among the
individual owners, which may suggest a degree of affluence and
a more developed sense of land as a marketable commodity.
Those who were granted their land individually were small land
holders: 50 ha in one case, and 90 ha in the other.
The biggest category among the individual owners was that of
apart granted, part boughtu. This may indicate the following:
1. Granting of land to individuals may have occurred more
than the table shows.
2. These individuals, moreover, were sufficiently affluent
or successful to buy more land.
3. Division of granted land between joint owners occurred
prior to the buying of more lands.
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The four inheritors among the individual owners were mostly old
settlers. Two of them had no surviving brothers, and the other
two had brothers and cousins in the community who owned
separate lands.
C.	 Size of Land Holdings
The landholdings among those interviewed varied between 25 and
900 ha. The three largest land holdings (800, 900, 900 ha)
were owned by residents of three hamlets in Sajir, which were
established by newly settled lineages of the local tribe.
Livestock breeding was a major activity in two of these
hamlets, which reduced the cultivated area considerably.
The largest number of the farmers owned "medium sized land
holdings" according to local standard (see table 6.5). Seven
owned more than 300 ha and ten were small owners. The local
standard, however, leaves a margin of 200 ha between small
owners and large owners, which is very substantial in terms of
cultivation. It was therefore decided that the medium category
should be subdivided into two categories of ownership, which
will be more relevant to the evaluation and analysis of the
data. This became more apparent as further analysis of the
farming operation progressed.
Table6.6 shows that the majority of farmers owned 200 ha or
less. That was the case for both the individual owners and the
collective owners. The collective owners, however, were more
likely to be distributed more evenly among all the categories
of ownership. This may be indicative of the numbers of
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TABLE 6.5
DIVISION AMONG FARMERS ACCORDING TO LOCAL CATEGORIZATION
OF LANDHOLDINGS AND TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
Individual Owners
Collective Owners
TOTAL
SIZE IN HECTARES
SMALL	 MEDIUM
100 HA OR LESS	 101-300	 HA
3	 7
7	 12
tQ
LARGE
OVER 300 hA TOTAL
1	 11
6	 25
7	 36
2 persons did not know size of their land holdings.
DIVISION AMONG FARMERS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF LAND AND TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP
Individual
Collective
TOTAL
SIZE IN HECTARES
100 OR LESS	 101 -	 200	 201 - 300	 OVER 300	 TOTAL
3	 5	 2	 1	 11
7	 7	 5	 6	 25
10	 12	 7	 7
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households sharing the use of land, or a result of the
interviewing method which sought to include as many of the
recently settled as possible (see chapter 3). These groups
tended to own large landholdings collectively and live beyond
the more populated farming areas.
The data presented here is based on interviews with willing and
available farmers. The number of individual owners of large
landholdings would have increased in the sample, if the more
successful of the farmers and owners were more wi\ng and
available to grant interviews. This data, moreover, is not
entirely significant without actually looking at the cultivated
areas of the land holdings, which will te discussed next.
D.	 Size of Cultivation
The areas of cultivation ranged in size between 10 and 528 ha
(see table 6.7). This shows that a substantial number of
hectares remains uncultivated in the landholdings. This was
confirmed when the total hectares owned were divided into
cultivated and uncultivated (see table 6.8). In fact the
hectares uncultivated exceeded the hectares cultivated by those
persons who did farm the entire area of their land, and who
numbered 16. The largest landholders accounted for most of the
uncultivated hectares. On the three holdings of 900, 900, and
800 ha, a total area of 1422 ha remained uncultivated. Only
one large landholder (over 300 ha) said that he cultivated all
of his land. The information he gave was suspected, however,
of being not entirely correct; this will be discussed later
when farm output is examined.
Table 6.7	 390
Landholdings and Area of Cultivation for all Farms
Categjries
of	 3-IcOha	 101-2O3ha	 Z)l-300ha	 Over3)Oha
L
Holdings
Landholding Culti vati on Landholding Cultivation Landholding Cultivation Landholding Culti vation
	
Area	 Area	 Area	 Area
25	 25	 114	 9)	 225	 150	 330	 120
9)	 50	 130	 1(X)	 246	 10	 4(X)	 30)
50	 50	 135	 70	 260	 260	 40)	 400
64	 64	 150	 60	 288	 288	 460	 203
71	 41	 150	 iCt)	 29)	 219	 8)0	 528
90	 72	 150	 150	 3(1)	 3)0	 OJ	 250
96	 96	 150	 150	 3W	 3))	 930	 400
103	 50	 160	 La)
103	 60	 169	 169
103	 1(X)	 19)	 193
2W	 19)
200	 2W
bjnberof	 -
Faniis	 10	 12	 7	 7
Total
I'&iiber of	 746	 6(B	 1898	 1579	 19)9	 1527	 419)	 2198
Ictares
Percent
Cultivatai	 8	 83%	 83%	 52%
(1) Two fanrs did not kno,i the size of their landholdings, nor their area of cultivation
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TABLE 6.8
CULTIVATED AND UNCULTIVATED HECTARES OF LANDHOLDINGS
AMONG FARMERS INTERVIEWED
	
SIZE OF
	
SIZE OF	 HECTARES
	
NUMBER OF
LAND
	
CULTIVATED UNCULTIVATED
	
FARMS
All Cultivated	 2792
	
2792	 0
	
16
Sorrie Uncultivated	 5951
	
3120	 2831
	
20
Dont Know	 A
TOTAL
	
8743	 5912
	
2831
	
38
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The considerable shortfall in area cultivated relative to the
total landholdings, especially in large holdings, may indicate
one or both of the following:
A. It may reflect that some other forms of land utilization
exist, which reduce the need for the farmers to increase
their cultivated area. This was certainly true in two
of the three largest landholdings in the sample. The
owners involved owned a large number of animals and
listed livestock as a source of income.
B. The tendency to cultivate all or most of the land owned
was most prevalent among those who owned 200 ha or less
(see table 6.7). This may indicate that the ownership
of larger landholdings is not, in the majority of cases,
significant for any increase in cultivation or
agricultural production (at least for the farmers
interviewed). If we exclude other productive uses of
the owned land, we could say that vast amounts of land
could be more productive, if held by other agricultural
operators.
Agricultural utilization, however, is not the only productive
utilization of land, as was previously observed in two cases (
a dominance of livestock breeding). Although animal wealth is
not discussed in this chapter, a conuient may be offered here
about the need to generalize the benefits of the availability
of convenient land for grazing over a larger number of settled
bedouins. The smaller farms established by settled nomads may
be more disposed to keep and increase the number of animals, if
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the land for grazing (comunually or individually held) is more
readily available.	 Even when animals are kept for cultural
reasons, or as fixed assets (as is the case with bedouins in
Saudi Arabia), the gradual increase in animal wealth, and the
gradual integration of the bedouins in the national context
will undoubtedly lead to better conditions in the future, for
livestock breeding as an alternative economic resource for the
rural population. These issues are explored more fully in the
next chapter.
Table 6.9 shows that the majority of farmers inter e'e
	 Z'6
persons) cultivated 200 ha or less.
	 These 26 individuals
accounted for 45% of all the cultivated area and owned 44% of
the uncultivated area ( ar a'era9e of LVT.6 ha per persor). The
10 larger cultivators accounted for 55% of all cultivated land
and owned 56% of the uncultivated area. 	 if we calculate an
average ownership per person of the uncultivated area in the
two larger cultivation categories, we would not be reflecting
the reality of the situation.	 That is because the three
largest landholders (300 and over) who remained in the two
largest cultivation categories, account for most of the
ownership of the uncultivated area (1422 ha). The other seven
individuals owned 171 ha only.
Comparison between table 6.7 and table 6.9 shows why the
uncultivated area was fairly constant for all categories of
cultivation in table 6.9. Table 6.7 shows that six farms have
moved from high categories of landholdings to the lowest
category of cultivation 	 (10 - 100 ha).
	 Five of these 259
uncultivated hectares are from the second category and 236 ha
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TABLE 6.9
DIVISION AMONG FARMERS ACCORDING TO SIZE OF CULTIVATION
PERCENT
NUMBER OF
	 NUMBER OF	 NUMBER OF	 OF 'TOTAL
CULTIVATION	 HECTARES	 HECTARES	 HECTARES	 NUMBER OF	 AREA UN—
SIZE	 OWNED	 CULTIVATED UNCULTIVATED FARMS 	 CULTIVATIVATED
10 - 100 HA	 1671	 1038	 633	 16	 2290
101 - 200 HA
	
2233
	
1629
	
605	 10
	
21%
201 - 300 HA
	
2738
	
1917
	
821	 7
	
29%
OVER 300 HA
	
1328
	
772	 3
	
27%
TOTAL	 8743	 5912
	
2831	 36
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from the third category of ownership. The same is true for the
100 - 200 ha category of cultivation. 470 ha of uncultivated
land has been transferred to this category from the highest
ownership category, while 125 ha was transferred to it from the
third category of ownership (201 to 300 ha). The third category
of ownership shows the least change. This may be because of
the exaggeration factor mentioned previously.
The above data seems to reinforce the previous point, that
there are alternative uses to landholdings among large owners,
as well as the fact that ownership of large areas of land is
unnecessary (agriculturally speaking) for farmers like the ones
in Sajir. This will be returned to when the output of farms is
analysed. Suffice it to say here that only one of the seven
large landholders ( see tatle 7) achie	 c ssa	 cca i
his farming activities by a) cultivating a large area of his
farm holding and b) achieving good productivity on the
cultivated area.
There are other factors which may be operative in determining
the cultivated areas of landholdings. These are the following:
1.	 Cultivation of new areas of land requires heavy
investment on the part of the farmer, even when we
assume that the necessary machinery like tractors,
ploughs, and harvesters are available. A new well and
new irrigation system would cost the farmer at least SR
340,000	 ($90,667).	 Neither of these expensive
requirements Is covered by a subsidy programe. Farmers
are also discouraged by the yearly drop in the
396
underground water level and are mostly concerned with
their present cultivation areas, without adding to their
problems.
2.	 Wheat cultivation dominates the area at present because
of its high profitability. Vegetable, fruits and
alternative crops, which were equally important in the
past, have been largely abandoned at present by the
farmers in the region. Even when they are cultivated,
the area utilized for them is very small because the
method of cultivation is traditional, and covers only 5
-10 ha. Alternative crops will be discussed later in
this chapter.
3.	 The Ownership of Agricultural Machinery
There are three elements that must be distinguished in relation
to the quantity of agricultural machinery on the farm. These
are the following:
A -	 Well.
B -	 Central pivot irrigation systems (CPIS).
C - All other machinery (tractors, ploughs, harvesters and
other items).
It became quite clear from the data that the number of deep
wells and the number of irrigation systems were directly
related, in the majority of cases. The exception was when the
farmers were large cultivators or involved in alternative
cropping, in which case the number of wells exceeded that of
CPIS. This will be discussed more fully later.
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The largest farmer in the sample had 22 deep wells, 17
irrigation systems and 50 agricultural machines for 528 ha,
cultivated in wheat. The smallest farmer in the sample was a
10 ha wheat cultivator who owned 236 ha of uncultivated land,
one well, one irrigation system and three items of farm
machinery. He had just installed his CPIS on a new well, given
that the old well had not functioned for the previous two
seasons, and he had just missed the planting time of wheat for
1985. The next smallest cultivator was a 25 ha landowner, who
owned one irrigation system (installed on one deep well), three
farm machines, and one surface well to help with the water
shortage he was experiencing from his deep well.
A.	 The Number of Wells
The number of wells ranged between I and 22 among the farmers
interviewed, with a majority of 24 owning 2-4 deep wells. Six
of the farmers said that they reserved 1-2 wells in their farms
for the cultivation of other crops (vegetable, fruit, alfalfa
and date palm). The irrigation systems were, in the majority
of cases, attached directly to the deep wells. The CPISs were
reserved for wheat cropping in all cases. In one instance a
farmer experimented by planting water melon under an irrigation
system in the suniner. His output was reported as very good.
Surface wells are resorted to when there is a shortage of water
during the wheat cultivating season. The surface water has
more salt content than the underground water, and it is usually
dug to a depth of 21 - 70 meters depending on the availability
of water. The cost of such wells is considerably less than the
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deeper ones, at SR7O per meter. These wells can be dug quickly
and cheaply at times of need, but water is not always found.
Some farmers in fact reported that they had to dig three
different sites on their land before water was found.
Irrigation of crops for a long period by surface water is
considered very damaging to the crops and the soil in the long
run. Salt in the water increases the salinity of the top soil
and renders future cropping very poor. Most farmers, however,
are too desperate for their wheat harvest, and too deficient in
cash flow to consider the long-term effects. Ten farmers in
the sample had surface wells on their farms.
The farmers who had more deep wells than were needed for their
irrigation systems numbered thirteen among those interviewed.
They tended to be large cultivators of wheat, or cultivators of
alternative crops. Those thirteen, however, do not exhaust
the number of farmers who cultivate alternative crops. This is
because a) not all the irrigation systems are attached directly
to the well, so small farmers who may have only one well could
use It in the sumer for their tomato or water melon crop, and
b) farmers who can afford more wells prefer to use large water
tanks to collect water for irrigation. This water may be from
one or two wells, and it ensures that the water pressure is
always constant for the irrigation system.
From the above discussion, it appears clear that the water
source is a matter of concern among most of the farmers
Interviewed.	 Ten had surface wells to augment their water
supply, and 13 had more wells than they had irrigation systems
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in an effort to avoid water shortages. This was confirmed by
further analysis of the ouput of wheat and other crops, which
were affected by water shortages.
B.	 The Central Pivot Irrigation System
On the first research visit to Sajir in 1982, the CPISs were
relatively new on the scene. They were therefore considered
prestige items. Al-rashash (sprinklers), as they are called
locally, were often mentioned as an indication of wealth and/or
respectability of farmers in the region. The researcher was
told often to go to such and such a farm, because the owners
have installed a rashash or a number of rashashat.
However, they have since become a comonplace agricultural
implement, and today the farmers who have a small number of
these (three or less) are not considered truly profitable or
competitive by the general public.
The rapid change in the cultivation methods, as well as the
attitudes of the farmers toward these changes, shows the high
degree of adaptability among the farmers in Sajir. It is also
a measure of the rapidity of the changes occuring at the
national level, and how all groups of the Saudi population can
very easily be incorporated within the process of change, if
the conditions are favourable.
Although the size and capacity of the CPIS (30-6Oha) is most
important in determining the precise area of cultivation and
how productive a farming operation is, the information needed
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could not be obtained uniformly for all the farmers
interviewed. This is a result of the inexperience of the
researcher at the early stages, and the considerable
difficulties involved in the interviewing process (see chapter
3).	 If the data had been obtained uniformly, then any
exaggeration of the cultivated area would have been picked up
immediately.	 Fortunately the farmers in most cases gave
accurate information.	 Those who did not, had to be deciphered
from the data relating to farm output.
Despite all of these problems, some general coments are
possible. The farmers interviewed, for example, in the
majority of cases owned three or less of these systems (see
table 6.10).
Those 29 individuals, however, do not correspond to the numbers
of persons in the "100 ha or less" area of cultivation (see
table 6.8), because there is considerable variation in the
sizes of the irrigation system. A 100 ha cultivation may have
up to three small Irrigation systems on the farm (25 to 30
each), while a 200 ha cultivator may also have three irrigation
systems (60 ha each). So in all probability the number of
individuals owning one to three irrigation systems should
correspond to the 200 ha or less cultivators. This means that
four extra farmers at least have exaggerated the cultivated
area on their farms.
Alternative produce like fruit, vegetables and alfalfa are
mostly cultivated traditionally, which means that not more that
ten ha were assigned for them. This means that we can ignore
Table 6.10
Ownership of CPIS Among the Interviewed Farmers
Number of CPIS	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Over 4
	 115
Number of Farmers	 9	 8	 12	 5	 4	 38
Table 6.11
THE OWNERSHIP OF FARM MACHINERY AMONG THE INTERVIEWED FARMERS
10-100 HA
	
101-200 HA	 201-300 HA	 OVER 300 HA
NUMBER OF NEW FARMS CULTIVATION CULTIVATION CULTIVATION CULTIVATION
MACHINES	 1984, 1985 AREA	 AREA	 AREA	 AREA	 TOTAL
lto4	 4(1)	 1	 0	 0	 0	 5
5to8	 0	 7	 0	 0	 0	 7
9to12	 1	 6	 4	 4	 1	 16
Overl2	 0	 1	 5	 2	 2	 10
TOTAL	 5	 15	 9	 6	 3	 38
(1)	 The two farmers who did not know the size of cultivation were owners of new1'
established farms (1984)
)O2
alternative cultivation as a reason for the discrepancy in the
data. No conclusions, however, could be drawn without accurate
and precise information about the size of the CPISs for this
group of farmers.
There were only four farming operations who owned more than
four irrigation systems. The largest owner (17 systems) was
the largest cultivator (528 ha), but the other three said that
they cultivated 150 ha, 200 ha and 288 ha. What this suggest
is that the ownership of the irrigation systems did not
correspond to the cultivated area, but to the degree 	 of
affluence that the farmer possesses.	 This was cocifrcced y
looking at the farm output. Two of the farmers who owned more
than four irrigation systems scored the	 hest 9d<cti''fty
among all farmers. Their incomes from ttheat re SR 3 mi11ioi
and SR 2 million respectively.
The high level of expense associated with the modern irrigation
systems (SR 120,000 - 400,000 each) gives a false expectation
of increased productivity and of a high level of increase in
the cultivated areas. In fact, a small farmer may increase his
area of cultivation to 30 ha of wheat, at a fraction of the
cost, by trebling the number of farm hands in the field and
Irrigating traditionally.	 The near total absense of the
practice of traditional methods among the farmers in their
wheat cultivating operations may indicate one or both of the
following:
1.	 The element of prestige in the ownership of al-rashash
may be operative among some of the farmers. This was
tO3
clearly seen in a number of cases. The farmers
concerned did not even own the most basic agricultural
machinery like harvesters and other needed ploughs, but
the irrigation system was firmly installed on the well.
2. There is an element of underemployment or °concealed
unemployment" in the farming operation. The farmers in
the majority of cases are involved in other economic
activities, and relied on their irrigation sistems and
recruited foreign labour in the agricultural side of tte
household economy. This point will be discussed further
later in this chapter. Suffice it to say here, that all
of the farmers said their role on the farm was as
managers and supervisors and hardly involved physical
labour, except for driving.
3. There are three factors that are operative in the case
of the farmers in Sajir, which disposes them to choose
the sophisticated agricultural machinery over intensive
labour in the farm. These are:
A. The availability of loans on easy terms (interest
free ten year repayment scheme) for the machinery
from SAAB.
B. The high level of economic sense in acquiring
this high technology, which makes it probable
that the CPIS could pay for itself in wheat
production (at the present price) about two
years. The life cycle for CPIS, furthermore, is
o4
about five to six years, which means 2 to 3 years
of profitability.
C. The desire to dispose of the need for farm hands
and personal labour, which frees the farmers for
other economic pursuits.
C.	 Farm Machinery
The number of machines on the farm was a better indicator than
the CPIS of the size, degree of sophistication and the age of
the farming operation (see table 6.11). There was a clear
difference between the older farms (pre 1980) and the newly
established ones (1980-1985). The older farms were better
equipped with the necessary ploughs, harvesters and farm
buildings.
Four of the newest farms (1984-1985) had no more than four
agricultural implements (see table 6.11). These inc?ted te
tractor, and two ploughs.
	 Harvesters were not present, nor
were balers and seed fertilizer drills.
	 Irrigation systems,
however, were installed in all the farms visited. The one new
farm (operative in 1984), which also had ten agricultural
implements, was owned individually by a civil servant from
Riyadh, who cultivates 120 ha, and visits the farm during his
free time.
The majority of farms (26) were fully equipped with all the
necessary agricultural machinery (see list in section I of this
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chapter). The number of machines owned by those interviewed
ranged from 3 to 50.	 The one owning 50 machines was the
largest cultivator and producer. 22 of the farms, however,
owned between 9 and 14 items of machinery. There was a cut-off
point, whereby all farms who had less than 9 pieces of
machinery were small in terms of cultivation and output. The
unavailable machinery is borrowed from neighbouring farms;
except in the case of harvesters, which can be rented at a cost
of SR 180-200 per hour depending on their capacity and size.
The interesting point shown in table 6.11 is that the group of
farms in the 101 - 200 ha category tend to be better equipped
than most of the other farms, especially the ones in the 201 -
300 ha category. This may be due to the tendency of the
cultivators in the two larger categories to be later settlers
than the ones in the 101 - 200 category. These farms will also
be the subject of further examination when the farm output is
looked at.
As seen above, the farmers are generally very well equipped as
regards farm machinery. They, however, complained of the
unavailability and high prices of agricultural machinery and
spare parts. They were also dissatisfied with the services
received from the agricultural companies based in Sajir. The
mechanics and engineers were few, and slow in giving the
services needed. There is also a very marked difference
between the prices demanded in Sajir and the more urban areas.
Most said that they would rather obtain the items from Riyadh,
because the agents in Sajir raise the prices unreasonably and
are not always efficient and competent.
o6
The farmers interviewed were more complimentary as regards
their own skills and knowledge. Most said that they have the
necessary skills and experience to hand the sophisticated
technology of their CPIS and other agricultural implements.
All said that they learned by the example of neighbouring
farms, whatever was not known to them. There were, however,
very serious indications that there are major problems as
regards the needed skills and experience.
For example, one us%&i
	 t\\c t'Ve\r	 t\o stm oi
their only well, which was situated too near to their home.
This meant that the irrigation systeirr could not rotate the fuT
circle because the house obstructed its way.
	 The expense
involved in relocating either the system or their house
discouraged them from effecting the necessary changes.	 In
another case, the farmer had broken his irrigation system in
two halves in his energetic effort at ploughing the field. He
was at the time of the interview desperately seeking a buyer
for his farm, and he told the researcher laughingly that he did
not think that he has a future in agriculture.
Some farmers felt that they did not have the necessary
knowledge and experience to act against the monopolies
exercised by the agents for agricultural equipment in the area,
whether national or foreign. Their lack of skill was confirmed
by the MAW officials in Sajir. They reported that many of the
major problems with the ordinary farmer's crops were due to
their ignorance of the preventative methods against diseases,
weeds, and grasses.	 Foreign skilled managers, and the more
successful farmers, comented on some of the farming practices
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of the local people. The CPISs for example were operated in
incorrect ways, which may be more convenient but is very
dangerous for the wheat crops. Some farmers choose a higher
speed of movement for the irrigation systems, which reduces
irrigation time and increases dampness, which in turn
encourages weed and fungal growth.
4.	 Wage Labour
All of the farmers interviewed employed wage labour on their
farms, with the number of farm empojees ranging 'ietween 2 and
13. They were recruited from Egypt, Sudan, Pakistan, India
and the Philippines. The Egyptians and Sudanese are preferred
as herders and carers of the animals, while Pakistanis and
Indians employed as farm labourers anO Liii vers.	 The
Phillipino workers are rare, but could be recruited for
driving and mechanical work. The monthly wages for herders
and labourers range between SR 550 and 700, depending on the
country of origin and length of service with the employers.
Drivers and mechanics command up to SR 1,000. These monthly
wages (146 - 266 dollars) are easily affordable by the farmers
in Sajir, especially when we consider the earnings received
from the wheat crops.
The farm workers live mostly in small brick unpainted rooms at
the farm. There is a minimum of furnishing in these rooms,
and toilet facilities are rarely provided. Food and medical
services are provided by the employer, but the working and
living conditions are extremely bad. These workers are cut
O8
off from any contact with the support network of their
compatriots, which exists in the larger urban areas in Saudi
Arabia. They do not have the small comforts of family life,
nor any means of vocalizing their problems to any formal
agency, either of their own or Saudi.
They rely, in most cases, on the goodness (or lack of it) of
their employers. Very traditional farming families were
observed to be on the whole, better employers of the foreign
workers.	 The traditional values of hospitality, generosity
and respect for males did much to relieve the difficulties of
those workers. The daily hardships were, in part, only a
reflection of the life-style of their employers, and the
difficulty of adjusting to a strange and foreign environment.
By contrast, those who have lifestyles resembling those of the
urban areas in Saudi Arabia became markedly divided from their
employees (as regards living, eating and working facilities).
The gap between the employers and employees (especially the
labourers) contributes to a treatment of the foreign workers,
which is based on the superiority of the nationals and the
Inferiority of the recruited labour.
The cheapness of the labour recruiting process for the farmers
Interviewed, especially of unskilled and poor foreign workers,
disposed all categories of the farming operation to engage
quite liberally in this process. This was indicated clearly
in the data. In fact the largest employers , of farm workers
(13,12) were a 200 ha and a 90 ha farming operation. The
very largest cultivator employed ten farm workers, who were
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mostly labourers and drivers. The number of workers among the
large cultivators (over 200 ha) ranged between 2 and 10
workers, while the 200 ha or less employed 2-13.
If we assume that what is locally regarded as a medium sized
farm needed four farm workers (9) (two labourers, one driver,
one animal carer), then we can safely infer that more than
half of the number of medium sized farms are employing more
wage labour than is needed.
The prevalence of labour saving machinery and technology gives
rise to the false expectation of a considerable reduction in
the number of agricultural workers.
	
This process, however,
was counteracted by the ease and cheapness of the recruitment
of foreign agrtcultura wer.	 'Ct
underemployment of national labour on the farm. They may get
involved in the transporting of their produce to the market,
but deem it unnecessary to perform manual labour on the farm,
or with the animals.	 This will be discussed further in a
later part of this chapter.
The tendency to have more workers than needed on the farm may
be due to the following:
1.	 The foreign unskilled workers come to Saudi Arabia on a
two year contract basis. The turnover of the workers
is therefore very high. It may be highest among the
agricultural workers because of their low pay and
harder working conditions (no data is available
regarding this matter). The locals in Sajir have
10
confirmed that it is very hard to keep and maintain the
same labour force for a long time. Recruitment of a
large number of workers raises the level of continuity,
and ensures a reasonable number of workers at the farm
when needed.
2.	 The farmers in Sajir are either employed or involved in
other economic activities. Their farm workers are
needed to cover for their own absence from the farm, as
well as for other jobs such as alternative commercial
activities and domestic needs. This was confirmed in
some cases when the farmers said that the farm workers
performed other functions, such as driving the family
or working in grocery shops when needed.
5.	 Fruits, Vegetables and Other Crop
Table 6.12 show the output of crops in the region for 1979,
which was obtained from the MAW office in Sajir (10), It
shows that there has been a considerable variety in
cultivation locally. The total cultivation area, however, was
very small in comparison to the present cultivation area,
mainly because of the traditional nature of the cultivation
methods. The 1979 produce, nevertheless, was all marketed in
the urban areas - except that alfalfa and water melon were in
part exported to the other Gulf states.
The situation at present is markedly different. The wheat
crop dominates in all farms and is alone responsible for the
increased area of cultivation. Fruits, vegetables, dates and
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ThLE 6.12
MAIN CROPS OF THE REGION IN 1979
CROP
1) Water Melon
2) Wheat
3) Tomatoes
4) Melon
5) Courgettes
6) Okra
7) Dates
8) Maize
9) Alfalfa
OUTPUT
5 Million Pieces
3659 Tons
2600 Tons
500,000 Pieces
2400 Tons
300 Tons )
600 Tons
320 Tons
For Household Use
CULTIVATED AREA
200 ha
1053 ha
130 ha
100 ha
180 ha
24000 Date Palm Trees
100 ha
30 ha
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 1
 regional office in Sajir 1979.
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alfalfa may be produced in some farms, but they are not
significant crops for the local farmers. The reason for this
are the extremely low profitability (if any) of fruit and
vegetable produce in the urban markets, and the lack of
improvement in fruit and vegetable cultivation methods.
All but one of the farmers interviewed, who cultivated
non-wheat crops in the past or at present, said that they did
so according to their traditional ways. The area of
cultivation, thus, ranged between 5 to 10 ha according to the
availability of farm workers. One farmer had tried
substituting wheat with water melons under a CPIS in one
season and reported good results. In general, however, those
who reported good produce and profits were very few.
The division among the farmers interviewed was as follows:
1. Fourteen farmers were producing no alternative crops.
Eight out of those had stopped cultivating fruits and
vegetables in their farms, and six have never
cultivated alternative crops.
2. Four of the farmers produced fruits, vegetables and
animal	 feeds	 in	 small	 amounts	 for	 household
consumption.
3. Fifteen farmers produced alternative crops (water
melon, tomatoes and other vegetables), but did not find
them profitable, nor significant for their farming
operation because of crop diseases, the labour
involved, marketing difficulties and water shortages.
4.	 Five farmers reported good profits on vegetables and
fruit crops (water melon and tomatoes mainly). They
complained of marketing difficulties, but were
convinced that alternative cropping is significant for
their farming operation.
The farmers who had considerable problems with their
vegetables and fruit produce reported their output in truck
loads or in tons. The type of truck which is commonly used by
the farmers in Sajir usually carries a three ton load. The
largest number of truck loads reported by a farmer was 100
I oads of tomatoes, thi c% ml ght ha'e been OO tons. Thi s Is a
considerable amount, considering the areas of cultivation
(5-10 ha), as well as that the same farmer had produced 405
tons of wheat with three CPISs covering 30 ha each. This
suggests that the farmer may not have been completely accurate
in reporting the number of truck loads of tomatoes from his
farm.
The same tendency existed with most of the other interviewed
farmers, who cultivated vegetables and fruits. At first they
were reluctant to give precise information, and when pressed
gave approximate numbers of truck loads or tonnage. This
makes an interesting contrast with their precise answers
regarding the output of wheat cropping. It is also a
reflection of the lack of importance of fruit and vegetables
to the farming operation, and the absence of a modern
marketing system (as in wheat) which makes precise knowledge
of farm output easily accessible to the farmers.
The five farmers who were somewhat satisfied with their
vegetables and fruit crops reported their output in monetary
terms. The range of earnings for those five farmers in the
three seasons (1983 to 1985) was from SR 300,000 down to SR
20,000. What was interesting was that the same farmer who
received the highest amount in 1983 had the lowest amount in
1985 (SR 20,000).
The money received for fruit and vegetables, however, averaged
about SR 50,000 amongst those farmers who profited from
alternative crops. This is a considerable sum considering the
losses experienced by others.
The variation between the experiences of the interviewed
farmers and between farming seasons is in part a reflection of
the considerable ecological difficulties involved in producing
fruits In an arid zone like Saudi Arabia, with a cultivation
method that is still largely traditional. It is also, on the
other hand, a reflection of the distribution and marketing
methods employed by the farmers themselves and existing in the
Kingdom. These latter elements will be discussed next, as
they relate to vegetables and fruits (tomatoes, water melons,
okra, and other vegetable crops).
6.	 The Distribution and Marketing of Fruits and Vegetables
(11)
Once the farmer in Sajir has made a decision to plant sumer
crops, and has survived the problems that may affect his crops
(diseases, labour and water shortages), he is faced with more
difficult decisions regarding how and where distribution and
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marketing takes place. Most farmer do not have the necessary
number of vehicles and drivers to begin transportation to the
markets. They therefore have to rent the time and the truck
of a self-employed driver to begin the distribution and
marketing process.
The rental of a truck costs the farmer approximately SR 300
per load.	 The cost may vary depending on the distances
involved. The urban markets nearest the farmers (Riyadh,
Buraidah, Aunaisah) may be less expensive in terms of cost of
transportation, but they receive the largest amount of similar
crops from the same and/or neighbouring regions. The farmer
who saves on transportation costs is faced with stiffer
competition and a reduction in prices offered for his produce.
The extreme heat in the suniner, and the rudimentary packing
and transportation methods, in the majority of cases force the
farmer to choose one of the nearest urban markets for fear of
damaging his produce.
The trucks used for transportation are usually the small
Toyota trucks, which are called locally Wanait. The water
melons are loaded on these trucks carefully and covered with a
canvas cloth, while the tomatoes and other vegetables are
packed in small wooden boxes, stacked on a truck, and
similarly covered. The driver - who may be the owner, or a
wage labourer, or the farmer - takes the produce to the
designated market.
Each farmer has dealings and an unwritten contract with a
dalal (auctioneer) in the most frequented urban market.
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Al-dalal receives the truck loads, records them, decides on
the opening price of their contents, and then sends one of his
employees to auction them off. Al-dalal's decision is based
on the availability of similar produce (local or imported) in
the market at that particular time, and the quality and size
of the produce.
The auction is conducted in the open air, with the auctioneer
standing on top of the truck and opening the bidding on the
load.	 The buyers are retailers and distributors, who are
locally based.	 Most of them do not have any storage
facilities, nor do they have a sophisticated network of
operation.	 They could be buying for their own shops, or
distributing to a number of outlets.	 The truck loads are
sometimes bought by two or three buyers, who divide the load
between them.
The operation of al-dalal is a small private venture.
	
He
rents a small space in the vegetable and fruit wholesale
market, and stocks items needed by the farmers such as
fertilizers, seeds, and chemical sprays. He could also be a
money lender to the farmers at times of need. He receives
2.5-5% of the price of each load, depending on the produce and
the contract between him and his customers. The price of the
truck loads Is received and recorded by al-dalal, and at the
end of the season the final accounts are settled.
Al dalal's role in the fruit and vegetable market is derived
from the traditional marketing conditions existing in the
Kingdom before modernisation (even the title is traditional).
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Traditional marketing has not survived in many aspects of the
agricultural market (dairy farming, poultry and meat), nor has
it survived in other comodities (industrial, or consumer
goods). It was operative in wheat and cereal marketing before
the Grain Silo and Feed Mills organisation was established,
but it is still maintained in this case.
Al-dalal in the fruit and vegetable wholesale market does not
deal with the transportation of goods, nor does he employ
drivers or vehicles available for rental.	 He may employ a
number of people to help with the process of auctioneering,
but he has no overhead expenses In relation to storage xd
distribution. His function closely resembles the function of
small traders in villages and small urban markets, when
approached by small producers to sell for them at a
percentage. The money lending aspect of al-dalal 's operation
was also an aspect of traditional traders; and it is still
practised in very traditional markets (12) (even in very large
urban centres).	 It is for these reasons that the sale of
truck loads must take place shortly after delivery, and al
dalal profits by any sale, at any price.
There was great resentment, on the part of the farmers in
Sajir, of al-dalal and the middlemen who auction and buy their
produce.	 All said that they would rather auction and sell
their produce themselves, but that was not possible for most
of them, because of their lack of expertise and connections in
the markets.
Some farmers, however, make great efforts to dispense with the
1i18
services of al-dalal, especially if the needed vehicles are
available to them. Some said that they transport and auction
their produce themselves. Their sons are sometimes taken out
of school to help in the distribution efforts. The farmers
who have to rent trucks, or cannot operate in this way, have
no means of changing the distribution and marketing situation
to their advantage.
The profitability of vegetables and fruits produced locally is
dependent on the following factors:-
The market chosen:	 Some farmers, who reported good
profits from their vegetables and fruits, said that
they have distributed them further afield than Riyadh,
Buraidah and Aunaisah. Some chose small urban markets,
which were not frequented by imported produce, or other
local producers. The prices received were higher, and
justified the further expenses of transportation.
2. The ownership of the transportation vehicles: The
farmers who owned their own trucks, employed their own
drivers, or drove themselves said that they were able
to reduce the expenses of marketing and receive
reasonable profits, especially if they can bypass the
al-dalal operation.
3. The time of the harvest: The farmers who planted and
harvested earlier or later than is customary for fruit
and vegetables, were able to avoid the rush of similar
local produce and gained reasonable profits. This was
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attributed also to how lucky the farmer is with his
crops. The farmers who had problems with their crops
(diseases, labour or water shortages) were unlikely to
beat other producers to the market, even if they
planted early. The most profitable vegetable and fruit
producer in the sample (SR 300,000) said that he
planted tomatoes early, and was extremely lucky with
his crop. He was however, unsuccessful the next time
he tried the same.
4.	 The degree of availability of similar imported produce:
The farmers were very bitter about the stiff
competition they have to face from foreign imports.
These imports are cheaply produced in the exporting
countries.	 They are also better packed, and
transported in refrigerated trucks. The end result for
any similar local produce is either complete wastage,
great loss, or a very low profit margin. The retailers
and middle men either prefered the imported goods, or
forced local producers to sell at very low prices. It
was often said by farmers that the sale of a truck load
was lower than the cost of the rental of the truck
(SR300).
From the considerations stated above, it is clear that the
marketing of vegetables, and fruit for an average farmer in
Sajir is fraught with difficulties. 	 The difficulties,
however, do not start with the distribution, and marketing of
the crops. There has not been any great development of the
traditional methods of cultivation of these crops. The
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farmers are beset with problems: diseases that could not be
checked, damages, and labour and water shortages.
The questions arising from the survey of the above farmers are
the following:
1	 Why do not all farmers take advantage of all possible
awareness of increasing the profitability of fruit and
vegetable cropping?
2	 Why do not they make a collective effort to combat the
negative elements of the distribution and marketing
methods?
The reasons for such shortcomings exhibited by most of the
farmers interviewed may be due to the following:
A	 The inexperience of the farmers involved in the
agricultural activities operative now in Sajir, or in
other regions like Sajir.
B	 The lack of great incentive to improve the
profitability of alternative crops, because of the
present dependence on wheat as a source of good income
for the farmers.
C	 The marked disinterest in Improving distribution and
marketing on the part of the responsible agencies in
the government (see chapter 4), which in turn reduced
the incentive among the farmers themselves as regards
creating an active lobby for their needs.
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The farmers in Sajir may not be all totally new to
agricultural production, but they are certainly very dependant
on government grants and subsidies to create a modern
agricultural operation. This dependency carries over to all
areas of the agricultural economy including marketing.
The recency and abruptness of all the presently exhibited
relations of production did not allow enough time for the
development of the education, experience and attitudes needed
by the farmers to work coherently and effectively for their
own benefit. It must also not be forgotten that the majority
of farmers are not solely dependent on agriculture as an
income generating activity. The satisfaction within the
household is increased by other wages, income and earnings.
The MAW extension office in Sajir offers some services which
are designed to increase and develop the agricultural skills
and knowledge needed by the farmers in the region. These
services, however, are performed by foreign Arab recruits
(from Egypt mainly), who have very little in coninon with these
bedouln farmers. Their sincerity may not be questionable, but
their ability to comunicate with the farmers is impaired by
the disparity of education, culture and experience. The
offices themselves are too Ill-equipped and under-staffed to
deal with the problems in the region adequately.
The farmers In Sajir were well aware of their own problems,
and sufficiently discouraged by the distribution and marketing
system of vegetable and fruits from attempting to increase
output, or attempt crop rotation on the farms. However, some
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saw certain developments nationally in relation to green-house
cultivation of fruit and vegetables, which presented
possibilities for their future. The green houses have just
been introduced into the country, and were beginning to spread
among the most successful farmers nationally. They offer a
cultivation method which is more productive throughout the
year. They also lessen the need for water, and increase
control over the environment and cropping. They do demand, on
the other hand, greater management skills, higher investment
and more skilled labour.
The marketing problems, however, are not going to be solved by
the adoption of these technologically advanced cultivation
methods. They must be looked at and remedied by the policy
makers in Saudi Arabia, if they are serious about agricultural
development in the Kingdom. The lack of concern may stem from
simply an oversight in the haste to increase agricultural
production in the Kingdom, or from the existing opposing
interests (importers of agricultural goods, urban consumer
demand, or traders of agricultural goods). These interests,
however, must be weighed against overall development of the
agricultural sector, and the need for a reasonable self
sufficiency.
8.	 The Wheat Crop
Wheat cultivation is the centre of the activities of the
farming operation in Sajir. Most of the farmers interviewed
said that they were quite satisfied with the incomes they
received, and relied on them to meet the annual repayments to
423
SAAB and the farm expenses.	 There was, nevertheless, a
surprisingly large number of farms who experienced major
problems with their wheat crops; which resulted sometimes in
the complete loss of crop, or very low productivity.
The data obtained was for the cropping seasons of 1983, 1984
and 1985.	 Throughout these three seasons, 22 farmers
experienced	 major	 problems,	 relating	 variously	 to:
installation of the CPIS, water shortages, crop diseases, arid
frost damage. Those who did not report major problems had
significant fluctuation in their yearly major output, which
suggested that productivity was neither constant nor steadily
imp rovi n g.
One hectare in Saudi Arabia produces, on average, four tons of
wheat. The very successful and technologically advanced wheat
producing projects in the country were able to raise
productivity to 7.5 tons per ha. The farmers interviewed in
Sajir were not in all cases truthful in reporting the size of
their cultivation area, either for fear of not meeting the
Islamic requirement of complete utilization of granted land,
or for some other reason (see beginning of section II of this
chapter).	 The wheat output of their farms, however, was
readily reported, because the precise weight of the produce
has been recorded by the Grain, Silo and Feed Mill
Organisation (GSFMO) when received from the farmers.
By comparing the output with the reported cultivated area, the
most unrealistic data could be detected. 	 For example, one
farmer said that he cultivated all 400 hectares of his farm,
and wheat was the only crop he produced. In 1985, this farmer
produced 150 tons, and did not report any problems with his
wheat crop. The disparity between the average production of
400 ha (1600 tons) and the actual production showed that the
farmer may not have been completely truthful in reporting his
cultivation area.
Careful examination of the data provided by those who reported
large cultivation areas and low production of wheat, without
any mention of crop damages, showed that there are three
possible cases of this kind. Those tended to be in the over
200 ha categories of cultivation. There is, however, no way
of conclusively proving that the cultivation area is different
than reported.	 It was therefore decided to include these
farmers in the following analysis of crop productivity, while
keeping in mind the possibility that the cultivation areas
were exaggerated.
Other cases of disparity between actual and possible output
were explained by the farmers as resulting from diseases,
frost damage, weed grass growth and water shortages. 	 The
range of output amongst farmers for the three seasons
1983-84-85 varied between 0.5 and 2550 tons. 	 The largest
producer was also the largest cultivator and one of the
largest landholders. The farmer who produced 0.5 ton in 1983
went on to produce 250 in 1985. The highest production of
wheat in these seasons was mostly in 1985. Only three farms
produced less in 1985 than in previous seasons.
	 Two lost
their wheat crop completely in 1985 and one produced 30 tons
less than in 1983. The reasons for the increase in
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production, however, were not due to better productivity, but
to increased cultivated area and the installation of new
irrigation systems.	 The fluctuation in productivity
throughout the three years showed that there is no constant
relationship between the cultivated areas and output.	 A
farmer may have produced more in 1985 on four irrigation
systems, but his productivity was better in 1984 on two
irrigation systems.
Table 6.13 shows the size of cultivation and wheat output in
1985 for the farmer interviewed. The range of output for the
four categories suggests that there is no direct relationship
between the area of cultivation and the wheat output. In fact
the "101-200" has produced on the whole better and more than
the 201-300 ha category. There was, moreover, a considerable
variation between the output of similarly sized cultivation
areas. One farmer produced 100 tons on 200 ha, while another
produced 1000 tons on the same number of hectares (see figure
6.1).
There was a significant and marked low productivity in most of
the farms visited (see figure 6.2). Only three farms exceeded
or reached the national average production of four tons per
hectare. The first was a 200 ha cultivator and producer (5.0
tons/ha); the second was the largest cultivator and producer
(also 4.8 tons/ha); and the third was a 10 ha traditional
cultivator, whose irrigation system was not installed at
planting time. The best average productivity (2.4 tons) was
among the "101-200" ha category of farmers, and the worst
among the "201-300" ha category (see table 6.14). This is
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TABJJE 6.13
SIZE OF CULTIVATION AND WHEAT OUTPUT AMONGST THE
INTERVIEWED FARMERS IN 1985
All
Cultivated
10 - 100 ha	 101 - 200 ha 201 - 300 ha Over 300 ha	 Area
Range of wheat	 (1)
output in tons	 0 - 300
(2)
Number of Farms	 18
Wheat production
in tons	 2164
(1) Two farmers lost their entire wheat crop in 1985.
(2) The two farmers who did not know the size of their cultivation area were included
in the 25 - 100 ha category, because their wheat output and number of irrigation
systems indicated a 60 ha or less cultivation ärea.
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surprising since both categories are considered medium sized
farming operations by local standards. 	 This may be due to
some exaggeration of cultivated land among farmers in the
"201-300" ha category (one suspected case of inaccurate
information was in this category). It may also be due to the
tendency among the farmers in this category to be recent
settlers. This was also the case for two of the farmers in the
"over 300 ha" category. Both were recent settlers, and both
produced very little wheat on a cultivation area of 400 ha.
Their productivity moreover, of 0.4 tons and 0.6 tons per
hectare reduced the overall productivity in the category
considerable.	 Productivity was more constant in the lower
categories, and 24 of the farmers in all categories produced 2
tons per hectare or less (see table 6.14).
The money received for the wheat crop was substantial,
considering the price paid for every kg. A ton of wheat since
1984 has been bought for SR 2,000, which was deemed
satisfactory payment by 34 of the interviewed farmers. A
large number of farmers said that they depended on the wheat
price to cover expenses, replay the annual installments to
SAAB and also have a reasonable profit margin. Incomes ranged
between SR 60,000 and SR 3,000,000. 19 of the farmers received
SR 400,000, which is SR 100,000 more that the highest yearly
repayment to SAAB in the sample.	 The repayments will be
discussed next, in relation to the credit obtained and the
incomes received from wheat.
3O	 TABLE 6.14
PRODUCTIVITY PER HECTARE IN 1985 AMONG THE
FARMERS INTERVIEWED
Category of
Cultivation Area	 10 - 100 ha	 101 - 200 ha	 201 - 300 ha Over 300
Total Number of
Hectares	 1158	 1629	 1917	 1328
Wheat Production	 2164	 3831	 1895	 2950
Average Tons per
Hectare for Farms 1.9	 2.4	 1	 2.2
Number of Farms	 18	 10	 7	 3
Range of
Productivity	 (1)
For all
Cultivation
Area
6032
10840
1.8
38
Tonsperha	 0-4	 0.9-5	 0.4-2.3	 0.4-4.8	 0-5
Number of Farms
reaching 4 Tons
perhaormore	 1	 1	 0
	
3
Number of Farms
Averaging 2 Tons
per ha or less	 11	 5	 6	 2
	
24
(1)	 Two farmers in this category reported complete loss of wheat crop for this year.
9.	 Credit, Repayment, Expenses and Income
All the interviewed farmers had obtained credit from SAAB.
The smallest loan was SR 273,000 and the highest was SR 3
million. Most of the credits obtained were medium term loans
for machinery and well digging. All farms in Saudi Arabia are
eligible for a SR 3 million credit facility if they fulfil the
requirements of SAAB's lending code, namely: a) meeting all
previous	 annual repayments and b) having a formal deed of
ownership of the land. The credit obtained, however, preceded
in the majority of cases the tightening up of SAAB's lending
practices; which meant that so farms obtared 'tare cret
without actually fleeting the present requirements. 	 In fact,
the largest receiver of credit (SR 3 million) did not have a
formal and acceptable deed of ownership to his land.
The relatively older farms (before 1980) seemed to have
obtained more credit than the more recently established farms.
This is clearly seen in table 6.15 which shows agricultural
credit and the cultivated hectares among the farmers. 	 The
larger categories, which contained the more recently settled
bedouins, showed substantially less credit per hectare than
the smaller categories. This was checked by looking at all
the farmers who settled after 1975. All had obtained less
than SR 0.5 million in credit from the agricultural bank.
Table 6.15 also shows that credit per hectare was highest
amongst the category of small farms. It also shows that the
credit per hectare decreased as the size of the farm grew.
8,410
	
5,686
	
4,518	 7759
32	 TABLE 6.15
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND THE CULTIVATED HECTARES
AMONG THE INTERVIEWED FARMERS
Cultivation Area in Hectares
10 - 100	 101 - 200	 201 - 300	 Over 300	 For Total
Cultivated
Area
Range of Credit
obtained in SR
Million	 .27 - 2
	
.8 - 27	 .45 - 2.3	 1.5 - 3	 .27 - 3
Number of Farms	 (1)
17	 10	 7	 3	 37
Amount of Credit
obtained in SR
Million	 15.66
(2) (3)
Cultivated Ha
	
1088
Agricultural
Credit per Ha
in SR	 14,393
13.7
	
10.9
	
6	 46.26
1629
	
1917
	
1328	 5962
(1) Data could not be obtained for 1 farm.
(2) Two farmers, who did not know the size of their cultivation area,were estimated to
have 60 ha of cultivation each. So 120 ha were added on to the cultivated area.
(3) The 70 ha cultivation area for the one farmer who did not give details of credit
from SAAB, were subtracted from the total cultivation area of this category.
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This is partly because all farms obtained credit for the same
machinery and items (well digging, engines, pumps, tractors,
and harvesters).
None of the farms in the sample obtained credit under the
"special project" category of loans, which may exceed SR 3
million and include all expenses for the reclamation of virgin
land. Also the majority of farms (16 farms) owned 9-12 items
of farm machinery (see table 6.11), these farms ',iere d'dde.d
almost equally between all categories of cultivation size.
The cost incurred by the farmers in their wheat producing
operation was measured in Table 6.16 according to the locally
obtained standard of SR 1.25 per kilogram of wheat for small
farmers, SR 1.0 per killogram for medium farms, and SR 0.75
per killogram for large farms. This standard was confirmed by
the local MAW officials, in the region. The farmers
interviewed, however, were not in a position to give precise
informatlom about the cost involved in their wheat cultivation
operation generally, nor were they asked to detail their
costs.
In Table 6.16, wheat income was measured for the farms in each
category of cultivation, taking into account the actual yearly
repayments to the bank and the inferred cost of wheat
cultivation. This shows some very interesting results:
1. The third category of cultivation (201-300 ha) did not
correspond to the general trend of increased income per
hectare, when cultivation increased. This may be due
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TABLE 6.16
PRODUCTION, COST AND INCOME OF
THE FARMERS INTERVIEWED IN 1985
Cultivation
Category	 10 - 100 ha	 101 - 200 ha	 201. - 300 ha	 Over 300 ha
Total Number of
Hectares	 1088	 1629	 1917	 1328
Wheat Production
in Tons	 2164	 3831	 1895	 2q50
Average
Productivity per
Hectare	 2	 2.4	 1	 2.2
Price in SR	 4,328,000	 7,662,000	 3,790,000	 5,900,000
Expense in SR (1) 2,705,000	 3,831,000	 1,895,000	 2,ZL2,SG
Repayment to
CAAB in SR	 1,494,000	 1,440,000	 1,038,000	 600,000
Total Cost in SR	 4,199,000	 5,271,000	 2,933,000	 2,812,500
Income in SR	 129,000	 2,391,00	 857,000	 3,087,500
Number of Farms	 17 (2)	 10	 7	 3	 -
Average Income
per Hectare (SR)
	
119	 1468	 447	 2325
Average Income
per Farm (SR)
	
7,588	 239,100	 122,429	 1,029,167
(1) Expense was calculated according to the local assumption of SR 1.25 per kg for
small farms, SRi per kg for medium farms and SR 0.75 per kg for large farms.
(2) The one farm whose credit data was not obtained was excluded from this table.
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to the low productivity (one ton per hectare) for this
group of farmers.	 Even the expense per hectare
incurred by these farmers was lower than the expense
for the "over 300 ha category".
	
This again is a
reflection of the recency of their settlement, and/or
exaggeration in cultivation area.
Nonetheless, their average earnings per hectare were
higher than the smallest category of cultivation.
2. The second category of cultivation showed the best
productivity generally and had better income than the
"10-100 ha" and "201-300 ha" categories. Their costs
(repayments and expense per kg of wheat) were
substantially higher than the two largest categories of
cultivation (over 200 ha). Their better productivity,
however, led to better incomes than the farmers in the
first and third categories of cultivation. It must be
pointed out here that one farmer, a 200 ha cultivator
who produced 1000 tons of wheat, was partly responsible
for the overall success of this category of
cultivation, as well as the increased productivity (see
graph 6.1)
3. The small farms category carried the highest burden of
cost per hectare, and the least income per hectare. The
average income per farm from wheat in this category
does not equal a monthly wage of a civil servant of
respectable standing in Saudi Arabia. Even if
productivity increases in this category to the national
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average of 4 tons per hectare (double the present
average), their earnings would not allow them to
expand, nor meet the high costs that might be incurred,
because of problems in the water source, machinery or
crops.
4.	 The fourth category of ownership showed the best income
per hectare (nearly double the income of the "1O12OO
hail ), although productivity was not the best.
	 The
spectacular earnings per farm, however, were mainly due
to the existance n this c,ateory ol t'ne largest
cultivator and producer, who achieved a 4,8 ton per
hectare yield on his farm.
	 The other two 400 ha
cultivators produced 150 and 250 tons respectively.
Their productivity and earnings, in fact, closely
resemble the farmers in the 2Ol3OO ha" category. The
potential income for this category, however, has been
demonstrated by the largest producer and cultivator in
the sample.
A coment may be pertinent here about the calculation
of cost to the farmer in table 6.16. Repayments to
SAAB were calculated as expenses, which apply only in
the short run. In the long run, however, repayments
are a form of capital investment in the farm's water
systems and machinery. The justification of including
them as expenses, at this point in time, is merely to
discover whether or not the agricultural operation is
capable at the present time of covering all the needed
capital investments and costs of production. It must
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be also remembered that the wheat price support is a
transitory factor.	 If the goverment reduces or
completely eliminates the present subsidy on the price
of wheat, the majority of farms, especially the smaller
ones, will not be able to meet their repayments, nor
the usual cost involved in farming in this area. This
will be especially true if no new factors appear on the
scene	 (like improvement in the marketing and
distribution of other crops, and/or new price support
for different crops).
Wheat cropping among the farmers in Sajir seems to be
profitable at present, even in the case of sn'rd?l
farmers, who are able to meet their repayments to SAAB
(capital investments).	 The profitabfltty,	 waver,
increases to spectacular heights in the case of large
cultivators, even for those who do not display
efficiency or great effort in the agricultural
operation (low productivity, shortfall in cultivation).
Nonetheless, the farmers who have problems with their
crops or with their water systems are in an unenviable
situation, whereby they cannot meet the cost of next
season's cropping, their yearly repayments, and the
needed changes on the farms (e.g. a new well), this
would be especially true of the smaller categories of
cultivation, who do not have a) substantial alternative
sources, and b) money saved from previous cropping
seasons.
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10.	 Hamlet Settlements and the More Recently Established
Farms
Throughout the preceding discussion of the agricultural
operation, the cultivation size has been used as the main
variable in the analysis.
	 The date of settlement and the
establishment of the farm, however, have been used
ocassionally as explanatory factors. This is not because they
they play determining roles in the agricultural operation
itself, but because they may influence the orientation of the
household, as regards land utilisation and the emphasis placed
on the agricultural operation.
In fact, it could be safely assumed that most of the farming
operations in the region are new in the form that they are
displaying at present. Modern agricultural machinery began to
spread after the mid 1970s and the agricultural progranine in
the second development plan (1975-1980). The high technology
of the central irrigation systems began to be used after 1979
and the wheat support policy, and it only became comon in the
region during the 1980s.
Even in terms of the establishment of farms in the region, we
saw in section I of this chapter that the overwhelming
majority of farms in the region (1200 - 1400) were established
after 1979 (the number of farms for that year was enumerated
at 500). The sedentary villagers in the region must have
accounted for the majority of the already established farms,
which means that bedouin farmers before that year were
relatively few. Nonetheless, the hamlets of Sajir - which
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tend to be more recently settled areas - display some
interesting features which are in part just a clearer view of
the settlement patterns in Sajir itself (especially as regards
land distribution), and in other aspects relatively unique.
This is because they combine a modern agricultural operation
with a predominantly traditionally based livestock breeding
operati on.
Hamlets are formed by lineages or kinship units, which apply
to the Amir of Sajir for a land donation (Iqta). The head of
the lineage (also called Amir) or kinship group, after
obtaining the land, either distributes it between the
households of his lineage, or retains it for collective use if
the kinship unit is small.	 The hamlets of Al-Tasrir (35
kilometres from Sajir's ceTitre) aiiá M-oa'oya'n are exarnp'es
of the former case.
Al-Tasrir, inhabited by Al-Ghadhabin lineage (approximately 30
households), was established in 1970 through a grant from the
Amir of Sajir to the Amir of the lineage. It is not precisely
known how many hectares were distributed to the members of the
lineage, but the Amir's household (three married brothers) is
the largest landholder in the hamlet. It is also one of the
largest landholding households, and the largest cultivator and
producer of wheat in the study's sample (800 ha owned, 528 ha
cultIvated, 4.8 ton/ha yield).
In 1978 a kinship unit from Al-Ghadhabin applied to the Amir
of Al-Tasrir for land to settle in. This unit, which included
three separate households (each containing married brothers)
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and headed by an elderly uncle, were given 100 ha on the outer
edge of Al-Tasrir's boundaries. When their farm was visited
in 1985, 50 hectares were cultivated for wheat, but their
considerable animal holdings were an important economic
concern of the family. Their herds of 400 head of sheep and
40 camels, however, were not larger than those of the Amir of
Al-Tasrir (300 head of sheep, 60 camels, and 20 cattle), who
had settled earlier. Despite the fact that they owned one
CPIS and five farm machines, they considered themselves
primarily pastoralists.
A1-Hobabyah hamlet display the same features.	 Three
individuals from three separate households were interviewed in
the hamlet, which houses members of Al-Karashmali lineage. Tile
head of lineage owned 900 ha of land, of which 250 ha was
cultivated. He also owned 300 head of sheep and 15 camels.
Another member of Al-Karashmah, who still practises short
distance pastoralism and whose farm was established in 1984,
cultivated approximately 60 hectares of his land (the total
area of the farm was not known to this farur), anO he o,'ne
400 head of sheep and 14 camels. The third individual from
A1-Hobabyah owned 246 ha of land of which 10 ha was
cultivated, and owned 15 head of sheep. The latter case was
exceptional in the sense that the farmer was an individual
owner, who had joined the military in 1971, and who bought
part of his land.
Another large hamlet, inhabited by Al-I-Iizman lineage of the
lltaibah tribe is another interesting case. Although Al-Hizman
came from the same sub-tribe as Al-Hanatish and the other
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lineages in Sajir, they are not closely linked to it in terms
of the earlier periods of settlement. In fact, this lineage
had settled in another area in 1949, and only came to Sajir in
1975 because of its better prospects for farming.
Subsequently, Al-Hizman acquired their land holdings through
purchasing.
Al-Rajhyah, the Hizman's settlement, is the furthest hamlet
from Sajir. Its members are primarily livestock breeders,
with considerable animal wealth. Their Amir's houshold owned
1000 head of sheep, 150 camels, and 15 cows. Their
cultivation area was reported at 400 ha, on a 900 ha
landholding. Their wheat output, however, was very poor at
0.6 ton/ha yield. This is despite the fact that the
agricultural operation was totally modernised with three
central pivot irrigation systems, fourteen agricultural
machines and ten farm workers. Their net income from wheat,
nonetheless, was considerable at SR 162,500. The livestock
breeding operation was a commercial venture with wage herders,
but was mainly conducted in the traditional pastoral custom
(herding and grazing patterns).
From the previously detailed cases, some common features can
be distinguished. These are the following:
1)	 The Iqta system of land distribution encourages
differentiation in landholdings between the members of
the lineages concerned. The system favours those in
politically superior positions in the traditional
sense.
2) The date of settlement as such does not determine or
define the degree of involvement or success in the
agricultural operation. The Amir of Al-Tasrir attained
substantial degree of success in wheat cultivation
despite the fact that he and his lineage are recent
settlers in Sajir (1970). His farm's performance and
output surpassed the performance and output of those
farms owned by older settlers in Sajir. The emphasis
placed on wheat cultivation was also heavier than that
placed by the Amir of Al-Rajhyah who sett'ed in the
1940's.
The 5-8 years difference between the date of
settlement, for the majority of the households
discussed previously, does not really account for the
dtfferences	 t(e	 rtj
because most had similar opportunities to take
advantage of the incentives offered by SAAB and the
wheat price to construct a profitable agricultural
operation.
3) Animal wealth, which is initially linked to the recency
of the pastoral way of life, seems to also correspond
later to the wealth or availability of large
landholdings. The heads of the three hamlets discussed
previously are cases in point.
4) The ownership of large animal wealth, either by new
settlers or by wealthy land owners, can orient the
household toward the maintenance and perpetuation of
livestock breeding as an important source of income.
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This, however, does not inhibit the formation of a
modern agricultural operation, be it small or large,
efficient or inefficient.
The above four points seem to reinforce the previously stated
premise that the agricultural operation must be analysed
independently from the "traditional" ideology of the bedouins.
Livestock breeding on the other hand may persist despite a
successful change to an agricultural economy, or the existence
of the necessary elements for such transferal. The linkages
observed in the hamlet settlements between livestock breeding,
the persistance of the pastoral traditions, and land ownership
will be closely analysed in the next chapter. Suffice it to
say here that the ideology of pastoral nomadism exerts a
stronger influence on the livestock breeding operation
practised by the bedouin farmers in Sajir.
The farmers in Sajir displayed great enthusiasm and eagerness
for modern agriculture, despite the limitations of their
education, experience and knowledge of the modern sector. This
may have been due to the lack of deeply rooted linkage to
traditional agriculture, and/or the perceived profitability of
the modern wheat farming operation.
Conci usi on
The modern agricultural, wheat producing operation currently practised
by the bedouin farmers in Sajir seems to suffer from all the classic
features of agriculture in an arid zone. These include water problems,
a high level of crop disease, soil deficiencies, and low productivity.
We may add to this list of problems the low skill of the agricultural
operators themselves, and the problems caused by an incoherent
development progranuile for agriculture, exhibited mainly in lack of
control over the water resources, unchecked expansion, a lack of
development of the marketing and distribution system (including the
lack of restriction on foreign imports), as well as the ineffective
nature of the training and counselling services for the farmers.
The bedouin farmers themselves are hugely attracted to the farming
operation by the need to own land, as well as the desire to profit from
the wheat support programe. The conditions governing their settlement
and participation in the agriculutural sector are characterized by the
following:
1) A system of land distribution that encourages differentiation,
mainly through the Iqta system.
2) A collective utilization of land by the extended family. This
may be satisfactory at the present time because it reduces
water and land utilisation, but it may become a pressing
problem in the future because of the Islamic laws of
inheritance, and a gradual emphasis on individual ownership
(as is the case for sedentary villages).
The future prospects for the more traditional of the farming
households are therefore bleaker than for those who are more
integrated into the relations of production of the nation at
large.	 If collective utilization of land and water was
universal in the region (or the nation), the profile of those
traditional farmers would have been different.
3) Despite the apparent enthusiasm for agricultural production,
the farmers maintain a multi-resource household economy. The
other resources are more traditional (livestock breedthc1 far
a group of farmers who are so inclined, either because of
their recently settled state, or because of other reasons
(discussed In the next chapter). Other resources also include
employment in the National Guard in the civil service, and/or
comercial activities. A great level of adaptability was
displayed by most farmers.
4) The agricultural operation was marked by significant lack of
the needed element of diversification of cropping. That is
because the farmers only experience profit in the wheat
cultivating operation. It Is also marked by a dependency on
foreign workers and the underemployment of the nationals on
their farms. Low productivity is another major characteristic
of the farming operation in Sajir.
5) Incomes from agriculture were highest among the largest
cultivators mostly, and those who appeared to have larger
experience of farming and a greater concentration on the
farming operation.
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The small operators (below 100 ha) were in the worst possible
condition, as regards the ability to profit, reinvest in the
farms, or manage through the expected difficulties (water
shortages or crop diseases). This group of farmers will be
the first casualty in any future development, whether
ecologically or in the area of policy changes.
6)	 The whole system of agricultural production is characterised
by wastage, and a concentration on maximum profit regardless
of the cost to the water resource and land conditions. The
larger producers seem to be the worst violators in this, by
virtue of being the largest utilizers; but they are also the
most likely to divert production into other areas (through
green houses, dairy farming, and other agricultural projects),
as well as the most likely to succeed in non farming
activities.
The question that is posed at this point is: why bother with
agricultural production if the nation's cost, in terms of natural
resources and monetary expenses, is as high as this? The answer, I
think, is that Saudi Arabia cannot afford to leave the agricultural
sector in its previous state of stagnation.
	 The advantages of
investments by the nation at large, and by the farmers themselves,
would have been maximised if a reasonable and coherent policy had been
implemented from the start.	 The need for changed thinking about
resource use, and the development of the rural economy, is urgent, if
Saudi Arabia is to salvage something from this experience.
References and Footnotes
1) Ministry of Agriculture and Water regional office in Sajir,
internal paper, 1979.
2) Al-Jazirah Newspaper, No 3721, 27/11/82.
3) Data obtained from Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank regional
office in Sajir, 1982.
4) Data obtained from Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank regional
office in Sajir, 1986.
5) Data obtained from Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank regional
office in Sajir, 1982.
6) "Large Projects" refers to new agricultural projects,
obtaining credit from SAAB exceeding SR 3 million, on newly
reclaimed land.	 The credit obtained includes all necessary
items	 for production	 (water systems,	 machinery and
construction).
7) The projects listed relate to the settlement of Sajir.
8) Based on discussion with lcoal agricultural officials, and
group meetings with some farmers of the region.
9) This assumption is also based on discussions with the local
offices and farmers, who assured the researcher that four
agricultural workers are quite sufficient for an average
medium size farm, with an average number of animals (50 to 100
head of sheep).
10) It was compiled for a newspaper article in 1979.
Unfortunately, no similar list exists for previous years, nor
for subsequent years.
11) This discussion Is based on a) a survey of Riyadh's whole sale
vegetable and fruit market, done by an informant, and b)
discussions with the farmers in Sajir.
Chapter Seven
Animal Wealth
4!t8
Introduction
As seen before in the previous chapter, the bedouins of Sajir are
predominantly multi resource people for whom farming is the major
activity. Animal wealth as an economic resource, however, is an
existing element that must be looked at and which can be tied in with
the degree of sedentism of any settled or semi settled community. The
numbers of livestock owned, the manner in which they are cared for, in
addition to the degree of their relevance in the household economy are
important factors for proper understanding of the patterns of
settlement among Sajirs population, and the changes affecting their
livelihood.
Animal wealth is a component of both the pastoral economy and the
agricultural one. The difference between the two lies in the fact that
animals are central for the pastoral existence, and as such the nomads
are almost exclusively engaged in animal care. Short distance nomads
and the settled bedouins would, therefore, be more inclined to regard
animals as vital, or at the very least important to the household
economy. The strong heritage of pastoralism among the settled
communities, moreover, would incline them to retain some of the
traditional patterns of caring and feeding methods.
In the past, nomads intent on settlement, in the majority of cases,
preferred to keep what animals they still owned. They either entrusted
them to relatives who were still pastoralists, or gave them to
professional herders for a fee. Herders of this kind come usually from
within the nomadic groups and seek to augment their incomes by taking
additional herds with the help of hired hands or even slave labour
(slavery was abolished in the early 1960s).
Other settlers, at different stages of the sedentarization process,
either brought their animals with them to the settled state, or
divorced themselves completely from livestock breeding through the
adoption of another form of economic pursuit. 	 How and why these
decisions are reached is a focus of this chapter. A second concern is
with the situation at present, and the means by which the target
community, the settled bedouins of Sajir, deals with animal wealth.
This will help to determine something about their sedentarized state,
as well as something of their economic status.
Another concern of this chapter is to examine the previously stated
assumption (above and in chapter six) that the livestock breeding
operation among sedentarized bedouins tends to retain at present more
of the traditional elements of pastoral	 nomadsm, because of the
strength of this heritage among the settlers (unlike the agriculture?
operation).	 This will be examined in the light of the increasing
incomes of the bedouins, the increasing opportunities for economic
diversification, and the education of this generation of bedouins and
future ones.
The chapter will be divided into two sections. The first will deal
with the factors affecting animal wealth generally, and the second will
deal with the target population and the data derived from the
interviews of the research sample.
SECTION I
1.	 Factors_Affecting Animal Wealth
As seen before, the sedenterization process involves the nomad in a
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series of decisions, some of which revolve around the animal wealth.
At a very basic level, whether or not the nomad still posseses animals
determines something about how to proceed in the route of
sedentarization. If the nomad has lost his animals because of
prolonged drought and/or a spreading disease, then his options are
relatively clean cut. To rebuild an economically viable herd requires
the accumulation of capital, and a lengthy period of time. The poor
household without sufficient pastoral resources has to turn to other
non-pastoral resources, which in most cases means settlement, either
temporary or prolonged. An example of this would be the settlement of
the Shrarat nomadic group of the northern region of Saudi Arabia, who
by 1958 were suffering from the effects of a 'ery lang çieead of
drought, which deprived them of the greater part of their livestock.
The Saudi government, recognising their plight, established Wadi
Sirhan agricultural project, which sought to transform the foundations
of their subsistance through substituting agriculture for their
pastoral activities. When the ecological conditions of the region
returned to normal, most of the members of the Shararat nomadic group
returned to the desert and pastoralism, although some preferred to move
on to urban centres and to seek eoyment1.
An impoverished pastoral household is unlikely to join other pastoral
units for two reasons. First, most nomadic units of production in
actuality can only support their members in their own ecological sphere
(2)• To have other units joining it with no pastoral resources upsets
the ratio between the number of animals and the number of people in
each unit. Second, the economic calamities which may affect nomadic
groups, either ecological or socially created, are regionally based, so
in all probability all the pastoral communities are victims of them.
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If the decision to settle is not directly connected to animal loss,
then a further decision has to be made regarding those same animals.
This involves the following choices:
A - Individual settlement versus settlement of the household or the
group.
B - Holding on to animal wealth versus selling it off.
Those two choices are connected and are dependent on factors both from
within the nomadic tribal structure and outside it. Some of these are
the following:
1.	 INDUCEMENT FOR SETTLMENT
These may be:
(a) Ecological in nature.
(b) Because of some political pressure.
Cc)	 Because of some changes in the nomads' perceptions and
attitudes toward their economic and social status.
The changes of perceptions and attitudes come because of
overall changes in the national economy that the pastoralist
is a part of (see chapter 5).
2.	 ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES AVAILABLE:
A nomad who holds other resources outside the pastoral
economy, or even who perceives himself able to acquire other
means of resources, would act differently from one who is
risking a great deal, or who may need some capital to begin a
new economic activity.
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3. THE TRIBE'S POSITION WITHIN THE NATIONAL SETTING:
The extent to which a nomad's tribe is sedentarized can
influence his decision regarding his animals. 	 The more
nomadic the tribe, the greater probability that the animals
would be kept in the desert. Two reasons account for this: a)
herd composition (discussed below), and b) some other members
of the lineage or clan would probably remain nomadic, which
offers the settling nomad an opportunity to entrust his
animals, or maybe his own family to the care of relatives or
brother tribesmen.'3
The more sedentarized the tribe, the 'tess 'tie'ty that herds
would be kept in the desert. In this case, the position of
the tribe within the national setting can be the most
influential factor. This includes such aspects as (1) the
tribe's status in relation to the power structure; (ii) any
claims that they may have to certain resources, ie. land and
water, and (iii) whether or not those claims are seen to be
legitimate by the national state. A bedouin from a
semi-nomadic tribe, who has an option to settle directly on
farming land claimed or belonging to his own particular group,
would be more disposed to retain all or most of his animals,
as part of the farming enterprise.
4. HERD COMPOSITION
The composition of the animal herds also plays a significant
part in the decision made by the nomad regarding what to do
with the animals. The nomadic camel herders facing economic
difficulties would be more inclined to leave behind their
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animals, because camel herding requires a greater degree of
mobility and spartial environment.	 On the other hand,
pastoralists with mixed herds and whose primary dependence is
on sheep herding can conceivably consider settlement without
sacrificing too many of their animals, especially if they
could depend on supplementary feeds or fodder.
5.	 THE ROUTE TO SETTLEMENT
Incorporated within the previous factors is a very important
element on which a great deal rests. 	 This thvoles the
question of how and where the initial step towards settlement
takes place. There are two routes:
First: The beoii may take empoy1TTt it'nn t'ne bounOares
of the urban structure; in either the military institutions,
or the civil service, or the urban based private sector. In
these cases, the tendency anongst the Saudi bedouins was to
undertake settlement individually. Members of the family, the
lineage or the tribe were left behind to continue with their
pastoral economic activities.	 Pastoral resources in those
cases were spared and maintained, if not indefinitely then at
least for a period.
This pattern of settlement has been pracised since the 1940s,
i.e. since the export of substantial quantities of oil from
Saudi Arabia began to bring in greatly increased resources;
and more particularly in the 1950s and the 196Os with the
expansion of goverment services and administration (it should
be noted that rural-urban migration was not unique to the
bedouin comunity, but also included villagers and farmers).
The migration of the male labour force was instrumental in
weakening further the pastoral economy. This happens through
the following means: A) It reduces labour input, thus reducing
productivity within the pastoral economy. B) It shifts the
household's reliance on the pastoral economy to reliance on
cash remittances from the group's sedentarized members. C) It
acts as an incentive for reduced mobility, so the contact
could be maintained with the migrating members of the family
and tribal group. The reduction of mobility, in the long run,
leads to the gradual transformation of the composition of the
herd, because sheep herding is more suitable to short distance
nomadism and semi-nomadism.
Success of the migrating members of any particular tribal
group in their chosen field of employment, often leads to the
gradual sedentarisation of their inuiiediate sub-group (clan,
lineage), if not the whole tribal group. 	 That is because
they serve as role models or a link to available resources;
thus providing increased opportunities for employment, or
better conditions of settlement to the remaining members of
their group. It is comonpiace to find some departments of
the government and military institutions headed by a
particular tribal member, and staffed by a large number of his
own tribal group.
Second: The other pattern of settlement tends to be rurally
based. This usually involves a move toward an agricultural
economy, and starts by the acquisition of the resources needed
for such a move, i.e. land and accessible water.
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This pattern of settlement is usually undertaken collectively
by a sub-tribal group or a whole group. Traditional community
rights are mainly at play here; but also economic power, and
the ability to wield political pressure, is notably successful
in bringing about this type of settlement. A successful move
to an agricultural economy, however, is not guaranteed to all
the groups that take such a step, mainly because of the
ecological factors and also because of the group's disposition
towards such a move. A group's disposition is governed by (i)
the state of their pastoral resources; (ii) any outside
resources they possess (i.e. grants, or employment in the
rurally based public sector, or the private sector); and (iii)
their perception of their chances of success in an
agricultural economy (i.e. the availability of water, good
soil conditions, land for settlement, and the state of
agriculture nationally.	 In particular, commitment to
	
an
agricultural economy is dependent on regional and
agricultural conditions, since these define the pastoral
conditions, as well as the availability of any outside of
resources.
This type of settlement pattern offers the nomadic group a
chance to retain their pastoral resources, but changes some of
their behavioural patterns markedly. It is obviously a step
that requires some past adaptation to such a move, especially
in the herd composition and the degree of integration within
the national setting ideologically or economically.
Settlements of this kind have occurred throughout the history
of Saudi Arabia.	 A prime example is the Ikhwan settlement
scheme (Hujar Scheme) in the early years of the 20th century,
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which continued to be undertaken even after the establishment
of the Saudi State (1932). The quality of change, however,
has not been always consistent among all groups.	 It may
signify a change from one subsistence economy to another, into
a mixed economy, or a modern economy.
2.	 A Brief Historical Account
As elaborated in an earlier section, the Saudi nomads in the early
periods of sedentarization were largely camel herders whose life was
transformed by the adoption of a strong religious ideology pushing them
into a sedentary way of life. Sedentary life had its own rewards -
ideologically, economically, and politically - and the nomads did not
hesitate to forgo their animals for their convictions. In the period
following the final defeat of the Ikhwan movement the herd composition
among the Saudi	 nomads	 began to change considerably,	 and
sheep-dominated herds began to be the most coninon pattern. This was
brought about for two reasons. 	 First, the state imposed laws
curtailing some of the mechanics of the pastoral nomadic system,
particularly that of the Dirah system (traditional land utilization).
Secondly, a process of integration with the sedentary economy was
encouraged by the opening up of other economic resources and the poor
ecological conditions under which pastoralization faltered during the
1950s and the early 1960s.
What the above facilitated was a pattern of sedentarisation based on
reduced mobility and a degree of sedentary integration. Semi-nomadic
and short distance nomadic groups were the majority during the 1950s
and the 1960s	 Animal wealth in these times was reduced because of
economic and ecological factors. Livestock, therefore, was not seen as
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a hindrance to the continuing process of sedentarization. 	 The
availability of land for settlement, the huge size of the country and
the limited nature of cultivation and agriculture were all favourable
elements that disposed nomads towards keeping on the animals while
proceeding towards sedentarism.
National economic development at the time was limited to urban areas,
and the national workforce lacked the educational training and skill
that is required to enter the modern econoniy. (5) Their services were
nevertheless required in low skill work and military organisations.
Rural-urban migration, therefore, involved only the males and heads of
households of the rural sector.	 Incomes generated from wage labour
(mostly military) were used to maintain a basically rural economy that
had not yet experienced a marked change in its way of life. (6)
Individual settlement (by undertaking wage employment) was prevalent,
but did not involve as large a number of settlers as group settlement
does. The latter continued to be the more significant general pattern,
because tribal membership continued to be the basic criterion on which
settlement of one group at one time and in a certain region was
considered. This in turn was mainly due to political factors, and to
the strength of the tribal social structure still felt all over the
Kingdom.
Nomadic groups considering settlement or a degree of sedentarism, and
continuing to hold some livestock wealth, in the the majority of cases
preferred to hold on to their animals. This was because (a) they were
still rurally based; (b) the rewards and advantages of settlement were
not clear cut, and the nomads preferred to keep their options open; (c)
there was still enough family labour to merit the continuation of a
degree of pastoral economy; and Cd) the rural economies remained
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basically traditional, and there were no major obstacles to the grazing
of animals over the vast uncultivated lands surrounding the areas of
settlement. Migratory movement, moreover, was curtailed and kept at a
short seasonal level (particularly during good rainy seasons).
In the more recent period of settlement, however, the rural economies
were and still are experiencing great alteration in their basic
structures. Especially affected was the agricultural sector, which
received great attention during the latter 1970s. Some elements of
economic development moved away from its traditional nature towards a
more technologically based modern sector (see chapters 4 and 6).
Traditional factors continued to affect it, but the change from a
subsistence based economy to one based on free enterprise and
capitalistic means of production was proceeding rapidly. This recent
period was discussed more fully in the previous chapters (4 - 6).
3.	 Patterns of Pastoral and Non-Pastoral Production Among
the Bedoulns
The term bedouins was selected to describe tribal members who are or
were engaged in pastoral activities, because bedouinism includes all
types of economic activities practised by long range, short range,
semi-settled and settled nomads. It also implies a definite tribal
organisatIon and a comon outlook. (7) The variance is limited to the
economic activities practised and the type of habitat and housing
conditions.
There are various patterns of production (pastoral and non pastoral)
existing among the bedouins in country. These vary between the purely
nomadic to the completely non-pastoral activities. 	 They may be
classified as follows:-
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1.	 SUBSISTENCE LONG-DISTANCE PASTORAL NOMADISM: Groups who are
practising this form of production are camel herding pastoral units,
who are either completely unengaged in any alternative forms of
production, or only marginally so. They are also involved in pastoral
migratory movement throughout most of the year (camping during the
suiier months).
In 1964 Al-falali identified three tribes which have among their
sections such long-distance pastoral nomads. 	 These are Al-murrah,
Shamer and Al-Dawasir. (8) Al-murrah are the most nomadic of all the
tribes in Saudi Arabia.	 In fact they were dubbed "Nomads of the
nomads" by Donald Cole in 1975. (9)	 The other two tribes have
sedentary factions, as well as semi-nomadic ones.
Even the members of the most nomadic tribe in Saudi Arabia, the camel
herders of A1-murrah, were increasingly becoming less nomadic in the
1970s: either by taking up wage labour, or by switching to more market
oriented sheep and goat herding, (10) which allow them more flexibility
to seek work outside the pastoral economy.
	
Agriculture, which was
hardly practised In the 1960s (except for date-palm gardening), became
more coniiion in the 1970s for these groups of bedouins. A study of the
Saudi bedouin in 1978 showed that 53% of bedouins seen in the summer
camps were either wholly or partially engaged in agricultural
activities. (11)	 Some of these bedouins were long-distance nomads.
About 68 percent of these engaged in agriculture, however, reported
that they produce only for domestic consumption.
The main feature of long-distance pastoraltsm is its dependence on
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camel herding.	 All purely nomadic groups in the country who are
reducing the degree of their nomadic activities need to lower their
dependence on camel herding, or switch to other herds. (13) That is
because camel herding signifies subsistence and extensive movement.
Alternative herds (sheep, goat, and cattle) are more suitable for a
more sedentary cash economy, because of their meat quality, care and
grazing patterns.
The 1978 study, mentioned above, showed that the degree of nomadism
correlated	 significantly	 with	 type	 of	 animals	 raised.	 (14)
Long-distance nomads raised three times as many camels as the
semi-nomadic groups. Even the size of the animal herds owned was on
the whole less among the semi-nomadic.
Long distance camel herders are becoming more rare at present in the
country, but they have not completely disappeared. In fact 18% of the
bedouins interviewed by Ibrahim and Cole in 1978 were camel herders.
They did however receive outside incomes such as pensions, wages for
membership in the reserves of the military, and/or money from relatives
in employment. (15)
2.	 THE SEMI-SETTLED, AND SHORT DISTANCE PASTORALISM: There is no
clear classification of the variable patterns of activities within this
category of pastoralism. The terms semi-settled and semi-nomadic are
sometimes used interchangeably.	 The short distance nomads are also
included in this intermediate stage between pastoral nomadism and the
sedentary state. The main feature of the semi settled groups is a
mixed household economy in which agriculture and/or wage labour are
added to some form of pastoral activities.
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Ibrahim and Cole did not make any distinction between short range
nomads and the semi-settled in their study of bedouins in Saudi Arabia.
(16) Both groups were shown to be more dependent on sheep and cattle
herds and more involved in agricultural activities. Their agricultural
production, however, was predominantly for domestic consumption. (17)
The following features were identified by the two writers among the
semi-settled groups, as regards the leftover characteristics of the
pastoral nomadic legacy:
A Animal raising: The types of animals raised either
shifted to sheep or cattle instead of camels, or have
been diversified to include all three.
B	 Curtailed or occasional movement: 	 The roaming of the
bedouins has been greatly modified, either by confining
it to a reduced area, or to make it occasional. This is
done with an established home base, in which the people
of the tribe reside, such as Hujar, villages or oases.
The majority of the tribes in Saudi Arabia were identified as
semi-settled in 1964 by Al-felali. (18) This includes the Utaibah
(from which the lineages under study come). They are mostly sheep
herders, whose movement is confined to short-range pastoralism or
occasional spring time outings. Most semi-settled tribes, however, may
have sections that are sedentary or nomadic bedouins.
3. THE SETTLED BEDOUINS: There is a degree of confusion among
some writers as regards the classification of some tribes (or sections
of tribes) in Saudi Arabia, as bedouins. Historically speaking, there
are mostly sedentary tribal people who were long established in farming
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villages and communities. The trouble lies in the widespread nature of
tribalism in most areas of the country, and the prestige attached to
the "pure bloodline" of the tribals.
This picture is universally accepted by both the bedouin tribals and
the sedentary ones; and it is strongly felt by the strict refusal of
the tribals to intermarry with members of non tribal communities or
families, even when they have higher economic or educational status.
The sedentary tribals would never identify themselves as bedouins
vis-a-vis the settled bedouin community.	 The latter are generally
thought of as rough, ignorant and aggressive, because of the recency of
their incorporation within the national setting, the general lack of
education and the low economic status of most of them. The sedentary
tribals, nonetheless, emphasise their tribalism and "bedouin origins"
vis-a-vis non tribals and non Arabs, to establish themselves as part of
this respected cultural tradition.
The settled bedouins are members of pastoral nomadic tribes who are
completely established in towns, hujar and villages. 	 They may
incorporate some of the pastoral legacy within their economic
activities, especially if they are rurally based. Animal raising and
movement may be incorporated to a limited degree within the household
economy, along with agriculture and/or wage labour.
Lineages may incorporate both settled and semi-settled and short range
nomads, as was observed among the lineage under study. The settled
bedouins share with the non-settled a common outlook, culturally
speaking, but differ in their habitat, housing, and the degree to which
pastoral activities are emphasised in the household ecànomy.
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SECTION II
1	 Animal Wealth Generally in Sajir
The region of Sajir is considered rich in the area of
livestock breeding. An estimate of animal wealth in 1979, by
the MAW regional office put the numbers of animals as follows:
	
140,000	 sheep
	
8,500	 camel
	
6,200	 goats
	
1,500	 cattle
	
7,500	 chickens
A later estimate by the same office in 1984 put the numbers of
sheep and camel herds owned by residents of Sajir, and the
other villages and bedouins hijars surrounding it, at about
700,000 head of sheep and 30,000 camels.	 The increase in
livestock in the region is due to a) natural increase in the
already existing herds, b) the inclusion of livestock owned by
the pastoralists, who are settling in the region, and c)
increases due to newly purchased animals and newly established
livestock operations. 	 Despite the lack of precise data
relating to the settlement of Sajir alone, It is clear that
the bedouins in Sajir are predominantly sheep breeders, with
significant ownership of camels. 	 Sheep and camel breeding,
however, is not constructed according to the modern models of
animal farming, but follows the traditional methods of
pastoral nomadism, despite some significant changes which will
be examined later in this chapter.
There is some movement toward modern livestock breeding by
residents of the region, which is exemplified by loans taken
through the agricultural bank for the construction of sheep
breeding operations on the farms of settled bedouins. These
were six in number in 1983, four of which were obtained by
residents of Sajir. The loans for these projects ranged
between SR 2.8 to 5.2 million. None of these projects were
visited by this researcher, because they were mostly under
construction.
The animals on the farms are mostly kept in the open, as near
to the farm buildings and/or the farmer's houses as possible.
They are prevented from escaping by wire fencing, but there
are no specific buildings or barns for special purposes in
relation to the animals. The grazing pattern corresponds more
to the set traditions of pastoralism, especially for the
larger herds, and for the farmers who can bridge the gap
between the needs of alternative economic activities (such as
agriculture and employment), and grazing requirements. Wage
herders, for example may take the herds into the desert for
lengthy periods, or for the day, more particularly in the
spring or during periods of rain. Even the animals that are
kept on the farm throughout the year are grazed on the
uncultivated areas of the farms, and have no specific fields
for grazing.
Supplementary feeds and veterinary service are becoming
increasingly utilized by the bedouins of the region, because
they are respectively subsidised and provided free by the
government. This is true even among the semi-settled and
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short-range nomads of the region.
	
Demand for animal care
services, however, outstrips availability of qualified and
trained personnel, according to the MOAW regional offices in
Sajir. Transportation to remote pastoral communities is also
a constant problem for the trained personnel.
The overwhelming majority of people in Sajir are settled
bedouins, who are sedentary throughout the year, but still
retain some of the animal raising aspect of pastoralism.
Al-Hanatish lineage still has a number of households who
remain short range nomads, roaming the desert pastures around
their home base Sajir. According to their kin, however, it is
only a matter of time before they settle completely, because
the younger members of these households desire the
sedentarised conditions.
2.	 Animal Wealth Among the Interviewed Bedouins:
Three elements were examined as regards animal wealth.
A	 Nature and magnitude
B	 Caring and feeding methods
C	 Relationship between animal wealth and other economic
and ideological factors.
A	 The Nature and Magnitude of Livestock Owned.
37 persons of the 38 interviewed owned livestock (see table
7.1). All were co-operative when asked about their number,
except one who saw it as an invasion of his privacy, and
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Table 7.1
The Division Amon g the Persons Interviewed
According to Ownershi p of Livestock
(1)	 One person in this category refused to give details about livestock
operation.	 He will be subsequently omitted from the coming 'Sheep
Ownership' analysis.
merely reported that his livestock is sufficient for domestic
use. That person will be omitted from the subsequent analysis
of sheep ownership.
Cattle ownership among the interviewed bedouin appeared to be
marginal, both in terms of numbers of individuals, and also in
that it was merely incidental among large livestock owners,
who depended mainly on their herds of sheep and camels. This
reflects the relative unimportance of cattle on the national
level among the farming communities, especially in the central
region. Although dairy farming does exist on a large scale in
Saudi Arabia, and has even reached self-sufficiency level, it
seems to have originated from urban sectors as capital
investment. For the above reasons, cattle ownership will be
largely ignored in this analysis.
1.	 Sheep Ownership
A total of 37 individuals owned sheep as a major component of
their livestock. The settled condition of bedouins favours the
adoption of sheep herding as opposed to camel herding, because
sheep are more adapted to reduced mobility as well as being
easier when it comes to methods of caring and feeding. More
importantly, the demand for their meat has always been greater
among the settled Saudi Arabians. That demand has increased
over the years, with population growth and better living
conditions in rural areas as well as urban ones.
It was interesting for the researcher to note that most
bedouins interviewed preferred to give, neat rounded numbers
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when reporting the size of their sheep herds (rounded to the
50s or lOOs). That suggested a lack of accuracy, either
because they did not know the precise number of their sheep,
or reflecting an element of exaggeration in reporting the size
of the herd. The first stated possibility in this
researcher's view is highly unlikely, because bedouins were
more precise when reporting the size of their camel or cattle
herds, even among large owners. The element of exaggeration
was, however, substantiated in many instances. In some cases,
individuals actually gave inaccurate information that was
contradicted by another member of the family (One such was by
a wife who was attending the interview, while others were by
another member of the family prior to the interview or after
it). Exaggeration of the number of animals owned could well
be in order to present a favourable impression to the
researcher and other persons present during the interview.
Boasting of
	 camel holdings was also a factor, but took
another form and will be discussed in the relevant section.
2.	 Size and Market Value of Sheep Herds
A majority of 17, according to the data provided by those
interviewed, owned between 100-200 head of sheep (see table
7.2). The price of sheep varies according to a) the breed,
and b) the animals' size. The most valued variety of sheep is
the Najdi one (called after the region of Najd) for both its
meat quality and large size,
A Najdi head of sheep may reach up to SR 800, and is valued on
average at SR 700 (about $ 200). Other varieties averages at
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TABLE 7.2W
DIVISION AMONG PERSONS ACCORDING TO NUMBER OF SHEEP OWNED
(1) Six individuals owned 100 head of sheep in this category.
SR 370 ($ 105).	 The Sheep herds of the region are mostly
composed of the Najdi variety, but for a conservative estimate
this study will assume that the herds are composed of half
Najdi sheep and the other half of different varieties of
sheep. In this case a bedouin owning 200 head of sheep would
be in possession of assets worth SR 107,000 (approximately $
30,570).
The Saudi bedouins, however, have tended in the past to retain
their livestock holdings as fixed assets, and seldom do they
market them in large quantities.	 Instead they only market
during high market values (during Hadj when demand is very
high), and/or when absolutely necessary.
3.	 IncentIves for the Breeding of Sheep
24 Bedouin farmers interviewed owned 100 or more head of
sheep, amounting to a capital of at least SR 53,500.	 The
reasons given by those 24 individuals as regards maintaining
livestock ranged from marketing only to domestic use only.
One individual also gave his reason as being tradition.
Owners of sheep herds of less than 100 all stated that they
kept animals only for domestic use; except that here too,
there was one (55 head of sheep), who stated that it is a
tradition for him (see table 7.3)
In the majority of cases, as seen from table 7.3, animal
wealth as regards sheep herds was maintained for both its
marketing value and for domestic use. Ownership of less than
100 head of sheep does not seem to be regarded as substantial,
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TABLE 7.3
DIVISION AMONG PERSONS INTERVIEWED ACCORDING TO CATEGORIES
OF OWNERSHIP AND THE STATED PURPOSE OF LIVESTOCK BREEDING
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and thus the households in this category maintain animals for
domestic purposes only. Marketing was mentioned 16 times as a
purpose for breeding among the '100 or more' category of
owners, while domestic use was mentioned 18 times by the same
category. Keeping in mind the considerable value of 100 herd
of sheep, it seems puzzling that such a viewpoint should be
taken.
In an effort to examine this further, the '200 or more'
category of owners was looked at to determine something about
what level of ownership signifies marketability to the animal
owners. Even then, not all listed marketing as an incentive
for animal breeding (see table 7.3).	 In fact three of the
eleven owners maintained that domestic use was the sole reason
for livestock breeding, one of whom owned 300 head of sheep
and 60 head of camel.
The above mentioned individual is a member of the Amir of
Al-Tasrir's household, one of the largest landowners in the
sample, and the largest cultivator and producer. Their large
farming enterprise (described fully in chapter 6) employs
three animal herders, with no involvement of the members of
the household in the caring and feeding operation. 	 All
livestock,	 moreover,	 is maintained within the farm's
boundaries, which means that coninercially obtained fodder is
needed for the animals.
The sketching of this particular household is intended to
demonstrate the contradiction between a highly commercial
farming operation and an ambiguous livestock operation. The
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management of the livestock breeding of this household
followed a commercial pattern, but the purpose of breeding
followed a traditional line.	 This pattern was never
demonstrated in any of the agricultural operations observed,
but was frequently seen with regard to livestock holdings.
Without drawing any conclusions at this point, possible
explanation of this could include the following:
1) The strength of the ideological and traditional heritage
of pastoralism, still felt by the bedouin farmers.
2) The large size of the households, which in many cases
include fathers, mothers, brothers, their wives and
children, in addition to unmarried sisters. Collective
ownership may appear substantial, but may seem less so
if we consider the number of owners.
3) An element of exaggeration, which was demonstrated
earlier, when reporting the size of herds.
4) The strength of domestic requirements by the household
for animal meat and by-products.
5) High incomes generated from farming and other resources,
which render livestock holding unimportant within the
household econorrjy.
4	 Forms of Domestic Usage of Animals
Domestic usage of animals at present in the bedouin
households, indeed all rural households, relates mainly to the
tradition of hospitality among Saudi Arabians, and
specifically among the bedouins. Sheep are slaughtered
regularly for visitors to the bedouin household. One sheep is
enough for a small occasion, but the pattern is for two or
more sheep to be served to the visitors. The perceived status
of the visitor and his/her relation to the household
determines the number of sheep slaughtered. The cooked heads
of sheep are usually put in a position of prominence on the
serving dishes, to demonstrate the hospitality of the
household, and the degree of honour of the visitor(s). This
form of usage for sheep meat was demonstrated clearly in
Sajir. Sheep milk, however, is not offered to the visitors as
frequently as camel milk (which is considered as a delicacy
rarely enjoyed by non-bedouins). It can be used by the women
to make a traditional snack called Iggt, which is served with
sweet tea or offered on its own. This snack is made by
thickening the milk, shaping it into round thin slices, and
then drying it under the sun. Although craved by some of the
urban population, the demand for iqqt is falling because the
hygenic conditions of preparation are perceived as bad. Iqqdh
is not sold in Sajir, nor is it habitually served for
visitors.	 If it is made, then it is usually for household
consumption.
Sheep and camel wool, which was traditionally spun by the
women for the making of rugs and tents, is no longer used by
the bedouins of Sajir. There was no evidence to suggest that
this traditional handicraft is still maintained by bedouin
women in Sajir. Very old women knew the art of spinning and
weaving, but no longer practised it, nor were younger women
taught this craft. The beautiful tent room dividers which are
characteristic of the traditions of bedouins were rarely seen
by this researcher, and when seen they were mostly heirlooms
of the pastoral past.
Sheep meat and less frequently camel meat is mostly bought
from the local market by the majority of the households
visited, which suggests that the animals owned by the
household are not kept for the daily need of the family
members. The Hadj period, however, is a time when livestock
can be important to the household. All muslims must offer
religious sacrifice on a specific day during Hadj. The number
of sheep slaughtered is a reflection of the economic status of
the members of the household, and their religious inclination
(rarely less than two). Rural households make a point of
keeping sheep for such a purpose, and the commercially minded
sell some of their animal stock at this time of high demand
and high prices.
Domestic use, on the whole, appears to retain some of its
importance as an incentive for maintaining livestock. It does
not retain, however, all of the important aspects of the
traditional usages (such as those for wool for spinning and
weaving, or milk for drinking and cooking). The meat value,
nevertheless, remains an important element in the domestic use
of livestock.
5	 Camel Ownership and the Value of Camel Herds
21 of the interviewed bedouins owned camels. The number of
camels ranged between 1 and 150.	 Almost 80 percent (16
individuals) owned 20 camels or less (see table 7.4) 	 The
large owners of camels tended to be the settlers of the
hamlets surrounding Sajir proper, where vast areas of
uncultivated land are available.
	 The ownership of camels
does not appear to correspond to the date of settlement. The
owners of the largest camel herd (150 head) settled in 1949.
Another household (60 camels) settled in 1960, and yet another
(40 camels) in 1978.	 On the other hand, a household that
settled in 1980 owned only 14 head of camel. So the decline
of camel ownership can not be linked to recency ofsettlenient
in the previous cases.
The high value of camels in the Saudi market - around SR
10,000, on average - makes the ownership of 20 camels an
asset of considerable value.	 Camels, however, are not
marketed widely in the Kingdom.	 Their meat is tough and
requires a great deal of cooking, but their position as the
major beast of burden in the past has been instrumental in
evolving their image of being noble animals (not unlike the
horse in western society). 	 Breeds of camels are precisely
known for their milk production, endurance, speed and other
characteristics.
The narrow specialised market for camels, in which they are
valued highly, is among the pastoral nomadic comunities for
whom the camel is a source of livelihood, and among the
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TABLE 7.4
DIVISION AMONG PERSONS ACCORDING TO
NUMBERS OF CAMEL OWNED
CATEGORY	 NUMBER
20 or Less	 16
21-40	 2
41-60	 2
More than 60	 1
TOTAL	 21
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princes and elites of the Saudi society who use them for
racing.	 This has contributed to the rapid increase in the
value of camels on the market That, however, does not
negate their relative unimportance in terms of meat quality
and domestic uses in the national context. The maintenance of
camel herds is also expensive in settled conditions, which
does not explain the purpose for which they are kept.
The interviewed bedouins did not make any distinction between
the incentives for breeding camels, and those generally stated
for livestock breeding (see table 7.5). An interesting point,
is that there was no greater reference to traditions among the
large camel owners. Of six large owners of camel herds among
the interviewed, only one stated that livestock breeding was
because of traditions.
6	 Relationship of the Ownership of Camels to the
Ownership of Sheep
The data suggests that ownership of camels corresponds closely
to the ownership of sheep (see table 7.6). That seems to be
In terms of sheer number of animals, as well as numbers of
persons in corresponding categories of ownership. For
example, the owners of "less than 200 head of sheep", who
numbered 25, owned between them 125 camels. The larger
category of sheep owners "200 or more", and who numbered 11,
owned between them 364 camels. If we look at the numbers of
persons in each category, we will find that the persons in
corresponding categories of ownership out-number the persons
in differing categories of ownership.
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TABLE
DIVISION AMONG CAMEL OWNERS ACCORDING TO THE
STATED PURPOSE OF LIVESTOCK BREEDING
t8O
TABLE 7.6
THE RELATIONSHIP OF OWNERSHIP OF CAMEL AND SHEEP
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What this suggests is that the bedouins of Sajir do not tend
to specialise in either sheep livestock or camel livestock.
This is surprising, considering the fact that the Utaibah
tribe is commonly held to be a semi-nomadic tribe,
specialising in sheep grazing. It also suggests that there
are other factors operating here, as regards the traditional
values and the economic ability to pursue them. These will be
considered at a later point in this chapter.
B	 The Care and Placement of Animals
Two elements were looked at: 1) the carers who perform the
chores of herding, feeding and milking; 2) the grazing and
accomodatlon patterns.
1	 The Carers
In the majority of cases (29 out of 37) wage labour performed
the chores of herding and milking (see table 7.7). This was
the case even when the numbers of animals was small. In one
case the householder owned only 15 head of sheep, but his farm
labourers performed the chores necessary for their
maintenance, in addition to their other duties.
Where the chores were performed by the family members, the
carers were listed as the mother, father, wife and sons. In
two of the five cases, the number of animals was small
(15,22). The job was therefore easily handled by the women in
the household, and did not involve any period of absence from
the farm. The elderly members of the households (mothers and
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TABLE 7.7
DIVISIONS AMONGST HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO THE
CARER OF ANIMAL HERDS
CARER	 NUMBER
Wage Labour	 29
Wage Labour and Family Members
	 3
Family Members	 5
TOTAL	 37
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fathers) also play a role as carers and supervisors of care;
their skill and experience was employed in two of the five
cases.
The one remaining case is an interesting one because it
highlights some important issues. The householder in question
stated emphatically that his sons performed the functions of
carers. As a father of ten sons and daughters (from three
wives), this seemed plausible; except that his herds were
large by local standards (300 head of sheep and 5 camels).
The sons, moreover, were all attending school, while the
daughters were not. The grazing pattern of the animals, also
involved all day grazing in the surrounding desert, and only
being returned to the farm at night.
The interesting point here is that such a herd requires a
labour input that could not be fully met if the carers have to
attend school. The females of the family and/or hired farm
labour, therefore, must participate in fulfilling the role of
carers. The recency of settlement of this household (1977),
and the small number of farm hands (two only), suggested that
the farmer was reluctant to admit that his daughters were
engaged in the grazing task. This was also generally observed
during the Interviews, whereby most farmers said that they
would never allow their daughters to graze the animals for
religious reasons, and in order to protect them from the
dangers involved in long periods of absence from the farm.
Despite the fact that women traditionally were a major element
of pastoral and agricultural production, in which they were
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frequently absent from their homesteads (gathering wood,
grazing animals, harvesting, and collecting water), 	 Islamic
principles discourage and prohibit contact between women and
men who are not their close relatives. The sedentarization
process, and the gradual integration of the bedouins within a
very religious society, coupled with the economic ability to
dispense with women's labour within the traditional structure
(when replaced by hired labour) have all led to a situation
whereby a man is not considered as doing his duty toward Islam
or his women if he allows them to do such chores. 	 The
perceived danger of these chores, such as grazing which
involves the unaccompanied absences from the home, is the
development of illicit relationships, kidnapping, and rape.
These happenings, however, are never publicly admitted because
in all these forms they are tarnishing to the honour and
reputation of the whole households.
In the eight cases in which family members were mentioned as
carers, seven listed a female member of the family. Their
chores however did not involve grazing, but only milking and
feeding. Even then, oddly enough, the daughters were never
directly listed by the head of the household. But when the
mothers were questioned about their daughter's contribution to
the caring and feeding of the animals in the household, it was
clear that they do participate in this. 	 Their contribution
and duties were perhaps seen as an extension of their mother's
duties and role within the household.
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2	 Placement of the Animals
The majority of the population of Sajir kept their animals
exclusively within the boundaries of farms. This was also
true of the interviewed bedouin farmers (see table 7.8). Of
the nine cases who did not, four did not graze them very far
from the place of settlement. 	 These four households were
settlers in hamlet settlements around Sajir, who enjoyed the
spatial freedom of uncultivated land surrounding them. Three
of them employed herders.
A further four cases kept their animals in the desert for
prolonged periods. 	 All of these employed herders (in three
cases more than one).	 All had camel herds, but only two
listed family members as joint carers. 	 The remaining last
case kept the animals mostly in the farm, but took them
occasionally to the desert.
Some of the bedouins in the two last categories (table 7.8)
said that they sometimes accompanied their herds to good
grazing pastures in the spring, but that was strictly for
recreational purposes. 	 Only one household stayed with the
animals at all times. This was a short-range tent dwelling
pastoralist household, who were visited during the summer when
camped near their homebase hamlet in Sajir. The eldest son of
the family resided permanently in the settlement, with his own
family and other members of the lineage. He also operated a
farm owned collectively by all members of the extended family.
The elderly father, who is not disposed towards settlement,
managed the herds along with a younger son and other members
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TABLE 7.8
DIVISION AMONGST HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO THE
PLACEMENT OF ANIMAL HERDS
PLACE
	
NUMBER
Farm at all times
	
28
Farnt mostl y , occasionally in the desert	 I	 1
Farm at night, surrounding desert during
day	 4
Desert during winter and spring seasons 	 2
Desert at all times
	
2
TOTAL	 I	 37
8T
of the household. The continued pattern of movement by the
household, however, was curtailed and did not take them too
far from the lineages settlement.
C	 The Relationship Between Animal Wealth, Land Ownership,
Cultivation Size and Other Factors
The study's population are a group of settled or semi-settled
nomads. Group migration and subsistence pastoralism are not
elements in their behavioural pattern. Livestock appears to
be an important economic resource, used both within the
domestic economy of the household and as a commercial asset.
Some of the factors affecting animal wealth are the following:
1. Land Ownership: The availability of the space needed for
the accommodation and grazing requirements of large herds of
sheep or camels may be linked to animal wealth among the
farmers. Table 7.9 looks at the numbers of animals in four
categories of land ownership. It shows that the numbers of
animals increased dramatically in the over 300 ha category.
The numbers of animals (especially in camel herds) might have
been less in the 5 - 100 ha category, were it not for the fact
that just two farms accounted for 500 head of sheep and 70
camels. One of these households kept their animals in the
desert throughout the year, while the other was a recently
settled household (1978) in the hamlet of Al-Tasrir.
The two medium size farming categories (101 - 200 ha, and 201
- 300ha) had similar numbers of camels, but the number of
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TABLE 7.9
DIVISION OF SHEEP AND CAMELS BY LAND OWNERSHIP
AMONGST THE INTERVIEWED FARMERS
CATEGORY OF LAND	 DO NOT
)WNERSHIP	 KNOW	 25 - 100	 101 - 200	 201 - 300	 OVER 300	 TOTAL
Total Hectares Owned	 746	 1763 (1)
	
1909	 l90	 8608
Head of Sheep
)wned	 450	 972	 1620	 705	 2055	 5802
Camels Owned	 19	 105	 48	 42	 275	 470
lumber of Farms	 2	 10	 11	 7	 7	 37(1)
(1)	 One farmer in this category of ownership (135 ha) did not give data about animals
owned.
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sheep owned by the smaller one (101 -200 ha) was greater than
than owned by the larger one (201 - 300 ha). This again may
be due to just two farms owning 425 herd of sheep and 35
camels.
Despite the above limitation, the tendency is clear when we
compare the smallest with the largest categories of land
ownership. The largest owners of animals in all these
categories are mostly residents of hamlets at the outer
perimeters of Sajir, which means that they did not lack the
space for the daily grazing of animals, either in the
surrounding desert or on the uncultivated lands belonging to
their settlement.
2. The Economic Status of the Household: Cultivation size,
which was used in chapter 6 as the major indicator of economic
status in the agricultural operation, has been shown to
correspond to animal wealth among the bedouin farmers (see
table 7.10). Again here the tendency is quite clear when the
largest category of cultivation is compared with the three
other categories.
The "201 - 300 ha" category, which showed very poor
agricultural performance (see chapter 6), is again shown here
to be in a better position as regards animal wealth. In fact,
the ownership of camels in this category is less than that in
the "101 - 200 ha" category, and similar to the smallest
category "10 - 100 ha".
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TABLE 7.10
OWNERSHIP OF SHEEP AND CAMELS BY SIZE OF CULTIVATION
CATEGORY OF	 DO NOT
CULTIVATION	 KNOW	 10 - 100	 101 - 200	 201 - 300	 OVER 300	 TOTAL
Hectares
Cultivated	 968(1)	 1629	 1917	 1328	 5842
Head of Sheep
Owned	 450	 1667
	 1)	 1040	 1350
Camels Owned	 19	 109
	
104
	
47
	
210
	
470
Number ot Farms	 2	 15
	
10
	
7
	
3
	
37(1)
Average Number of
Sheep per Farm	 225	 111
	
129	 148
	
450	 157
Average Number of
Camels per Farm	 9	 7
	
10	 7
	
70	 13
(1)	 One farmer in this category of cultivation (70 ha.) did not give data regardinc
animals owned.
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The two farms in the "do not know" category, who have been
estimated to have 60 ha or less cultivation area (see chapter
6), are two households in which the pastoral experience is
very strong (one settled in 1978, and the other is involved in
short-range nomadism). 	 This accounts for their better
position as regards the average number of animals owned.
The strength and recency of the pastoral experience are
naturally expected to have a major role in increasing animal
wealth; but what was not expected is to find camel ownership
prevalent among all categories of cultivation, even among "101
- 200 ha" farms which showed the best agricultural
performance.	 This suggested that there are other factors
operative here, which contribute to the increase in the
ownership of camels (as well as sheep) despite the lack of a
truly comercial incentive.
3.	 Ideological Elements: There is an element of prestige in
the ownership of camels that was demonstrated frequently
during the interviews. Bedouins who owned camels talked very
proudly of them, and some invited the interviewer to visit the
site on which they were grazed or kept.
The prestige stems from the high value of the animals on the
market, and	 from the perception that camel ownership
maintains a link to the not too distant past or pastoral
nomadism. Nomadism is perceived as a noble system by both the
bedouins and the wider popular culture. 	 They would often
insist, during interviews conducted in modern villas, that
they are still truly bedouin and substantiate these statements
by refering to their camel holdings.
492
Question 68 of the interview brought out this aspect most
clearly.	 Individuals, in a significant number of cases,
included 'bedouin' in their definition of themselves. They
also prefered the word morzaraa (agriculturalist) to Fallah
(peasant farmer), and businessman to 'merchant'. This appears
at first glance a contradiction, because the term bedouin (in
its popular usage) negates modernity. The individuals
interviewed, however, wished to reaffirm their link to the
tribal structure, which is a major component of the dominant
ideology, as well as to the political power structure.
These elements, the economic and ideological, compete for
realization in the attitudes and behavioural patterns of the
population of Sajtr. There are strong indications for the
economic perspective as it relates to animal wealth at
present, such as its relationship to landownership,
cultivation size and the pastoral comercialisation of
livestock. The Ideological and traditional elements are also
strongly indicated, by the general attribution of camel and
sheep ownership to traditional and domestic uses, and the
marked reluctance to abandon this aspect of their traditional
economy.
Both, however, stop short of being completely realized. At
the economic level, the data indicates that the population of
Sajir do not operate at a fully corrunercialised level when it
comes to their animal herds. This is indicated by their
reluctance to commit livestock to the market. It is also
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indicated by the high incidence of camel breeding, which may
represent a substantial asset, but in fact represents
potential capital being withheld from other more dynamic
elements of the economic system. Even when comercialisation
is present, full exploitation of the livestock resources
(by-products) is not attempted.
At the other level (traditional ideology), the same holds
true. The rationality of the traditional bedouin pattern is
not fully realised.	 This is indicated by the shrinkage of
domestic usages, and the marked withdrawal of family labour
from the management of this resource. The traditional aspect
of livestock breeding was only mentioned	 five times by
individuals, when asked about the purpose of animal breeding.
This may be because there is an awareness among the population
that traditions are no longer practised, so they refrained
from mentioning them.
The crucial fact here is that the population of Sajir can
afford to indulge themselves at both levels, the economic and
the Ideological.	 The animal herds can be kept without the
full realisation of their potential in either the modern
coninercial sense or the traditional sense. This is due to the
following:
1.	 The	 agricultural	 operation	 has	 been	 generously
subsidised and supported since the start of the
agricultural development programe in the mid 1970s.
Substantial incomes are also generated from wheat
cropping (the major crop in the region at present), and
agricultural credit had been quite easily obtained for
the establishment of farms by the bedouin population.
This eliminated the need to either specialise or convert
the livestock capital into an agricultural one. It also
encouraged the farmers, especially the successful ones,
to convert some of their agricultural profits into
livestock holdings.
2. Animal herds were subsidised until 1979 (see chapter 4).
Feeds and fodder, moreover, are still subsidised, which
reduces the expenses Involved in the upkeep of animals
in the settled state.
3. The availability of recruitable cheap foreign labour at
low monthly wages (SR 500 - 700), in both the
agricultural operation and the livestock operation,
reduced or perhaps eliminated the competition for family
labour between those two systems.	 The farmers can
conveniently engage in both, without experiencing
difficulties or dividing their time between the desert
and the agricultural settlement.
4. Spatial considerations, important for livestock
(especially camels) are not a problem for the bedouins
of Sajir, because the land distribution system (Iqta)
offered them an opportunity for large landholdings, such
as are not available for other bedouins with no
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traditional rights to settlement. Al Nafoud desert,
moreover, is adjacent to the region, which offers the
pastorally minded farmers an important grazing ground
for animals.
5.	 As was seen in the previous chapter, most of the
interviewed bedouins had alternative economic resources
(various forms of employment and/or commercial
ventures), in addition to agriculture and animal
holdings. These resources distance the bedouins from
pastoralism, on the one hand, but they also encourage
wealthy households to invest more in livestock holdings.
The ownership of animals and the new patterns of their
management maintain the link with the most desirable
elements of the bedouin past, without jeopaordising any
of the other economic subsystems, particularly as
regards behavioural requirements.
Conclusion
Animal wealth was examined in detail because it is an important
economic aspect for Saudi bedouins in general, as well as for those in
Sajir. Livestock holdings, as was seen in the beginning of section II
of this chapter, are considerable in the region. They may also gain in
importance, if the present trend for modern sheep farming continues.
This trend is demonstrated by the six sheep rearing projects which were
under construction during the period of the field work in the region.
The importance of livestock to the farmers in Sajir can be reasonably
496
assumed to be a legacy of their pastoral way of life. This importance
was substantial, as is clear from direct observation, as well as in the
data from the interviews. Whether or not this affects their comitment
to sedentarism and the agricultural operation is an issue to be
examined through the data provided by the chapter.
Another concern was to look at the extent to which the traditional
aspects of pastoralism influence the present patterns in the livestock
breeding operation, and its relationship to other subsystems of
production existing within the household. For instance, how important a
role does It play in the determining the behavioural pattern of the
household, and what are the needs for animals and their by-products in
the domestic economy?
In the majority of cases, the persons interviewed behaved like
sedentary farmers regarding their livestock holdings, but felt like
pastoralists to themselves. Their absorption in the market economy of
the sedentary state was clearly exhibited by their greater dependence
and Involvement in other economic resources, like employment and/or the
agricultural operation.	 The livestock operation did not seem to
Influence either their behavioural pattern or any other concrete
elements of the household economy.
The evidence also shows that the bedouins have, to a great extent,
abandoned the traditional elements of the pastoral existence. Family
labour, for example, has been withdrawn from the livestock breeding
operation, and the various forms of domestic uses for the animals and
their by products have been neglected (except for meat). Subsistence,
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and the movement of the household alike, moreover, are largely
forgotten by the bedouins of Sajir. In fact, the only remnants of the
traditional way of life are the tendency to keep animals in large
numbers, and to hold them as fixed assets.
The above, however, does not define the present methods of livestock
breeding as modern.	 The bedouins in Sajir, at present, are in a
curious position. While pastoral labour has been transferred to hired
hands, and the economic rationality of the traditional system has been
largely abandoned, modern methods and full commercialisation have not
been adopted. The co-existence of these elements is encouraged by a)
the wealth and increased incomes of the bedouin households, and b) the
subsidised agricultural operation. 	 The first element encourages the
more wealthy to maintain livestock without any concentrated effort for
further development, while the second encourages the more pastoralist
of the bedouin households to enter into an agricultural economy, and be
like sedentary farmers and bedouins in the management of their
livestock.
Another element, which will be discussed more fully in the next
chapter, is the perception of some bedouins that animal wealth is a
facet of their economic system that ensures their future, in case of a
decline in the agricultural one, and/or other means of livelihood.
This is of course due to the considerable difficulties encountered in
wheat cultivation, and the obstacles facing the diversification of the
agricultural operation.
Whether or not this perception of livestock breeding as an "open
option" is in fact capable of reducing the ill effects of any setbacks
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for the households most at risk is a question that would need further
elaboration, and a more comprehensive look at the households in
operation. it is clear, however, that the "open option" applies more
frequently in the economically successful households, who can afford to
invest more capital in animal wealth, and pay the expenses of keeping
them in settled conditions.
Meanwhile, a valuable skill and expertise is being lost to a future
generation of Saudi Arabians. The adoption of foreign labour as hired
carers and herders, the withdrawal of the family's labour, and the
negligence of the traditional crafts and skills may lead in the future
to the unviabllity of the "open option."
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Chapter Eight
Selected Features of the Soclo-Economic System
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Introduction
The bedouins and pastoralists are often perceived as diametrically
opposed to sedentary farmers and an agricultural way of life. This is
so, both in the classical anthropological literature, and in the public
image of bedouins in Saudi Arabia. 	 This chapter will explore first
the means through which the images of nomads and bedouins become
possible in the literature, and in the popular culture of Saudi Arabia.
It will also examine how these images affected the study of the
sedentarization process, especially in agricultural settlements.
The latter part of the first section will explore 'bedouinism' as a
concept and a practice in the Saudi society at present, and how it
relates to the ideology and socio-economic system of pastoral nomadism.
The emphasis will be on whether or not 'bedouinism' at present still
retains the political and economic elements identified with pastoral
nomadism, and in what way do Saudi bedouins conform to this system.
The second section will concentrate on the data from the interviews
with the bedouins in Sajir. Its central concern will be the effect of
the legacy of bedouinism on the perceptions, self identification and
attitudes of the farmers, and also on their comitment to a farming
livelihood.	 The central point of the anaylsis will be the farming
aspect of the lives of the bedouins interviewed.
Two further elements will be discussed briefly in Section II: A)
Women's position in this society, and how it relates to the traditional
legacy; and B) a comparative study of how 23 sedentary farmers
responded to the same section of the questionnaire (relating to
perceptions and attitudes).
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This will hopefully allow us to pass judgement on how far the pastoral
bedouin ideology and way of life could be related to the actual current
practices of the bedouin farmers, and determine whether these
traditional aspects are visible in the interviewed bedouins' own
perceptions, attitudes and comitment to the farming operations.
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SECTION I - THEORETICAL ISSUES
1)	 Images of Pastoral Nomadism
Pastoral nomadism is often perceived as a distinctive social order,
which sets it conceptually apart from sedentary or peasant society
The differentiation between peasant societies and pastoral nomadic
societies rests on the differences in economic adaptation, and the
strength of the political organisation of the segmentary lineage
system. Specifically, the three elements characterising pastoral
nomads and which give rise to the differentiation between them and
sedentary societies are said to be the following:
1) A subsistence economy in which animals (rather than lands)
are the primary economic concern of the nomads.
2) The political-ideological system of segmentation, on which
the integration of most pastoral nomadic society rests, and
which is perceived as being characterised by an equality
between the segments (see chapter 1).
3) The ecological adaptation of mobility which allows nomadic
society to move with their capital (animals) whenever
threatened or whenever the need arises.
Connected to these perceptions of pastoral nomadism are other
perceptions of the social and economic order. These are that it tends
to be more egalitarian, independent and economically homogenous, than
sedentary. The images of the nomads also include that of hostile,
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mobile, and warlike societies, who have been (historically speaking)
the invaders of subjugators of peasant societies.
Clearly then, the central issues involved in the comparisons between
nomadic and sedentary society are focussed on:
1 - Animals versus land.
2 - Mobile conditions versus stationary ones
3 - Political independence versus political subjugation
The first issue involves a characterisation of the livestock capital as
highly volatile Herds can be built up fairly quickly (by
reproduction) and can be decimated even more rapidly (through droughts
and diseases).	 By this characterisation two images of the nomadic
economic structure emerge:
1) Under good conditions pastoral nomadism is capable of
great buoyancy and a high level of surplus production,
unmatched in peasant societies. This situation leads
the pastoral nomadic societies to a position of
dominance over sedentary ones, which finds expression in
structures of subjugation and political domination.
2) The nomadic groups, their animals and their ecological
resources are interconnected by the delicate balance of
nature, in which herd size, the number of people it
supports, and the ecological environment are mutually
dependent. This gives rise to the levelling effect by
which the groups remain economically homogeneous.
Deviations from this accepted structure are explained by
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the effects of outside agents (such as military
conquests, or involvement in non pastoral political and
economic structures) on nomads.
	 Other forms of the
levelling effect are (1) the dropping out of poor nomads
into an agricultural livelihood; and (2) the conversion
of the capital owned by rich nomads into land.
Two other characterizations of the nomadic capital (i.e. animals) are
said to bring about further differentiation between nomadic and
sedentary groups. These are the following:
1) Animals are essentially vulnerable to theft This
creates a need to develop a highly militarised social
order, in which protection- and hence aggression - are
dominant themes.
2) Animal grazing is linked to movement, which makes
nomadic pastoralism generally less ' routinised than
peasant agriculture.	 The herders, aoreaver, estirte
the probability of obtaining grass and water, on a
seasonal or daily basis.
	 This creates a need for
flexibility, whereby the group may disperse with each
small	 unit	 acting	 separately,	 and	 aggregate
periodically.
The need for protection from outsiders (other nomadic units or
sedentaries) and autonomy in pastoral nomadic societies is fulfilled
by the segmentary lineage system, wherein smaller units are free to
exercise individual decision making, while assured of the provision of
mutual protection. The individual independent household is linked to
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an ever larger structure until a major section of the social universe
is incorporated	 This provides the flexibility and military
readiness of the nomadic societies.
From the above characterisation of the nomads' economic and political
order and their mobility comes the perception of them as having greater
ininunity to subjugation by central governments, and greater capacity
for imposing structures of domination over sedentary villages and
settlements (through taxation and payments for protection). 	 The
segmentary lineage system, moreover, is often perceived as being
uniquely suited to pastoral nomadism because the segments are
essentially politically equal. This reinforces the idea of the whole
system as egalitarian and economically homogenous.
2)	 CriticIsm of the Classical Image
Needless to say, the above classical and stereotypical images of
pastoral nomadism have been the subject of close scrutiny by
anthropological and sociological research, which has left most of the
accepted assumptions practically shattered.
	
Theoretical challenges
include the following:
1)	 The validity of conceptualising pastoral nomadism as a social
order (7) or mode of production distinctive from sedentary
social orders.	 Pastoralists and peasants mut be seen as
sharing the coninon element of production for subsistence.
Concentration on the attributes of animal husbandry and
spatial movement reduces the analysis to the level of the
technicality of production.
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2) A theoretical distinction must be made between aboriginal
social groups, and historically determinate populations which
interact systematically with other societies. Most studied
nomadic societies are of this second kind	 Economic
constraints in the latter groups cannot be equated with
natural or ecological constraints, but are dependent on the
combined effect of the social conditions which facilitate or
inhibit systematic production, the appropriation of resources
and the accumulation of surplus. In other words, the applied
practice of livestock husbandry cannot give all the clues to
the articulation and transformation of the social system. (9)
3) The segmentary lineage system cannot be seen as uniquely
suited to pastoral nomadism, nor leading to a tendency for
egalitarianism (in combination with the system of animal
raising). Emperical data and theoretical investigation have
thus established that there is no social form coniiion to all
pastoral nomadic societies, and none that is perculiar to
them	 The danger of the category of fnomadismu becoming
analytically sterile prompted anthropologists to pursue two
options:
1) To fasten on the ideological and cultural features held
to be common to all nomadic societies according to some
anthropol ogical accounts.
2) To insist that the two elements composing the concept of
nomadism - namely (1) pastoralism as a productive
system, and (2) residence in mobile and fluid groups -
should be studied separately in their differing
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implications (12) S
The first option has an inherent implication of polarising the nomads
and the sedentaries. The ideological and cultural traits of nomadism
are seen as the opposite of those in peasant society.
	 The cultural
traits of pastoralists - namely, lack of interest in fixed property
and fixed resources, and the nomads' dependence on unimproved natural
environment - are seen as represented symbolically in the nomad's
tents, their migration, their animals, and other valuables. (13)
Settlement, in this framework, means a radical transformation of the
society.
This option is, however, rejected by anthropologists concerned with the
pastoralists among Middle Eastern populations. Tent dwelling and stock
rearing are not imbued with central meaning in these societies; in
which on the contrary nomadic pastoralism is a multi resource economy,
and in which the "nomadic ideology" turns out to be characteristic of
tribally organised people, settled or unsettled 14)• Many studies of
nomadic people and their process of sedentarisation show that there is
no central ideological or cultural polarisation that may inhibit nomads
from settling (see chapter 1). Nomadism and sedentarisation are seen,
therefore, to be economic adaptation rather than an ecological or
cultural adaptation and radical transformation.
3.	 The Significant Issues
The second option, of studying the two components of the concept of
nomadism - namely the productive system and the residential mobility -
separately has produced a wealth of material in which various
characteristics of pastoral nornadism have been central
	
Empirical
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data and comparative literature have been the basis for such material.
The central issues of the pastoral economies studied include herd
management, herd size, demographic features, and the significance of
the spatial mobility of the nomads in the political arena. The
segmentary lineage system is also a major focus for such studies. The
implications of such features are incorporated in the analysis of the
pastoral nomadic structure.
The study of pastoral nomadic societies in the Middle East has largely
followed the above theme of inquiry (the second option). Two broad
theoretical approaches have been identified by Ernest Geilner among
writers on pastoral societies in this part of the world: one which
views the flow of goods as central and another which takes the balance
of power perspective	 Both these economic and political
approaches, however, shy away from identifying generally central
ideological and cultural traits. This is because of three reasons.
One is the need to study nomads in their separate historically
determined situations. Another is that both approaches are structural
in nature, which limits the analysis to an attempt to show how certain
economic and/or political situations constrain the society into courses
of actions, which have particular results. Thirdly, the ideological and
cultural approach has been largely unsuitable for the study of Middle
Eastern nomadic groups, who have a symbiotic relationship with the
sedentary societies, and who are on the whole multi-resource economies
that practise agriculture as well as pastoralism.
A.	 The Cultural Consequences of Sedentarisation
The tendency to ignore the 'ideological ' component of pastoral nornadism
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has led to a vacuum in the recent significant literature. As a result
the classical conceptions of what it is to be a nomad survived to a
limited extent, especially when nomadic societies have been studied
during the sedentarization process. W Goldschmidt, who represents some
features	 of	 the	 classical	 anthropological	 thinking	 on	 the
subject,identified the ethos of pastoral social systems in 1976 as
fall ows:
"People who live by herding animals have a pride, a hauteur,
a strong sense of the individual worth and a strong sense of
the nobility of pastoralism as a calling" (17)
Goldschmidt also identified seven alleged personality traits in
pastoral nomadic people (18), These are the following:
1) They are open in their interpersonal relationships to act out
their feelings rather than to supress them.
2) They are aggressive in the pursuit of their aims and
arititions, both politically and physically.
3) They are low in the expression of affection and have little
empathy for the suffering of others below them (women,
children, animals, and low status individuals).
4) They have a capacity to endure physical hardship and pain.
5) They have little interest in engaging in hard and monotonous
labour.
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6) They have a strong sense of machismo.
7) They are anxious about themselves, their status and the
projection of their future.
In outlining the consequences of the sedentarization process on the
Sebei nomads in the Southern Nilotic regions, Goldschmidt described
three areas of moral deterioration (19)• These are a) the increased
incidence	 of witchcraft,	 b)	 the	 break	 up	 of	 intrafamilial
relationships, and c) a generalised and pervasive anomie. Witchcraft
is seen by the sedentarized nomads as a tool to act out their hostility
or aggression, as a result of their inability to counteract a difficult
situation with effective hostility and/or the freedom to move away.
The break up of intrafamilial relationships and anomie are a result of
the loss of the strong sense of machismo and the meaningfulness of the
pastoral traditional ritual and values.
Philip Carl Sulzman, in a completely different vein, also identifies
three areas of change in the social, cultural and behavioural patterns
of the now sedentarized nomads of Baluchistan in Persia (20)• These
are the following:
1)	 A decline in lineage corporateness and solidenity, as a
result of the decline in co-residence and mutual economic and
political support.	 Lineage mates live together less, and
have divergent economic interests apart from pastoralism.
They are therefore increasingly less prepared to provide
economic assistance and political support. These changes are
due to sedentarization which results in a differing
involvement in other economic activities (i.e. migration for
511
wage labour, and/or irrigated agriculture) in addition to
pastoralism. They are also due to the decline of self-help as
a means for social control, and the increased economic
inequality between tribesmen in their new economic
structures.
2) Another change is the decline of patriarchal authority of the
traditional family, leading to an increase of egalitarianism
within the age strucutre.
3) A loss of the nomad's identity as a hardy fierce warrior.
The decline of nomadism and lineage solidarity, as well as
the new subordinate political and economic relationship with
the non-tribal members, have delivered a blow to the
self-definition of the tribesmen as autonomous and powerful
in their social world.
Salzman's description of the changes in the Baluchi society is
extremely relevant in principle, if not in detail to our present case.
It is undoubtedly valid for the Baluchi in their wider society in which
pastoral nomadism as a way of life had been somewhat marginal. An
issue that might be picked up from the above descriptions, however,
regarding the decline of lineage corporateness, is the emphasis placed
on the lack of co-residence and economic homogeneity in the settled
state (at the level of similarity). Are we to understand that when the
sedentarized nomads live together and participate in similar economic
activities (other than the traditional) then there would be a greater
level of lineage corporateness? This is partly negated by Salzman's
other factor leading to this change - namely that of the increased
economic inequality between tribesmen in their new production patterns.
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Salzman described the traditional animal wealth of the Baluchi as
unstable due to the droughts and occasional epidemics, which result in
losses for rich and poor alike. (21), The new forms of wealth, on the
other hand, are more stable and less visible.	 For example, lineage
mates have differing access to the water resource (for irrigated
agriculture), which	 creates a more stable form of economic
differentiation within the group. 	 Cash from wage labour and/or
smuggling, moreover, are invisible forms of resources, which are not
likely to be shared by lineage mates. 	 In fact Salznian notes in the
same context that protecting one's resources from less fortunate
lineage mates is an ongoing concern for relatively prosperous tribesmen
(22)
B.	 Settlement and Co-Residence
Co-residence has been picked up by Donald Cole in his study of the
Al-Murrah tribe in Saudi Arabia.	 He states that these tribesmen
derived settlement through a "tribal gathering place" where both the
nomads and their sedentarised relatives could interact together as a
brotherhood (23)• Despite not actually knowing what brotherhood means,
we can assume that lineage mates (the most important social grouping
for Al-Murrah and the Saudi bedouin society) see co-residence as a
major element in maintaining tribal relationships.	 By implication,
mutual support and a high degree of self help are seen to be effective
in lineages organised in this way.
According to Cole, Al-Murrah tribesmen look down on spontaneous
settlements by tribal groups in shanty towns outside cities, because
these represent to them the man's break from his tribal group.
Conversely, a lineage settlement in a convenient place in one's
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territory is seen as ideal to maintain tribal linkages and cohesion.
Cole, however, does not accept that Al-Murrah could maintain full
tribal organisation in a settled state. For him the tribal segmentary
organisation is part of their adaptation as nomadic pastoralists. On
the social organisation of the tribesmen in settlement, he writes:
"Settlement implies greater concentration of people and a
kind of rigidity that prohibits the process of fission and
fusion. Their recent settlement in shanty towns already
reflects a de facto break in the tribal social organisation,
although most of the settlers continue to think of themselves
as members of the tribe. We can expect the tribal
organisation to maintain itself at least partially only if
settlement is planned on a large scale throughout Arabia and
if conscious attempts are made to decentralise these
settlements in such a way that small groups of kin can settle
together and combine pastoralism with other activities (25),,
Although it is not precisely explained in the above what is meant by
decentralised settlements, it seems to be a situation whereby the
settlers are fully active in both the planning and implementation of
projects destined to change their way of life (26)• Cole, furthermore,
does not lay stress on the role of the "other activities" in the
pastoralist's society. Whether or not these activities are always
compatible with their "partial maintenance" of the tribal relationship
in the sense that he implies is debatable.
For example, there are marked differences between the effects of
engaging in different forms of agricultural activities on the pastoral
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societies in Saudi Arabia. As was seen in chapter five, simple
agricultural (baal) and date-palm gardening required very little labour
on the part of the bedouin, and did not conflict with the dominant
pastoral activities. Fixed land utilization in the baal case was
dependent on yearly fluctuation of rain, and extremely marginal to the
economy of the bedouin household (subsistence if they are lucky).
The two forms of irrigated agriculture - traditional and mainly
subsistence, and modern market oriented - are qualitatively diferent in
terms of nature and effect on the bedouin households dominated by a
pastoralist economy. Both, however, are achieved through a
decentralised form of land distribution (Iqta by the lineage leadership
to the lineage members on the lineage's land), and are also directly
connected to national characteristics of the rural economy at different
periods. The first (traditional and mainly subsistence) reduces the
labour coniiiitment to pastoral activities; while the other ends up by
completely altering the patterns of production and the levels of
agricultural income among the bedouin participants.
C.	 Settlement and Tribal Relations
Even when decentralised forms of land distribution are present, the
tribal leadership is devoid of its true political function. 	 Cole
himself testifies to this in his study of Al-Murrah:
"Today the tribe no longer enjoy the same degree of autonomy
as in the past and tribal leaders base their power on their
ability to act as intermediaries between the members of the
tribe and the rulers of Saudi Arabia (27),
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Even as far back as 1963, a special group study comissioned by ARAMCO
reached the conclusion that wealth had loosened the connection between
the tribal leaders and the corrvion man; and that the rise of a wealthy
central government has, together with this, promoted a more direct
relationship between the people and the top (28),	 states:
"Even among bedouins, we are told, the older tribal and
subtribal allegences are being replaced by the idea that the
centre and not the tribal head or his subordinate is seen as
the source of effective power and the place for submitting
petitions and bringing requests
The above was happening against a background which appeared to maintain
tribal	 relations, and the legitimacy of the tribal	 leaders.
Abduirahaman Said in 1980 stressed that "the Saudi government had been
most careful not to abruptly interrupt the authority patterns, the
National Guard, for example pays salaries through tribal sheikhs" (30),
Said most accurately asserts that the new social and authority
structures are a result of a new set of economic arrangements over
which the bedouin has very little control. He writes:
"The bedouin's realization of his vulnerability in the face
of the national economy sets in motion a chain reaction that,
often, results in a hurried restructuring of both social and
authority relationships." (31)
Others see the emerging forms of social and authority structures as
directly related to state policy. Helen Lackner wrote the following in
1978:
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"It is only in the 1960s and the 1970s that traditional
social structures have been uprooted under the contradictory
pressures of a traditionalist political system and economic
policies based on western concepts of development and
modernisation.H (32)
She goes on to say that the bedouin ideology is, on the one hand,
hailed throughout the state as an ideal to which all should aspire,
while on the other hand the state was established on the basis of the
manipulation of some social and political values
D.	 uBedouinismN: Contradictory Images
The contradictory atitutes to the bedouin ideology (rooted in the
nomadic past) were touched upon by Ibrahim and Cole in 1978. They
stated that there are contrasting views on the social status of the
bedouin. One is very high, which relates to the tribal descent and the
so-called pure blood line of the tribals (especially operative in
marriage situations). The other view, in constrast, regards the
bedouins as having very poor social status due to their lack of
modernity and education, as well as a perception that they represent an
anachronism in contemporary Saudi Arabia (34),
Ibrahim and Cole state accurately that one or the other of these two
views are sometimes held by diferent groups, even among the tribals
themselves as in the case of different sections of the Royal Family
The phenomenon, however, is more ambivalent than two differing
opinions held by different groups. In fact the two considerations seem
to be operative at the same time at a certain level. While one view
(high status) relates to the ideology of bedouinism or tribalism, the
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other pertains to the actual manifestation of bedouinsim in the present
society.	 Keeping in mind at the present state's determination to
settle the nomadic population since before the beginning of the Saudi
history, let us consider the following passage from the Second
Development plan (1975-1980):
"The bedouin have a complex highly developed social, economic
and legal system that has adapted to change over many
hundreds of years. Nevertheless, the pace of change in the
rest of the kingdom has recently been so fast that the
economic	 and social gap between the bedouin and the
remainder of the population is widening, consequently
specific programes based on realistic appraisal of the needs
and changing social and economic role of the bedouin are
required to improve the life of this segment of the
population." (36)
The above passage displays quite clearly the dualistic perceptions of
'bedouinism' by the Saudi system and ideology as on the one hand
positive and consistent with change (particularly the early ones),
while simultaneously being perceived as negative and not consistant
with the recent modern changes.
The same development plan characterises the bedouin groups as having
low per capita income in comparison to the national average, and a lack
of access to most social, educational and other services (37)•	 In
addition to the low economic status and lack of education (translated
as 'ignorance' in the popular culture), the Saudi bedouin also suffer
from images of violence, individualism and opportunism in the present
society. These images run in parallel to the idea that the present
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state-controlled conditions have given the Saudi society peace and
prosperity under the umbrella of an Islamic ideology. The Saudi state
is seen as having overcome the previous conditions of tribal wars,
strife and divisions.
The internalization of these ideas (which have some justification in
the history of the area) is clearly obvious to any observer of the
Saudi society. They also find their way into one dimensional academic
analysis of Saudi history, as in the following:
"King Abdalaziz conducted a very intelligent prograniie to
transform this society from strife torn society into a
comunity to which he taught the rneaing of citizenship,
stability and earning a living through means other than
plunder, killing and looting. He endeavoured to transfer the
people from the bedoulnism pastoral stage to that of
agriculture and settled family life. He imbued them with the
quest for knowledge, and strove to free their beliefs from
superstition and to restore them to the priority of Islam."
(38)
The 'plunder and looting' characteristics of the pre-state conditions
are of course related to full fledged tribal wars, and the practice of
raiding.	 The latter has been variously described as (1) a bedouin
sport in which no one got hurt (by John Habib) (39); (2) a form of
resource exchange in nomadic soiety (L Sweet); (40) and (3) a practice
which never involved casualties nor unmatched tribal groups (Donald
Cole). Cole also stated that powerful tribes in Saudi Arabia never
raided the other lineages of their own tribe, nor weaker or poorer
tribal groups. Only equal status tribal units and their animals were
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open to al-ghazzu (raiding) (41)• Tribal wars, on the other,hand, were
waged to obtain territories, or to subjugate another group or to
pillage (42)
Despite the absence of the above manifestations of the tribal way of
life at present, the idea persists that bedouin aggression and
individualism need to be controlled firmly, as in the following:
"It is very essential to bring the bedouins under increasing
control of the central government as an important step toward
their achieving	 more politcal stability and better living
conditions." (43)
Another manifestation of this image of aggression and violence is seen
in the present society in the differenciation between the two military
institutions: The Army, and the National Guard. The National Guard,
which is predominantly composed of tribal bedouin members is often seen
as a second class military institution, requiring a very low
educational level and also potentially violent and dangerous
On the individualistic nature of tribalism, Ibrahim and Cole wrote in
1978 that the tribal structure works in two ways: one that provides a
framework of unity and co-operation, and another which leads to
segmentation and exaggerated individualism. 	 The first leads the
members of the lineage or tribe to work together from comon economic
and social goals, while the other leads to extreme jealousy and lack of
co-operation among the segments of the tribe.	 The two authors,
moreover, state that the non co-operative aspect of tribalism is in the
ascendant in the present Saudi society
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The above leads to an impression that a tendency to maintain the
'ideology' of tribalism while endeavouring to remove the political and
economic function of the tribe leaves empty shell, in which only the
most biologically persistent characteristic (i.e. the segmentary blood
ties) is operative. As an example of this, Ibrahim and Cole related a
statement of a tribal member, in which he told them that within his
tribe, each family (extended household) wants a modern well, an
agricultural plot, and a school. None wanted to join together,
especially above the lineage level, to have comon schools or other
modern facilities. All facilities not specifically designed for them
and their own children were refused. (46)
Similar attitudes were observed in this study's region (see chapter 3);
not only among the bedouin comunities, but also in the villages of the
region (sedentary tribals). This situation leads us to conclude that
the Individualism that is seen as a negative manifestation of the
nomadic tribal ideology is actually aggravated and heightened by the
present conditions and not merely a legacy of the past.
The negative images of the bedouin in the present Saudi society, which
include poverty, ignorance, violence, aggression and individualism, are
at some level similar to Goldschmidt identification of the nomadic
personality. Some (like low economic and educational status) are a
direct result of the isolation of the bedouin groups. The others are
stereotypes that result from misrepresentation of the conditions
prevalent in the past, and/or a direct result of changes affecting
tribalism and the bedouin way of life at present.
E.	 The Bedouln Identity
While Salzman described the Baluchi nomads as losing their
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self-identification which was derived from pastoral economic adaptation
(i.e. hardy fierce warrior), the Saudi
	
bedouins situations in
sedentarized conditions is somewhat more ambivalent. On the one hand,
they represent to themselves and to others the closest link to the
'nomadic tribal ideology'.	 The positive images of this ideology
include bravery, generosity, hardiness and loyalty to one's group.
Certain manifestations of the tribal structure, moreover, continue to
be maintained; these include tribal territories, tribal leadership, and
the legitimacy of the Royal Family as the leaders of tribal (and
Islamic) people.
On the other hand, bedouin groups in the present modern society are
marginal in terms of integration into the new modern economic
arrangements.	 Their images are, furthermore, mostly negative and
seemingly call for more incorporation into broader political and social
structures through sedentarization. 	 This duality could lead to an
ambivalent self-identification by the bedouins themselves, if the
messages from the wider society are internalised.
Connected to the latter element is the idea that the bedouin groups are
the least likely to have a feeling of control over the new set of
economic arrangements, because they require a new set of personal
qualifications and a greater level of transformation in the internal
community (as discussed by A Said and referred to above).
The consequences of all the above elements for the self-identification
of the bedouin, and his perception of his relationship with the wider
society, must include tension between the pull of pride in representing
a revered cultural ideology, the pull of the traditional heritage (as
practised by fathers and grandfathers), and the pull of modern culture
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which offers improved levels of livelihood and incomes, and to which he
is considered inferior.
The inferior position of the bedouin to the modern society seems to be
internalised among the bedouins themselves. For example, the term
bedouin is used popularly to indicate ignorance, even among the
bedouins (or tribals) themselves. The bedouin of Sajir used the term
to describe themselves when indicating ignorance of certain matters, or
when refering to the lack of education of the females in their
households.	 The study's population self-identification will be
discussed more fully below.
4)	 Issues of Detail
The above analysis leads to the central issue of concern for this
chapter - namely that of the effect of the legacy of bedouinism on the
perception, self identification and attitudes of the interviewed
bedouins as regards their farming activities.
As seen before (chapter 5) Al-Hanatish in Sajir start the
sedentarisation process by a strong reference to their tribal identity.
This reference allows them to take their place in the settlement, and
to enter advantageously into a sedentary economy which include farming
as a major component. In fact it could be said that the Al-Hanatish
lineage has found the ideal situation (described by Cole in 1975) for a
desirable way of life, and for partially maintaining tribal relations
(see previous section).
Not only do the lineage mates have a "gathering place", but they also
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exploit similar resources, and have similar interests as regards the
dominant economic sub-system (farming). The distribution process of
these resources, moreover, is decentralised at the implementation
level, if not where its legitimacy originates.	 Furthermore, the
sub-groups in the lineage have an opportunity to retain as much of
their tribal and kinship cohesiveness as they desire. Hamlet
settlements in Sajir by minimal lineages, are in fact exercises of this
ability. The distribution of the resources in some of these hamlets is
also left to the sub-group and its leaders.
The analysis of animal wealth among the interviewed bedouins (chapter
7) also showed that the bedouin legacy exercises some influence over
the ownership and the management of livestock, if not on the
behavourial pattern of the owners. The interviewed bedouin,
furthermore, perceived themselves as pastoralists in relation to their
animal holdings, despite not being actively engaged in the relevant
traditions, nor in the behavioural requirements.
Moreover, the pattern of settiment of Al-Hanatish in Sajir and the
available resources (water, larger plots of land and grazing deserts)
are all elements that are not opposed to the continuation of a pastoral
economy. Some groups of the region have chosen animal breeding as a
dominant household economy, as opposed to a complete enmeshment in a
farming livelihood (see chapter 5). These elements can be seen as
positive forces for a continued identification with the bedouin
identity and the pastoral legacy.
On the other hand, an agricultural household economy is even more
advantageous to the bedouin household at the present time. The
economic and social rewards of a farming sedentary livelihood exceed
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differentiated economic status among the different groups of
landholders at present, not only in farming, but also in
relation to animal holdings (see chapter 7). This was
clearly observed when comparing the largest category of
landowners to the smallest one. This economic inequality
experienced by lineage mates cannot be encouraging to lineage
corporativeness, nor to the continued identification with the
group as a whole.
3. There was a marked tendency to depend on the state's
incentives for agricultural production, and especially on the
wheat farming prograrline as outlined by the state. This in
effect discouraged any other forms of cultivation, or any
internally devised alternatives in this farming community (as
well as others). Vegetables and other cereal production have
all but ceased in Sajir and the surrounding communities,
especially among the less economically advantaged group of
farmers who can not afford to initiate other farming
projects. This brings to mind A. Said's analysis of the
vulnerability of the bedouin in the face of new economic
patterns of production (see previous section). Most of the
largest farming projects (for cereal and fodder production,
milk production and vegetable production) in the region
represent urban based capital investments (see chapter 6).
4. A noteworthy element of the analysis of the farming operation
among Sajir's community was the high level of adaptability to
the new forms of agricultural production. This might not
have been expected of a pastorally orientated community,
especially among the more recently settled groups in Sajir.
The quick acceptance of the technically advanced farming
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methods and the new structures of production could represent
a natural push for an economically more advantageous
productive system. It is, nonetheless, indicative of a rapid
process of social change, which started earlier than more
recent developments.
In the light of the above considerations, i.e. elements in the social
system which encourage the bedouin identity and bedouinism, and other
elements discouraging to the traditional social structure (lineage
solidarity and bedouinism), this chapter will focus on locating the
effectiveness of the opposing factors in the interviewed bedouins'
perceptions and attitudes especially to the dominant economic
sub-system (farming).
Although the new forms of agricultural production have been already
identified as potentially and actually a distancing factor from the
traditional social systems, there is a need to know the effectiveness
of this recent development on the bedouin's perceptions and attitudes
to this important sector of their lives. We can not assume that the
new elements are already reflected in the general conceptions,
especially when the changes are recent, potentially limited to certain
time period (as long as state support is given), and are also opposed
by other existing traditional factors.
The areas that will be looked at are the following:
1.Perceptions of Agriculture (questions 63-67 of the interview, see
appendix). In addition to the empirical data of the interviewees'
opinion and views of the general farming issues, and their proposals
for the solution of the various farming difficulties; the analysis will
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also endeavour to locate the following elements of the farmers'
answers:
A	 The group as an effective agent in the perceptions of the
general issues and problems, and in the proposed solutions to
these problems.
B	 Perceptions of control over the farming operation, as
measured by a direct question and by a number of open ended
questions about agricultural issues. The emphasis will
include 1) the farmer as a passive recipient of change versus
an active agent in the process of change, and ii) self help
as a means for social control.
The two issues are derived from the analysis previously outlined in
section three of the cultural consequences of sedentarization as well
as the regional considerations outlined above.
2. Self Identification by the bedouin farmers. As seen in the previous
section, the bedouins perceived identity may be influenced by tensions
from three pulling factors: one originating from the close linkage to a
respected ideology (bedouinism), another connected to the traditions
practised by the fathers and forefathers of the bedouins in the not too
recent past; and yet another, which relates to the pull of the modern
culture with its new forms of economic patterns, which offer the
bedouin improved livelihood.
The analysis of this part of the data will consider the above, as well
as emphasising the interplay between the ideological and the economic
aspects of the bedouins' conceptions of themselves.
	
The latter may
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include not only farming as an important aspect of the farmers' lives,
but also employment and even livestock breeding as aspects of the
bedouin household economy.
3 Comitment to agriculture and other related attitudes. Despite the
virtual discrediting of the classical image of the nomads being hostile
and inimical to the sedentary agricultural lifestyle (by wide
anthropological studies of nomads settling in agricultural
communities), this idea persisted in the Saudi official circles
regarding the Saudi bedouin.
In 1969 Faisal Bashir described the great comitment of the bedouin for
the preservation of his history and his tribe. He went on to say:
"This kind of commitment to preserve and defend a way of life
and its history is a significant barrier for nomadic persons
considering abandonment of nomadic traditions and settlement
in villages or cities." (47)
Others saw the bedouins as despising agriculture and handicrafts (48),
or considering agriculture as a "craft" of which they are ashamed (49),
A report by a Saudi Arabian delegation in Jordan in 1965 described some
bedouins of Saudi Arabia as entering agriculture only when they are
obliged to do so.	 Their lack of experience and expertise, however,
disposes them to return to pastoralism after the need is eliminated
(50)
The above views may be partly an effort to explain the failure of the
official settlement schemes of the Saudi Government (Wadi Sirham, and
Haradh). They therefore do not emphasise the continous cycle of
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agricultural settlement by the nomads, nor their frequent practise of
dry and date-palm agriculture.
The internalization of this attitude in the Saudi popular culture was
demonstrated by the views expressed by some members of the official
personnel of the agriculture services during the fieldwork period, by
the members of the sedentary village comunities, and even by some of
Al-Hanatish themselves. These views voiced a doubt about the
comitinent of the bedouin to agricultural production, claiming that it
is partly due to the economically favourable circumstances of farming
at present.
In order to investigate this issue, two areas were looked at:
1. The nature of this comitrnent: i.e. for 'settlement'
only, or for the increased incomes generated by
agricultural production in Saudi Arabia at present.
2. The strength of this comitment (in case of reduced
incomes) and the desire to continue in a farming
lifestyle.
These issues are focussed on by questions 69 and 72 of the interview,
as well as question 75 which deals with the bedouin farmers' aspiration
for their children.
4. The latter parts of this chapter will focus on bedouin women's
position in the present social system, and the role of the bedouin
ideology in this position. There will also be a brief description of
the results of the interviews conducted with the members of a sedentary
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community (in Al-Burud). Only the issues of concern to this chapter
will be emphasised, to ascertain if there are indeed differences
between bedouin and sedentary conceptions and perceptions of farming in
the present Saudi society.
Section II The Interview Data
Before analysing the data from the interviews, a few cautious comments
may be pertinent at this point. Perceptions, self images and attitudes
are hard to measure at any point, because sociologists do not have a
yardstick by which to measure them. They become even harder to measure
when we consider the frame of mind of the researcher and his/her
subjects of study. The intellectual and attitudinal prejudices that a
researcher brings with him/her affect the way the people under study
respond to the so called 'scientific' survey. In this case two
elements must be borne in mind.
1. This researcher entered the interaction with the bedouin
farmers emphasising the agricultural operation as a safe
issue, and while endeavouring to study other things may have
focussed on the interests, perceptions and attitudes of the
bedouin farmers toward the farming component of their
economic livelihood. This in turn may have affected their
expression of other equally important interests and aspects
of their lives.
2. Being a native of the soclo-economic structure and an
interested party to some extent, the researcher may have been
either too enthusiastic for, or unimpressed by, particular
elements in the studied society. For instance, the
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researcher is enthusiastic for the continued existence and
development of the agricultural component of the
socio-economic structure, but hopefully without endangering
the smaller operators in the Sajir region. 	 This may be
opposed to a 'rational' economic argument, which stresses
productivity, efficiency and national interests. This
position, in turn, may affects the perception of the
importance of agricultural operations among the small
operators.
Another example would be in relation to the 'tribal
ideology'. A non-native researcher may become struck by the
frequency and strength of stated importance of this aspect in
the bedouin life. This one, however, is used to sedentary
'tribal' farmers talking in terms of tribe and lineage, but
acting on the basis of individual self-interest (even within
the nuclear family), as regards ownership of land and other
related interests.
Needless to say, by the mere fact of openly stating these prejudices
and perceptions, an effort is being made toward eliminating their
effect on the results to an acceptable level. The discussion will now
turn to the data from the interviews.
1) Perceptions of Agriculture
A Perceptions of Problems
There was an element of confusion in the way some farmers responded to
general enquiries about the agricultural operation. For example, when
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farmers were asked initially about the general problems (open ended
question), they referred to the immediate personal problems facing them
at the time of the interview. These run on the level of not having
enough money, where to store their wheat harvest, debts to SAAB and
other people, and/or not receiving their payments for the wheat
harvest.
When next asked specifically about certain general problems (see
appendix 1, question 64), they switch their concern to whatever worried
them most of the listed items. The most emphasised problem was
marketing and distribution of agricultural goods (see table 8.1).
Water shortages and crop diseases came second and third in order of
priority among all the farmers.
Only three farmers listed lack of own experience and lack of training
as the most important problem facing the agricultural operators in the
region. The farmers comments about "lack of own experience" and "lack
of training" were checked to see if in fact they represented a concern
for the farmers. Eleven of the interviewees saw 'lack of experience'
as somewhat of a problem, while 25 said that the experience is
available.
Lack of training, however, was picked as somewhat of a problem by a
larger number of farmers (than the eleven picking 'lack of
experience'). This type of comment was accompanied by negative
comments about the regional office of MAW and its services.
Labour shortage did not seem to be a concern for the overwhelming
majority of the farmers. Comments about agricultural labour were at
the level of difficulty in obtaining trained foreign labour, the delays
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Table 8.1
Farmers' Perception of Agricultural Problems
Problems Emphasised	 Number of Farmers
Marketing and Distribution of
Agricultural Goods (not wheat) 	 17
Water Shortage	 7
Crop Diseases	 5
Non Co-operation of Government
Agencies	 2
Lack of experience and training 	 3
Other	 3
None
Total
	 38
Table 8.2
Perception of Control Over Problems
Degree of Control
	
Number of Farmers
None	 21
Complete Control
	
6
Uneven Partial Control 	 11
Total	 38
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encountered in the process of recruiting, or difficulties in retaining
experienced farm workers.
B Perception of Control
The majority of the farmers felt they had no control over the farming
problems (see table 8.2). Eleven only said that some problems can be
controlled by the farmer, while six saw the problems as well within the
farmer's	 control.	 When	 perceptions	 of the problems were
cross-tabulated with perceptions of control, some contradictions
appeared to exist among those who expressed complete control over
farming difficulties, especially in the area of water shortages (see
table 8.3). This confirmed this researcher feeling upon examining the
data, that almost all of those who expressed a feeling of control over
agricultural problems were not quite well versed, nor fully experienced
in the agricultural activity.
Some examples may demonstrate this point. A farmer (recent settler)
answered the open ended questions about problems with "I have not
noticed any' s . He went on to coment on each listed item as "that is
not a problem", except for marketing and distribution. He went on to
explain that marketing is not a problem, but distribution is because
they have to rely on desert unpaved roads. When asked about why he
chose his answer "well within the farmers control" he said "I can
control my own personal problems, but not general issues."
Other explanations for choosing "control" were "the government gives us
everything," "we are farmers, we know everything on our farm", "after
preparing the land, we are in full controV', and fljf we are made
comfortable, we control everything."
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Table 8.3
The Farmer Perceptions of Problems and their Control over these Problems
Deree of Control
Problems Emphasised	 None f Complete	 Partial Control	 Total
Marketing and Distribution	 10	 1	 6	 17
Water shortage	 5	 2	 0	 7
Crop Disease	 1	 1	 3	 5
Non Co-operation of
Governmental Agencies	 2	 0	 0	 2
Other Problems(1)	 3	 1	 2	 6
None	 0	 1	 0	 1
Total	 21	 6	 11	 38
(1> These include: having no money, SAAB yearly repayments, lack of experience,
lack of agricultural training, and the climate.
Table 8.4
Proposed Action to Avoid or Lessen Farming Problems
Degree of Perceived Control
None	 Full	 Partial	 Total
Action by
State's Agencies	 16	 1	 6	 23
Action by
Farmers	 3	 1	 3	 7
Combined Action by
state and farmers	 1	 1	 0	 2
No Answer (1)	 1	 3	 2	 6
Total	 J21	 1 6	 I	 ii	 I 38
Five farmers did not understand the question posed. One
said that there are no problems to be solved.
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The majority of farmers who chose "beyond farmer"s control" were well
versed in farming problems, and idignant about facing them. The ten
who perceived marketing and distribution as the major problem, thought
of it as arising from lack of action by the government and/or the
monopolies exercised by the "middlemen" of the marketing operation.
Another five saw the problems arising from governmental agencies, and
only six saw natural problems (water shortages, and crop diseases) as
paramount.	 The explanations of their choice of "no control" were
overwhelmingly in relation to their perception of the state's agencies
as having the sole responsibility for the improvements and the
alleviation of the felt problems. 	 One young farmer expressed their
feelings eloquently: "Because we were nothing before the governments
support, and we cannot continue, nor meet our corinitments without the
continuation of this support."
The third group of farmers, who thought that some problems can be
controlled by the farmers, were divided into three groups when it came
to explaining their choice:
A -
	 Four saw some problems as arising from God's will and nature
(water, disease, productivty), and therefore beyond farmers'
control.	 Other problems, however, could be controlled by
farmers.
B -
	
Four saw marketing as beyond the control of the farmer,
whereas he could control problems arising on his own farm.
C -
	 Three saw the availability of money (material wealth) as the
major component toward the solving of all problems. Without
it, problems cannot be controlled.
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C) Proposals for Solutions
When it came to proposing solutions to the problems faced by the farmer
(see table 8.4), the majority of the farmers thought that only
governmental action would be able to eliminate the farming problems.
Here again, there was some inconsistency among the farmers who
perceived themselves in full control, and two of them were not able to
understand the question posed. The majority of the other two groups
(no control, some control) saw the solution lying in the hands of the
government.
When it came to the type of action proposed, suggested state actions
ran along these lines: "Solve marketing problems", "reduce SAAB debts",
"increase financial support", "provide counselling and crop management
facilities" and "solutions are difficult and are only understood by the
governmental agencies". The proposed actions by farmers, on the other
hand, were the following: "The farmers must change their attitudes
towards farming", " we must conserve water", "we must seek counselling
in relation to crop problems", "the farmers must concentrate on
farming", "we must form marketing co-operatives", and "we must seek
help from the government."
D An Overview of the Perceptions
In the above it is quite clear that the group's actions figured only
slightly in the farmers' answers. Only twice was collective action
ever mentioned by the farmers, and at no time was the lineage or its
leaders referred to. This is not surprising, when we consider that the
farmers'	 frame of reference was overwhelming towards others rather
than self when it came to the problems themselves and control over
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them, and also in considering solutions to these problems.
If, for argument's sake, we consider the anger and indignation of the
group of farmers who perceive no control over problems as an expression
of political potency or assertiveness (as opposed to passivity and
acceptance), then the question arises: why did they not express
solutions that included themselves as the active agents of change? In
fact, the third group of farmers (see table 8.4) who saw some measure
of control in the hands of the farmers, were more constructive in their
proposed actions.	 They are the ones who suggested marketing
co-operatives, water conservation and crop rotation.
In concluding this section of the analysis of the data, some tendencies
are clear. These are the following:
1 -	 The farmers interviewed tended to perceive themselves as
lacking control over their agricultural activities.
2 -
	 The "lineage" or group does not play an important part (if
any part) in the farmer's perceptions of their status as
farmers at the present time.
3 -	 The farmers tend to see themselves as passive recipients of
change, and passive agents in the process of change, when it
comes to their non-traditional activity.
It could be argued at this point that this researcher's emphasis on the
agricultural operation during the interviewing process has focussed the
attention of the bedouin farmers on their status as farmers. Answers
regarding other elements of their social system could have been,
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therefore, deemed inappropriate. This could well be true, but the
analysis at this point does not claim to cover other than this aspect
of their socio-economic system, which is after all a very important
element of their livelihood and their process of sedentarisation. It
is, therefore, legitimate for the interview to focus their attention on
themselves as farmers, and to draw conclusions from their answers at
least in this respect.
2 Self Identification
The farmers were, for the most part, reluctant to slot themselves in
one single mould of identification. Two tendencies were clear: a) a
need to call themselves bedouin, and b) a need to perceive themselves
as modern. The first tendency showed itself in insisting that they are
bedouin farmers. The second tendency showed itself in their preference
for the Arabic term mozaraa (agriculturalist), rather than falah (which
has peasant or traditional connotations). It was also clear when the
farmers were enthusiastically talking about their "business man"
activities. The self-identification of "employee" was added on by the
farmers themselves to the list of identifications in the interview.
Only one farmer refused to identify himself and another said that he is
a citizen of the country and nothing else.
When "agriculturalist" and "farmer"
	
self identifications were
amalgamated, the majority of farmers (23): (see table 8.5) seemed to
refer to the farming components of their lives. The bedouin part,
however, received respectable attention from the farmers (12 cases).
Those in the "all of the above" category are ignored at this point,
because they do not make any difference in the numbers that make up the
competition between the "ideological component" (bedouin) and the
Table 8.5
5tO
Self-Identification Among the Farmers
Form of Identification
1 - A Farmer
2 - A edouin farmer
3 - A t3edouin
4 - A sedentarised Bedouin
5 - Employee
6 - Businessman
7 - All of the above
8 - Other identification (citizen)
9 - No self-identification
Total
Number of Farmers
17i
, 23
6J
12
2)
3
1
3(1)
1
1
38
(1) 15 farmers in total utilized "bedouin' t in their self-Identification,
when we add this category of identification.
Table 8.6
Perception of Farming Future
Outlook	 Number of Farmers
Optimistic	 18
Pessimistic	 8
Mostly optimistic	 6
Mostly pessimistic	 3
No answer	 3
Total	 38
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"economic component" (farming) in the three first categories.
When we add the four individuals who described themselves as
businessmen and employees, we find that the economic activity of the
farmer, in the majority of cases, dictates how he perceives himself.
That, however, does not allow us to ignore the serious nature of the
traditional pull. This is because the twelve who saw themselves as
bedouins, bedouin farmers, or sedentarized bedouins were for the most
part also practising livestock breeding.
Another interesting feature was found among two of the most recent
settlers, who insisted that they are farmers, even though one of them
was a short-range pastoralist, and the other a large animal holder.
Despite the slight inconsistency, we could say here that those
interviewed in Sajir feel the pull of a tension between "modern"
economic	 activities	 and	 "traditional"	 ideological	 or economic
categories.	 The tendency, however, is toward identifying with the
factors most effective in their lives at present, be it agriculture or
livestock breeding.
A comment about the inter-personal contact between the researcher and
the Interviewees may not be out of place here. Most of the farmers
showed varying degrees of bedouin machismo during the interview. There
were, however, some subtle differences observed in various groups of
farmers. The rich and successful farmers were more proud,
condescending and unimpressed, despite being always helpful and
chivalrous. Another group of farmers, who were more traditional and
less successful, showed a degree of awe, and a hesitancy towards what
they perceived to be the "professional" nature of the interview. The
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younger and more educated group were openly pleased with the encounter,
which they thought of as a novelty and a diversion. Some even wanted
to lengthen the experience by inviting the researcher to avail herself
to their help whenever needed.
All in all, we could therefore think of bedouin machismo (which is
sometimes expressed by pride, laughter at other's expense and/or
arrogance) as stemmimg from the natural community's pride, a high
degree of self evaluation (rooted in the reality of their economic
status), or a form of defence against situations, which are perceived
to be threatening to the bedouin's self image.
3 Commitment and Attitudes to the Agricultural Operation
A) Comitinent to Farming
In trying to gauge satisfaction amnong the farmers, by asking about
optimism or the lack of it in the farmers outlook on agriculture, it
became quite apparent that the majority of farmers considered optimism
a moral virtue. This was the case, even when the farmers had been
highly critical in their previous convients on farming (see table 8.6).
There was a general strong reaction to the word motashaam
(pessimistic), which was considered not in accordance with Muslim
virtues.
In answer to the question "what would you do in case of a deline in the
farming incomes?", the farmers were more realistic. Their answers
were also more comprehensive than the stated action options in the
interview (see appendix, Q.70).	 The responses were cross tabulated
with land ownership to see if there are differences among different
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categories of ownership (see table 8.7). Two tendencies were clear in
reviewing the responses to the question. These are the following:
1	 A slim majority of eighteeen saw themselves as committed to
farming,	 either	 because of choice, and/or financial
commitments (to SAAB, and the capital invested in the farm).
2	 Fourteen farmers were anxious to assert their comniitnient to
their land (farm), but said that they will concentrate on
other activities. These activities may include some form of
animal husbandry.
In comparing the answers of the two smaller categories of landownership
25 - 100 ha, and 101 - 200 ha) and the two larger ones (201 - 300 ha,
and over 300 ha), more of the larger holders (7 out of 14) expressed a
firm commitment to farming. The smaller holders were less likely to
express the same comitment (10 out of 24). Those who voiced a concern
for continued profit (see table 8.7), were successful farmers, two of
whom were the most efficient in the wheat producing operation (see
chapter 6).
If we look at each category of landholders separately we would find the
smallest category (25 - 100 ha) and the third category (201 - 300 ha)
are most likely to keep the farm, but concentrate on other activities
(5 out of 10 in the one case or 50%, and 3 out of 7 or 43% in the
other). The reason for this among the small holders (25 - 100 ha) may
be seen as resulting from lack of prospects because of small size of
the land owned, and also because of bad performance in the agricultural
operations (see chapter 6). The bedouins in the larger category (201 -
300 ha), however, were on the whole large owners of animals which may
Table 87
Divisions Among Farmers According to Landownership and
Action in case of decline in Agricultural Incomes
Land ownership in hectares
Action	 Do not	 25-100 101-200 201-300 over 300 Total
know
1-I will keep on
farming as long as
Ican	 1	 2	 1	 2	 2	 8
2-I have to keep on
farming because of
my financial
commitments	 0	 3	 4	 2	 1	 10
3-Will only cultivate
if it is profitable	 0	 0	 2	 0	 1	 3
4-I will keep my
farm, but
concentrate on
other activities	 0	 5	 4	 3	 2	 14
5-Leave farming
altogether	 1	 0	 0	 1	 2
6-I do not know	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 1
Total.	 2	 10	 12	 7	 7	 38
Table 8.8
Alternative Choices for Livelihood Among the Farmers
in the Different Categories of Cultivation
Cultivation size in hectares
do not
Options for livelihood	 know	 10-100 101-200 201-300 Over 300 Total
1-None	 0	 7	 1	 3	 0	 11
2-Livestock	 2	 5	 2	 3	 1	 13
3-Employment	 0	 3	 4	 0	 1	 8
4-Commercial Activities
	
(real estate, business) 0 	 1	 2	 1	 0	 4
5-Many options	 I 0	 0	 1	 0	 1	 2
Total	 2	 16	 10	 7	 3	 38
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account for their choice in this respect, i.e. for animal husbandry.
The two bedouin farmers who are in the "I do not know" category
(estimated to have 60 ha of cultivation) are a very recently settled
bedouin, and a short-range pastoralist (living in a tent). The latter
bedouin identified himself as a farmer, and continued to show extreme
commitment to farming by being the one to say "I will keep farming as
long as I can". The other person in this category, by contrast had no
hesitation whatsoever about leaving.	 He said, in explaining his
choice, that he tried farming, and it does not suit him.
It is not hard to explain the short-range nomad's apparent commitment
to the idea of farming. The members of the family, who were settled in
the lineage's hamlet settlement, explained that this section of their
family continued in pastoralism because the elderly father and mother
were not disposed toward settlement. 	 The younger son (the one
interviewed) and his sisters were, on the other hand, anxious to
experience the 'comforts' of settlement and the advantages it brings,
like education, entertainment and civilisation (hadharah). This
bedouin's comitment appears to be to a way of life rather than to
farming per Se; of which he had very litle experience in any case. The
other settled bedouin is assured of his place in a settled state
(ownership of land, and actual sedentarisation), which allows him to
make a judgement about farming based on his short experience.
B) Alternative Options for Livelihood
When the alternative choices for livelihood were explored, the
advantages of a multi-resource household economy became apparent.
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Twenty seven of the interviewed bedouin perceived themselves as having
at least one option for an alternative livelihood. The data, however,
was handled in a simplified manner by taking the first option stressed
by the bedouin farmers. These options were cross tabulated with the
cultivation size, which is seen in this work as an indicator of
economic status. This is to show the effect of the economic status of
the bedouin farmer on the choice he makes for an alternative
livelihood. Two farmers, however, insisted that they have many options
(see table 8.8).
Livestock breeding was the favourite option for the farmers, especially
for those in the smallest category of cultivation (10 - 100 ha), and in
the third category (201 - 300 ha). Employment came second as an open
option for the farmers, especially for those in the second category of
cultivation (101 - 200 ha). Those who said that they have many options
were the highest producer of wheat (528 ha cultivated and 4.8 ton/ha
yield) and the highest yielder of wheat among all the interviewed (200
ha cultivated, 5 ton/ha yield).
The perception of no other option for alternative livelihood was
highest again among the smallest category and third category of
cultivation (10-100 ha and 201-300 ha), while the two recently settled
bedouins in the "do not know" category saw livestock breeding as an
open option for livelihood.
Perceptions of lack of options, in general, did not always follow the
reality of the situation among the farmers. It depended, in fact, on
an evaluation and assessment of their personal situation by each
farmer. Not all the farmers who percieved no option but farming are,
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in fact, farmers only. Some were employed, or owned livestock. For
example, the young farmer who talked despairingly about the need for
continued support from the government (see beginning of this section),
chose to say that he has no option but farming, despite being a high
school graduate in the civil service at Sajirs Amiriat. His
assessment of his situation, however, prompted him to say that he had
no hope to pay his debts and keep his land except by farming.
Many of the others interviewed reflected the same tendency. Some who
had less prospects than the above case, for instance, were more
optimistic about their future merely because they generally had less
"worried" attitudes towards the state of things. An example, here,
would be in three cases in the small cultivation category, who in fact
did not own any substatntial livestock holdings, but optimistically
said that animal breeding is an open option.
The choice of options was also sometimes reflective of a frame of mind
and how the farmers felt about their various resources. A prosperous,
highly placed civil servant (in the telephone and telegraph office in
Sajir), who owned real estate and comercial ventures, did not refer to
these assets when responding to the question. Another, who described
himself as an employee, and owned livestock, saw employment as
important in his future prospects.
From the above, and in an attempt to analyse table 8.8, the following
conclusions may be drawn:
1	 There is a high commitment to farming. 23 of those
interviewed saw their future in cultivation or animal
farming, regardless of their other resources outside the
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agricultural sector.
2	 The traditional element in this settled comunity (i.e.
pastoralism) reaserts itself at times of uncertainty (i.e.
decline in farming incomes), especially among the less
prosperous (small cultivators) and the more recently settled
("I don't know" and "third" categories of cultivation).
3	 The modern sector options (employment, comercial activities
and/or real estate and business) seem to be operative among
the more successful of the farmers, either in actual
cultivation size or productivity on the farm (see coninents on
farming performance in chapter 6).
C) Aspirations for Children
Despite this apparent commitment to farming at present among the
bedouin farmers interviewed, they did not seem to value it highly as a
prospect for their children.
	 In fact only one said unconditionally
that he wanted his sons to be farmers (see table 8.9). The interesting
point about this particular farmer is that he had only settled in 1978.
He was also actively seeking a buyer for his farm, on which he had
achieved no success.
The overwhelming majority of the farmers placed a great emphasis on a
good education and a good employment. Success and monetary profit were
put as conditions, if the children were to follow a farming career. In
responding to this question, the farmers expressed a degree of
dissatisfaction in the farming livelihood, and previously unspoken
perceptions of hardships and low self esteem.
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Table 8.9
Aspiration for Own Children
Type of Aspiration	 Number of Farmers
1-A good education and a
good job	 25
2-Not farming in any case	 4
3-Success	 2
4-Farming if profitable 	 2
5-A good education comes
first	 2
6-Employment with
farming	 1
7-It is up to them	 1
8-I wish them to be
farmers	 1
Total	 38
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Education, for boys, was high on the agenda as an aspiration and hope
for the farmer's children. How much of an education proved to be an
ambiguous area. Some farmers specified high school as a satisfactory
level, while others asked what is the highest level of education,
before actually choosing that level. The majority, however, specified
a college level of education as desired. Not all, nonetheless, were
convinced that this will be the case for the sons, because the latter
have not showed enough aptitude or desire to go on in the education
ladder.
What was not ambiguous at all, however, was that traditions, past and
present, were never operative in the perception and images of good
future prospect, naturally desired by those interviewed for their
children. This was not the case in the area of aspiration for
daughters (which will be discussed in the next sections), nor was it
true for the sedentary farmers (also discussed later).
No conclusions will be drawn at this point, because certain matters and
issues become more clear when we consider bedouin women and sedentary
farmers.
4)	 The Bedouln Women In Sajir
Regrettably, there was no systematic seeking of data about women, and
from women in the questionnaire side of this work. This proved an
important oversight as the interaction with bedouin households
proceeded. The initial decision was made because it is a well known
fact that bedouin women do not participate in the agricultural sector
in the region of study.	 Even so, two reasons are now apparent for
including them as a very important element in any study or analysis of
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male-dominated economic activity. These are the followng:
1	 The exclusion of 50% of the labour force may be easy to
identify by mere observation, but cannot be analysed, nor
understood	 comprehensively	 without	 questioning	 the
motivations and elements operative in this situation, in a
manner that puts the agents (men and women) in a position of
verbalization	 and	 direct	 explanation.	 Intellectual
speculation risks reflecting only the beliefs of the speaker
(or writer).
2	 The study of women in a traditional society, especially in
this one, explains much more about the perceptions, attitudes
and the objective situation of the dominant male orientated
SoC 0-economic system.
The reality of these premises was demonstrated intellectuay ac
emotively to this researcher. 	 Certain objective realities which
prompted an intellectual and emotive stance, proved hasty and weakly
supported with further observations and analysis in the field and from
the literature.	 This hopefully will be demonstrated in the ensuing
discussi on.
From the start, the reasons for the images of bedouin women as
victimised, passive and marginilized creatures became clear. 	 The
bedouin machismo operated at its full level, when talking about their
women. They talked about them as ignorant, uncivilised ("unurbanised
and bedouin" as it was expressed) and completely useless. The
researcher's initial reaction was to half believe their stated opinions
and to be dismayed, until the opportunity arose to observe the
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interpersonal relationship between bedouin men and women, observe
differences between them in demeanour and attitudes, and observe the
actual role of women in the scheme of things.
Anthropological writers have seen women's role as being in the private
sphere of the social world (51)• While this may be a reasonable
assessment, it appears to be accompanied by certain images of womens
status, which are more arguable. These are the following:
1	 The domestic world is not connected to the political arena of
the social world. Decision making within this private sector
affects only family matters, and domestic affairs.
2	 Women's roles within the domestic sphere are characterised by
inferiority to men's roles outside it, as well as by
subservience and lack of power. Men, for example, will never
perform women ' s roles, while women often take male roles,
especially physical tasks, whenever the need arises. Women
are also seen by their male counterparts as without sense
(like children) 52 . They have no status in the public arena,
but are obliged to be supervised and to share the decision
making process with men in the private one.
The underlying asumption in the above two images is this: Any role
that women have in the private sphere is not connected to, nor
influential in the political and economic sphere. These images and
assumptions suffer to a great extent, from a male centrality in
anthropological literature and traditions. It is hard to imagine that a
group, who experience the same socialisation process, who have a
measure of power within the domestic sphere, and who are interconnected
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to the dominant groups by interdependent human and emotional feelings,
have no effect whatsoever on the public and social world.
Anthropological material about "women and power" in the nomadic and
sedentarised society informs us that women exert power by subversive
means. They make and break men by gossip, by traditional patterns of
praise or mockery (through songs and poems), and br witchcraft (53)•
Other means of indirect power on the part of women, are the roles they
play in marriage alliances between groups, and the favourable or
negative impressions they give to other households or groups through
generosity, good hospitality and helpfulness, or the lack of these
characteristics.
Cynthia Nelson outlines other areas where women's powers may be
exerted.	 These are the social sphere, the attainment of religious
status (or sainthood), influence over sons, and as inciters of courage
and bravery in battles and situations of warfare54.
In all the above legitimately constructed scenarios of womens power in
different nomadic groups, the womens' human capacity to exceed or be
superior in a given social and economic strucutre is not emphasised.
Women have equal opportunity to internalise the socialisation process
(said to exist) of assertiveness, aggression and independence, even if
this capacity is confined to the private sphere. If it does exist,
there is no reason why it should not be recognised directly even when
it is not openly acknowledged. There is no need to see women's power
as solely exerted through indirect or subversive means. The social
world of pastoralists and traditional society is limited by its nature;
hence women's particpation in it and knowledge of it can, in principle,
be complete.
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The physically overt separateness of men and women's worlds has given
the impression that no real linkage can exist. Women disappear behind
the veil, the tent and the domestic divide, yet they can have equal
knowledge of the public world through their husbands, their sons and
other women. Ethnocentric and male observers of traditional and
nomadic societies have no means of bridging the gap that exists. The
male agents in the society may experience womens power, but seldom
acknowledge it publicly to other males in their society, let alone to
strangers. Females also play a role in keeping this image intact. The
internalisation of the place of women in the scheme of things does not
allow women to overtly exercise authority or acknowledge it even to
other women. It happens, therefore, that some men and women might see
themselves as unusual (in terms of being more equal at home) in their
interpersonal relationships and the roles they play in the private
sphere. That is not to say that the men's superior economic and
political positions do not act to exclude women from power and
authority. It is just imperative that we recognise women as sometimes
active agents in their social world, and not only through indirect
means, but also in direct interaction.
Sedentarisation, on the whole, seems to be perceived as an element
favouring the political and economic liberation of women in male
dominated societies This happens through the amalgamation of the
worlds of men and women, the opportunity for women to hold an economic
and productive status outside the traditional sphere (agricultural and
labouring jobs), and the ability of women to own and inherit assets
(land, jewellery and money). Other changes include the interpersonal
relationship between men and women in the family environment. Divorce
becomes less easy, because men may fear loss of dowries and/or the
incomes generated by women.
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The sedentarisation of the bedouins in Sajir does not seem to conform
to this scenario of women in the sedentarisation process. An overview
of this researcher's obserations of the reality of Sajir's bedouin
women may be sumarised as follows:
Women display more of the elements that are said to be
integral to the "bedouin identity" than men. 	 If not by
direct assertiveness, then by a pride, a perceptible high
level of individual worth, and self assurance.
2	 The actual interpersonal interaction between men and women
does not follow the set image of anthropologists, nor that
specified by the male bedouins.
3	 The women's social world is the arena in which the
"traditional values" and the bedouin "ideology" seem to play
their most potent role.
4	 Women in the sedentarised groups lose whatever vestige of
economic productivity they possessed in their traditional
society. Women are slowly being marginalised and confined to
a world of domestic tasks. The alleged process of liberation
through productive activity outside the home does not seem to
be allowed to proceed by the society at large, nor by the
male dominated setting of rules and customs. The prosperous
nature of this oil - subsidised society allows it to dispense
with women's labour through the recruitment of foreign
labour.
5	 The Islamic rules which should regulate and monitor a basic
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justice for women (in the area of inheritance, marriage and
legal status), are constantly being violated by both men and
women. Men do so because violations are to their advantage,
while women accept these violations for themselves and their
daughters (especially in marriage and inheritance).
6 Some vestiges of the expression of women's power (in the
traditional sense) can be seen as being eroded by an
integration within a society that not only separates male and
female worlds, but also favours the man's development in the
social, educational, economic and technological spheres.
This uneven development results in women's inability to
participate fully and adequately in their socio-economic
environment. This may not be completely accomplished at this
point in time, but will be soon realised in the coming
generations of this society, if things remain as they are.
The actual demeanour and impact of bedouin women come in sharp contrast
to the machoistic comments of bedouin men. On the whole they possess a
high level of self-respect, dignity and feelings of individual worth.
Their insular position in relation to an outside world which may erode
their confidence, and their ability to still understand and participate
in the present socio-economic sytem, which is still not entirely beyond
their existing capacity, allows them to project themselves in a manner
sometimes superior to their menfolk, overtly and covertly. The
identity of the "bedouin" becomes more pronounced among women. Their
reserved, unimpressed, and frankly superior demeanour pays homage to
the pastoralist's individualistic independent and insular nature.
In observing the interaction between men and their wives, there was
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always an even chance that women would play the dominant role in the
interaction. This is because women are largely still on an equal
footing with their husbands, when it comes to education or the ability
to understand and experience the physical and social changes affecting
their lives. Another element contributing, to this phenomenon is the
tendency of men to marry often and to much younger women, or for first
wives to be in touch with the outside world through their sons. Thus in
a significant number of cases, when women were present during the
interviews, they prompted answers, contradicted information, or
apologised for their husband's faults in understanding and grasping
certain concepts.
The way in which men and women interacted was also sometimes marked by
mutual respect, affectionate rapport, or bantering insults. A man may
say "teach this ignorant women something about civilisation" (hadharah
or being urbanised), and the woman retorts by saying something about
his age, his own lack of hadharah or his posturing coninents.
The women in this bedouin society attain status through marriage,
motherhood and the strength of certain bedouin traditional elements in
the society, still wholly uneroded by the sedentary state. Women, for
example, act as hosts to male strangers (a practice unthought of in
sedentary societies) in the absence of their men. The hospitable
nature of the bedouin does not allow isolated household units to turn
away visitors. Young mothers in their thirties, accompanied by their
young sons, will entertain a male visitor until the return of their
husband. That is only possible for elderly and strong minded women in
sedentary villages.
Motherhood, revered by Islam and Muslim societies, is a positive agent
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within the institution of marriage (in discouraging divorce) and in the
social world. Thus there was more respect and acceptance on the part
of the bedouin men and women of this researcher when accompanied with
her own children during the process of visiting farming households,
Motherhood yields other advantages through the respect demanded from
sons and daughters towards their mother (an Islamic commandment). Sons
are a link to the public world, while daughters are a help in the
domestic one. The marriages of these sons and daughters are also an
arena in which women's power may be expressed.
There are, nonetheless, negative aspects of the traditional elements on
the lives of women. Girl 's education is an area in which negative
traditions reign supreme, without affecting their brothers.
	 Younger
and unmarried daughters are closeted within the domestic sphere,
without any of the traditional rights accorded to their mothers for the
sake of honour and propriety. Bedouins in remote settlements and farms
constantly told this researcher, that they would never send their
daughters to school if it is not right in the hamlet or even on the
farm.	 The fear is centred on the girls being exposed to unsavoury
intentions and gossip and the questionable morality of the other
groups' young men. I was told by an elderly head of an extended family
that they had more than twenty females in their family, and they wanted
a girl's school on the farm. Meanwhile the girls grow to the marriage
age (15-16) having never had an opportunity to learn how to read or
write in the school of the hamlet nearby (fifteen kilometers away).
By contrast the individualistic and segmentary mature of tribal society
(expressed in rivalry and mistrust) does not seem to affect boys'
education, or the economic aspirations of fathers and mothers for them.
This does not exist only in bedouin society. Six girls in a sedentary
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village were not allowed to go to teachers training school (three years
diploma course after the ninth grade) by their fathers and mothers,
because it is situated in a bedouin settlement. Younger women (married
and unmarried) are also not expected to work in the traditional sphere,
nor as teachers in girl 's schools, unless there is a formal agreement
from the family's authoritative head, i.e. father or husband. This is
also operative in the cities and represents a new form of inequality
for bedouin women.
Women's inability to perform modern economic functions because of
traditions, coupled with the ability of the society to replace their
labour, plus the significant changes in the economic sphere, all
contribute to a gradual marginalisation of women. This is also
reflected in the constant violations of women's Islamic rights in the
society. For example, as was seen in chapter six, women are not
acknowledged as part owners of land holdings through inheritance (a new
form of inequality for bedouin women). The marriages and divorces of
women are also influenced by the increase in incomes and the
development of a monetary society. Men for example are now more likely
to indulge themselves with more than one wife (a practice allowed but
never encouraged in Islam). Fathers and daughters, moreover, are more
likely to accept some unsuitable offers of marriage (already married
elderly suitors), because of the economic status of the man. Young
girls are also sometimes forced into marriages by their fathers (and
mothers) because the dowry offered is high (although forced marriages
are not allowed in Islam).
The right to be divorced without the agreement of the husband, is also
sanctioned by Islam for women.	 This right was supported by the
traditional practice of unhappy wives seeking the protection of their
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own families or of respected elders in the community. Nowadays the
economic burden of harbouring divorced women and their children seems
to weigh heavily on fathers and brothers (as opposed to the conditions
in a subsistence society). It is also unacceptable that unmarried
women live alone (or with their children), even when they are self
supporting. Divorce, therefore, is discouraged if it is initiated by
the women themselves, and unhappy women remain in the marriage
situation because of their families' pressure.
It is little wonder, then, that economic and political differentiation
is fast becoming more pronounced between men and women generally in
Saudi Arabia, and more particularly for the bedouins. These
differentiations, which may have existed among previous generations,
are more pronounced in this generation and are sure to reach heightened
proportions among the young. Their ill effects are beginning to show
themselves among young married and unmarried girls (for whom the social
structure is most severe). Some signs of dissatisfaction were shown by
this group by a tendency to have schooling and education as a permanent
issue of discussion in their lives. The young wives (during visits to
bedouin households), moreover, debated ways to preserve their single
wife status, while others showed helplessness and frustration at being
one of two or three wives, and/or their lack of education.
The moral in this profile of bedouin women in Sajir is not to
completely rely on our own cultural and intellectual prejudices in
assuming that women's role can only be analysed and understood by
reference to the established images and literature. If anthropologists
can argue that that the segmentary lineage ideology is an image, then
we can argue that the extremely negative view of women in the nomadic
traditional society is also an image, fostered by men and
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uncontradicted by women. Sedentarisation, by the same token, must not
be seen as a positive transformation for women by virtue of the
process's direction towards a "modern" state of affairs.
Observing bedouin women has indicated to this researcher, that certain
manifestations of the asserted ideologies (including bedouinism) are
mostly tools to be used for particular purposes by the dominant social
sectors (who happen to be mostly men in this case). Important elements
of this analysis include the following:
1	 The segmentation aspect of the social system, which
encourages divisions and jealousies between the various
sub-groups, seems not to affect the education nor the
development of the male children of the bedouin families. On
the other hand, it operates fully in the case of the females
who are increasingly being displaced within the productive
structure.
2 Only certain aspects of the modern social system, which
derive their legitimacy from the Islamic ideology, as well as
the new levels of affluence, are activated in the issues
relating to women. This, coupled with the afore mentioned
element of the bedouin ideology, results in a diminishing
female role in the present society, and an increasing
inequality of women which cannot be legitimized by Islam nor
by traditions (e.g in regard to marriage, inheritance,
education and economic marginalisation).
5)	 Comparative Elements Between the Sedentary and Bedouin
Farming Communities
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Twenty five interviews were conducted in the sedentary village of
Al-Burud in Asser, which covered almost all the farming households in
this village.	 Twenty three interviews were completed, while two
farmers chose to conclude the encounter before reaching the end of the
interview.	 The sedentary village is intimately known to this
researcher, because it is her village of origin, as well as the base
during the fieldwork period. 	 Certain features were ininediately
recognised as differing from the data obtained in Sajir. These are the
following:
A	 Only three of the farmers interviewed in Al-Burud owned
their land collectively: with brothers in two cases, and
Sons and brothers in the third case. All the rest were
heads of nuclear families.
B	 Landownership is more markedly differentiated among the
sedentary farmers.	 The large owners owned more land
than the ones in the bedouin coninunity, mainly because
they were more actively involved in cultivation and the
revification of agricultural land. The middle group of
owners were substantially fewer than the bedouin middle
group of owners in Sajir. The sizes of land owned by
the small holders are also substantially smaller than
the farming lands owned by the small owners in Sajir.
C	 Inheritance, revivification of barren lands, and grants
(through the Amir) from the Ministry of Agriculture's
Public Land Distribution Section, were the means by
which landholdings were obtained. The largeholders were
inheritors , and also largely prosperous farmers of the
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elite of the village, who could afford to revive and
cultivate virgin areas, previously uncultivated
traditionally.
D	 Differentiation in economic status (land ownership and
agricultural incomes ) can sometimes cut across the same
family. Brothers may be in completely different
categories of economic status depending on education,
employment and/or the opportunity to cultivate and
revive land as early as possible in this time of
agricultural boom. By contast, the Sajirans were mostly
extended family owners.
In the framework of this chapter, the data shows that these farmers
were a great deal better versed when it comes to pereptions of problems
and proposed solutions to these problems. Whether or not they differ
greatly in their essential outlook will be seen below. The results of
interview in this section of the questionnaire are the following:
1 Perceptions of Problems: As before with bedouin farmers "marketing
and distribution" and "water shortages" came top of the list of
problems. A related problem to "marketing and distribution", namely
"competition faced from foreign produce", was cited up by three farmers
as the major problem facing farmers in the region. Two farmers only
(the same number as among the bedouin farmers) identified lack of their
own agricultural skill as the major problem in the region.
2 Comments on Farmers' Skill and Training: More of the sedentary
farmers commented on skill and training problems. More than half (13
farmers) said "yes, that is a problem", while only eleven out of 38 of
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the bedouin farmers identified it as such.
3 Perceptions of Control: The data showed some interesting differences
between these sedentary farmers and their counterparts in Sajir, as
regards perception of the degree of control. 	 The sedentary were
divided thus:
No Control	 7
Complete Control	 3
Uneven Partial Control 	 11
Yes if you are rich	 2
23
In referring to table 8.2, it became obvious that sedentary farmers are
more likely to see themselves as in control of their farming
activities, and its related problems. 	 This could be a reflection of
their long experience, and the degree of thought and contemplation
which they chose to devote to this section of the quesionnaire.
4 Proposals for Solutions: Here again "action by the state agencies"
was put as the only solution, by the majority of the interviewed
farmers:
Action by state's agencies 	 18
Action by farmers	 3
I do not know	 2
At first glance this seems a contradiction to their previous
perceptions of control. 	 It may, however, be due to their conviction
that they are on top of all problems within their control, and that
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what remains to be solved can be only solved by state action. Farming
co-operatives were also mentioned by more farmers in Al-Burud than in
Sajir (about half the interviewees), while at the the same time
emphasising state action.
5 Self Identification: Naturally, most of the farmers in Al-Burud
identified themselves as farmers. There are, however, some interesting
differences from bedouin farmers in Sajir. Self identification ran as
follows
Farmer (Mozaraa):	 14
Farmer (Falah):	 3
Businessman:	 2
Businessman & Farmer:	 1
Unemployed Farmer:	 1
Farmer & Employee:	 1
Livestock Breeder:
	 1
Total	 23
The farmers who identified thmeselves as peasant farmers or Falah, said
the come from a long line of Falalih (plural of Falah). The unemployed
farmer was a share cropper previously but is not able to find work
since the agricultural boom, given the prevalence of foreign
agricultural workers. Since he does not own land, he is living on a
piece of land donated to him by a prosperous farmer in Al-Burud, but
this land is so small, that he only cultivates for household
consumption. The livestock breeder is of bedouin origins (settled in
the villages, even before the Al-Ikhwan movement), he owns a small
piece of land (0.5 ha) and concentrates on animals.
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From the above it seems obvious that sedentary farmers do not have any
strong tension between the farming side of their livelihood and other
areas (more than half were also employed as teachers or civil servants,
in the region, or in Riyadh). Differentiation within Al-Burud is more
obvious than it is among the bedouin farmers, and can be easily
recogni sed.
6 Comitment to Farming: The sedentary farmers were clearer in their
answer to the question about the type of action in case of reduction in
agricultural incomes. The answers were as follows:
I will keep on farming as long as I can: 	 11
Leave completely:	 4
Augment my income from other activities:	 7
I was forced to leave farming:
	
1
(the sharecropper)
TOTAL
	
23
Comitment to farming was as high in this group as it was among
bedouins in Sajir. It was interesting to find four farmers
unequivocally stating their intentions to leave farming. Their reason
for this choice was to explain that farming is transitory in their
lives, and that as employees they could handle payments to SAAB, or
perhaps sell the farm. By contrast, losing the farm was not on the
agenda for most of the bedouin farmers, because the farm is a
reaffirmation of their sedentary state and a place for them and their
animals (symbolically as well as realistically for some).
7 Options for Alternative Livelihood: There was a marked difference
between this group of farmers and the bectouins of Sajir, when it came
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to perceptions of options (which in turn reflect their respective
situations). The options for the sedentary farmers were as follows:
1 - None:	 7
2 - Business and commercial activities:	 6
3 - Employment:	 7
4 - Unskilled work (driving, work in garage): 	 2
5 - Date palm cultivation and livestock:	 1
Total
	
23
Modern sector options figured more among this group.	 Livestock
breeding was not perceived as important in the farming activities among
the sedentary. Around 30 percent saw no other option to farming, which
is not much different to the 29 percent of the bedouin farmers (see
table 8.8). This seems to support the notion that there is not a basic
difference between how sedentary farmers and bedouin farmers go about
conducting their household economy.
	
Both groups are multi-resource
economies. The difference lies in what other resources they are also
engaged in.	 While the bedouin farmers tended to look to livestock
breeding as an option, the sedentaries look to employment and
comercial acitivies, in which they are more experienced. This is a
big difference, but both options are rooted in economic rather than
ideological differences.
8	 Aspirations for Children:	 Again here there was no difference
between this group of farmers, and their counterparts in Sajir, at
least regarding sons. Education was high on the list of aspirations
for the children. When it came to whether or not they wanted them to
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keep on farming, most said no. Their answers were as follows:
No:
	
16
Yes:
	
4
Employment with farming:	 2
The four who said yes were prosperous farmers with successful
cultivation practice. They expressed a desire not to have their own
efforts wasted by the abandornent of farming by the next generation.
Employment through education was the most frequently expressed desire
for children. A small number wanted them to go into business and
commercial acitivities.
A maximum education for girls (up till teaching diplomas) was also
expressed as desirable by those in Al-Burud, unlike the bedouins in
Sajir.
Conclusion
If we consider the data from the last section of this chapter, we could
say that there is no valid reason to suppose that there are basic
differences in the attitudes and perceptions of the bedouiri farmers
towards the farming operation, merely because of their positions as
bedouins or sedentarised pastoralists. 	 There was a significant
similarity between the two groups in their perceptions of problems,
proposed solutions and the level of the commitment to the farming
enterprise. Both groups generally perceived the following:
1	 The two major problems of farming at present are marketing
and distribution of crops (other than wheat), as well as the
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water shortages experienced by the farmers in the region.
Neither group perceived any major problematical issues in the
farming operation conducted by themselves personally. The
labour issue in particular did not worry most of the bedouin
and sedentary farmers. Skill and training, furthermore, were
low on the agenda of both groups.
2 Both groups showed the characteristic of seeing themselves as
largely dependent on the state for the solution of their
problems in farming, and a tendency to identify "others° as
responsible for improving the situation.
3	 Both showed the same level of commitment to farming in
relation to themselves, but not as a future prospect for
their children. Their own commitment was derived from the
perceived high level of investment they had already put into
farming and the resulting financial burdens. That kind of
commitment, however, was perceived as totally unacceptable
for their sons.
However, the bedouin and the sedentary farmers differed in the
following elements:
The sedentaries showed a higher level of perception of
control over farming issues. This may be due to their longer
experience of farming, their less vulnerable status towards
the new patterns of production (due to better education and
longer experience of the modern sector), or because farming
(and the ownership of land) does not mean a symbolic,
realistic and risky transformation to new forms of livelihood
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(as in the case of bedouins), which offer more than an
improvement in income. The bedouin as a group would
therefore feel more dependent on what is being offered,
especially when they fully appreciate the situation.
	 This
higher dependency leads to perceptions of less control.
2 The perceptions of other options to a farming livelihood were
naturally different between the sedentaries and the bedouins.
The bedouin emphasised livestock breeding as an open option,
while modern sector options figured more among the
sedentaries. The implications of such differing options are
major; but they also seem to spring from economic elements,
rather than ideological ones.	 This is because whenever
individual bedouins perceived themselves as able to
successfully move away from the traditional occupation (in
relation to their economic status), they would gladly do so.
This was also reflected in their aspirations for their
children. None said that they wished their sons to pursue
pastoralism or livestock breeding. This latter tendency was
especially true of the more successful bedouin farmers (see
table 8.8).
We can therefore safely conclude that the ideology associated with
bedouinism has little or no bearing on the bedouin's perceptions,
attitudes and evaluation of their dominant economic activity (farming).
This is supported by the lack of association between the tribal
identity, group and leaders, and the stated perceptions of farming
itself. Lineage corporateness and self help had been superseded in
this case by the relationship of the individual to the centre, and the
relations of production within the agricultural sector.
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Bedouinism, however, operates at two levels among Al-Hanatish in Sajir:
as an asserted ideology, and as an economic activity. Bedouinisrn as an
an asserted ideology operates more effectively among the more
sedentarised bedouins.	 For them the ideology is activated whenever
needed. Reasons for its activation include:
A	 When it is capable of yielding an advantage to the
individual, as in the area of land distribution or as a
positive self image. It also retains a needed level of
social identification and cohesiveness within the group.
This can be seen in the case of sedentarized bedouin
groups moving to Sajir in the 1970s (see chapter 5).
B) In uncertain situations, when the bedouins are unsure of
their status or position in non - traditional economic
situations. This is particularly seen among the less
successful farmers.	 Even when these did not own
animals, they perceived livestock as a possible future
prospect.
C) When the maintenance of certain facets of the
ideological system does not interfere with, or even
complements, the social and economical development of
the bedouin group. The situation of women is a clear
example.	 For girls the unco-operative aspect of
tribalism (as regards education) was retained, while it
did not affect their brothers.	 This is because males
are more important economically to the household, and
also because such restriction complements the changing
roles of women in the modern economic system of
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production. The same can be said to exist among rich
bedouin farmers, who keep large animal herds, because
they do not interfere with the dominant household
economy, and are tended by hired labour.
By contrast, bedouinism as a dominant economic activity is found among
the short distance pastoralists (see chapter 5) in Sajir, and among the
most recent settlers, who do not concentrate on the farming aspect of
their household economy (see chapter 6), or are actively engaged in
pastoral behaviour (see chapter 7).	 Admittedly this group is not
widely represented in the sample.	 We can, however, conclude
tentatively from the data of this chapter that their coriiiiitment to
settlement is not at all affected by their experience of agriculture
Keeping the farming land was high on the agenda for the bedouins, even
when they showed little commitment to cultivation. Only two said that
they would leave farming completely.
The above could be because the resources available are not
contradictory to settled livestock breeding (large plots of lands,
grazing deserts nearby). This is of course reflective of the changing
face of pastoralism (see chapter 5), to a pattern not dependent wholly
on the traditional characteristics like migration and the total
comitment of the household labour to animal breeding. The question
remains, however, whether those partially coniriited to pastoralism now
are in fact the ones to create the future modern animal husbandry in
Saudi Arabia. The present comitment of the fathers must be weighed
against their aspiration for their children (education and government
employment), the actual training the children receive, and the future
economic prospects for these groups in the modern economy.
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Two final comments at this point. First,there was no felt need among
the farmers to pursue an occupation perceived to be a compoment of the
ideological heritage. Rather, perceptions of the options open were in
fact based on personal experience and ability.	 Second, both the
sedentary and bedouin farmers would be more committed to farming,
provided that the best possible objective conditions are created. This
latter point will be pursued further in the final conclusions of this
Study.
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Conclusion
It is time that the various strands of argument and analysis in this
study are brought into focus, and hopefully woven into a larger whole.
This was only partly done in the previous chapter (as regards
bedouinism), and will continue in this final part. However, due to the
large number of issues actually tackled by the various parts of the
study, this section will begin by focusing on the particular important
issues and then progress into placing the studied community into a
larger perspective.
On the Theoretical Status of the Saudi Nomadic (and Bedouin)
Sector:
The Saudi nomadic and bedouin sector must be viewed as a integral (and
indivisible) part of the hlmodernu Saudi nation, both politically,
economically and socially. This is not only in terms of the bedouin
being either integrated within, or influenced by national factors; but
also in terms of the bedouin sector having been an important and
influential element in the process of creating the national political
and social identity. This view is not only justified by the
theoretical stance adopted by chapter one, in which the nomads were
conceptualized as an integral part of their regional setting, or by the
view advocated by the anthropologists studing Middle Eastern nomadic
societies (see chapter one). It is rather a view mostly promoted by
the study of the Saudi Social formation, both in pre-state times,
during the formation of the modern central state, and even in the
present circumstances of the nation at large.
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1. In pre-state society:
Most of the important traditional elements of the society in the
Peninsula, prior to centralized conditions, could be placed on a
continuum that extended from the nomadic pastoral sector (the bedu),
through to sedentary farmers (hadhar) and even to the urban sector.
Let us take the example of the factors constituting the tribal system,
the basic social structure of the Peninsula's society. Blood ties and
descent constituted the social basis in all three sectors. Nobility of
the tribe, furthermore, was a function of its pure descent, its
military prowess, and its size in terms of membership and territorial
occupation (see chapter 2).
The deciding factor was mostly the economic occupation of the tribe.
Nomadic camel herding tribes by virtue of their economic occupation
were most isolated, most in need of territorial space and therefore of
the military organisation to control it (Khazanove, chapter 1). Other
factors, undoubtedly, were also operative in determining the status of
the tribe, like control of major resources (be it pastoral or
sedentary), alliances between tribal structures, and/or the support of
outside powers. Nonetheless, within the interior of the Peninsula, the
large nomadic tribes tended to be the most prominent politically and
socially.
The associated characteristics of tribalism like cohesiveness,
political and territorial organization and independence could also be
conceived of as differing only in degrees between the purely nomadic to
the purely sedentary tribes. Cohesiveness was of course strongest in
the more isolated, purely nomadic tribes, broke down slightly in more
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sedentarized conditions, and became manifested in cohesive
neighbourhood communities within urban structures (see chapter two).
Territorialy, the nomadic tribes kept dirah for their exclusive use and
protected them against all others. The villagers, similarly, kept
hemma around their settlement, and also utilized it collectively (for
grazing) and to the exclusion of others (see chapter 4).
The political leadership, moreover, was similar in sedentary and
nomadic conditions, i.e. hereditary sheikly families with the paramount
leaders from these families chosen for their personality, ability and
skill (leadership not necessaril, passed from father to son). Those
leaders, furthermore, relied heavily on the consultation and support of
the other notables within the tribe. In other words, the tribal
leadership in nomadic and sedentary tribes followed the principles
specified by the segmentary system, being more fluid among the nomadic
tribes and more rigid and structured in sedentary conditions (sedentary
leaders, called Amirs, are mostly from powerful nomadic tribes and were
interlinked with territorial control). Hence the basis of the tribal
structure of descent and kinship remained constant in the customary,
subsistence based, productive systems in the peninsula (i.e. nomadism
and agriculture), while the associated characteristics varied only in
degrees and not in essence.
In addition to sharing one (Arab Moslem) culture and a similar social
system, there was a marked integration between nomads and sedentaries
on two levels: a) a tribe may be divided into sedentary and nomadic
sections, while sharing the same social tribal identity; and b) there
is political and economic integration between divided tribal units, and
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even between nomadic tribes and urban centres. 	 This high level of
integration was emphasised by most anthropologists concerned with
Middle Eastern nomadic comunities like Nelson, Geilner, Mohamed and
Barth, and was spelled out by Cole specifically on the Saudi nomads
(see chapter two).	 This regional integration, undoubtedly, was
strengthened by the emergence of the central national authority, which
became an ever-present unifying force and a source for shared
experiences of change (politically, ideologically and economically) for
the bedouins and the rest of the population.
2. During the creation of the modern state
To reiterate the bedouin's military role in the creation of the Saudi
central government also at this point is rather an exercise in stating
the obvious.	 Nonetheless, the strength of this role has to be
restated, along with other important factors. 	 The bedouin's
integration in this national process may be swmijarised as follows:-
1.	 The bedouins had major military roles in the creation of the
Saudi state. This role lasted from 1912 to 1930 and resulted
in the unification of the far reaches of the Kingdom,
especially the all important western region with its holy
cities of Meccah and Madinah. Despite the fact that many
writers have stressed that the support of the volatile
bedouin warriors has not been the backbone of rbn Saud's
strength (he relied more heavily on the steady and staunch
support of the urban and sedentary populations), the bedouin
mobile army was the only viable instrument for spreading
Al-Saud's authority over hostile urban centres in the east
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and west, and the widely dispersed nomadic and rural
population.	 Their fanatical zeal for the Wahabi ideology
surpassed any similar tendency among the sedentaries, and
struck fear among the superior military powers in the west of
the Peninsula (Sharif Hussain's forces in Meccah).
2.	 In addition to this strong bedouin military involvement in
the process of state building, the bedouin can be seen as
integrated into the process through two other means. A)
Ideologically as well as factually, the bedouins' social
system represents the purest and most dynamic and effective
of the traditional heritages in the Peninsula, i.e. the
qabilah or the tribal social system.	 This social system,
moreover, among the bedouins could not be completely overcome
by their adoption of the Wahabi ideology (see chapter two).
As such, and because they represent a sizable percentage of
the Saudi population, they remained for a long period an
embodiment of a real and important traditional force, which
had to be reckoned with by the new state.
B) Their fanatical adoption of the Wahabi unitarian faith,
and the manifestation of this involvement in the Ikhwan
movement and army led to 1) the strengthening of the movement
which was first started by, and among, the sedentaries, and
ii) an association of the bedouins with the most restrictive
representations	 of this	 revivalist	 Islamic	 Ideology,
especially after the Ikhwan revolt (1928 - 1930) which was
fought over some of Ibn Saud's association with non - Moslems
(and non - Wahabis), and his introduction of modern
innovations (radio, telegraph, etc).
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Despite the dispersal and defeat of the (bedouin) Ikhwan's most
effective political and military forces, and the triumph of the
sedentary version of the wahabi ideology, the bedouin tribal population
remained a reason and a focus for political and economic policies by
the now firmly established Saudi state. These policies were on two
levels. The first dealt with maintaining a politically harmless tribal
structure, which continues to recognize the legitimacy of the
traditional system. In doing so, the extremely traditional population
are not antagonized, and the state maintains the part of its legitimacy
that is derived from its essentially traditional character. The
second level of these policies was instrumental in the gradual erosion
of the basic premises of the traditional existence in its most dynamic
form (ie. pastoral nomadism, an efffective tribal	 leadership,
cohesiveness, etc).
The above policies included the incorporation of major tribal political
leaderships (sedentary and bedouin) into the state structure. This was
in order to neutralize their effectiveness within the traditional
sector, and among those still recognising their authority (like
pastoralists, semi pastoralists and even some settled tribals). Other
policies were designed to remove the basic economic functions of the
tribe as a social organisation, by abolishing the dirah and hemma
systems, and encouraging settlement and agricultural production among
the nomads. Finally, there were policies that either ensured (or did
not oppose) a process of maintaining a degree of viability for the
tribe as a social organisation, with a leadership that is still viable
to a certain degree.
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This latter process was been mainly operative among the rural
population, who remained mostly traditionally organised (socially and
economically) until the 1970s. It is, furthermore, a process often
forgotten by most of the commentators on the Saudi urban based
developments and social change. It is usually manifested in most
villages and almost all of the bedouin settlements being essentially
organised on a tribal basis, with lineages or tribal units settling
separate locations with their own traditional leaders assuming
administrative status. Most of these leaders, furthermore, were
granted economic power to administer and distribute the resources
exclusively among their tribal kin, particularly the land resources
essential for agriculture.
Even when an official traditional land grant (Iqta) was not given to
the traditional leaders (because of their modest status or the less
than large size of their comunity), their administrative position
conferred upon them a favourable position in relation to the resources
(particularly before the PLDO). This heightened their position in (and
outside) their community, as well as allowing them to acquire an
economic position that was favourable to an easier incorporation within
the modern agricultural sector of the later 1970s and the 1980s.
Thus tribal leadership assumed an administrative and elitist position
in rural communities, which originated from the position of mutual
support between the traditional leadership and the state structure.
This mutual support may have not been by design in all cases; but it is
always the result of the strength of the essentially traditional
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character of the state and society, and the absence of any legitimate
modern and countervailing political force within the state's structure
which could reduce the need for its traditional legitimacy.
To return to the original point: the process of keeping a degree of
viability for the tribe as a social organisation has been operative,
relatively speaking, frequently among the bedouin sector and among the
rural population, because of their greater degree of involvement with
the traditional elements of the society, and the greater need: a) to
incorporate them nationally through their leaders and in a settled
state, and b) not to antagonize them by a markedly differing
organisational structure.
3. Present-day society
The bedouin sector has become, since the gradual transformation of the
Saudi society, even more integrated within the national setting. This
is because the 1940s up to the 1960s had witnessed a rapid rise in
bedouin sedentarization due to two elements: a) the increased economic
opportunities for wage labour outside pastoralism (in the oil industry,
military institutions, and unskilled labouring jobs), and b) the
periods of drought affecting the peninsula during the 1950s and the
1960s, which forced large numbers of pastoralists to turn to sedentary
production. The 1970s and the 1980s, furthermore, have seen rapid
economic transformation of the rural economy which brought the bedouins
(be they nomadic or settled) into closer association with the social
and economic changes already experienced by the Saudi urban sector.
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periods of drought affecting the peninsula during the 1950s and the
1960s, which forced large numbers of pastoralists to turn to sedentary
production.	 The 1970s and the 1980s, furthermore, have seen rapid
economic transformation of the rural economy which brought the bedouins
(be they nomadic or settled) into closer association with the social
and economic changes already experienced by the Saudi urban sector.
One of the early features of the present bedouin integration has been
in its continued role as a military force for the state (Cole, chapter
two). This has occurred through three means: i) As a continuation of
the Ikhwan army.
	
The remnants of the Ikhwans were briefly organised
into the White Army, which later became known (and grew) as the
National Guard. ii) As a result of the alliance between the bedouin
tribal leaderships and the state, which ensured the loyalties of the
bedouins through their leaders. This alliance was manifested in the
continued sponsorship of Important tribal units (by gifts, subsidies
and grants), through an extensive network of interrelationships either
through marriage, easy access to the rulers, or by the tribal leaders
assuming administrative positions in their areas. Another important
form of alliance was through tribal leaders becoming section leaders of
reserve National Guard units, which were staffed by male members of the
leader's tribal unit. Finally: iii) Military employment, particularly
in the National Guard, has been the major form of viable employment for
the poor, uneducated and unskilled nomads who wished to settle.	 It
assured them of a wage packet, and allowed them to gain entry into the
settled modern sector.
Another important feature of the bedouin integration in today's Saudi
Arabia has been through a definitive transformation of the sector's
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access to resources. The land reforms which started in 1925 (a law
abolishing the dlrah system), culminated in the Public Land
Distribution Ordinance of 1968. This latter ordinance amounted to a
juridical intervention in the rural land resources, which was capable
of altering the tribe's system of economic integration. It changed,
once and for all, land utilisation and appropriation among the bedouins
from its traditional collective nature to an individual and private
one. This in turn encouraged cultivation among the bedouins and a form
of animal husbandry that is in keeping with sedentary conditions (sheep
herding).
Land distribution, moreover, introduced a greater level of economic and
social differentiation among the bedouin comunities (similar to those
among sedentaries and hadhar). This was true in both of the two
systems of distribution - Iqta (traditional) and PLDO (administrative),
because both had differential approaches to distribution. In the Iqta
case, nepotism and the relationship to the tribal leader were the bases
for differentiation; while in the PLDO case, differentiation was mostly
between ordinary traditional farmers and large conuiiercial agricultural
ventures, i.e. economically capable farmers or urban based capital (see
chapter four). This process of transformation and differentiation has
dealt a decisive blow to the internal economic integration and
cohesiveness associated with the tribal social system and noinadism, and
has brought the mainly traditionally organised conuiunities into closer
proximity to the sedentary forms of production and social
differentiation.
The most recent phase of economic transformation in the rural economy
has been through the agricultural developments of the 1970s. These
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developments sought to increase growth, output and agricultural income
through introducing advanced technology and more "modern" relations of
production. This came about through a generous system of
agricultural subsidization, non-interest loans and a price support for
wheat. The agricultural policies of the latter years of the 1970s
resulted in a radical transformation of agricultural production, but it
did not introduce any substantial improvements to the marketing of
agricultural goods, nor to the indigenous labour and skill resources
of the sector.
The end result for the bedouins has been to further distance those
settled and semi-settled from the conditions prevalent in the
traditional occupations (pastoralism, semi-pastoralism), as well as
from the conditions of production in traditional sedentary farming.
These	 previous	 conditions	 had characterized production	 (i.e.
subsistence), and helped in moulding the bedouin way of life. 	 The
improved conditions in agriculture, and the high level of agricultural
Income, especially from wheat cultivation, acted as an encouragement
for entering the sector, and for abandoning animal husbandry if that
had not yet occurred. The methods and patterns of production,
moreover, encouraged a dependency on newer forms and relations of
production like single cash crops, the recruiting of farm labour (often
foreign), and a very close involvement with the market and the national
agricultural services.
The above important developments came on top of two previous ones
(mentioned briefly above), i.e. the impoverishment of the Saudi nomads
during the periods of droughts in the 1950s and the 1960s, and the
opening up of other areas of gainful employment for the bedouins
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outside pastoralism. These early happenings disposed the nomads toward
settlement, but it also allowed them to keep one foot in their
traditional occupation either through semi-nomadic activities in their
Hujar or by subsidizing pastoralism with the wage packet. The later
developments, i.e. the land reforms and distribution policies and the
agricultural policies, had a dynamic that acts within the rural sector
and changes the bedouins' relationship to the resources and to the
productive activities.
To sumarize the argument thus far regarding the nomads' status within
Saudi society, we could say that the nomadic sector has been
essentially a powerful cornerstone of the traditional society, an
important and influential element in the structuring of the new Saudi
state and society, and mostly a dependent sector in the political and
economic circumstances of the present society. In other words the
sector has lost most of its importance, but has remained thoroughly
integrated with the other systems of production.
This integration, moreover, has been a function of i) the nature of the
relationship between the sector and other productive systems (i.e. a
similarity of culture and social organization), ii) official policies
that seek to curb the independence of the sector and to amalgamate the
nomads (i.e. land reforms and political and economic strategies), and
iii) the nature of the developments and responses within the sector,
like the status of the present tribal leadership, the adverse natural
and economic circumstances experienced by the sector, and its less than
favourable status in comparison to the modern, oil subsidized, economy.
These latter factors had encouraged the bedouin nomads to settle in
droves at different stages in Saudi history, and in doing so they have
weakened the sector further in the present society.
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From the above it is clear that the bedouins (i.e. those from nomadic
origins, be they previous or present) could not be viewed in the same
way that we have considered the nomadic sector. This is because the
bedouins do not have a uniform history of settlement and integration,
nor do they possess a uniform status in the present society. This
later point will be explored further when bedouinism is discussed.
On the Sedentarization and the ilDetribalizatlonu Process
In chapter two, this study made a conceptual distinction between
tribalism as a phenomenon and pastoral nomadism (i.e. al-badawah) in
the desert regions of the Peninsula. Similarly bedoulnism, as it is
comonly perceived at present, has been identified as a wide (or large)
social category which incorporates several productive activities -
pastoralfsm, semi pastoralism and sedentary production among settled
conriunitles from nomadic tribes.
Tribalism, as was stated time and again previously, is an encompassing
social system which extends beyond the boundaries of single productive
activities, and single social categories (the relationship of
bedoulnism to tribalism will be re-stated below). This system,
furthermore, had been the basis of the traditional society of the
Peninsula, and an influential political element during the formation of
the Saudi social structure; and it remains a socially significant
consideration within the present Saudi society, even among the urban
population who are engaged in modern sector production (see chapter
two).
591
We cannot, therefore, equate a detribalization process with the
sedentarization of nomads.	 The two phenomena are theoretically
independent of each other, but are likely to meet in practice in
particular situations and at certain levels. 	 For example, the land
reforms and distribution policies are important parts of a
detribalization policy, in so far as they are designed to remove the
economic component of the tribe as a social organisation and as a
regulator of the agricultural and grazing land resources.
This important ingredient of the detribalization process, however, can
be (and has been) counteracted by another official policy which bestows
traditional Iqta (land grant) to particular tribal leaders for the
purpose of distributing it among their people. The system of
tribalism, therefore, is not fully challenged in those cases of land
distribution; but it is modified to perform two functions: a) render
the internal tribal authority secondary to the state authority, which
sanctioned the official Iqta, and b) endorse the desired result of
changing the mode of access to the resources, i.e. private instead of
collective and sedentary rather than nomadic.
Thus we find that tribal exclusivity and social integration are
partially retained among the settling nomads enjoying the benefits of
the Iqta form of the land distribution. Other nomadic groups, on the
other hand, are faced with the full implication of this policy of
detribalizatlon within an urban setting, or even in their designated
place of settlement.
The same argument can be constructed for the balancing act employed to
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gain an equilibrium between a recognizably strong central authority,
and a traditional population with an internal tribal leadership that is
still seen as legitimate. 	 By promoting the position of the tribal
leaders within their units - through administrative positions, some
economic power, and as an important link to the power structure (i.e.
to the ruling family and the central authority) - the state ensures
that the political tribal system is modified to promote the following:
a) the loyalty of the influential tribal leaders, and subsequently the
loyalty of their people; b) a measure of control over the dispersed,
rurally based, traditional population;	 and c) the elimination of an
effective dynamic tribal leadership, or of the tribe as a political
organization.
Again in the above arrangements tribalism as a system is not fully
challenged, but it is manipulated for particular results. 	 So even
though the central authority has gathered all the relevant political
authority to Its self, it has retained enough of the traditional
structure to ensure traditional loyalty, and the legitimacy it derives
from being an essentially traditional governing body for a traditional
population. Sedentarizatlon of the nomads under the above conditions,
therefore, does not signify a full detribalization of the bedouin
settling corianunity.
Some circumstances of sedentarization, however, may mean a drastic
break from the tribal conditions of the traditional livelihood. The
individual settlement of bedouin families, or small tribal units in and
around urban centres can mean a total break from the significant areas
of tribal relations. The settling nomads in this case are entering a
modern sector of the economy (mainly waged work), and come under the
593
full impact of its political and state organisations. Socially, they
are isolated from their all inclusive tribal organisation and therefore
from the cohesiveness and Integration associated with it.
Nonetheless, the tribal identity of the sedentarizing nomads and their
bedouinism (i.e. their association with a nomadic tribe and a pastoral
way of life) remain alive and operative among the settlers in urban
centres, as is the case with the hadhar tribals whose tribal
affiliation Is a source of pride and identity.	 In these cases of
sedentarization, tribalism becomes only an ideological factor that is
devoid of any real political and economic effectiveness. The retaining
of the ideological component of tribalism, however, is not without its
own effectiveness, or beyond any real power as will be argued later.
Thus far, we might conclude that the sedentarization process cannot be
regarded as equivalent to a detribalizing process among the nomads, who
represent the strongest and the purest form of tribalism in Saudi
society. The two processes could meet at some levels and in particular
situations, but are mostly independent of each other. That, however,
does not answer the questions of whether or not there is a
"detribalizing policy", nor does it identify the force and impetus for
the detribalizatlon process (see introduction).
To attempt a comprehensive answer to the above two questions (i.e. is
there a detribalizing policy? and what is the impetus for the
detribalizatlon process?) the relevant factors will be listed briefly:
1.	 The Saudi policies have been to remove any effective and
dynamic elements of the traditional heritage, which may prove
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to be a challenge to the centralization of authority and to
state control. These policies included removing the economic
function of the tribe as a regulator of resources, as well as
stripping it of its political function (by incorporating the
tribal leadership into the state structure). Finally, state
policies sought to incorporate the nomadic sector (the most
dynamic of the tribal organizations) within the rural
sedentary economy, which is characterized by fixed resources
and a less independent productive system.
2. On the other hand, the policies have ensured that the
structure of tribalism is not fully eliminated. Some very
relevant analyses of the Saudi political system (see chapter
two) have stressed the alliance between the traditional
forces and the modern ones (Niblock), and the political role
that the tribal leaders have assumed in the early political
development of Saudi society (Abir). This role, however, is
perceived as having been greatly diminished as the Saudi
regime had gained strength, and as its administrative body
had developed and modernized itself.
3. Chapter four and the later chapters of this thesis, however,
have stressed that the Saudi rural society and economy had
remained traditional (in organization and production) at
least until the beginning of the previous decade. Chapters
three, and five to eight have also shown in practice two very
important facts:
A)	 The tribal system still exerts very considerable
influence over the people of the region. This is seen
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in how different settlements organize themselves
socially, and administratively, as well as in their
initial access to the resources (Iqta through the tribal
Amir).
B) The rapid changes and economic and social development
experienced in the region are creating strong currents
of transformation, which are gradually (or perhaps
rapidly) eroding and sweeping aside all of the important
associated characteristics of the traditional life. So
nomadism and pastoralism are no longer the important
productive activities they were previously among the
bedouins,	 nor	 does	 subsistence	 and	 traditional
agriculture dominate sedentary production.
C) Furthermore, the cohesiveness and social integration
which might be initially strengthened by the traditional
social organization of the settlers and villages are
also being affected and eroded by the newly created
relations of production and economic structures,
especially in the dominant activity of agriculture. The
new forms of domestic economy, furthermore, have been
instrumental in encouraging powerful new types of social
differentiation which are based on landownership,
cultivation size, employment and all the other
indicators of economic status.
0)	 Finally, the training and education that the younger
generation receive and the kind of aspirations that
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adults have for their children (especially sons) are not
in keeping with the ideological principles propagating
the continued existence of a dominant traditional
society.
The above, quickly sketched, elements in the argument may be added to
this researcher's conceptualization of a "detribalizing policy" as a
deliberate attempt at the total eradication of the tribal social
system, by a political and economic structure totally different from
that of tribalism.	 This has been the case for the detribalisation
process in Africa and parts of the Middle East (ie Turkey and Iran).
In Saudi Arabia, however, this has not been the case.
The policies employed by the Saudi state can not be called, therefore,
an attempt at the eradication of the tribal social system; nor are the
state structures and the general society radically opposed, in
principle, to what is comonly perceived as the embodiment of the
tribal existence (nomadic tribes). In fact the ideals and ethos of
al-badawah and the social system of kinship and descent are still
hailed throughout the society, while most of the Saudi population still
retain an identity partially derived from their tribal affiliation.
We must, therefore, reach the conclusion that the policies themselves
were only designed to contain tribalism in a harmless social structure
devoid from its political and economic dynamism, and not potentially
dangerous to the central authority. Furthermore, the retaining of the
surface social dynamism of tribalism, I.e. in social organization
(residentially and administratively in the rural sector, and
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ideologically in the urban sector), and a small measure of economic and
political viability for the tribe (the tribal leadership as the rural
administrator, and the defacto exclusive tribal access to the
agricultural resources), amounts in reality to partially retaining
tribalism without its redeeming characteristics which encourage group
cooperation,	 collective	 productivity,	 integration	 and	 social
cohesiveness (at least within the tribe).
Retaining the social aspect of tribalism, furthermore, amounts to
another form of differentiation and prejudice in the new society:
between tribals and non tribals, noble tribes and humble ones, rich
politically incorporated tribal units and isolated impoverished ones,
as well as nepotism and political and economic inequality. Within the
tribe itself, the process has also lead to competition between lineage
mates, increased jealousies between tribal units, a high degree of
unco-operative behaviour, and finally to new forms of political and
economic differentiation.
This has been Indicated strongly in the studied region between units of
the same lineage, clan and tribe. It has also been displayed between
the sedentary tribals and the bedouin ones, and between the different
settlements and hamlets of Utaibah. If we add this study's observation
to those of Ibrahim and Cole (1978) on the ascendancy of the non -
cooperative manifestations of tribalism in Saudi society (see chapter
eight) among the bedouins they have studied, we may safely conclude
that the positive integrative force of the traditional society has
effectively been replaced by the integrative and authoritative capacity
of the central organizations; while the negative force of tribalism
(i.e. fission and divisions) has been retained and fostered by the
Saudi tendency to keep the surface social manifestation of the
traditional society.
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The previous argument, however, does not negate the fact that there is
a gradual process of detribalization occurring in the Saudi society, of
which the above development is but one of the symptoms. The strongest
impetus of this process, however, is not the political policies of the
state, nor is it the early economic reforms like abolishing the dirah
system and theoretically altering the access to the resources (although
they may be regarded as the first steps). 	 The real detribalizing
impetus can be seen In the actual economic and social transformation of
the society, which helped to minimize the effectiveness of the
traditional forces and factors, and replaced them with a new set of
economic forces with Its own set of social factors. Naturally, this
has happened gradually in the Saudi society and it has become apparent
earlier in the urban modern sector; while the rural, more tradition
bound econoniy had to await the oil price increase of the 1970s and the
concentrated efforts of the state.
However, the process of transformation in the rural economy could only
start after the basic principles for the potential change had been
established, i.e. the land reforms, the administrative changes and the
incorporation of the nomadic sector.	 The detribalization process,
moreover, could be strongly seen in the effects of the new pattern of
production emerging in the rural economy as a result of the policies
for the development of agriculture. It can also be observed in the
increased dependence on wage employment, the decreased dependency on
the traditional occupations and their related institutions, and the
near total economic dependency on the state and its institutions for
every aspect of rural life. Only the long term effects of these
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developments and new patterns of productive activities are capable of
rendering any vestige of the society's traditional organizations and
the associated ideology as ineffective.
The above was indicated quite strongly in the studied cases in Sajir.
Some fundamental changes in the household economy have had profound
effects on most aspects of the bedouin farmers' lives, as well as on
their perceptions, attitudes and aspirations. The changes occurring in
the agricultural side of the household economy with its new relations
of production (recruitment of wage labour, modern technology, reliance
on cash crops, dependency on the state's incentives, higher incomes,
and a close involvement with the market) have led to marked changes in
the practice of the traditional occupation (animal husbandry and semi -
nomadism). These changes range from decreased practice of pastoralism
to engaging waged herders for the livestock capital. (This matter will
be discussed fully at a later point of this section).
The point of the above argument is this: the detribalization process
that is progressing at this time in Saudi society cannot be said to be
a result of single political and economic policies of the state, nor is
it closely associated with any clear policy for the sedentarization of
nomads.	 It is in fact the combination of these policies and the
natural processes of economic changes occurring in the Kingdom. If we
have to single out a strong clear impetus for the detribalization
process, then it is in the new sets of productive activities and
patterns of production which are emerging in the country, which render
the ideological components of the traditional society and economy if
not ineffective, then only marginally influential.
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On the Sedentarizati on Process
Chapter two criticised the conventional way of viewing the settlement
of nomads in Saudi Arabia, which usually consists of the
characterization of the Hujar settlement scheme, during the Ikhwan
movement (1912 - 1930), as the early period of nomad settlement and any
subsequent settlement period as recent. Another form of
differentiation is between induced settlement (i.e. during the Ikhwan
period) and spontaneous attempt (any Internally motivated settlement).
This study, however, favours a conceptualization of the sedentarization
process not only from the point of view of landmarks in the history of
the nomadic sector (i.e. the Ikhwan movement, the seven year droughts
affecting pastoral resources, and the state agricultural settlement
schemes), but also from the point of view of national economic
developments, particularly those in the rural sector.
The other kind of distinction between induced and spontaneous
settlement is useful to a limited degree, but it does not tell of the
complexity of the set of circumstances surrounding the event of
sedentarizatlon. Furthermore, nor does it recognize that any process
of development favouring the settlement of nomads, which is after all a
major change to their socio-economic system, would have a measure of
voluntary action which is induced by a set of circumstances which
include factors beyond the control of the individual. For example,
settlements due to droughts, an encapsulating state (by land reforms or
settlement schemes), or the nomad's own perception that sedentary
production is more favourable than the pastoral one all have elements
of induced as well as voluntary action.
After looking closely at the agricultural sector and the Saudi rural
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development, this study went on to outline three stages of nomad
sedentarizatlon in chapter five, which were later examined in the light
of field work data.	 These outlined stages, furthermore, can only
reflect the national developments and changes until recent times, but
can not be seen as the final episode in nomads' sedentarization. These
stages were conceptualized as follows:
1. The early stage of nomad settlement (1910 to the early
1930s). This stage was dominated by the Ikhwan movement,
which indicated a hitherto unknown push for settlement among
the Saudi nomadic tribes. The main characteristic of this
stage is sedentarization through Ideological intervention.
2. The intermediate stage of nomad settlement (1940 - 1960s).
This stage was dominated by a process of sedentarization
motivated by two elements: A) the productive instability of
pastoral nomadism, felt keenly by the Saudi bedouins through
both ecological circumstances (droughts and loss of grazing
pastures), and juridical and policy inspired interventions
into the dynamic of pastoral nomadism (land reforms,
settlement schemes); and B) the opening up of other economic
opportunities for wage employment, which were generated by
the modern public sector (the military and the administrative
organizations), and by the oil industry and revenues.
3. The most recent stage of nomad settlement (1970s up to the
present) Is characterised by a voluntary self - initiated
push for a more settled state by large numbers of Saudi
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nomads. This push was motivated by new economic developments
occuring in the rural sector, which generated new forms of
agricultural production, and new levels of agricultural
incomes. The process has been accompanied by a heightened
level of penetration of the modern sector institutions into
the rural economy. These institutions include governmental
services	 (i.e.	 educational	 institutions,	 agricultural
extension	 offices	 and	 social	 services),	 and market
facilities.
The difference between the above three stages of nomad sedentarization
has been sketched briefly at some points above, but will be focussed
upon here by describing the characteristics of each period:
1.	 The first period of nomad sedentarization was marked by a
large scale, high profile settlement scheme ithich 'ias
motivated by the need to establish and spread the political
authority of Ibn Saud over the independent nomadic tribes and
coastal regions. The vehicle for this political goal was the
Wahabi ideological movement, which was preached among the
nomadic tribes to encourage them to settle, as well as to
take the message to the far reaches of the Peninsula. The
Ikhwan movement and army were therefore created, and nearly
200 Hujar were erected.	 The nomadic settlement of this
period was marked by a general withdrawal from the nomadic
economy, by abandoning migratory movement and exclusive
dependence on animals.	 Substantial aspects of the tribal
social structure were nonetheless retained and practiced
(tribal settlements and effective tribal leadership), while
there was a near total dependence on Ibn Saud's subsidies and
provisions.
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2.	 The second stage of nomad sedentarization had a more complex
set of motivating factors and influences, which were detailed
at length in chapter five.
	 Settlement in this period,
however, meant a respite from the economic difficulties of
pastoralism, a greater opportunity to take advantage of
health and education services, and a chance to enter into
wage labour. This period, moreover, contains the seeds for
the more marked developments occuring in the third period, as
regards land distribution (1968), the establishment of Saudi
Arabian Agricultural Bank (1969), as well as the increased
incorporation of the nomads through settlements.
	
All of
these elements paved the way for the substantial changes
arriving with the agricultural programe (mid 1970s), which
followed the booni in national wealth due to the increase in
oil prices.
Furthermore, the diversification of the economic structure of
pastoralism and semi pastoralism, by adding cash incomes to
subsistence pastoralism and/or subsistence cultivation among
the bedoulns, in this period had the basic characteristic of
allowing the nomadic population to keep one foot firmly
planted in their traditional occupation and to practise a
multi-resource economy.
	
It meant, however, that they
remained basically subsistence oriented as regards the
traditional rural occupations (pastoralism and cultivation),
with a tendency to depend on cash remittances.
3.	 The third period of sedentarization was also commented on in
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the detailed discussions above.	 Briefly, the dynamic of
development in this period and the motivating influences for
the bedouin population were within the rural sector.
Furthermore it had the following characteristics:
A) A higher level of disposition toward settlement among
the nomads, because the rural standards of living had
greatly improved with the initiatives and incomes
generated by the agricultural policies.
B) There were qualitative changes in the sedentarization
process of this period, because the move for the bedouin
is not from one subsistence economy to another, nor is
it a diversification of the economic structure. It is
rather a move to comercial farming and markedly
different relations of production, by way of using
modern agricultural methods and machinery, a growing
ability to employ wage labour in the settled state, and
a close association with market forces.
C) The positive dynamic of change originating in the rural
sector (due to changes in agriculture) has a great
potential for distancing the bedouin from their
traditional occupation (pastoralism), and a greater
tendency for eliminating the integrative forces
operative within the traditional social system and the
traditional occupation (see the discussion above
relating to the detribalization process). The new
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patterns of production with their social characteristics
(differentiations in landownership and cultivation,
employment, education and wealth) are powerful forces
capable of sweeping aside the traditional social
characteristics and forces.
Upon examining the above stages of nomad settlement in the light of the
process of sedentarizatlon among the bedouin in Sajir, it was revealed
that the outlined periods are largely significant in the case study.
On the whole, the patterns of settlement in Sajir conformed to the
expectation derived from the outlined periods. The settlement process
among Al - Hanatlsh in Sajir, therefore, came in the following pattern:
1. The early settlers were motivated by the teaching of the
Ikhwan movement. They settled for Jihad and were actively
engaged in the Ikhwan battles. Settlement for this group of
Al-Hanatish meant an addition of subsistence farming to
subsi stence pastoral i Sm.
2. The intermediate settlers (1940 to 1970s) were largely
motivated by the economic hardships of pastoralism, and their
urgent need to enter the waged labour market (especially in
the National Guard). The bedouin economy in this period
experienced a marked diversification of its economic base,
but pastorallsts and farming activities remained largely
subsistence based and traditional. The wage packets of the
males in the household were used mostly to augment the
traditional economy.
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3.	 The latest stage of settlement in Sajir is characterized by a
great influx of Al-Hanatish and other related lineages to
Sajir to take advantage of the new forms of agricultural
production, which promised better working conditions and a
greater income. The settlers were not only pastoralists
settling for the first time, but also semi-settled groups
(closely related to Al-Hanatish), and men who were working in
other regions of the kingdom. The overwhelming motivating
factor for this group of settlers is the ownership of land,
and the desire to engage in modern commercial agriculture.
Chapter five also revealed very marked differences between the settlers
of the different periods, as regards education and modern sector
experience. On the whole the early settlers were better able to enrol
in schools and therefore engage in urban sector employment, and also
better able to quickly assimiliate into the expanding modern economy
(commercial activities, civil service and military work). By contrast,
the group who had remained pastoralist till the beginning of the 1970s
were the least likely to have had received an education, or engaged in
urban based enployment (except the military).
Another very important development in the 1970s in Sajir was the
evolution of pastoralist units that are very well integrated in the
cash economy of the country. Despite the small insignificant numbers
of these pastoralist units (at least in Sajir), they represent another
alternative for the Saudi bedouin. This is because they tend to
utilize the technology useful to them (water tanks, transportation
trucks, electric generators, etc), as well as engage in income
generating activities (employment for some of the males). They may
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also share in the ownership of comniercial firms in Sajir, and tend to
employ salaried herders and own built up houses (in case of need).
This form of short-distance pastoralism which revolves around a home
base (Sajir in this case) is perceived by Sajirians as a short term
measure, because the younger generation in those pastoral households
desire permanent settlement.
On Rural Development and the Agricultural Policies
After looking closely at the Saudi agricultural sector, one of the main
conclusions of chapter four had been to characterize the recent Saudi
agricultural policies as over ambitious, albeit commendable, attempts
to increase agricultural growth, production and contribution to the
national economy, beyond the limited natural and skilled labour
resources of the sector. The route which has been taken to achieve an
apparent growth (i.e. increase in production, and rise in income) was
mostly through fostering a dependency in the sector on state
assistance, subsidies, and price support, and more importantly on
foreign technology and labour resources.
The recent success story of the sector (in the 1980s), which is often
pointed out in relation to wheat, poultry and dairy production, is
largely explained by the involvement of large urban capital in
agricultural production (see chapter four), and not by an evenly
distributed productive growth among the original rural producers (i.e.
traditional farmers and settled bedouins). These large companies and
producers, moreover, are favoured with the best conditions for
production, in terms of land distribution (through the PLDO or even
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Iqta), grants and loans (through SMB and MOAW), and the opportunity to
obtain the skills needed for modern production (through recruiting
skilled foreign labour).
In characterizing the Saudi rural development, this study concluded
that there are three stages to this development.
1. The early land reforms (1925 to early 1960s). These were
mainly designed to transform the structure of pastoral
nomadism in the country by encouraging settlement, and
changing land use among the nomadic population. These
reforms underlined the Saudi comitment to private ownership
of land.
2. Later land reforms (through the PLDO 1968) and the Iqta
policy allowed three types of developments:
A) One continuous with the traditional form of land tenancy
In the agricultural sector (through the PLDO), which
encouraged small owner/occupier, labour intensive
methods of production. These reforms were based on land
distributions of 5-10 hectares of land to private
individuals.	 The main beneficiaries of these reforms
have been landless nomads and peasants.
B) Another policy of the PLDO is targeted to encourage big
comercial enterprises by allocating large sized land to
companies and corporations (400 hectares). The main
beneficiaries of this policy are the existing large
farmers and urban based commercial interests.
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C)	 The	 Iqta, traditionally inspired system of land
distribution (practised more frequently in the early
stages of the rural history) has variable results in
terms of landownership and type of cultivation, because
it depends on the decision by the ruler, and the good
will of the tribal leader administering the land
distribution among his people. 	 The Iqta system,
however, tends to favour the tribal elites nationally
and within the tribal	 unit.	 It also creates
differentiated landholding based on nepotism and the
relationship to the tribal (administrative) head.
3.	 Within the content of the above differential	 land
distribution policies, the agricultural development policies
have been implemented. The latter's main objectives were to
increase production, transfer technology, and to expand the
role of private enterprise in agriculture. 	 This was done
through huge credit facilities, subsidization and price
support for wheat.
The outcome of the combination of the above policies was twofold. One
was a total transformation of the production methods, especially for
the huge landowners who are better placed to take advantage of the
agricultural benefits and the wheat price support (by employing the
high technology of wheat cultivation or the CPISs). The other was to
improve production among the smaller landholdings through the
application of better agricultural methods and technology.
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Rural development in Saudi Arabia, therefore, is marked by a
combination of the total transformation approach (in land reforms and
agricultural production among the large landholdings), and the
improvement approach (among the small landholdings). It is also marked
by some tendencies toward the reformist and technocratic models of
rural development, because there is an element of redistribution of
wealth; especially when we consider the effects of the subsidization
programe on the smaller farming enterprises.
In another vein, the Saudi rural development is marked by its tendency
to forget the limited nature of the natural and labour resources of the
agricultural sector, by promoting growth beyond the capacity of the
water resources (on the long term), and by creating a gap between the
skills available and those required by the transferal of technology.
It also has a tendency to concentrate on the production side of the
agricultural operation, while not paying enough attention to developing
the market and the distributive aspect of agricultural production.
This lop-sidedness extends also to the type of agricultural production
encouraged by the generous official subsidies and policies. So wheat
cultivation, poultry and dairy farming have had the lion's share of
subsidization and encouragement (at least until the present time) among
the small as well as the large producers.
The outcome of the above tendencies was to create the following
characteristics in the rural sector:
A)	 A near total dependence on the state's (oil generated)
wealth, its initiatives and subsidization programes; in as
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much as no areas of rural activity were sufficiently
developed	 for	 productivity	 and	 profitability	 on	 a
self-reliant basis.
B) A dependency on recruited foreign labour, not only because of
the skills required in production, but also because the high
incomes generated by wheat cultivation create the ability to
do so.
C) A dependency on foreign technology, even among the small
producers.
0)	 A high degree of wastage of the country's valuable resources
(capital, water and arable land) in the interest of rapid
growth and a modernization programe, which only serves to
redistribute the wealth in the short term, mainly to those
who least need it (i.e. the large rural and urban based
producers of agricultural goods).
The Saudi "rapid growth" rural development, therefore, may be
criticised by the modernization school of thought because of its
tendency to waste financial resources, its failure to meet the "free
market" logic, and its tendency to promote a lop-sided programme of
development (production versus distribution, wheat versus other crops,
etc.) in the agricultural sector.
On the other hand, other schools of thoughts on development
(particularly the dependency approach) may see it as creating a
dependent economy, wasteful of the valuable natural resources and
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leading to economic differentation among the agricultural producers, in
terms of land ownership and income. Another major criticism to the
Saudi rural development programe is its lack of consideration for the
Islamic laws of inheritance, which tend to fragment the land between
the inheritors. This might render the presently used technological
implements of cultivation (especially the central pivot irrigation
systems, covering at least 25 hectares of land) unviable for the
majority of modest individual producers. Large farming enterprises and
companies may well solve the problem of land fragmentation by share
holding and other devices, but the traditional owner/occupier farming
establishments are unlikely to so do.
Chapter six, which examined the agricultural operation among the
interviewed Sajirians in great details, saw the Iqta system of land
distribution in motion (along with most of its implications). It also
observed clearly most of the above shortcomings in the agricultural
programe. This aspect of this study's observations will be discussed
when the attempt is made below to visualize the Sajirian experience of
sedentarization and development in an overall context.
On the Phenomenon of Bedoulnism
Chapter two drew a clear distinction between tribalism and bedouinism.
The latter is largely a social category (rather than a social system),
which signifies current or past involvement in pastoral nomadism. The
justification for using bedoulnism as a social category actually
springs from the strength of the tribal system in the Peninsula, and
the generally stronger adherence of the bedouin (mostly nomadic) tribes
to the principles of the tribal system. So the Saudi individuals who
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originate from a known nomadic (ie bedouin) tribal unit do not of
course lose their tribal (ie bedouin) identity upon settling, nor does
their traditional heritage allow them an easy shedding of this
identity.
We may, therefore, conceive of bedouinism as being nearer to the
extreme end of the tribal continuum, by virtue of the pastoral nomadic
heritage, which is the most dynamic manifestation of tribal life (in
terms of the political and social structures). 	 This is why the
bedouins of Saudi Arabia are often perceived (nationally) as the
embodiment of the tribal ethos and ideology, and of a respected
traditional heritage (tribalism and al-badawah) which is shared
minimally by the majority of the population and also by the ruling
regime.
Conversely, the other side of the same image is to perceive them as
embodying all the (alleged or real) negative, backward and destructive
tendencies and ills of the previous tribal existence.
	 These
characteristics are said to include danger to the national political
integration, a lack of participation in the modern econoniy (i.e. wasted
human resources), and tendencies to aggression, individualism and
opportuni Sm.
The formulation of these images in the Saudi context has been examined
In chapter eight, and their ambivalence discussed and demonstrated.
They are mostly a result of four factors:
1.	 The perception that the present state-controlled conditions
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have given the Saudi society peace and prosperity under the
umbrella of an Islamic ideology.	 Moreover, they have
overcome the previous conditions of tribal wars, strife and
divisions.
2. Some of these images are a result of the relative isolation
that some of the bedouin pastoralists have experienced until
the present. This has not allowed them to benefit from the
early educational and economic opportunities; which in turn,
facilitated perceptions of the bedouins as ignorant and
backward.
3. Most of these images (like violence, aggression and
opportunism) are stereotypes that result from lack of
understanding of the nature of the bedouins' real integration
in the Saudi society, and/or misrepresentations of the
conditions prevalent in the past. Other images, however, are
a result of the changes affecting tribalism, which had
allowed its co-operative aspect to disintegrate, and its
individualistic tendencies to surface.
4. On the other hand, the bedouins enjoy a positive high status
image in relation to their stronger adherence to the ideology
of the tribal system, with its associated characteristics of
bravery, loyalty to one's group and, above all, the alleged
high level of purity in the blood line. This ideologically
high status has frequently made women from noble bedouin
tribes the favoured choice for marriage partners to senior
Royal princes, who also seek to strength their tribal ties.
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We may, therefore, conceive of the phenomenon of bedouinism as
containing an ideological component as well as a practical one. The
previous ideological high status gives the bedouins an added pride in
their bedouin identity nationally, in addition to the strength of their
identification with their tribal unit. The other images which are
associated with the manifestation of bedouinism as an economic and
social practice (fe. economic marginality, relative isolation, lack of
education or modern sector skills, and low income) are elements that
offset and negate the positive identity and push the bedouins toward
settlement and sedentary production.
This ambivalence is compounded by the general tendency to continue with
certain manifestations of the tribal structure, especially among the
bedouiris, which may initially strengthen the tribal Identity and
produce concrete positive outcomes. Such manifestations include
tribally owned territories (Iqta and comunity right of access) in
settlement, operative tribal	 leaderships,	 and the ideological
legitimacy of the tribal way of existence.
Among those Interviewed in Sajir, the ambivalence and strength of the
two sides of the bedouin identity was clearly exhibited. Most of those
Interviewed, therefore, showed a marked need to call themselves
bedouln, while simultaneously asserting themselves as part of the
modern society. Hence they tended to a) add the term bedouin to any
form of self - identification, and b) to choose terms of
self-identification that show modernity. So mazaraa (agriculturist)
was preferred to falah (connoting peasant farming), and business man to
merchant. This was not the case among the sedentary farmers
interviewed In the nearby village, who saw no need to shun the word
falah (see chapter eight).
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Another aspect of bedouinism in the studied community (especially among
the less sedentarized and successful bedouins) is manifested in the
practice of pastoralism - or, more appropriately at present, of animal
husbandry - in the settled state. This tendency (ie. the ownership of
large herds of sheep and camel) signified to this researcher the pull
of the tension between the traditional occupation (as both ideology and
practice), and the new, more profitable, modern occupations. This
tension showed itself in two ways:
A) The perception that the ownership of livestock in the settled
state represents a familiar and reliable open option in the
lives of the newly sedentarized. Even when the settled
bedouins have no animal herds at present, animal husbandry
represent to them a safe future prospect in case of failure
in farming.
B) Livestock rearing (i.e. the ownership of animal herds) can
act as a	 form of asserting the ideology of bedouinism.
Hence the bedouin farmers (whenever they can) keep large
herds of camel and sheep, which act as a reminder and
assertion of their distinct identity and ideology.
The first manifestation of bedoulnism as a practice (open option) was
more operative among the more recently sedentarized, and those with
reduced expectations of their futures as farmers (see chapter eight).
The second manifestation (asserted ideology) was more operative among
the rich and capable farmers, who can afford to keep large herds of
animals, without realising their full comercial value. Overall,
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however, the animal holdings in Sajir did not conform to either of the
two logics associated with i) the traditional occupation of
pastoralism and ii) the comercial organization of animal farming (see
chapter seven). The main reason for this, in the opinion of this
researcher, is contained in the nature of the economy practised by the
Sajirians (along with other similar comunities), which allow them to
have a very favourable multi-resource household economy. 	 Thus the
household economy in Sajir has the following characteristics: a) an
artificially supported profitability of wheat cultivation, b) the
ability to employ farm labour in cultivation and herding and c) a
tendency to receive several other incomes from wage employment. This
point will be returned to In the final section.
The Case Study in an Overall Context
Al-Hanatish in Sajir represents a favourably placed, well integrated
bedouln community, whose history of sedentarization closely matches and
follows the historical events of the area, as well as developments in
rural policy at national level. Their privileged position comes from:
A) their tribal status as Utaibis, and their integration in the
political system through their present leadership (which played a
supportive role to the state during the Ikhwan battles); and B) their
central geographical position in a region favourable for both
agriculture and pastoralism.
The first element allowed them access to a large territory surrounding
their Ikhwan settlement, through the Iqta that was given to their first
Amir. This territory proved subsequently to be highly favourable in
terms of the available arable land and its underground water resources.
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Al-Hanatish's sedentarization pattern, furthermore, followed closely
the periodization set out by this study, which in turn derives mainly
from the history of bedouins in Saudi Arabia, as well as the important
events in rural development. Hence the Hanatish sedentarized bedouins
can be divided into three groups: those who had settled early for
Jihad; those who came to settlement because of the adverse conditions
facing pastoralism during the 1950s; and finally, those abandoning
pastoralism in favour of agriculture and the new productive methods tn
the 1970s and 1980s.
The differences between the three groups, moreover, are partly due to
the difference in the time of their entry into more sedentary
conditions. This allowed them to gain a level of economic and
educational status, which in turn determined their success rate in the
recent modern developments in the rural context as well as in Sajir.
Chapter Five showed clear differences in the skills, educational levels
and modern sector experience between the settlers in the three
different groups, particularly between the early settlers and the most
recent ones. The latter group had a marked lack of education, skill
and experience of farming.
The date of settlement and its associated effects, however, are not the
only important elements determining the status of the individual in
Sajir. As mentioned before, Sajir's case demonstrated the Iqta system
in motion within agricultural setting. Along these lines, Chapter Six
showed the following:
1.	 There is a tendency for the system of Iqta to favour the
elites of the comunity, who claim leadership status among
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their units (small or large). Thus we saw hamlets of Sajir
(of small sub-lineages) claiming land donations from the Amir
of Sajir, through their sub-Amir; and dividing these among
themselves in a manner which grossly favours the hamlet's
leader (the administrator of the hamlet's Iqta and land
distribution). This was also demonstrated in a general way
in the vast areas of hectares donated to certain individuals
through the Amir, even when they did not belong to local
tribal units.
2. In addition to the marked differentiation in land ownership,
the Iqta system in Sajir resulted in a general tendency for
large holdings, which is clearly different from the national
5-10 hectares of land donations specified by the PLDO. This,
in effect, allowed the development of large farming
enterprises in Sajir, and favoured the use of the modern
technology of wheat cultivation - ( i.e. CPISs covering 25
hectares of land). The practice of Iqta in Sajir, moreover,
was described as generous (despite its uneven nature) by the
people of the region, because of the relatively open
disposition of the administrators.
The people of Sajir have always had a riulti-resource household econoniy.
The settlement initially (i.e. during the Ikhwan times) was
predominantly engaged in military battles, but was receiving subsidies
and provisions from Ibn-Saud In Rlyadh. Ever since the defeat of the
Ikhwan the settlers in Sajir have combined subsistence primitive
cultivation (baal) with subsistence pastoralism and wage employment
(particularly in the military). The opening up of other economic
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opportunities in the 1950s and 1960s outside the rural sector have also
disposed many of Sajir's men to leave the settlement and take up work
elsewhere.
The turning point for development and increased settlement in Sajir
came with the growth in the agricultural sector. It began in the late
1960s (with the introduction of modern water systems and deep wells),
accelerated in the mid 1970s with the beginning of subsidisation and
loans programes (through SAAB), and reached fever pitch in the late
1970s and the 1980s with the wheat price support policy. Nonetheless
Sajirians, despite their great enthusiasm for agriculture, remain
multi-resource people with wage employment constituting an important
part of their household economy.
Agriculture in Sajir, moreover, suffers from all the classic features
of agriculture in an arid zone. These include increasing water
shortages, a high level of crop disease, soil deficiencies, and low
productivity. We may add to this list all the problems already
described in our characterisatlon of the Saudi rural economy (an
incoherent development prograriine, lack of control over the water
resources, unchecked expansion, and a lack of development of the market
for all agricultural goods), as well as the lack of skill and
experience among the majority of the farmers in Sajir. The resulting
picture is not an encouraging one, nor does it show much promise of
improvement in the future.
The agricultural scene in fact was characterised by a significant lack
of the much needed element of diversification of cropping. That is
because the farmers only experience profit in the wheat cultivation
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operation.	 It was also marked by a dependency on foreign workers,
which in turn leads to the underemployment of the nationals on their
farms.	 Low productivity, furthermore, was a major feature of the
farming picture (see Chapter Six).
The incomes from agriculture, moreover, were highest among the largest
producers and cultivators, and those who appeared to have longer
experience of farming or a greater level of concentration on the
farming operation. These latter farmers also seem to be the ones
capable of bridging the gap between the available water resources and
the continued existence of agriculture (in the long run), by employing
the even more sophisticated technology of greenhouse cultivation of
fruits and vegetables, thereby reducing the need for water and
diversifying cropping. This was reflected in the bedouin farmers'
varying statements of their commitment to farming in case of reduced
income (i.e. from wheat cultivation). More of the large landowners
expressed a firm comitment to farming, while the smaller landowners
were more likely to abandon cultivation altogether (see Chapter Eight).
The small operators in Sajir (below 100 ha) were in the worst possible
condition as regards the ability to profit, reinvest in the farm, or
manage through the usual difficulties (i.e. water shortages or crop
diseases). This group of farmers will be the first casualty in any
future development, whether ecological or in the area of policy
changes. In fact, since the end of the fieldwork period news from the
studied region has indicated that many of the small farmers (at least
in Al-. Burud) have either sold their farms or put them up for sale.
This tendency will increase once the wheat price support has ended.
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En another vein, the remarkable adaptability that the Sajirians
displayed in quickly accepting and adjusting to the new agricultural
methods, as well as the level of rationality associated with the
choices made in the household economy, also lead to the conclusion that
there is no problematical cultural change involved in the
sedentarization process, or in the change to agricultural production.
Infact, the Sajirians were ready to take up any suitable, profitable
and advantageous economic activity as soon as it became available.
This is, of course, contrary to the generally held opinion in Saudi
Arabia that bedouins have a cultural bias against agriculture, which
was discussed in chapter eight.
The general impression of the bedouins in Sajir as open and adaptable
was also confirmed by the remarkable similarity between their attitudes
and perceptions, and those expressed by the twenty five sedentary
farmers (see chapter eight). This confirmed to this researcher that
the ideology associated with pastoral nomadism or bedouinism does not
have any determining effect on the agricultural operation as it is
practised in Sajir, i.e. as a dominant sub - system of the household
economy.
The perceptions and attitudes of the farmers generally (sedentary and
bedouin) were rather influenced by the internal characteristics of the
farming enterprise, and the nature of choices within the agricultural
sector. The similarity of the attitudes between the two groups of
farmers was manifested in terms of seeing themselves as predominently
dependent on the state's help and incentives; perceiving "others" as
responsible for improving any unsatisfactory element in agriculture,
and even showing the same level of comitment to farming. In both
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cases, however, this comitment is only in relation to themselves and
their already invested capital in the farm, but not as a future
occupation for their children.
The prevailing influence of the farming operation was not only seen in
the existing relations of production, and the opinions and attitudes
expressed.	 It was also clearly visible in the sphere of animal
holdings among those interviewed. 	 The importance of livestock, in
terms of ownership and size, can be reasonably assumed to be a legacy
of the bedouin pastoral heritage. That legacy, however, did not have a
determining influence on how the farmers conducted the livestock
breeding operation.	 Infact in the majority of cases, the persons
interviewed behaved like sedentary farmers regarding their livestock
holdings, but felt like pastoralists to themselves.
The absorption of the bedouin interviewed into the market economy of
sedentary agriculture production was clearly exhibited. 	 Hence they
relied more on other economic resources (ie. agricultural, employment)
than they did on pastoralism. They were also seen to have abandoned
most of the traditional elements of the pastoral existence, even if
they had only recently settled. Furthermore, family labour was usually
withdrawn from the livestock breeding operation; while the various
forms of domestic uses for animals and their by-products were being
largely neglected. These developments, however, do not define the type
of animal husbandry practised in Sajir as modern, because full
commercialization and modern farming methods have not yet been adopted.
Nonetheless, the above does not negate the continued importance of
bedouinism and its associated ideology. The strength of this ideology
was clearly seen in the following areas:
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1. The tendency to keep large herds of animals in the settled
state (particularly camel herds), and as fixed assets (see
chapter seven).
2. In the perception that the ownership of livestock on the one
hand represents a familiar and reliable open option for the
future (especially for less successful cultivators), and on
the other hand acts as an assertion of bedouin identity and
ideology (especially for rich farmers).
3. In the organization of many of the different sub-lineages in
Sajir in separate hamlets, with different sub-Amirs and
different facilities where possible (i.e. the tribal
individualistic aspect of beclouinsim).
4. In the status of women in Sajir society. Here again, the
tribal aspect of the bedouin ideology was seen to be strongly
operative for women in its most restrictive form. This is
because women have become extremely marginal in the forms of
production presently practised. This in turn allows the
society at large to activate the most narrow forms of the
prevailing ideologies in their case. In Sajir, this was seen
in a combination of restrictive bedouin practices and Islamic
ones - as regards education, marriage, social isolation, and
the traditional role of bedouin women in pastoral society
(see chapter eight).
Bedouinism may prove to be even more important to the Sajirians, if and
when the subsidized agricultural operation (i.e. wheat cultivation) has
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subsided into more realistic levels of attractiveness. 	 This is
especially so for the farmers of modest status, who may not be able to
go into technologically advanced and therefore more expensive forms of
cultivation, or into the modern private sector.
Final Comments
A dominant impression of the agricultural region of Sajir has been the
new nature of the set of economic activities practised at present,
especially in farming.	 This impression was supported by the high
levels of dependency on foreign technology, skill, and labour, as well
as on government incentives.	 The other side of the impression is an
abrupt, and even sad, economic and cultural discontinuity of an
important and previously dominant sector of the economy, i.e. pastoral
nomad I Sm.
The irony of the bedouins abandoning an economic system practised for
thousands of years in extreme harmony with the ecology and the natural
resources of the region, and going into a productive system that has
yet to prove itself as capable of providing for and supporting large
populations In the long run, is too obvious to be missed by anyone.
One of the many reasons for this development has been in the lack of
any strong and concentrated effort to modernize the pastoral sector,
such as could bring to the (pastoral) bedouins all of the services
appropriate for the conducting of modern societies. 	 These would
include: education of children in mobile units, mobile health services,
and promoting the economic integration of pastoralism itself.
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To be sure, the agricultural sector has been deserving of high levels
of both public and private investment, after the many years of
isolation and neglect. These investments, however, have proved to be
mainly geared for pure growth and high profit. Too little attention
has been given to balanced integrated development (for all agricultural
goods), the natural resources (especially water), or the long term
gradual transformation of the sector (as regards indigeneous labour
and skill resources).
Furthermore, many of the large producers of agricultural goods are at
risk in the sector today, because of the high levels of competition for
the market (by foreign and Saudi goods) in the most supported and
subsidized areas of production like dairy, poultry, and even vegetables
and fruit production. These large producers, however, are best placed
to salvage something from their capital investments and experiences of
agricultural production.
By contrast, the small, previously bedouin or traditional producers are
the ones most at risk in today's agricultural enterprise. They risk
being left largely without resources in the face of changes in national
policies, or against their (comparatively speaking) high levels of farm
investments and agricultural credit. Their only alternative, in case
of adversity, is to leave the sector (if not themselves personally,
then their children), and join the already saturated low skill market,
or the civil service urban sector.
The first national priority is, therefore, toward these small and
family farming units, seen in Sajir in extended bedouin family
structures (sometimes recently settled); and whose comitment to
farming is largely a comitment to a lifestyle, rather than to capital
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investment and profit. Other areas of the Kingdom, furthermore, will
undoubtedly have more of these family farming households, who are even
more dependent on cultivation and not pastorally minded.
The type of action that should be taken on their behalf is, infact,
part and parcel of any plan to improve the agricultural policies, and
create a well balanced, integrated, and gradual transformation and
development of agricultural production. Such a plan might include the
following:
1. A closer scrutiny of the underground water resources, and greater
measures of control over them. This should apply particularly to the
larger producers, who have greater ability to abuse and overuse the
water for irrigation and for any other agricultural enterprises.
2. Greater attention to the land resources among the traditional,
extended family, farming units; in order to increase their share of
cultivated land and allow them to enter into modern methods of
producti on.
3. A widening of the incentive structure in agricultural production
with reasonable levels of support (i.e. not excessively attractive),
and also for a greater range of agricultural products. These policies
of support, moreover, should be updated frequently and with the utmost
attention to not creating a lop-sided agricultural growth.
4. Greater attention to the marketing of agricultural produce, and the
structures of distribution within the Kingdom. 	 Such a policy will
include:
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A. Import restrictions on foreign goods also produced at home,
or which are potentialy produceable at home.
B. A modernization of the distributive methods, which will
ensure a just share for all operators.
C. Creating a national network for marketing and distribution.
5.	 A greater attention to developing agricultural labour and skill
resources within the Kingdom. This could be done by short paid courses
of training and education for the farmers of today, as well as the
farmers of the future (i.e. the children of the present ones). Another
important measure for this aspect of development is greater
restrictions on the recruiting of foreign labour, except in essential
cases. This would reduce the tendency to engage in cultivation on an
absent, casual or "underemployed basis.	 It would also increase the
comitment to, and knowledge of, farming.
The above measures seen by this researcher as most important, if we are
to improve the future prospects of farming, thereby reducing high
profiteering from agriculture among the rich and increasing optimism
among the traditional majority of the rural population. Optimism and a
reasonably high level of expectations are the only means through which
comitment and continuity can be maintained and increased in the
agricultural sector of today and tomorrow. It will also ensure that
the already sedentarized bedouins of Sajir, and any like them, remain
agriculturally inclined.
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Appendix I
The Personal Interview
(A) Background Personal Information
1.	 Farm's Name:	 2. Type of Dwelling:
3. Farmer's Name:
4. Age:	 5. Place of Birth:
6. Marital Status:
7. No. of Children:	 Male:	 Female:
8. No. of Siblings:	 Male:	 Female:
9. Lineage:	 10. Tribe:
11. Previous Occupation:
Current Occupation(s):
12. Educational Level:
13. Sources of Income:
(B) Family Background
1. Relatives living with you, other than ininediate family
(wives and children)
2. Do they also share in the farming activities?
Yes:	 No:
3. Who ultimately makes the final decisions when it comes to farming
activities?
4. Do you also practise animal husbandry?
Yes:	 No:
If yes, for what purpose?
Family History
5. Have you ever participated in a nomadic life style?
Yes:	 No:
If yes, (6)	 If no, (11)
630
If farmer has been a nomad.
6.	 What form of nomadic activities:
1. Camel Grazing
2. Sheep and Camel Grazing
3. Sheep Grazing
4. Living only as nomad
5. Practised some form of agriculture
6. Nomadic activities were limited to certain times of the
year
7. Lived mostly in a tent
8. Lived mostly in a mud house
9. Involved in military activities as well as nomadic ones
10. Others
7.	 When did your nomadic activities cease completely?
8.	 What were the incentives for a sedentary life style for you
personally?
1,
2.
3.
Are there any members of your family still practising a nomadic
way of life?
Yes:	 No:
If yes,
- Relationship:
- Where
-Why
- Changes affecting their
traditional ways:
10.	 If no members of the family still practise nomadism, who was the
last one to abandon nomadism and settle? Where did they settle?
If farmer has never been a nomad
11.	 Has any member of your family ever lived as nomad?
Yes:	 No:
If yes:
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12.	 What form of nomadism did they practice (if known):
1. Camel grazing
2. Sheep and camel grazing
3. Sheep grazing
4. Lived only nomadic life
5. Practised some form of agriculture
6. Nomadic activities were limited to
certain times of the year
7. Lived mostly in a mud house
8. Lived mostly in a tent
9. Were also involved in military activities
10. Other
13.	 Have they settled now?
Yes:
	
No:
If yes: Go to (14) If no: Go to (15)
14.	 What were the incentives for their settlement; and when and where
did they settle ?
Incentives:
When
Where
If no:
15.	 Have there been any changes to their nomadic lifestyle?
Yes:	 No:
What C?)
16.	 What were the reasons for the choice of Sajir as the place for
settlement for you and your family?
Work Experience
17.	 If previously experienced in farming, what form of farming?
1. Traditional sumer camp.
2. As sharecropper.
3. Leasing of farmland.
4. As farm labour.
5. Others.
18.	 How long did that particular activity last?
19.	 What crops were you cultivating?
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20. Was there division of labour resources within the family (lineage)
as regards different sources of livelihood?
Yes:	 No:
Specify:
21. Were there any sources of livelihood apart from the nomadic and
the agricultural?
22. Were you ever a member of a military institution?
Yes/What:	 No:
23. Were you ever employed in the city?
Yes:	 No:
If yes, list employment:
Period
No.	 Place	 From	 To	 Nature of work
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
As a farmer:
24. Do you own farming land?
Yes:	 No:
25. Do you own or share in owning more than one farm which are located
separately from each other?
Yes, go to (26)	 No, go to (27)
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26.	 If more than one land holding, specify the first acquired till
last acquired
Time	 Means of	 Type of
No. Name of farm Acquired Location	 Acquisition	 Size	 Ownership
(refer to 27)
	
Sole/Shared
27.	 How did you acquire your farming land?
1. Buying
2. Granted from Government
3. Granted by Amir
4. Grant or gift from other sources
5. Obtained through governmental policy for land distribution
6. Inherited
7. Others
28.	 Do you have the deed for your land specifically for each holding?
Yes	 No
If no:	 Why not?
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29.	 What is the size of your land (cultivated and uncultivated)?
Percentage
Total Area Cultivated	 Uncultivated	 Cultivated
30. Did you have any choice in the selection of your land?
Holding	 Yes	 No
Why?
31. Is your land(s) part of the tribe's dirah/hemma (traditional
grazing land), or does it have special status for your family or
lineage?
Yes:	 No:	 Some only:
Special status if present:
32. Do you own this land individually?
Yes:	 No:
If not sole owner:
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33	 Who is/are your co-owners?
1. Close family members (fathers/brothers/sisters)
2. Not so close family members (cousins/uncles)
3. Other (specify)
34.	 Do they also practise farming with you?
Yes	 No
Go to (35)	 Go to (36)
35.	 What sort of partnership do you have?
36.	 Do they receive any part of output or profit for their share?
Yes	 No
37.	 Why have you not divided the property among yourselves?
1. Too small a property
2. The partners are so many
3. To maintain family ties
4. Other (specify)
38.	 What crops do you cultivate?
39.	 Do you use flood irrigation? For what crops?
Yes:	 No:
Crops?
40.	 Do you use modern irrigation systems? For what crops?
Yes	 No
Which Crops?
41.	 How many farm labourers do you employ?
No.	 Type of Labour
	 Number	 Country of Origin
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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42.	 Do you or any member of your family actually work in the farm
doing chores? (specify for each)
Yes:	 No:
Family Member	 Type of farm work (chore)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
43.	 What machinery/equipment do you have and how many?
1. Tractor	 7. Big Transport Vehicle
(trailer)
2. Seed drill attachments 	 8. Medium Transport Vehicle
(Benz)
3. Plough/rotavator attachment
4. Harvester
5. Bailer
6. Grain bin/store
9. Pickups
10. Central Pivot System
11. Engine/Pump
12. Other farm equipment/specify
44.	 How many wells do you have on your farm(s), and how are the
irrigation systems attached to them?
45. When did you first acquire your modern irrigation systems, for
what crop, and what were the incentives for their use?
Time:	 Crops:
Incentives for use:
46. Did you face difficulties in the process of transition from
previous methods of irrigation to present ones?
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47. Who is responsible for the operation and maintenance of your farm
machinery? Do you find the levels of operation and maintenance
adequate?
Person(s) responsible:
Inadequate	 Adequate
Why?
48.	 It is well known that almost all Saudi farmers obtain loans and
subsidies from various governmental institutions. 	 Is this the
case for you?
Yes:	 No:
If yes:
49. Have you found any difficulties in obtaining loans and subsidies
in the past and are there any changes in this situation at
present?
Yes:	 No:
Specify:
50.	 What have your loans from the agricultural bank amounted to?
51.	 Do you take seasonal loans from traders?
Ifyes:	 Yearly amount _______________
Whatpurpose _________________
52.	 What are your loans for:
1. Farm machinery (list)
2. Seeds and fertilisers
3. Farm projects, specify:
4. Well digging
5. Animal stock, specify:
6. Others, specify:
53.	 What is the amount of the annual payment that is made to the bank?
54.	 What subsidies did your receive, or are you still receiving, and
for what purpose?
Well Digging	 Animal Project	 Tree Planting
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55.	 Is the income from farming enough to cover the expenses and
payment of loans?
	
56.	 If you keep animal stock:
No.	 Type	 Place Kept	 Number
1.
2.
3.
57.	 For what purpose do you keep animal stock?
1. Comercial
2. Personal Use
3. Tradition
4. Other, (specify)
58.	 Do they graze outside the boundaries of your land?
Yes:	 No:
59.	 Who does the shepherding of your animals?
60.	 Thinking of the last three seasons of wheat cropping, would you
mind telling me the following information:
Year	 Season	 Weight	 Marketing Procedure	 Problems
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61. Other crops that were significant in terms of size and commercial
value in the last three seasons:
No.	 Season	 Weight	 Marketing Procedure	 Problems
62. Where do you obtain your
Seeds:
Fertilizers:
63. What would you say are the problems that farmers generally face in
this area? (refer to table for classification).
64. What do you think about each of the following elements as
potential problems in this areas?
Farmer's Coments	 Rate of
Code	 Elements as problems	 On Each	 Emphasis
1	 Weather
2	 Water shortage
3	 Marketing & distribution
4	 Crop diseases
5	 Lack of own skill
6	 Low quality of farming
advisory services
7	 Non-co operation of
governmental agencies
8	 The incomplete nature
of social services
	
9	 Labour shortages
	
10	 Competition of foreign
products in market place
	
11	 Lack of control on
agricultural growth
	
12	 Low skill of foreign labour
13	 Other
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65.	 Would you say the majority of farming problems are:
1. Beyond farmer's control
2. Well within farmer's control
3. Not exclusively (1) or (2), but a combination of both.
66.	 Expand and state the reason for your choice.
67.	 What can be done to avoid or lessen problems either by farmers or
others?
No.	 To be done by farmer 	 To be done by others
68.	 How would you define yourself and why?
Reason
1	 Bedouin
2	 Agriculturist (mozaraa)
3	 Farmer (falah)
4	 Businessman
5	 Merchant
6	 A settled bedouin
7	 Other
69.	 How do you personally think about the future of farming in this
area, and why?
ReasonC ode
1	 Optimistic
2	 Pessimistic
3	 Mostly optimistic
4	 Mostly pessimistic
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70.	 If as some people think, income from farming declines in the
future, would you personally:
1. Continue farming
2. Leave farming altogether
3. Go on farming but augment your income from other activities
71.	 Why?
72. What other choices do you have for livelihood?
73. What would you do, if you were an official charged with improving
the state of the agricultural area?
74. What would you demand, if you were representing the farmers in
your region.
75. Would you like your children to follow in your footsteps and be
farmers? Why?
Yes:	 No:
76. To what level do you hope to educate your children?
Sons
Daughters
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